2016年08月发表的文章(26)

[译文]食品营养标签有用吗?

The Surprising Failure Of Food Labeling
食品标签的意外失败

作者:Omri Ben-Shahar @ 2016-06-28
译者:Shawn Lai(@NiGuoNiGuoNi)
校对:王涵秋
来源:promarket.org,https://promarket.org/surprising-failure-food-labeling/

If lawmakers want to improve the dietary choices of Americans, the first thing they need to recognize is that the problem is not information.
如果法律制定者想要改善美国人的膳食选择,他们首先要意识到问题不是出在信息上。

Food labeling is one of the least objectionable types of regulation bursting into the scene in recent decades. It is also one of the least successful.  It is also one of the least successful.

食品标签是近几十年来闯入市场的管制政策中争议最少的一种,同时也是最失败的一种。

The ongoing explosive debate about labeling foods produced from genetically engineered crops, known as GMOs, is a testament to how important food labeling is perceived. Congress is currently in the midst of tight legislative battle on the enactment of a national GMO labeling bill, to override state labeling laws. But GMO labeling is only one front in the food labeling agenda.

最近的关于标签转基因食品(也就是GMO)的火热争论证实了食品标签多么被看重。为了取代各州原有的标签法案,国会目前正处于一场关于制定全国性转基因标签法案的激烈立法战争之中。但是转基因标签只是食品标签议程表的一个方面。

“Labelists” (folks who embrace mandated labeling as an effective form of regulation) have successfully pushed for an assortment of food labels over the past two decades. Obamacare, for example, requires (as do many local laws) the prominent posting of calories in restaurants.

“标签主义者”(那些认为强制性标签是一种有效管制的人)已经在过去二十年中成功推进了各种食物的标签立法。举例来说,奥巴马医改要求(很多地方法律也是如此)将食品的卡路里张贴在餐馆的显眼处。

First Lady Michelle Obama, a well-intentioned food labelist, is promoting what she regards as a labeling success—the “Nutrition Facts” chart found on every packaged food. Many cities in the U.S. have adopted a new hygiene labeling  for restaurants—mandatory signs displaying a sanitation grade of A, B, or C.

作为一个出于好意的食品标签主义者,第一夫人米歇尔·奥巴马正在推动一项她所认为的标签事业胜利的项目——在所有包装食品上标注“营养价值”表。很多美国城市都为餐馆采用了一种卫生标签——强制性地将卫生情况分为A, B, C。

And numerous other labels are mandated or proposed: country of origin labels, safe-handling labels, food justice, even “activity equivalent” labels that would tell consumers the number of minutes they would have to jog to burn the calories eaten!

除此之外,还有大量其他标签是强制性的或建议性的:原产地标签,安全使用标签,食品正义性标签【译注:证明食品的(more...)

