含有〈主义〉标签的文章(10)

新反动派

【2016-06-07】

@whigzhou: 原来敌人早已把我们称作新反动派(neo-reactionary),把我们的运动称为黑暗启蒙(The Dark Enlightenment),好喜欢这两个名字,感谢敌人~

@whigzhou: 简单说,我们新反动派是基于达尔萨斯主义(Darthusian)的理论认识而重构的、在理性上自觉的保守派,而旧反动派则是基于对盎格鲁撒克逊文明和新教伦理的习惯性珍爱的朴素保守派。

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【2016-06-07】 @whigzhou: 原来敌人早已把我们称作新反动派([[neo-reactionary]]),把我们的运动称为黑暗启蒙([[The Dark Enlightenment]]),好喜欢这两个名字,感谢敌人~ @whigzhou: 简单说,我们新反动派是基于达尔萨斯主义(Darthusian)的理论认识而重构的、在理性上自觉的保守派,而旧反动派则是基于对盎格鲁撒克逊文明和新教伦理的习惯性珍爱的朴素保守派。  
[译文]进步派的种族主义历史

When Bigots Become Reformers
 当顽固派变成改革者

作者:Damon Root @ 2006-05
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:Whig Zhou(@whigzhou)
来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2006/05/01/when-bigots-become-reformers/

The Progressive Era’s shameful record on race.
进步时代在种族问题上的黑记录

The Progressive Era and Race: Reform and Reaction, 1900-1977, by David W. Southern, Wheeling, W.V.: Harlan Davidson, 240 pages, $15.95

《进步时代与种族问题:改革与反动,1900-1977》,作者 David W. Southern

THE PROGRESSIVE movement swept America from roughly the early 1890s through the early 1920s, producing a broad popular consensus that government should be the primary agent of social change.

大概从1890年代早期开始,直到1920年代早期,进步主义运动席卷美国,催生了一个广泛的民众共识,即政府应当是推动社会变化的首要主体。

To that end, legions of idealistic young crusaders, operating at the local, state, and federal levels, seized and wielded sweeping new powers and enacted a mountain of new legislation, including minimum wage and maximum hour laws, antitrust statutes, restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol, appropriations for hundreds of miles of roads and highways, assistance(more...)