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The Surprising Failure Of Food Labeling 食品标签的意外失败 作者:Omri Ben-Shahar @ 2016-06-28 译者:Shawn Lai(@NiGuoNiGuoNi) 校对:王涵秋 来源:promarket.org,https://promarket.org/surprising-failure-food-labeling/ If lawmakers want to improve the dietary choices of Americans, the first thing they need to recognize is that the problem is not information. 如果法律制定者想要改善美国人的膳食选择,他们首先要意识到问题不是出在信息上。 Food labeling is one of the least objectionable types of regulation bursting into the scene in recent decades. It is also one of the least successful.  It is also one of the least successful. 食品标签是近几十年来闯入市场的管制政策中争议最少的一种,同时也是最失败的一种。 The ongoing explosive debate about labeling foods produced from genetically engineered crops, known as GMOs, is a testament to how important food labeling is perceived. Congress is currently in the midst of tight legislative battle on the enactment of a national GMO labeling bill, to override state labeling laws. But GMO labeling is only one front in the food labeling agenda. 最近的关于标签转基因食品(也就是GMO)的火热争论证实了食品标签多么被看重。为了取代各州原有的标签法案,国会目前正处于一场关于制定全国性转基因标签法案的激烈立法战争之中。但是转基因标签只是食品标签议程表的一个方面。 “Labelists” (folks who embrace mandated labeling as an effective form of regulation) have successfully pushed for an assortment of food labels over the past two decades. Obamacare, for example, requires (as do many local laws) the prominent posting of calories in restaurants. “标签主义者”(那些认为强制性标签是一种有效管制的人)已经在过去二十年中成功推进了各种食物的标签立法。举例来说,奥巴马医改要求(很多地方法律也是如此)将食品的卡路里张贴在餐馆的显眼处。 First Lady Michelle Obama, a well-intentioned food labelist, is promoting what she regards as a labeling success—the “Nutrition Facts” chart found on every packaged food. Many cities in the U.S. have adopted a new hygiene labeling  for restaurants—mandatory signs displaying a sanitation grade of A, B, or C. 作为一个出于好意的食品标签主义者,第一夫人米歇尔·奥巴马正在推动一项她所认为的标签事业胜利的项目——在所有包装食品上标注“营养价值”表。很多美国城市都为餐馆采用了一种卫生标签——强制性地将卫生情况分为A, B, C。 And numerous other labels are mandated or proposed: country of origin labels, safe-handling labels, food justice, even “activity equivalent” labels that would tell consumers the number of minutes they would have to jog to burn the calories eaten! 除此之外,还有大量其他标签是强制性的或建议性的:原产地标签,安全使用标签,食品正义性标签【译注:证明食品的生产过程中不涉及不平等或违反人权的情况】,甚至还有告诉消费者需要慢跑多少分钟来消耗他们所摄入卡路里的“同等运动量”标签! Big Hopes For Labels 寄托于标签的希望 There is a widespread belief that food labeling would do social good. The First Lady predicts that nutrition labeling will “make a big difference for families all across this country” and “help solve the problem of child obesity.” The NYC Commissioner of Health is confident that restaurant hygiene labels “gives restaurants the incentive to maintain the highest food safety practices.” And the Royal Society for Public Health in England claims that the activity-equivalent labels would “prompt people to be more mindful of the energy they consume” and “encourage them to be more physically active.” 很多人认为食品标签对社会有益。第一夫人预言营养标签会“对全国各地的家庭产生重大影响”并且“帮助解决儿童肥胖问题”。纽约市的卫生局局长确信餐馆的卫生标签“激励了餐馆保持最高的食品安全水平”。英国皇家公共卫生协会宣称“活动等同量”标签会“激励人们更多地关注他们所摄入的能量”并且“鼓励他们去更多地活动身体”。 It is easy to see why labelists hang such high hopes on labels. People are motivated to eat well, so if they make poor food choices it must be because they have poor information. The solution seems obvious: deliver simple information. This would offset the half-truths and misleading messages that food advertising and front-of-the-package claims make. Indeed, when surveyed, consumers often nod in agreement and support more labels and more information, further kindling labelists’ conviction in the value of their enterprise. 很容易看出为什么标签主义者在标签上寄托了那么多的希望。人们都想吃的好,所以如果他们在食品方面选择不当一定是因为他们得到的信息不到位。如此一来解决方案显而易见:传递全面的信息。这些会抵消食品广告和包装封面上的宣传所带来的误导。事实上,调查显示消费者通常也认同更多的标签和更多的信息,这进一步助长了标签主义者对他们事业的自信。 Disappointing Reality 令人失望的现实 But in reality there is little to celebrate: food labels don’t work! Study after study shows that labels have failed to promote even modest dietary improvements. Perhaps most surprising is the failure of calorie labeling. When fast food chains were ordered to post calorie counts, everyone expected a drop in calories consumed and in serving sizes. 但是事实上却没有什么好高兴的:食品标签根本没有用!大量研究显示标签根本没能推动哪怕一点膳食方面的进步。也许最让人吃惊的是卡路里标签的失败:当快餐连锁店被命令标注卡路里数值时,所有人都以为卡路里消费量和食物的大小都会下降。 But no! Research found almost no significant change. Even when minor reduction was spotted, it was not clinically meaningful. A modest exception is Starbucks: with labeling, customers were found to consume 6% fewer calories per transaction (interestingly, the effect is due to food, not beverage choices). 但是并不是这样。研究显示几乎没有显著变化。即使有微量的减少,也不具备任何临床上的意义。有一个不大不小的例外发生在星巴克:当使用标签时,消费者平均每单消费减少了6%的卡路里(有趣的是,这些变化是发生在食物而非饮料的选择上)。 But even such small effect does not carry over beyond the elite food market. Calorie labels have of no effect on low income people or on adolescents. A survey of all the evidence concludes “calorie labeling does not have the intended effect of decreasing calorie purchasing or consumption.” 但是即使是这么小的效果在高端食品市场以外却没有发生。卡路里标签在低收入群体和年轻人身上没有效果。一项证据完备的调查总结道:“卡路里标签没有达成预期的减少卡路里消费或摄入的效果。” Take another example, perhaps the crown jewel of food labelism: the Nutrition Data box on packaged food. It is widely thought successful, because people notice and use these labels to compare food products. It is even regarded a model for labeling reforms in other areas—a template for improved financial or data privacy disclosures. 举另一个也许是食品标签主义最核心的例子:包装食品上的营养数据表。这个标签被广泛认为是成功的,因为人们可以用这些标签去比较不同的食物产品。这甚至被认为是一个其他领域标签改革的模范——一个先进的金融或数据隐私公开的模版。 Unfortunately, despite their prominence, Nutrition Data labels have not delivered the desired effect. People might choose to eat fewer calories per meal, but then remain hungrier for snacks. Indeed, in the past generation—the time during which these labels were perfected—the number of average “eating occasions” per day increased from 3½ to 5, and the overall daily consumption of calories increased by 400. Not exactly a resounding success. 不幸的是,尽管非常出名,营养数据标签并没有起到想要得到的作用。人们可能会选择每餐摄入较少的卡路里,但是因此他们会更饥饿然后去吃零食。实际上,在上一代人中——那是标签最完美的时代——平均每天“进食次数”从3.5次上升到了5次,总计每天卡路里摄入量增加了400,可见这并不是一个令人瞩目的成功。 The disappointing performance of food labels is confirmed in other contexts. Despite early enthusiasm about the perceived success of restaurant hygiene grades in Los Angeles, newer and more comprehensive data collected by Stanford’s Daniel Ho suggests that grades have not made restaurants cleaner or reduced the incidence of foodborne illness. Similarly, the “organic” label had the unintended effect of lowering the quality of organic foods. And the list of failed labels and disclosures extends well beyond the food area, and has been documented thoroughly. 食品标签令人失望的表现也在其他背景下得到了证实。尽管人们对于早期洛杉矶餐馆的卫生评级方面的成功抱有极大的热枕,但由斯坦福大学的Daniel Ho搜集的更新的和更加全面的数据表明,卫生评级并没有让餐馆变得更加干净或是减少食物传播疾病的发生率。无独有偶,“有机”标签起到了降低有机食物质量的反作用。各种失败标签以及其他失败的公开信息的案例远不仅限于食品领域,并且被详细记录。 Beyond Food Labels 食品标签之外 If lawmakers want to improve the dietary choices of Americans, the first thing they need to recognize is that the problem is not information. Unlike choosing mortgages or colleges, choosing healthy food is not complicated. People have enough experience to know that a double cheeseburger with bacon (1400 calories at Hardee’s) is not healthy, even without labels that quantify this intuition. For many, the problem is commitment. Another diet book or better labeling is a superfluous response to what is at core a question of willpower. 如果法律制定者想要改善美国人的膳食选择,他们首先要意识到问题不是出在信息上。不同于选择贷款或大学,选择健康食物并不复杂。人们已经有足够的经验来判断一个夹了培根的双层芝士汉堡(在Hardee’s卖的那种有1400卡路里)并不健康,并不需要标签来量化这个直觉。对于大多数人,问题在于坚持。再多一本关于膳食的书或是更好的标签都是徒劳无功的,因为关键在于一个人的意志力。 Tax on unhealthy food may help, as it did with cigarettes, but also ignite too much political resentment. For consumers in under-served communities where obesity is prevalent, the problem is lack affordable supply of better food. Here, social policy should begin by improving access to grocery choices. 对不健康食物征税可能有用,正如同征税对减少吸烟有用一样,但是这同时引起了很多政治争端。对于那些住在超重问题普遍,生活不便的社区的人们来说,问题是缺少负担得起的健康食物的供应。在这种地方,社会政策应该始于增加购物的渠道。 But access is not enough. Healthy food has to be affordable, suggesting that some type of need-based subsidy is required. Access and subsidies are effective but expensive policies. They require budgets. This explains why labelism is winning the day: for the government, food labels are really cheap. 但是光有渠道不够。健康的食物必须不能太贵,这意味着有些基础需求的补贴是需要的。渠道和补贴确实有效,但是代价高昂,因此需要政府的预算。这解释了为什么现在标签主义占上风:对于政府来说,食品标签实在是太便宜了。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]当代人吃了太多红肉?

How Americans Got Red Meat Wrong
美国人对红肉的理解怎么错了

作者:Nina Teicholz @ 2014-06-02
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:The Atlantic,http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/how-americans-used-to-eat/371895/

Early diets in the country weren’t as plant-based as you might think.
我国的早期饮食并不像你所想的那样以植物为主。

The idea that red meat is a principal dietary culprit has pervaded our national conversation for decades. We have been led to believe that we’ve strayed from a more perfect, less meat-filled past. Most prominently, when Senator McGovern announced his Senate committee’s report, called Dietary Goals, at a press conference in 1977, he expressed a gloomy outlook about where the American diet was heading.

几十年来,红肉乃饮食首恶的观念一直在我们国家的争论中普遍流行。有人告诉我们,现在我们已经偏离了过去那种更为健康、吃肉更少的传统。最出名的一件事是,在1977年一次媒体发布会上,参议员McGovern代表其所在的参院委员会宣读了名为《膳食指导》的报告。会上他曾对美国人饮食的演变提出了一种非常悲观的展望。

“Our diets have changed radically within the past 50 years,” he explained, “with great and often harmful effects on our health.” These were the “killer diseases,” said McGovern. The solution, he declared, was for Americans to return to the healthier, plant-based diet they once ate.

“过去50年,我们的饮食发生了剧烈变化,”他解释道,“对我们的健康构成了巨大且往往是有害的影响。”McGovern还说,“这些都是致命的疾病”。他宣称,解决办法就是:美国人要回归他们以前食用的那种更为健康、以植物为主体的饮食。

The justification for this idea, that our ancestors lived mainly on fruits, vegetables, and grains, comes mainly from the USDA “food disappearance data.” The “disappearance” of foo(more...)