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When Bigots Become Reformers  当顽固派变成改革者 作者:Damon Root @ 2006-05 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:Whig Zhou(@whigzhou) 来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2006/05/01/when-bigots-become-reformers/ The Progressive Era’s shameful record on race. 进步时代在种族问题上的黑记录 The Progressive Era and Race: Reform and Reaction, 1900-1977, by David W. Southern, Wheeling, W.V.: Harlan Davidson, 240 pages, $15.95 《进步时代与种族问题:改革与反动,1900-1977》,作者 David W. Southern THE PROGRESSIVE movement swept America from roughly the early 1890s through the early 1920s, producing a broad popular consensus that government should be the primary agent of social change. 大概从1890年代早期开始,直到1920年代早期,进步主义运动席卷美国,催生了一个广泛的民众共识,即政府应当是推动社会变化的首要主体。 To that end, legions of idealistic young crusaders, operating at the local, state, and federal levels, seized and wielded sweeping new powers and enacted a mountain of new legislation, including minimum wage and maximum hour laws, antitrust statutes, restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol, appropriations for hundreds of miles of roads and highways, assistance to new immigrants and the poor, women's suffrage, and electoral reform, among much else. 为实现那一目的,一大批年轻的理想主义斗士活跃在地方、各州直至联邦政府层面,掌握并运用手中势不可挡的权力,制定了成堆的新法律,涉及最低工资和最长工时法、反托拉斯法、酒精出售与消费限制、对数百英里道路与高速路的征用、对新移民及穷人的补助、妇女投票权和选举改革,等等。 Today many on the liberal left would like to revive that movement and its aura of social justice. Journalist Bill Moyers, speaking at a conference sponsored by the left-wing Campaign for America's Future, described Progressivism as "one of the country's great traditions." Progressives, he told the crowd, "exalted and extended the original American Revolution. They spelled out new terms of partnership between the people and their rulers. And they kindled a flame that lit some of the most prosperous decades in modern history." 今天,许多自由左派人士希望复兴这一运动以及它带来的社会正义氛围。在一场由左翼团体“美国的未来运动”举办的会议上,记者Bill Moyers称进步主义是“美国的伟大传统之一”。他向与会者说,进步派“提升并拓展了原本的美国革命。他们阐明了人民与统治者之间合作关系的新条件。他们所点燃的火焰,照亮了现代历史上最为繁荣昌盛的年代之一。” Yet the Progressive Era was also a time of vicious, state-sponsored racism. In fact, from the standpoint of African-American history, the Progressive Era qualifies as arguably the single worst period since Emancipation. The wholesale disfranchisement of Southern black voters occurred during these years, as did the rise and triumph of Jim Crow. 然而,进步时代也是一个种族主义得到国家支持、极为严重的时代。事实上,从非裔美国人历史的角度来看,进步时代可以说是自黑奴解放以来最为黑暗的一段时间。南方黑人选民的公民权遭到大规模剥夺,就发生于这段时间,Jim Crow法【译注:指南方各州通过的在公共设施使用上实行种族隔离的法律】也是在此期间出现并流行。 Furthermore, as the Westminster College historian David W. Southern notes in his recent book, The Progressive Era and Race: Reform and Reaction, 1900-1917, the very worst of it-disfranchisement, segregation, race baiting, lynching-"went hand-in-hand with the most advanced forms of southern progressivism." Racism was the norm, not the exception, among the very crusaders romanticized by today's activist left. 另外,正如威斯敏斯特学院的历史学家Daivd W. Southern在其新书《进步时代与种族问题:改革与反动,1900-1917》中所提到的那样,其中最糟糕的情形——剥夺选举权、种族隔离、种族羞辱和对黑人实施私刑——“与南方进步运动的最先进活动是携手并进的。”正是在那些被今天的左派活动家浪漫化的斗士中,种族主义是种常态,而非例外。 At the heart of Southern's flawed but useful study is a deceptively simple question: How did reformers infused with lofty ideals embrace such abominable bigotry? His answer begins with the race-based pseudoscience that dominated educated opinion at the turn of the 20th century. Southern的研究不无瑕疵,但非常有用,其核心是一个看似简单的问题:那些心中充满崇高理念的改革者们怎么会有这样恶劣的偏执言行?他的回答始于一种以种族为基础的伪科学,这种伪科学在19和20世纪之交时曾在知识人的观念中占据主导地位。 "At college," Southern notes, "budding progressives not only read exposés of capitalistic barons and attacks on laissez-faire economics by muckraking journalists, they also read racist tracts that drew on the latest anthropology, biology, psychology, sociology, eugenics, and medical science." “学院里头,”Southern提到,“崭露头角的进步派不仅阅读调查记者所写的揭批资本主义大亨、攻击自由放任经济学的东西,他们也阅读那些征引最新的人类学、生物学、心理学、社会学、优生学和医学研究的种族主义小册子。” Popular titles included Charles Carroll's The Negro a Beast (1900) and R.W. Shufeldt's The Negro, a Menace to American Civilization (1907). One bestseller, Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race (1916), discussed the concept of "race suicide," the theory that inferior races were outbreeding their betters. 当时流行的作品包括Charles Carroll的《黑人是野兽》(1900)和R. W. Shufeldt的《黑人对美国文明的威胁》(1907)。Madison Grant所写的畅销书,《伟大种族的消逝》,讨论了“种族自杀”这一概念,该理论认为卑贱种族已然比优等种族繁殖得更快。 President Theodore Roosevelt was one of many Progressives captivated by this notion: He opposed voting rights for African-American men, which were guaranteed by the 15th amendment, on the grounds that the black race was still in its adolescence. 西奥多·罗斯福总统就是诸多被这一概念俘获的进步人士之一。他反对非裔美国男性获得由宪法第15修正案保障的投票权,理由就是黑人种族尚未成年。 Such thinking, which emphasized "expert" opinion and advocated sweeping governmental power, fit perfectly within the Progressive worldview, which favored a large, active government that engaged in technocratic, paternalistic planning. As for reconciling white supremacy with egalitarian democracy, keep in mind that when a racist Progressive championed "the working man," "the common man," or "the people," he typically prefixed the silent adjective white. 这类理论强调“专家”观点,主张扩大政府权力,与进步主义的世界观严丝合缝,后者就欣赏大而有为、实施专家治理和家长式计划的政府。至于在白人至上与民主平等之间如何调和,你只要记住,当一个种族主义的进步派拥护“劳动群体”、“普通人”或“人民”时,他总是会加上一个不说出声的形容词前缀,“白人”。 For a good illustration, consider Carter Glass of Virginia. Glass was a Progressive state and U.S. senator and, as chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, one of the major architects of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. He was also an enthusiastic supporter of his state's massive effort to disfranchise black voters. 这里有个很好的例证,就是弗吉尼亚州的Carter Glass。Glass是个进步派,既是州参议员也是国会参议员,他曾任国会银行与货币委员会主席,是1913年《联邦储备法》的主要缔造者之一。他也是弗吉尼亚州大规模剥夺黑人选民公民权行动的热情支持者。 "Discrimination! Why that is exactly what we propose," he declared to one journalist. "To remove every negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of the white electorate." “歧视!为什么这恰恰就是我们所提倡的,”他对某记者宣称,“为了合法地移除每一个可以甩掉的黑人投票人,避免极大地削弱白人选民的数量优势。” Then there was political scientist John R. Commons, an adviser to the Progressive Wisconsin governor and senator Robert M. LaFollette and a member of Theodore Roosevelt's Immigration Commission. Commons, the author of Races and Immigrants in America (1907), criticized immigration on both protectionist grounds (he believed immigrants depressed wages and weakened labor unions) and racist ones (he wrote that the so-called tropical races were "indolent and fickle"). 然后还有政治科学家John R. Commons,他曾是威斯康辛州进步派州长和参议员Robert M. LaFollette的顾问,还曾是西奥多·罗斯福的“移民委员会”成员。Commons著有《美国的种族与移民》(1907),同时从贸易保护主义立场(他相信移民压低了工资、削弱了工会)和种族主义立场(他写道,所谓的热带种族都“懒惰而善变”)出发批评外来移民。 Woodrow Wilson, whose Progressive presidential legacy includes the Federal Reserve System, a federal loan program for farmers, and an eight-hour workday for railroad employees, segregated the federal bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. "I have recently spent several days in Washington," the black leader Booker T. Washington wrote during Wilson's first term, "and I have never seen the colored people so discouraged and bitter as they are at the present time." 伍德罗·威尔逊,这位进步派总统的遗产包括联邦储备体系、一项针对农民的联邦贷款计划和铁路工人八小时工作日制度,对华盛顿的联邦机构实施了种族隔离。“最近我在华盛顿呆了几天”,黑人领袖Booker T. Washington在威尔逊的第一个任期写道,“我从没见过有色人种像今天这样气馁心酸。” Perhaps the most notorious figure of the era was Benjamin "Pitchfork" Tillman, a leading Southern Progressive and inveterate white supremacist. As senator from South Carolina from 1895 to 1918, Tillman stumped for "Free Silver," the economic panacea of the agrarian populist (and future secretary of state) William Jennings Bryan, whom Tillman repeatedly supported for president. 或许这一时代最为臭名昭著的人物应数“干草叉”Benjamin Tillman,南方进步派领袖,同时也是冥顽不灵的白人至上主义者。Tillman从1895年至1918年一直是南卡罗来纳州的参议员,一直为William Jennings Bryan这位土地民粹主义者(后曾出任国务卿)的经济万灵药——“自由银币”——而奔走鼓呼,并反复支持后者出任总统。 "Pitchfork" Tillman favored such Progressive staples as antitrust laws, railroad regulations, and public education, but felt the latter was fit only for whites. "When you educate a negro," he brayed, "you educate a candidate for the penitentiary or spoil a good field hand." “干草叉”Tillman对反托拉斯法、铁路管制、公共教育等进步主义产品均表支持,但他觉得公共教育这种东西只适用于白人。“你要是教育黑人”,他干嚎道,“那就相当于为监狱教育出一个后备分子,或说是糟蹋了一个农活好手。” Nor did African Americans always fare better among those radicals situated entirely to the left of the Progressives. Socialist Party leader Eugene V. Debs, though personally sympathetic to blacks, declared during his 1912 campaign for the presidency, "We have nothing special to offer the Negro." 在完全处于进步派最左端的激进分子面前,非裔美国人也并不总是能讨得了好。美国社会党领袖Eugene V. Debs尽管私底下同情黑人,但在1912年总统竞选活动中仍宣称:“我们不能向黑人提供什么特殊对待”。 Other leading radicals offered even less. Writing in the Socialist Democratic Herald, Victor Berger, the leader of the party's right wing, declared that "there can be no doubt that the negroes and mulattoes constitute a lower race-that the Caucasian and even the Mongolian have the start on them in civilization by many years." 其他激进分子领袖愿意付出的甚至比这还少。社会党右翼领袖Victor Berger在为社会主义刊物《民主先驱报》所写文章中宣称,“毫无疑问,黑人和黑白混血是一个低等种族,白人甚至蒙古人都在文明程度上领先他们许多年。” The celebrated left-wing novelist Jack London, covering the 1908 heavyweight title bout between black challenger Jack Johnson and white boxing champ Tommy Burns, filled his New York Herald story with lurid ethnic caricatures and incessant race baiting. "Though he was a committed socialist," observed Jack Johnson biographer Geoffrey C. Ward, London's "solidarity with the working class did not extend to black people." 著名左翼小说家杰克·伦敦曾报道过黑人挑战者Jack Johnson和白人拳击冠军Tommy Burns于1908年进行的重量级拳王争霸赛,在为《纽约先驱报》采编的故事中,他用尽了各种夸张的族裔讽刺和层出不穷的种族羞辱。“尽管伦敦是个坚定的社会主义者,”Jack Johnson的传记作家Geoffrey C. Ward说道,但他“并没有将其与劳动阶级的团结延伸到黑人身上。” As Southern thoroughly documents, these examples just begin to scratch the surface. Progressivism was infested with the most repugnant strains of racism. But was there something more, something inherent in Progressivism itself that facilitated the era's harsh treatment of blacks? 正如Southern的详尽描绘所示,以上例证只是浮光掠影。种种令人心生厌恶的种族主义性质在进步主义之中泛滥成灾。但是,这一时代对于黑人的残酷态度,是否出于进步主义本身所具有的某种内在特质? According to Southern, who repeatedly maintains that racism derailed "the great promise" of Progressivism, the answer is no. "The ideas of race and color were powerful, controlling elements in progressive social and political thinking," he argues. "And this fixation on race explains how democratic reform and racism went hand-in-hand." Southern的回答是“并非如此”。他反复强调,种族主义偏离了进步主义的“伟大愿景”。“种族观念和肤色观念强大无比,控制了进步主义的社会与政治思想元素,”他论证道,“而这种对于种族的关注,解释了为何民主改革会与种族主义并驾齐驱。” That is surely correct, but is it the whole story? As the legal scholar Richard Epstein has noted, "the sad but simple truth is that the Jim Crow resegregation of America depended on a conception of constitutional law that gave property rights short shrift, and showed broad deference to state action under the police power." 这当然是对的,但这就是事情的全部面目吗?正如法学家Richard Epstein所说,“真相虽然可悲,但很简单:美国的Jim Crow种族隔离法案奠基于一种宪法理念,这种理念漠视财产权,并对国家依据治安权实施的行动表现出最大程度的顺从。” Progressivism itself, in other words, granted the state vast new authority to manage all walks of American life while at the same time weakening traditional checks on government power, including property rights and liberty of contract. Such a mixture was ripe for the racist abuse that occurred. 换句话说,进步主义本身就把广泛的新权限赋予国家,使之能够管理美国人生活的方方面面,同时又削弱了传统上对于政府权力的各种制衡,包括财产权和契约自由。这种组合对于所发生的种族主义虐待而言,正是水到渠成。 Take the Supreme Court's notorious decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), a case that has rightly come to symbolize the South's Jim Crow regime. In Plessy, the Court considered a Louisiana statute forbidding railroads from selling first-class tickets to blacks, a clear violation of economic liberty. 以最高法院在“普莱西诉弗格森案”(1896)中臭名昭著的判决为例,这个案子自此已经恰如其分地成为南方种族隔离体制的象征。在普莱西案中,最高法细致考察了路易斯安那州一条禁止铁路公司将头等票卖给黑人的法令——这是一条明显违反经济自由的法令。 In its 7-1 ruling, the Court upheld segregation in public accommodations so long as "separate but equal" facilities were provided for each race, setting off an orgy of legislation throughout the old Confederacy. South Carolina, for example, segregated trains two years after Plessy.Streetcars followed in 1905, train depots and restaurants in 1906, textile plants in 1915-16, circuses in 1917, pool halls in 1924, and beaches in 1934. 在其7-1的判决中,最高法院认可在公共设施中实施种族隔离,只需每个种族都获得“隔离但平等”的设施。这一判决在整个过去的南部邦联地区引爆了一轮立法高潮。比如,普莱西案两年后,南卡罗来纳州就在火车上实行了种族隔离。1905年是有轨电车,1906年是火车站和餐厅,1915-1916是纺织厂,1917年是马戏团,1924年是台球厅,1934年则是海滩。 No doubt many of those businesses would have excluded or mistreated black customers whatever the law. But in a market free from Jim Crow regulations, other businesses would have welcomed blacks, or at least black dollars, forcing racist enterprises to bear the full cost of excluding or mistreating all those potential paying customers. (This was one of the chief reasons the segregationists pushed for those laws in the first place.) 毫无疑问,不管法律如何规定,许多上述企业还是会排斥或歧视黑人顾客。但是,如果某个市场没有受到种族隔离法规的限制,其他企业就可能欢迎黑人,或至少是黑人身上的美金,那些排斥或歧视此类潜在付费顾客的种族主义企业就会被迫承受由此产生的全部成本。(这就是隔离主义者一开始推动此类立法的最主要原因之一。) The state, in the eloquent words of the historian C. Vann Woodward, granted "free rein and the majesty of the law to mass aggressions that might otherwise have been curbed, blunted, or deflected." 用历史学家C. Vann Woodward文辞华美的话来说,各州把“完全的自由和法律的庄严认可”赋予了“大规模的侵害行为,而这本来是可以有所限制、有所缓和或有所修正的。” Furthermore, this tangled web of regulations, ordinances, codes, and controls was spun during the heyday of Progressivism, precisely when such official actions were least likely to receive any meaningful scrutiny. Southern, despite his otherwise close attention to the many permutations of race and racism, fails to recognize this major defect in the Progressive worldview. 另外,这一团由各种规章、条例、法令和控制组成的乱麻是在进步主义的鼎盛时期编织出来的,而当时恰恰就是这种官方行为最不可能受到任何有意义的细致审查的时候。尽管Southern在其他地方考察种族和种族主义的各种不同组合时细致绵密,在这里却没有注意到进步主义世界观的这一巨大缺陷。 A similar failure handicaps his treatment of one of the era's rare victories for African Americans. In Buchanan v. Warley(1917), the Supreme Court unanimously overturned a Louisville ordinance segregating residential housing blocks by race. The case involved a voluntary contract between a white seller and a black buyer for a housing lot located in a majority-white neighborhood. Under the law, the new black owner could not live on the property he had just purchased. Southern还有一个不足之处,导致他未能很好地处理非裔美国人在这一时期所取得的罕见胜利之一。在“布坎南诉沃利案”(1917)中,最高法院一致判决推翻路易斯维尔市依据种族来隔离居民住宅街区的法令。在该案中,黑人买方和白人卖方自由订立合同,购买一套位于以白人居民为主的街区的住宅。按照上述法律,这位黑人新房主不能在他刚刚购买的房产内居住。 Writing for the Court, Justice William Rufus Day held that "this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a person of color...is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of law." 大法官William Rufus Day代表最高法院写道,“企图阻止涉案房产转让给有色人……这是对于宪法第十四修正案关于各州不经正当法律程序不得干涉财产权的基本法则的直接违反。” Yet Southern dismisses this rare and important victory as "hollow" and incorrectly asserts that it "was decided not on the grounds of human rights, but on those of white property rights." In fact, the judicial recognition of black rights stood at the very center of the decision. Justice Day's opinion clearly states that the Fourteenth Amendment "operate[s] to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against him solely because of color." 然而,Southern却称这一罕见且重要的胜利“意义不大”,并且错误地断言其“并非基于人权所作出的判决,而是基于白人的财产权。”事实上,法院对黑人权利的承认正处于上述判决的核心。大法官Day在其意见中清晰阐明,第十四修正案“的作用是,准予并授权有色人获得财产,不受各州仅仅因为其肤色而针对他的立法歧视。” Nor should Southern's characterization of this victory as "hollow" pass unchallenged. As the legal scholars David Bernstein and Ilya Somin have argued, the Buchanan ruling played a major though sadly underappreciated role in the burgeoning fight for civil rights. Southern对这一胜利“意义不大”的描述也不应该轻轻揭过。正如法学家David Bernstein和Ilya Somin论证到的,布坎南案判决在风生水起的公民权斗争中发挥了重要作用,很遗憾没有获得应得的承认。 "Buchanan could not force whites to live in the same neighborhood as blacks," Bernstein and Somin write, "but it did prevent cities from stifling black migration by creating de jure and inflexible boundaries for black neighborhoods, and may have prevented even more damaging legislation." It is well worth noting, they continue, that the South did not adopt South African-style apartheid at this time, despite widespread white support for such measures. “布坎南案无法强迫白人和黑人住到同一个街区去,”Bernstein和Somin写道,“但它对各市通过为黑人街区制造法定且固定的边界以限制黑人迁徙的做法发挥了阻止效果,并且可能阻止了其他伤害性更大的立法。”他们接着说,特别值得注意的是,美国南方当时并没有采取一种南非式的种族隔离,尽管当时白人普遍支持此类举措。 In addition, Buchanan was the first major Supreme Court victory for the four-year-old National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a huge boon for the organization that would go on to win the landmark Brown v. Board of Education (1954), overturning Plessy. W.E.B Du Bois, an NAACP founder and longtime editor of its newsletter, The Crisis, gave Buchanan credit for "the breaking of the backbone of segregation." 此外,布坎南案是当时成立仅4年的“全国有色人种协进会”在最高法院所取得的第一次重要胜利,这为该组织带来了极大的好处,此后它将赢得里程碑式的“布朗诉教育委员会案”(1954),从而推翻普莱西案。该组织的创始人之一、长期为会刊《危机》担任编辑的W. E. B. Du Bois赞扬布坎南案“打断了种族隔离制度的脊柱”。 Despite these significant shortcomings, The Progressive Era and Race deserves careful attention. The Progressive movement unleashed, aided, and abetted some of the most destructive forces in 20th-century America. The better we understand this history, the less likely we are to repeat it. 尽管存在这些重大缺陷,《进步时代与种族问题》仍值得细心阅读。进步运动解放、助推和煽动了在20世纪美国历史上最具破坏性的一些力量。我们对这段历史了解越多,重复犯错的可能性就越小。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]学术界的左倾已到了何种程度?