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How Americans Got Red Meat Wrong 美国人对红肉的理解怎么错了 作者:Nina Teicholz @ 2014-06-02 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:The Atlantic,http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/how-americans-used-to-eat/371895/ Early diets in the country weren't as plant-based as you might think. 我国的早期饮食并不像你所想的那样以植物为主。 The idea that red meat is a principal dietary culprit has pervaded our national conversation for decades. We have been led to believe that we’ve strayed from a more perfect, less meat-filled past. Most prominently, when Senator McGovern announced his Senate committee’s report, called Dietary Goals, at a press conference in 1977, he expressed a gloomy outlook about where the American diet was heading. 几十年来,红肉乃饮食首恶的观念一直在我们国家的争论中普遍流行。有人告诉我们,现在我们已经偏离了过去那种更为健康、吃肉更少的传统。最出名的一件事是,在1977年一次媒体发布会上,参议员McGovern代表其所在的参院委员会宣读了名为《膳食指导》的报告。会上他曾对美国人饮食的演变提出了一种非常悲观的展望。 “Our diets have changed radically within the past 50 years,” he explained, “with great and often harmful effects on our health.” These were the “killer diseases,” said McGovern. The solution, he declared, was for Americans to return to the healthier, plant-based diet they once ate. “过去50年,我们的饮食发生了剧烈变化,”他解释道,“对我们的健康构成了巨大且往往是有害的影响。”McGovern还说,“这些都是致命的疾病”。他宣称,解决办法就是:美国人要回归他们以前食用的那种更为健康、以植物为主体的饮食。 The justification for this idea, that our ancestors lived mainly on fruits, vegetables, and grains, comes mainly from the USDA “food disappearance data.” The “disappearance” of food is an approximation of supply; most of it is probably being eaten, but much is wasted, too. Experts therefore acknowledge that the disappearance numbers are merely rough estimates of consumption. 我们的祖先主要吃水果、蔬菜和粮食,这种想法的依据主要来自美国农业部的“食物消散数据”。食物的“消散”只是供给量的近似值;其中大部分大概是被食用了,但也有许多是被浪费了。因此,专家们承认,食物消散数据只是对食物消费量的大概估计。 "I hold a family to be in a desperate way when the mother can see the bottom of the pork barrel." “我认为,如果一个主妇的猪肉桶都见底了,那这个家庭应该很窘迫。” The data from the early 1900s, which is what McGovern and others used, are known to be especially poor. Among other things, these data accounted only for the meat, dairy, and other fresh foods shipped across state lines in those early years, so anything produced and eaten locally, such as meat from a cow or eggs from chickens, would not have been included. McGovern和其他许多人使用的数据来自1900年代,这些数据质量之糟糕是出了名的。不说其他,这些数据只体现了早年间跨州贩卖的肉类、乳品和其他新鲜食物。因此,本地生产并消耗的一切东西,比如牛所产之肉或母鸡所产鸡蛋,都没有计算在内。 And since farmers made up more than a quarter of all workers during these years, local foods must have amounted to quite a lot. Experts agree that this early availability data are not adequate for serious use, yet they cite the numbers anyway, because no other data are available. And for the years before 1900, there are no “scientific” data at all. 由于那时候农牧民在劳动力中占到了四分之一强,因此本地食品总量必定相当大。尽管专家们同意,早期的这一食物可获得性数据并不能够用于严肃场合,可他们还是会引用这些数字,因为没有其他数据可用。至于1900年之前,那就根本没有任何“科学”数据了。 In the absence of scientific data, history can provide a picture of food consumption in the late-18th- to 19th-century in America. 尽管缺乏科学数据,但有关18世纪晚期至19世纪美国的食物消费,历史仍能给我们提供一幅画面。 Early Americans settlers were “indifferent” farmers, according to many accounts. They were fairly lazy in their efforts at both animal husbandry and agriculture, with “the grain fields, the meadows, the forests, the cattle, etc, treated with equal carelessness,” as one 18th-century Swedish visitor described—and there was little point in farming since meat was so readily available. 根据许多记录,早期的美洲殖民者都是“漫不经心”的农牧民。不管是在牲畜饲养,还是在农业种植方面,他们的工作都相当懒惰。正如18世纪一位瑞士访客所说,他们“对于粮田、牧场、森林和牲畜等等,都一样的随意对待”。由于肉食唾手可得,费力农牧也没多大意义。 Settlers recorded the extraordinary abundance of wild turkeys, ducks, grouse, pheasant, and more. Migrating flocks of birds would darken the skies for days. The tasty Eskimo curlew was apparently so fat that it would burst upon falling to the earth, covering the ground with a sort of fatty meat paste. (New Englanders called this now-extinct species the “doughbird.”) 在殖民者的笔下,此地的野生火鸡、鸭子、松鸡、野鸡等等都异常丰富。迁徙的鸟群遮天蔽日,好几天都没完。极北杓鹬美味可口,而且极为肥硕,掉到地上竟然还会炸开,能让泥土表面盖上一层肥腻的肉糊。(新英格兰人将这一现已灭绝的物种称作“面团鸟”。) In the woods, there were bears (prized for their fat), raccoons, bobo­links, opossums, hares, and virtual thickets of deer—so much that the colo­nists didn’t even bother hunting elk, moose, or bison, since hauling and conserving so much meat was considered too great an effort. A European traveler describing his visit to a Southern plantation noted that the food included beef, veal, mutton, venison, turkeys, and geese, but he does not mention a single vegetable. 