New Study Indicates Existence of Eight Conservative Social Psychologists
最近研究显示:保守派社会心理学家现存8位

作者:Jonathan Haidt @ 2016-1-7
译者:Marcel ZHANG(@马赫塞勒张)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Heterodox Academy,http://heterodoxacademy.org/2016/01/07/new-study-finds-conservative-social-psychologists/

Just how much viewpoint diversity do we have in social psychology? In 2011 nobody knew, so I asked 30 of my friends in the field to name a conservative. They came up with several names, but only one suspect admitted, under gentle interrogation, to being right of center.

社会心理学领域到底有多大的观点多样性?2011年时还没人知道,所以我询问了30个该领域的朋友,让他们举出一位保守派。结果他们提到了好几个名字,但在温和的盘问之下,只有一位嫌疑人承认了自己的政治倾向是中间偏右的。

A few months later I gave a talk at the annual convention of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology in which I pointed out the field’s political imbalance and why this was a threat to the quality of our research.

几个月后,我在人格与社会心理学协会(SPSP)年会上发言时,指出了该领域的政治失衡现象,以及为什么这种现象会对我们的研究质量造成威胁。

I asked the thousand-or-so people in the audience to declare their politics with a show of hands, and I estimated that roughly 80% self-identified as “liberal or left of center,” 2% (I counted exactly 20 hands) identified as “centrist or moderate,” 1% (12 hands) identified as libertarian, and, rounding to the nearest integer, zero percent (3 hands) identified as “conservative or right of center.” That gives us a left: right ratio of 266 to one. I didn’t think the real ratio was that high; I knew that some conservatives in the audience were probably afraid to raise their hands.

我要求在场的约一千名听众举手表明自己的政治倾向,估计大略有80%的人认为自己是“自由派或者中间偏左派”,有2%(我数下来不多不少20个人)认为自己是“中立派或者温和派”,只有1%(12个人)自认自由意志主义者,如果直接取整的话,几乎0%(3个人)自认“保守派或者中间偏右派”。我们看到的是一个266:1的左右派比值。我不认为真实的比值会如此之高,我知道当时听众席里有些保守派可能会怯于举手。

Some of my colleagues questioned the validity of such a simple and public method, but Yoel Inbar and Yoris Lammers conducted a more thorough and anonymous survey of the SPSP email list later that year, and they too found a very lopsided political ratio: 85% of the 291 respondents self-identified as liberal overall, and only 6% identified as conservative.

有些同事对我这种简易公开方式的有效性提出了质疑。但是,同年晚些时候,Yoel Inbar 和 Yoris Lammers在该协会邮件组中进行了一场更加彻底的匿名调查,结果他们也发现了一边倒的政见比值:总共291个调查对象中,有85%认为自己基本可以算作自由派,而只有6%的调查对象认为自己是保守派。

That gives us our first good estimate of the left-right ratio in social psychology: fourteen to one. It’s a much more valid method than my “show of hands” (which was(more...)