森林里还有熊(因其肉肥而贵重)、浣熊、食米鸟、负鼠、野兔以及跟灌木一样密集的野鹿——猎物如此繁多,以至于殖民者都不愿意费力去捕杀麋鹿、驼鹿或野牛,因为他们觉得要把这么多肉拖回家保存实在太费劲了。一位造访南部某种植园的欧洲旅客提到,当地人的食物包括牛肉、小牛肉、羊肉、鹿肉、火鸡和鹅,他可没有提及任何一种蔬菜。 Infants were fed beef even before their teeth had grown in. The English novelist Anthony Trollope reported, during a trip to the United States in 1861, that Americans ate twice as much beef as did Englishmen. Charles Dickens, when he visited, wrote that “no breakfast was breakfast” without a T-bone steak. Apparently, starting a day on puffed wheat and low-fat milk—our “Breakfast of Champions!”—would not have been considered adequate even for a servant. 小孩子牙都还没长齐,就已经开始喂食牛肉。英国小说家Anthony Trollope于1861年造访美国后曾说,美国人所吃牛肉是英国人的两倍。Charles Dickens访美后则写道,如果没有一块T骨牛排,“早餐就不成其为早餐”。显然,即便是对仆人而言,早上吃点膨化小麦和低脂牛奶——我们的“早餐之冠”——也是不够的。 Indeed, for the first 250 years of American history, even the poor in the United States could afford meat or fish for every meal. The fact that the workers had so much access to meat was precisely why observers regarded the diet of the New World to be superior to that of the Old. 实际上,在美国人最初的250年历史中,即便是国内最穷的人,每顿也能吃得起肉或者鱼。劳动者如此容易吃上肉,这一事实正是当时的观察者认为新大陆饮食优于旧大陆的原因所在。 “I hold a family to be in a desperate way when the mother can see the bottom of the pork barrel,” says a frontier housewife in James Fenimore Cooper’s novel The Chainbearer. “我认为,如果一个主妇的猪肉桶都见底了,那这个家庭应该很窘迫。”在James Fenimore Cooper的小说《戴锁链的人》中,一位西部边疆家庭主妇如此说道。 In the book Putting Meat on the American Table, researcher Roger Horowitz scours the literature for data on how much meat Americans actually ate. A survey of 8,000 urban Americans in 1909 showed that the poorest among them ate 136 pounds a year, and the wealthiest more than 200 pounds. 研究者Roger Horowitz在其著作《把肉食端上美国餐桌》中四处搜求文献,想要找到美国人到底食用多少肉食的数据。1909年针对8000位美国城市居民的一份调查显示,受访者中最贫穷的每年食肉136磅,最富裕的则超过200磅。 A food budget published in the New York Tribune in 1851 allots two pounds of meat per day for a family of five. Even slaves at the turn of the 18th century were allocated an average of 150 pounds of meat a year. As Horowitz concludes, “These sources do give us some confidence in suggesting an average annual consumption of 150–200 pounds of meat per person in the nineteenth century.” 在1851年发表于《纽约论坛报》上的一份食品预算中,一个五口之家每天可以得到2磅肉。在18世纪初,即便是奴隶,每年平均也可以得到150磅肉。正如Horowitz所总结的,“这些资料让我们可以多少有点自信地推测:在19世纪,每年的人均肉食消耗量平均大概是150至200磅。” About 175 pounds of meat per person per year—compared to the roughly 100 pounds of meat per year that an average adult American eats today. And of that 100 pounds of meat, about half is poultry—chicken and turkey—whereas until the mid-20th century, chicken was considered a luxury meat, on the menu only for special occasions (chickens were valued mainly for their eggs). 也就是说,每人每年大概175磅肉。与之对比,平均每个成年美国人现在每年大概食肉100磅。在这100磅肉中,大概有一半是禽肉——即鸡肉和火鸡。与之相比,在20世纪中叶以前,鸡肉一直被视作为奢侈肉类,只在特殊场合才能进菜谱(母鸡因为能生蛋而价值颇高)。 Yet this drop in red meat consumption is the exact opposite of the picture we get from public authorities. A recent USDA report says that our consumption of meat is at a “record high,” and this impression is repeated in the media. 然而,红肉消耗量下降这一事实,与我们从公共权威那里得到的印象大相径庭。美国农业部近期的一份报告说,我们的肉食消耗量正处于“历史最高记录”,而且这一说法还在媒体上反复流传。 It implies that our health problems are associated with this rise in meat consumption, but these analyses are misleading because they lump together red meat and chicken into one category to show the growth of meat eating overall, when it’s just the chicken consumption that has gone up astronomically since the 1970s. The wider-lens picture is clearly that we eat far less red meat today than did our forefathers. 这一说法暗示,我们的健康问题与肉食消耗量增加有关。但是这种分析是误导性的,因为它们将红肉和鸡肉并为一类、混为一谈,以此来证明总体食肉量的增加。实际上,只有鸡肉消耗量才于1970年代以后出现了极大增长。把视野放宽的话,图景很清晰:今天我们所食用的红肉量远远不能与我们的祖先相比。 867fe71bcMeanwhile, also contrary to our common impression, early Americans appeared to eat few vegetables. Leafy greens had short growing seasons and were ultimately considered not worth the effort. And before large supermarket chains started importing kiwis from Australia and avocados from Israel, a regular supply of fruits and vegetables could hardly have been possible in America outside the growing season. 同时,还有一件事也与我们通常的印象相反,早期美国人似乎蔬菜吃得很少。绿叶蔬菜生长季节短,人们最终觉得它们不值得费心种植。而且在大型连锁超市为我们从澳大利亚进口猕猴桃、从以色列进口鳄梨之前,只要生长季节一过,要想在美国实现果蔬的常规供应就几乎不可能了。 Even in the warmer months, fruit and salad were avoided, for fear of cholera. (Only with the Civil War did the canning industry flourish, and then only for a handful of vegetables, the most common of which were sweet corn, tomatoes, and peas.) 即便是在温暖的月份,因为担心霍乱,人们也会避开水果和生吃蔬菜。(罐头行业只是内战以后才开始兴盛起来,而且那也只是罐装少量蔬菜,最常见的主要有甜玉米、西红柿和豌豆。) So it would be “incorrect to describe Americans as great eaters of either [fruits or vegetables],” wrote the historians Waverly Root and Rich­ard de Rochemont. Although a vegetarian movement did establish itself in the United States by 1870, the general mistrust of these fresh foods, which spoiled so easily and could carry disease, did not dissipate until after World War I, with the advent of the home refrigerator. By these accounts, for the first 250 years of American history, the entire nation would have earned a failing grade according to our modern mainstream nutritional advice. 所以,历史学家Waverly Root和Richard de Rochemont说,“认为美国人是水果或蔬菜的大量食用者,这种说法是错的”。尽管美国在1870年确实出现了一次素食运动,但美国人对这类非常容易腐烂、可能携带疾病的新鲜食物普遍存疑,这种疑虑直到一战以后随着家用冰箱的出现方才消散。根据这些资料,在美国历史的头250年,要是参照我们现在主流的营养学建议,整个国家得分都会不及格。 During all this time, however, heart disease was almost certainly rare. Reliable data from death certificates is not available, but other sources of information make a persuasive case against the widespread appearance of the disease before the early 1920s. 然而,在整个这一时期,心脏病几乎难得一见。基于死亡证明的可靠数据现在还没有,但其他方面的信息令人信服地证明,在1920年代前期以前,心脏病并没有大面积出现。 Fat intake rose 12 percent from 1909 to 1961, but it was owing to an increase in the supply of vegetable oils, which had recently been invented. 从1909年至1961年,脂肪摄入量提高了12%,但这是因为人类新近发明了植物油,其供给增加了。 Austin Flint, the most authoritative expert on heart disease in the United States, scoured the country for reports of heart abnormalities in the mid-1800s, yet reported that he had seen very few cases, despite running a busy practice in New York City. Nor did William Osler, one of the founding professors of Johns Hopkins Hospi­tal, report any cases of heart disease during the 1870s and eighties when working at Montreal General Hospital. 19世纪中期,美国最权威的心脏病专家Austin Flint曾在全国上下搜集心脏异常病例的报告,最后却说案例寥寥无几,尽管他当时在纽约的生意非常繁忙。约翰·霍普金斯医院的创始教授之一William Osler,在他于1870年代及1880年代在蒙特利尔综合医院工作期间,也未提及任何心脏病案例。 The first clinical description of coronary thrombosis came in 1912, and an authoritative textbook in 1915, Diseases of the Arteries including Angina Pectoris, makes no mention at all of coronary thrombosis. On the eve of World War I, the young Paul Dudley White, who later became President Eisenhower’s doctor, wrote that of his 700 male patients at Massachusetts General Hospital, only four reported chest pain, “even though there were plenty of them over 60 years of age then.” 关于冠状动脉血栓的首份临床描述出现于1912年,而1915年的一本权威教材——《动脉疾病及心绞痛》——则根本没有提及冠状动脉血栓。一战前夜,年轻的Paul Dudley White(后来曾为艾森豪威尔总统担任医生)写道,他在马萨诸塞综合医院的700名男性病人中,只有4个报告有胸痛,“尽管他们中许多人已经过了60岁年纪。” About one fifth of the U.S. population was over 50 years old in 1900. This number would seem to refute the familiar argument that people formerly didn’t live long enough for heart disease to emerge as an observable problem. Simply put, there were some 10 million Americans of a prime age for having a heart attack at the turn of the 20th century, but heart attacks appeared not to have been a common problem. 1900年,美国人口中大约有五分之一超过50岁。有种常见的论调认为,以前的人寿命不够长,所以心脏病根本还来不及成为一个显著问题。不过上述数字似乎能够驳斥这种论调。简单地说,在20世纪初,大约有1000万美国人已经到了容易发生心脏病的年纪,但那时候心脏病似乎并不是一个常见问题。 Ironically—or perhaps tellingly—the heart disease “epidemic” began after a period of exceptionally reduce meat eating. The publication of The Jungle, Upton Sinclair’s fictionalized exposé of the meatpacking industry, caused meat sales in the United States to fall by half in 1906, and they did not revive for another 20 years. 讽刺地是,或者说颇能说明问题的是,心脏病的“流行”发生在食肉量出现异常减少之后。Upton Sinclair出版的《屠宰场》一书以小说形式对肉类加工业进行了揭露曝光,导致1906年美国肉类销售量直接减半,此后20年都没能恢复。 In other words, meat eating went down just before coronary disease took off. Fat intake did rise during those years, from 1909 to 1961, when heart attacks surged, but this 12 percent increase in fat consumption was not due to a rise in animal fat. It was instead owing to an increase in the supply of vegetable oils, which had recently been invented. 换句话说,食肉量的减少恰好发生于冠心病猛增之前。1909年到1961年期间,当心脏病出现激增时,脂肪摄入量确实也增加了,但是脂肪消耗量上增加的这12%并不来自动物脂肪的增加。相反,它来自植物油供给的增加,后者新近才被发明出来。 Nevertheless, the idea that Americans once ate little meat and “mostly plants”—espoused by McGovern and a multitude of experts—continues to endure. And Americans have for decades now been instructed to go back to this earlier, “healthier” diet that seems, upon examination, never to have existed. 尽管如此,美国人过去吃肉很少、“主要吃植物”的观念——McGovern和许多专家都信奉这一点——还在继续流传。而且,过去几十年,美国人接受的指导一直是,他们应该回归这种更早、“更健康”的饮食。只不过,经验证发现,这种饮食习惯从未存在过。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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[译文]窗户税的故事