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New Study Indicates Existence of Eight Conservative Social Psychologists 最近研究显示:保守派社会心理学家现存8位 作者:Jonathan Haidt @ 2016-1-7 译者:Marcel ZHANG(@马赫塞勒张) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Heterodox Academy,http://heterodoxacademy.org/2016/01/07/new-study-finds-conservative-social-psychologists/ Just how much viewpoint diversity do we have in social psychology? In 2011 nobody knew, so I asked 30 of my friends in the field to name a conservative. They came up with several names, but only one suspect admitted, under gentle interrogation, to being right of center. 社会心理学领域到底有多大的观点多样性?2011年时还没人知道,所以我询问了30个该领域的朋友,让他们举出一位保守派。结果他们提到了好几个名字,但在温和的盘问之下,只有一位嫌疑人承认了自己的政治倾向是中间偏右的。 A few months later I gave a talk at the annual convention of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology in which I pointed out the field’s political imbalance and why this was a threat to the quality of our research. 几个月后,我在人格与社会心理学协会(SPSP)年会上发言时,指出了该领域的政治失衡现象,以及为什么这种现象会对我们的研究质量造成威胁。 I asked the thousand-or-so people in the audience to declare their politics with a show of hands, and I estimated that roughly 80% self-identified as “liberal or left of center,” 2% (I counted exactly 20 hands) identified as “centrist or moderate,” 1% (12 hands) identified as libertarian, and, rounding to the nearest integer, zero percent (3 hands) identified as “conservative or right of center.” That gives us a left: right ratio of 266 to one. I didn’t think the real ratio was that high; I knew that some conservatives in the audience were probably afraid to raise their hands. 我要求在场的约一千名听众举手表明自己的政治倾向,估计大略有80%的人认为自己是“自由派或者中间偏左派”,有2%(我数下来不多不少20个人)认为自己是“中立派或者温和派”,只有1%(12个人)自认自由意志主义者,如果直接取整的话,几乎0%(3个人)自认“保守派或者中间偏右派”。我们看到的是一个266:1的左右派比值。我不认为真实的比值会如此之高,我知道当时听众席里有些保守派可能会怯于举手。 Some of my colleagues questioned the validity of such a simple and public method, but Yoel Inbar and Yoris Lammers conducted a more thorough and anonymous survey of the SPSP email list later that year, and they too found a very lopsided political ratio: 85% of the 291 respondents self-identified as liberal overall, and only 6% identified as conservative. 有些同事对我这种简易公开方式的有效性提出了质疑。但是,同年晚些时候,Yoel Inbar 和 Yoris Lammers在该协会邮件组中进行了一场更加彻底的匿名调查,结果他们也发现了一边倒的政见比值:总共291个调查对象中,有85%认为自己基本可以算作自由派,而只有6%的调查对象认为自己是保守派。 That gives us our first good estimate of the left-right ratio in social psychology: fourteen to one. It’s a much more valid method than my “show of hands” (which was intended as a rhetorical device, not a real study). But still, we need more data, and we need to try more ways of asking the questions. 这就给我们提供了社会心理学界中左右派比值的第一份合理估计:14:1。这就比我之前的“举手”办法要可靠多了(当时我只是为了表明观点,并非真正的学术研究)。但是话说回来,我们还是需要更多的数据,而且需要尝试更多的调查途径。 A new data set has come in. Bill von Hippel and David Buss surveyed the membership of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology. That’s a professional society composed of the most active researchers in the field who are at least five years post-PhD. It’s very selective – you must be nominated by a current member and approved by a committee before you can join. 现在我们有了一组新数据。Bill von Hippel和David Buss调查了实验社会心理学会(SESP)的全体会员。这是个由该领域最活跃的研究者组成的专业协会,全体成员都至少已博士毕业5年。他们都是经过精挑细选的,入会必须获得会员提名且通过一个委员会的批准。 Von Hippel and Buss sent a web survey to the 900 members of SESP and got a response rate of 37% (335 responses). So this is a good sample of the mid-level and senior people (average age 51) who produce most of the research in social psychology. Von Hippel和Buss向该学会的900名会员发送了网上调查问卷,回应率为37%(共335个回应者)。所以,对于在社会心理学领域贡献了绝大部分研究的中高级人员(平均年龄51岁)而言,这是一个很不错的样本。 Von Hippel and Buss were surveying the members’ views about evolution, to try to understand the reasons why many social psychologists distrust or dislike evolutionary psychology. At the end of the survey, they happened to include a very good set of measures of political identity. Not just self-descriptions, but also whom the person voted for in the 2012 US Presidential election. And they asked nine questions about politically valenced policy questions, such as “Do you support gun control?” “Do you support gay marriage?” and “Do you support a woman’s right to get an abortion?” Von Hippel和Buss的问卷要调查的是会员们对进化问题的观点,试图了解许多社会心理学家怀疑或厌恶进化心理学的原因。在问卷最后一部分,他们碰巧设置了一组很棒的政治认同鉴别方法。不仅仅包括自我描述,而且还问到了他们在2012年美国大选中的投票对象。此外他们还提出了9个已成为政治心理价(valence)的政策问题【编注:心理价(valence)是指那些会恒常的引发正面或负面情绪的东西、事情或特征】,比如“你是否支持枪支管制”,“你是否支持同性婚姻”和“你是否支持妇女堕胎权”等等。 In a demonstration of the new openness and transparency that is spreading in social psychology, Von Hippel and Buss sent their raw data file and a summary report to all the members of SESP, to thank us for our participation in the survey. They noted that their preliminary analysis showed a massive leftward tilt in the field – only four had voted for Romney. Von Hippel和Buss体现了新近在社会心理学界蔚然成风的公开透明精神,将他们的原始数据文件和总结报告发送给了SESP的全体会员,以感谢我们在这场调查研究中的积极参与。他们指出,他们的初步分析显示出了该领域严重左倾的现象——只有四个人曾给罗姆尼投过票。 I then emailed them and asked if I could write up further analyses of the political questions and post them at Heterodox Academy. They generously said yes, and then went ahead and made all the relevant files available to the world at the Open Science Framework (you can download them all here). 而后我通过电邮联系了他们,问我能不能就这些政治问题写个深度分析并发到异端学院(Heterodox Academy)网站上。他们很大方地同意了,紧接着就把相关文件发到开放科学框架网(Open Science Framework)上并开放了下载(你们可以在这个网站下载全部资料https://osf.io/ebvtq/)。 So here are the results, on the political distribution only. (Von Hippel and Buss will publish a very interesting paper on their main findings about evolution and morality in a few months). There are three ways we can graph the data, based on three ways that participants revealed their political orientation. 下面就是仅涉及政见分布问题的成果了。(Von Hippel和Buss将会在几个月后发表一篇非常有意思的论文,主题是他们在进化和道德方面的主要发现。)依照参与者透露他们政治倾向的三种途径,我们也可以通过三种方式来将数据图表化。 1)Self-descriptions of political identity: 36 to one. 1)自我描述的政治认同:36:1。 One item asked “Where would you put yourself on a continuum from liberal to conservative?” The 11 scale points were labeled “very liberal” on the left-most point and “very conservative” on the right-most point. If we do a simple frequency plot (a graph of how many people chose each of the 11 possible responses) we get the following: 有一道题问到:“在自由派和保守派之间这个连续区间内,你会将自己定位于何处?”在这11个选项中,最左端的那个被标为“极端自由派”,最右端则为“极端保守派”。如果我们绘制一个频率分布直方图(一个体现11个选项对应人数的图表),则得下图: vonhippel.figure1-1

【图表一:政治倾向自评分】

The graph shows that 291 of the 326 people who responded to this question picked a left-of-center label (that’s 89.3%), and only 8 people (2.5%) picked a right of center label, giving us a Left to Right ratio of 36 to one. This is much higher than that found by Inbar and Lammers. The main source of political diversity appears to be the 27 people (including me) who self-identified as centrists. 图表显示,该题的326位回答者中有291位选择了中间偏左标签(占总数89.3%),而只有8位选择了中间偏右标签(占总数2.5%),这就得出了一个36:1的左右派比值。这比Inbar和Lammers发现的比值还高。政治多样性主要基于27位自我定义为中间派的回答者(包括本人在内)。 2)Presidential voting: 76 to one. 2)总统选举投票:76:1。 Another item asked: “Who did you vote for in the last presidential election (if you are not a US citizen, or if you did not vote, who would you have voted for if you had voted)? The options were: “Obama,” “Romney,” or “Other.” If we do a frequency plot of the 3 possible choices we get this: 另有一道题问到:“在上次总统大选中你把选票投给了谁(如果你不是美国公民,或者你并未投票的话,假设让你投票,你可能会投给谁)?”选项有这么几个:“奥巴马”、“罗姆尼”或“其他”。如果我们依照这三个选项绘制频率分布直方图,则得下图: vonhippel.figure2

【图表二:2012年美国总统大选】

The graph shows that 305 of the 322 people (94.7%) who responded to this question voted for Obama, 4 (1.2%) voted for Romney, and 13 (4.0%) said they voted for another candidate. This gives us a Democrat to Republican ratio of 76 to one. 图表显示,该题的322位回答者中有305位(占94.7%)投给了奥巴马,4位(占1.2%)投给了罗姆尼,而有13位(占4.0%)回答者投给了其他总统候选人。这就得出了一个76:1的“驴象比”比值。 3)Views on political issues: 314 to one. 3)政治议题上的观点:314:1。 A third way of graphing the viewpoint diversity of these senior social psychologists is by computing an average score across all 9 of the politically valenced policy items. For each one, the 11 point response scale was labeled “strongly oppose” on the left-most point and “strongly support” on the right-most point. 将这些资深社会心理学家的观点多元状况图表化的第三条途径,就是算出他们在九道政治心理价问题上的平均得分。每个问题的答案选项都有11个,最左端的为“强烈反对”,最右端为“强烈支持”。 I converted all responses to the same 11 point scale used in figure 1 so that “strongly supporting” the progressive position (e.g., pro-choice) was scored as -5 and “strongly supporting” the conservative position (e.g., prayer in school) was scored as +5. That puts the leftists on the left and the rightists on the right of the graph. Here’s the graph: 我将所有回答都转换成与图表1中的11个选项一一对应,也就是说,“强烈支持”进步派立场的(比如主张堕胎权)就会被记作-5分,而“强烈支持”保守派立场(比如支持校内祷告)就会被记作5分。这样就可以在图表上把左派标到左侧,右派标到右侧。图表如下: vonhippel.figure3

【图表三:对九个政治议题的观点】

I counted anyone whose average score fell between -1.0 and +1.0 (inclusive) as a centrist. The graph shows that 314 of the 327 participants (96.0%) had an average score below -1.0 (i.e., left of center), one had an average score above +1.0 (i.e., right of center), and 12 were centrists. That gives us a Left to Right ratio of 314 to one. 我将所有平均得分在-1.0与1.0之间的参与者都算作中间派。图表显示,在327名参与者中有314位(占96.0%)的平均得分低于-1.0(即中间偏左),只有一位参与者的平均得分高于1.0(即中间偏右),另外还有12位是中间派。这样我们就得出了一个314:1的左右派比值。 What does this mean? 这意味着什么? However you measure it, and for all samples measured so far, social psychology leans heavily to the left and has very few people right of center. Von Hippel and Buss’s new data confirms the story that a few of us told in a recent paper (Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim & Tetlock, 2015) in which we created the graph below, which shows just how fast psychology has been moving to the left since the 1990s. The ratio of Democrats to Republicans (diamonds) and liberals to conservatives (circles) was roughly 3 to 1 for most of the 20th century. But it skyrockets beginning in the 1990s as the Greatest Generation retires and the Baby Boomers take over. 不论你如何衡量,就目前已经测得的样本来看,社会心理学界已经左倾得非常严重了,只有很少人是中间偏右的。Von Hippel和Buss的新数据也证实了我们几个在最近的一篇论文(Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim和Tetlock于2015年发表)里说到的情况,文中我们绘制了下面这张图表,它显示了从1990年代起心理学界是以何等之快的速度左倾化的。“驴象比”(在图中以方块示出)和“左右比”(在图中以圆圈示出)比值在上个世纪基本为3:1。但随着“最伟大世代”【编注:作家Tom Brokaw将成长于大萧条年代,接着参加二战,随后又经历了战后大繁荣的那一代人称为最伟大一代】的退休和婴儿潮一代的接班,这个比值在90年代开始直线窜升。 diversity-graph

【图表四: 1920年代起学院心理学家左右派比值的攀升。(详见Duarte等人在2015年发表的论文)】

Why does this matter? 这为什么重要? Most people know that professors in America, and in most countries, generally vote for left-leaning parties and policies. But few people realize just how fast things have changed since the 1990s. An academic field that leans left (or right) can still function, as long as ideological claims or politically motivated research is sure to be challenged. But when a field goes from leaning left to being entirely on the left, the normal safeguards of peer review and institutionalized disconfirmation break down. Research on politically controversial topics becomes unreliable because politically favored conclusions receive less-than-normal scrutiny while politically incorrect findings must scale mountains of motivated and hostile reasoning from reviewers and editors. 美国以及大多数国家的教授们一般都会支持左翼政党或政策,这没什么新鲜,但鲜为人知的是, 1990年代以来事态是以何其快的速度转变着。只要意识形态主张或者出于政治目的的研究仍必然会遭到挑战,那么一个左倾(或右倾)的学术领域就还能运转。但是当一个学术领域从左倾发展到铁板一块的左翼时,同行评议或者体制化否证的正常保障监督措施就会崩溃。对在政治上有争议的论题的研究会变得不再可靠,因为存在政治偏袒的结论现在受到的审查少之又少,而政治不正确的发现则需要排除万难,须要遭受评议人和编辑们发出的种种带有政治动机和敌意的论证。 I consider the rapid loss of political diversity, over the last 20 years, to be the second-greatest existential threat to the field of social psychology, after the “replication crisis.” The field is responding constructively to the replication crisis. Will it also attend to its political diversity crisis? Or will it continue to think of diversity only in terms of the demographic categories that most matter to people on the left: race, gender and sexual orientation? 我将过去二十年间发生的这次政见多样性的迅速退减视为,社会心理学领域的第二大致命威胁,仅次于“可重复性危机”。这个领域正在积极地应对可重复性危机,那么它也会去解决它的政见多样性危机吗?还是说,它仍旧只会从人口统计学这个对左派人士来说至关重要的角度来考虑多样性?只会考虑种族、性别和性向问题? I don’t mean to single out social psychology. It is the field that I know best, but what we have learned at Heterodox Academy is that this problem, this rapid shift to political purity, has happened to most fields in the humanities and social sciences in just the last 2 decades. 我并不是故意要把社会心理学挑出来。这只是我最熟悉的领域,但我们在异端学院意识到了:这个问题,即政治单一化现象,仅在过去的短短20年内就在大部分人文社科领域都已经发生了。 An optimistic ending 一个乐观的结局 I would like to end by thanking my colleagues. I have been raising a fuss about these issues since 2011. In that time I also moved from the left to the center, politically. I am no longer a progressive. So you might expect that I’ve been ostracized, but I have not. Nothing bad has happened to me. 我想以我对同事们的感激来结尾。从2011年开始我就因为这些事搞得他们鸡犬不宁,那时候我也在政治倾向方面由左派转变为中间派。我不再是个进步主义者了。所以你可能以为我已经被排挤了,但是并没有,万事顺遂。 Some of my colleagues believe that the political imbalance is not a problem. But the majority response has been, roughly: “This is really interesting. We really truly value diversity, and we agree with you and your co-authors that diversity of viewpoints is the kind that confers the most benefits on groups. But gosh, how are we going to get more?” 我的有些同事觉得政见失衡没什么大不了的。但大多数回答大概是这样的:“这确实挺有意思的。我们的确很看重多样性,而且我们同意你和你的合著者的观点,观点多样性是那种可以为团体带来最大益处的东西。但是啊,我们怎么才能获取更多多样性呢?” That’s our mission at Heterodox Academy – to figure out how to get more. It will be hard, but it can and must be done. Please see our “solutions page.” 这就是我们在异端学院中的使命了,那就是搞清楚如何能获得更多的多样性。道路是曲折的,但前途是光明的。请参看我们的“方案页”。 Post script: Paul Krugman recently referred to us at Heterodox Academy as “outraged conservatives,” and he said that the leftward shift in the academy was really just the rightward shift of the Republican Party since the 1990s. He suggests that professors didn’t change their views on policy, they just stopped identifying as Republicans as the party went off the deep end. 附:Paul Krugman最近将我们这些异端学院上的人称为“愤怒的保守派”,他说1990年代以来学界的左转其实只是共和党的右转。他的言下之意是,教授们并没有改变过他们的政见,他们只是在共和党转入极端时不再自我标榜为共和派了而已。 There is surely some truth to Krugman’s argument, but that doesn’t negate our claim that the makeup of the professoriate really did change after the Greatest Generation retired. Krugman’s argument could not explain graph #3, for example, which shows just a single person with views on social issues that are right of center. Also, I should point out that most of us at Heterodox Academy are not conservatives, and if you read everything on our site, it will be hard to find evidence of “outrage.” Krugman的质疑确实反映了部分事实,但这并没有驳倒我们的主张,最伟大世代逝去之后教授阶层的组成结构确实发生了变化。比如,Krugman的质疑就没能解释图表三里只有一个人对偏右社会事件支持的现象。此外,我必须要指出,异端学院上的大多数人都不是保守派,而且如果读过我们网站上的所有文章的话,你会很难发现有“愤怒”的踪迹。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

保守派是什么

【2015-10-18】

@研二公知苗 保守主义定义本来就很难嘛,有人将其定义为一种特定的意识形态,出现于法国大革命之后,以柏克为始祖,这基本就是你姨采纳的说法。但是根据另一种的“情境化定义”,认为保守主义就是一种在相似情境下反复出现的普遍性的思潮。

@whigzhou: 其实我更喜欢心理学家的定义,保守性是一组伦理/政治方面的心理特质,这组特质的聚合度很高,拥有这组特质的人很大可能成为保守派,但具有保守特质的人,在不同的社会/思想经历下,生成了不同的政治/伦理主张,进而,这些人在特定的社会/历史情境中,聚合为特定(more...)