The Window Tax: A Tale of Excess Burden
窗户税:税收超额负担的一个案例

作者:Timothy Taylor @ 2015-11-06
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar)
二校:慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:Conversable Economist,http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-window-tax-tale-of-excess-burden.html

For economists, the “excess burden” of a tax refers to the idea that the cost of a tax isn’t just the amount of money collected–it’s also the ways in which taxpayers alter their behavior because the tax has changed their incentives. A moderately well-known classroom and textbook example is the “window tax,” first imposed in England in 1696 by King William III, and not definitively repealed until 1851. The excess burden of the window tax was that lower-income people ended up living in rooms with few or no windows.

经济学家用税收“超额负担”指称这样一种概念:纳税的成本并不只在于所缴税费的数额——还在于纳税人受缴税影响而做出的行为改变。一个大家比较熟知的例子,就是课堂上常提到的“窗户税”。该税从1696年在威廉三世命令下开征,直到1851年才彻底消失。这里的超额负担在于,低(more...)

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The Window Tax: A Tale of Excess Burden 窗户税:税收超额负担的一个案例 作者:Timothy Taylor @ 2015-11-06 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar) 二校:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:Conversable Economist,http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-window-tax-tale-of-excess-burden.html For economists, the "excess burden" of a tax refers to the idea that the cost of a tax isn't just the amount of money collected--it's also the ways in which taxpayers alter their behavior because the tax has changed their incentives. A moderately well-known classroom and textbook example is the "window tax," first imposed in England in 1696 by King William III, and not definitively repealed until 1851. The excess burden of the window tax was that lower-income people ended up living in rooms with few or no windows. 经济学家用税收“超额负担”指称这样一种概念:纳税的成本并不只在于所缴税费的数额——还在于纳税人受缴税影响而做出的行为改变。一个大家比较熟知的例子,就是课堂上常提到的“窗户税”。该税从1696年在威廉三世命令下开征,直到1851年才彻底消失。这里的超额负担在于,低收入人群就此选择生活在很少或没有窗户的房间里。 Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab review the history of the window tax and provide actual estimates of how it affected the number of windows per house in their article, "The Window Tax: A Case Study in Excess Burden," which appeared in the Winter 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (where I have toiled in the fields as Managing Editor since 1987). Wallace E. Oates 和Robert M. Schwab在《经济展望杂志》(2015/冬)的《窗户税:超额负担之案例分析》一文中回顾了窗户税历史,并给出了其影响家庭平均窗户数的估测值(我自1987年起担任杂志总编)。 The article popped back into my mind earlier this week when I learned that Oates, a highly distinguished economist based at the University of Maryland since 1979, died last week. One of Oates's specialties was the area of local public finance, and his 1972 book on Fiscal Federalism, is a classic of that subfield. 前几天,我听说Oates已于上周去世,心里不禁又浮现起这篇文章。这位卓越的经济学家自1979年起一直任教于马里兰大学。他擅长的领域之一是地方公共财政,其1972年出版的《财政联邦主义》正是这一领域中的经典。 Here are some facts about the historical window tax, courtesy of Oates and Schwab. 下面引用Oates与Schwab写到的一些历史。
  • William III intended it as a temporary tax, just to help out with the overhang of costs from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the most recent war with France. But it ended up lasting 150 years.
  • 威廉三世原本只是为了摆脱1688年光荣革命和上一次英法战争带来的财务超支而暂时实行窗户税,不料它最后却延续了150年。
  • "An important feature of the tax was that it was levied on the occupant, not the owner of the dwelling. Thus, the renter, not the landlord, paid the tax. However, large tenement buildings in the cities, each with several apartments, were an exception. They were charged as single residences with the tax liability resting on the landlord. This led to especially wretched conditions for the poor in the cities, as landlords blocked up windows and constructed tenements without adequate light and ventilation ..."
  • “该税的一个重要特征是:征收对象是住户而非房产所有者。因此,纳税人是租户而非房东。不过城区多套房公寓楼是例外。收税官将多套间整体看做单元住宅向房东征税。这就使得城市贫民的生活状况非常悲惨,因为房东们会把窗户封起来,所修套间的光照和通风都不足……”
  • The window tax was thought of as improvement on the "hearth tax," that Charles II had imposed in 1662. "The tax was very unpopular in part because of the intrusive character of the assessment process. The `chimney-men' (as the assessors and tax collectors were called) had to enter the house to count the number of hearths and stoves, and there was great resentment against this invasion of the sanctity of the home. The window tax, in contrast, did not require access to the interior of the dwelling: the “window peepers” could count windows from the outside, thus simplifying the assessment procedure and obviating the need for an invasion of the interior."