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【2015-10-18】 @研二公知苗 保守主义定义本来就很难嘛,有人将其定义为一种特定的意识形态,出现于法国大革命之后,以柏克为始祖,这基本就是你姨采纳的说法。但是根据另一种的“情境化定义”,认为保守主义就是一种在相似情境下反复出现的普遍性的思潮。 @whigzhou: 其实我更喜欢心理学家的定义,保守性是一组伦理/政治方面的心理特质,这组特质的聚合度很高,拥有这组特质的人很大可能成为保守派,但具有保守特质的人,在不同的社会/思想经历下,生成了不同的政治/伦理主张,进而,这些人在特定的社会/历史情境中,聚合为特定的保守主义,相互间完全可能对立。 @whigzhou: 沿这条脉络可以把问题看得更清楚,甚至可以预测一个人在特定认知环境下会形成何种政治倾向,以及,基于人口统计学数据而推测,特定社会条件下,会出现何种政治潮流 @熊也餐厅:是不是要保守的内容和价值观不一样,才形成不同的立场? @whigzhou: 对,保守派必定是维护某种既有秩序的,但具体维护的是哪个秩序,每个保守派有可以不同选择 @whigzhou: 所以和保守派对立的,其实是激进派(或叛逆派),从心理机制上看,最根本区别可能是,前者重原则,后则重计算 @whigzhou: 复古派(比如新儒家和塔利班)不是保守派,相反,往往是激进派,因为他们要复的那个古,只是一套理想,根本不是一种现实中存在秩序或传统 @PlusKing2022:那么复封建主义呢 @whigzhou: 都铎朝的封建主义是保守派,腓特烈大帝所面对的封建主义也是保守派,今天的就不是  
[微言]理想对话者

【2015-08-11】

@熊观七路:辉格老师所持的无镇腹主义更倾向于大卫.弗里德曼吗?

@whigzhou: 比较能相容,但也有很大不同,哲学基础上,他是功利主义,虽然是我比较能接受的版本,但和我们契约主义还是有着深层区别,现实问题上,他大概接受不了我的很多亲保守派主张,但无论如何,对我来说,他都符合最理想对话者的条件

@whigzhou: 所谓理想对话者,就是三分钟内即可hedge出各自论点,找出分歧(more...)

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【2015-08-11】 @熊观七路:辉格老师所持的无镇腹主义更倾向于大卫.弗里德曼吗? @whigzhou: 比较能相容,但也有很大不同,哲学基础上,他是功利主义,虽然是我比较能接受的版本,但和我们契约主义还是有着深层区别,现实问题上,他大概接受不了我的很多亲保守派主张,但无论如何,对我来说,他都符合最理想对话者的条件 @whigzhou: 所谓理想对话者,就是三分钟内即可hedge出各自论点,找出分歧所在,并在五分钟内将讨论转向经验事实的认定方面(这方面的分歧总是难以也不应指望在短时间内消除),相反,碰到糟糕对话者,大伯我就只好把精力都花在剃头上了。
[微言]哲学、主义和主张

【2015-08-11】

@黄章晋ster:因为他们俩大致属于同一个生态位。

@tertio:右边这个判断错得太离谱了吧,这等于说安兰德与哈耶克一个生态位

@whigzhou: 教官说的是事实,虽然我对这一事实何以出现也是大惑不解。刚花了十几分钟想了想,这似乎揭示了有关政治生态、政治光谱,以及政治倾向如何结晶成派系的某些一般模式

@whigzhou: 为说明这情况,我需要先做一点预备性论证。对个人而言,从哲学基础,到主义(或者叫政治信条,表现为一组标签),再到具体的政治主张(more...)

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【2015-08-11】 @黄章晋ster:因为他们俩大致属于同一个生态位。 @tertio:右边这个判断错得太离谱了吧,这等于说安兰德与哈耶克一个生态位 @whigzhou: 教官说的是事实,虽然我对这一事实何以出现也是大惑不解。刚花了十几分钟想了想,这似乎揭示了有关政治生态、政治光谱,以及政治倾向如何结晶成派系的某些一般模式 @whigzhou: 为说明这情况,我需要先做一点预备性论证。对个人而言,从哲学基础,到主义(或者叫政治信条,表现为一组标签),再到具体的政治主张,可以形成一个连贯而自洽的体系,但从群体表现看,事情不是按这个逻辑发生的,光谱、主义、派系,可以在这三个层次的任意一个上汇聚结晶,结果就是若干团乱麻。 @whigzhou: 因为绝大多数人不会将自己的反思深入到哲学层次,所以,除了一小撮有哲学兴趣的人之间,结晶通常发生在后两个层次上 @whigzhou: 至于后两个层次哪个优先,取决于特定制度环境下,表达机会和参与机会之前的相对关系,假如表达机会很多,参与机会很少,则结晶倾向于在第二个层次(即主义层次)上发生,反之,若参与机会相对较多,则结晶更多发生在第三层次(即主张层次)上 @whigzhou: 注意:我说的参与机会并不直接对应结铛或投票的机会,而是更一般的指,以自身行动改变政治进程的可能性,比如同样是票决制或代议制,越是下层的地方性事务,个人参与就越大,而在联邦层面,大部分以为自己在参与的人,其实不过是在表达 @whigzhou: 问题是,第二个层次上的共同点,虽然在站队(更贴切说是虚拟站队)时最具号召力,却往往是最肤浅也最没用的,举个较纯粹的例子,罗斯巴德和大卫·弗里德曼常被一起归为Libertarian和市场无镇腹主义,但这两位无论在哲学基础上,还是现实主张上,可以说毫无共同之处(除了都用英语写作之外) 。 @whigzhou: 草,对付关键词屏蔽花了二十分钟,本来还想多说几句,太麻烦,算了~
[微言]Libertarians

【2014-06-16】

@whigzhou: 关注了一段时间美国的Libertarians,发现他们很少谈论减税、解除管制、贸易自由化等等议题,谈论最多的是大麻合法化和反战,尤其热衷反战,原因不难理解,前面这些议题的“正确立场”早已被保守派抢去了,要显得自己有所不同就只能谈论和保守派相左的话题,结果是,他们的调调听起来往往比左派还左派

@whigzhou: 这也是为何我觉得自己其实挺Libertarian的,可对现实中见到的Libertarians实在爱不起来的缘故

@w(more...)

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【2014-06-16】 @whigzhou: 关注了一段时间美国的Libertarians,发现他们很少谈论减税、解除管制、贸易自由化等等议题,谈论最多的是大麻合法化和反战,尤其热衷反战,原因不难理解,前面这些议题的“正确立场”早已被保守派抢去了,要显得自己有所不同就只能谈论和保守派相左的话题,结果是,他们的调调听起来往往比左派还左派 @whigzhou: 这也是为何我觉得自己其实挺Libertarian的,可对现实中见到的Libertarians实在爱不起来的缘故 @whigzhou: 其实就算反战你也别学左派的反法啊,比如你不能以打仗要死人为由来反吧,美国是募兵制,不是义务役,当兵是自愿的,战死也是责任自负 @whigzhou: 你倒是可以说我们Libertarians反对国企,而美军是国企,但这并不是说不要打仗,而是说应该到尼泊尔去招私人雇佣兵打,这才够Libertarian对吧? @whigzhou: 你也可以说打仗要花纳税人钱,但这也不是说不要打仗,可以找受益人要钱啊,第一次海湾战争的费用就是受益国分摊的嘛,现在也可以如法炮制,马利基要救命可以,石油收入抵押啊,到时候发票开过去呗 @寄生草的空间:不可行。反战舆论就够难缠了,再整个死亡面前不平等,为了钱而杀人之类的恶名声,这是嫌麻烦不够大啊。 @whigzhou: 注意我这是在给Libertarians上课,Libertarians哪里会管可不可行  
[微言]力勃儒与第三势力

【2013-02-06】

@某:抱歉,此微博已被作者删除。

@whigzhou: 将现代liberal传统追溯到罗斯福也太短了点,至少可追溯到1909年劳合·乔治政府的People’s Budget http://t.cn/zY5riUa 福利主义的大规模实施,肇端于此,上院这块宪政刹车皮也在此过程中被摧毁,社会从此向福利主义滑去

@Victor_Tianlong 其实我觉得美国从建国前乃至殖民地建立时就是两条路线的斗争,甚至可以追溯到更远的英国玫瑰战争两派~~~只是代表两条路线的派别不断在换名字~~ P.S.辉总,你觉得为什么没(more...)

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【2013-02-06】 @某:抱歉,此微博已被作者删除。 @whigzhou: 将现代liberal传统追溯到罗斯福也太短了点,至少可追溯到1909年劳合·乔治政府的People's Budget http://t.cn/zY5riUa 福利主义的大规模实施,肇端于此,上院这块宪政刹车皮也在此过程中被摧毁,社会从此向福利主义滑去 @Victor_Tianlong 其实我觉得美国从建国前乃至殖民地建立时就是两条路线的斗争,甚至可以追溯到更远的英国玫瑰战争两派~~~只是代表两条路线的派别不断在换名字~~ P.S.辉总,你觉得为什么没有出现第三条路线呢? @whigzhou: 其实第三势力总是有的,只是一到选战中就又变成两个了,这跟选举制度有关 @whigzhou: Libertarian不就是第三条路线嘛,只是选举时通常以共和党身份,假如美国采用的是比例代表制,Libertarian的立法席位应该不少。美国选举制是最不利于小党的,同时它也让大党练就了容纳和吸收各种新派系的能力和传统 @Victor_Tianlong:后来选举制确定后是好理解,我奇怪的是为什么从一开始就只有两条路线呢?保皇派革命派,联邦党民主党,这样的。 @whigzhou: 嗯,这可能有两个原因:1)英国影响,2)当一项政治议题占据压倒性地位时,两分对立就是自然的结果,而建国期刚好有这样的议题 @whigzhou: 另外,近来有些研究显示,人可能有先天的政治倾向,而这一先天倾向可能就是两极的 @Victor_Tianlong:原来又是祖传的~~ @whigzhou: “先天的”不一定是“遗传的”,比如可能跟排行有关,长子是保守派的概率似乎就比幼子大一些,再如出生的季节、胎儿期的营养状况,也会对个性有所影响(不知是否影响政治倾向),这些也是先天的,但不是遗传的 @小野猪君:实在两派都不挨边的是沉默派 @whigzhou: 沉默没关系,只要投票就挨边了  
[微言]自由主义与民族认同

【2012-12-09】

知乎上有人问:自由主义者如何处理自由主义信念与自己族群认同的关系?

@whigzhou:
1)文化认同是多维度多层次的,民族和价值观只是其中两个维度;
2)对我来说,各种认同仅在同一维度上才会相互排斥,而在不同维度上可以共存;
3)假如一种认同需要我放弃在其他维度上的认同——民族主义常如此要求——,我会加以抵制;
4)民族原本是一种语言共同体,但近代以来已与国家权力越来越紧密的捆在一起,已经被国家绑架和改(more...)

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【2012-12-09】 知乎上有人问:自由主义者如何处理自由主义信念与自己族群认同的关系? @whigzhou: 1)文化认同是多维度多层次的,民族和价值观只是其中两个维度; 2)对我来说,各种认同仅在同一维度上才会相互排斥,而在不同维度上可以共存; 3)假如一种认同需要我放弃在其他维度上的认同——民族主义常如此要求——,我会加以抵制; 4)民族原本是一种语言共同体,但近代以来已与国家权力越来越紧密的捆在一起,已经被国家绑架和改造了,当它以此种邪恶面目出现时,它就是我的敌人; 5)相反,假如民族主义者清醒的撇清其与权力的关系,他们可以成为我的朋友。  
权利、自由与自由主义

感觉上一篇说的不太清楚,虽说谈论主义是件乏味的事情,不过既然到这份上了,还是再理理清楚。

为什么自由不仅仅是权利?

说自由主义之前,先说什么是自由。

自由有两层含义,第一层就像哈耶克说的,是免于强制,无疑,这里有个限定条件:权利边界之内免于强制。

那么,权利是什么?是法律规则所划定的行为边界。法律哪里来?如之前说过的,是博弈过程中所产生的集体信念,它既是均衡的结果,也是维持均衡的条件(从进化的观点看,这不是循环定义,正如蛋和鸡不构成循环)。

假如只有这一层意思,那自由便等同于权利,而社会的自由状态便等同于法治,可是,我们可以想象到的法治社会,却可以是很不“自由”的,比如,某种极端禁欲主义社会,或某种行会式权利盛行的社会,或某种极端身份等级制社会,行为边界可能是很清楚的,但边界(more...)

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感觉上一篇说的不太清楚,虽说谈论主义是件乏味的事情,不过既然到这份上了,还是再理理清楚。 为什么自由不仅仅是权利? 说自由主义之前,先说什么是自由。 自由有两层含义,第一层就像哈耶克说的,是免于强制,无疑,这里有个限定条件:权利边界之内免于强制。 那么,权利是什么?是法律规则所划定的行为边界。法律哪里来?如之前说过的,是博弈过程中所产生的集体信念,它既是均衡的结果,也是维持均衡的条件(从进化的观点看,这不是循环定义,正如蛋和鸡不构成循环)。 假如只有这一层意思,那自由便等同于权利,而社会的自由状态便等同于法治,可是,我们可以想象到的法治社会,却可以是很不“自由”的,比如,某种极端禁欲主义社会,或某种行会式权利盛行的社会,或某种极端身份等级制社会,行为边界可能是很清楚的,但边界内可以作出的行为却很少,或者说,行为空间很小;并且,这样的均衡的确可能存在。 所以,为了让这个词汇不与其自然语义完全脱离,我给它加上第二层含义:行为空间最大化,体现在法律上,就是宽容原则;这样,当我们比较两个法治社会,或两种都有法律保障的权利分布状态时,就可以说,哪一个是更自由的;不难发现,既然涉及“最大化”,必定需要引入某种客观标准。 几种不同的自由主义 在上一篇里,我列举了对自由制度的三种信念,这是为了区分不同的“主义”,但我确实不知道,该把“自由主义”这个帽子套在其中哪个头上算比较合适。 这些主义的共同点是,都赞同自由制度,但出于不同的理由: 1)因为它所保障的那些权利本身很重要,比如人身、财产、言论自由等; 2)因为它比其它制度更可能导致某种(对我来说)可欲的状态,比如发达、繁荣而富裕的社会; 3)假如人们能预见到(2),他们多半也会同意那种状态是可欲的。 前面我说,我同时持有三个信念,后来想了一下这不太准确,其实我只对前两条比较肯定,第三条只在部分情况下肯定,即,在多数时候,当我论证自由制度为何可取时,我是学哈耶克的样,用后退到底的方式:如果这样这样,你们会发现情况将变成那样那样,而那是几乎所有人都会认为是更糟的情况。 但在有些事情上,我会前进到第二条,改用这样的方式:如果这样这样,情况会变成那样那样,我可不喜欢那样;甚至前进到第一条:不管后果是什么,我可不想失去这些权利。 小橘子眼神很好,计划生育就是个显著的例子,我的确相信,计划生育的长期后果在多数人眼里将是可欲的(尽管也有些很糟糕的中短期后果),但我仍然反对计划生育,这与我通常所用的反对方式,确实不同。