  • 窗户税是被当作“炉灶税”的一个改良版本而提出来的,后者由查理二世于1662年开征。“炉灶税极度招人厌,部分原因在于评估过程的侵犯性。‘烟囱工’(当时对估税员和收税员的称呼)必须进到房间里面数壁炉和火炉的数目。对于这种侵犯产权神圣性的做法,人们怨声载道。与之相比,窗户税则不需要进入住所内部:‘窥窗工’从外头就可以数清窗户数目,从而简化了评估程序,无需再闯进房内。”
  • The window tax was intended as a visible measure of ability to pay: that is, a high-income person would live in a place with more windows than a low-income person. But at the time, it was widely recognized that windows were a very imperfect proxy for wealth. Adam Smith wrote about this problem of window tax in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations: “A house of ten pounds rent in the country may have more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much poorer man than that of the latter, yet so far as his contribution is regulated by the window-tax, he must contribute more to the support of the state.”
  • 窗户税的本意是用有形的手段判断有支付能力的人:即高收入者所住之处的窗户多过低收入者。但在当时,普遍认为,拿窗户作为财富的表征并不十分完善。亚当·斯密1776年在《国富论》中就窗户税的这一问题写道:“乡间10镑租金的房屋,有时比伦敦500镑租金房屋的窗户还要多。前者的住户比后者的住户通常要穷得多,但尽管如此,只要是由窗户税来规定捐额,前者就得贡献更多金钱以支援国家。”
  • When the rates on the window tax went up, it was common for owners of homes and apartments to block or build over many or all of their windows. The results on human well-being were severe. "A series of studies by physicians and others found that the unsanitary conditions resulting from the lack of proper ventilation and fresh air encouraged the propagation of numerous diseases such as dysentery, gangrene, and typhus. ... A series of petitions to Parliament resulted in the designation of commissioners and committees to study the problems of the window tax in the first half of the 19th century. In 1846, medical officers petitioned Parliament for the abolition of the window tax, pronouncing it to be `most injurious to the health, welfare, property, and industry of the poor, and of the community at large'."
  • 一旦窗户税的税率上涨,宅子和公寓的所有者定会大量甚或全部封堵或筑死其窗户。人的福祉受到严重影响。“医疗工作者和其他许多人所做的一系列研究发现,缺乏适当通风和新鲜空气的不卫生环境,助长了如痢疾、坏疽和斑疹伤寒等众多疾病的蔓延……议会收到大量请愿书。于是在19世纪上半叶,众多专员和委员会得以受指派着手研究窗户税的问题。1846年,卫生部门官员向议会申请废除窗户税,称其‘对于贫民及整个社群的卫生、福祉、产权和勤勉极其有害’。”
  • Here's Charles Dickens writing in 1850 about the window tax in Household Words, a magazine that he published for a number of years: “The adage ‘free as air’ has become obsolete by Act of Parliament. Neither air nor light have been free since the imposition of the window-tax. We are obliged to pay for what nature lavishly supplies to all, at so much per window per year; and the poor who cannot afford the expense are stinted in two of the most urgent necessities of life.”
  • 1850年,查尔斯·狄更斯在他多年主持出版的杂志《家常话》中如此描写道:“‘像空气一样自由’这条谚语已经因议会而过时。自窗户税开征后,无论是空气还是光线都不曾免费过【译注:“自由”与“免费”的英文都是free】。我们被迫为大自然慷慨的恩赐付费,只要时间、窗户还在,而无法承担这笔开支的穷人,只能在这两样至关紧要的生活必需品上节约。”
Oates and Schwab work with a mix of data on the number of windows in a sample of houses in Shropshire and economic theory about household behavior when confronted with taxes to generate an admittedly rough estimate that on average, collecting a certain amount of money through the window tax created an excess burden--in terms of the costs of living in a place with fewer windows--equal to an additional 62% of the value of the tax. Oates和Schwab将什普罗郡样本住宅的窗户数据和面对个税居民行为经济理论结合起来,得出一个粗略的估计:整体说来,因窗户税那笔钱产生的超额负担——就人们选择住在窗户较少的住所这一行为成本而言——相当于税赋的62%。 Oates and Schwab ask why the window tax lasted so long, give its many problems, and offer an appropriately cynical answer: "Perhaps the lesson here is that when governments need to raise significant revenue, even a very bad tax can survive for a very long time." 既然窗户税问题如此之多,Oates和Schwab就追问为何它能持续如此之久。他们给出的回答是一种恰到好处的冷嘲:“也许,此处的教益就是,如果政府需要显著增加收入,那么即便是极为恶性的税种也能存活很长一段时间。” I didn't know Oates personally, but I had one other job-related interaction with him back. Along with his work in local public finance, Oates was also well-known as an environmental economist. His 1975 book, The Theory of Environmental Policy (written with William Baumol) was highly influential in setting the direction of what at the time was a fairly new and growing field. 我私下里和Oates并无深交,但之前曾因工作关系和他有过另外一次互动。除了在地方公共财政领域的成绩以外,Oates还以环境经济学家的身份知名。他1975年的著作《环境经济理论与政策设计》(与William Baumol合著)影响极大,为当时这个相当年轻、正在成长的领域设定了方向。 In 1995, Oates was a co-author in one of the most downloaded and cited exchanges the JEP has ever published on the subject of what is sometimes called the "Porter hypothesis." 1995年,以人称的“波特假说”为主题,Oates与人合作,为《经济学展望杂志》写了一篇文章,成为该刊史上下载和引用得最多的文章之一。 Michael Porter made the argument--bolstered by a large number of case studies, that when environmental goals are set in a strict way, but firms are allowed flexibility in how to achieve those goals in the context of a competitive market environment, firms often become quite innovative in meeting those environmental goals. 以大量案例研究为支撑,迈克尔·波特提出了如下论点:当环境目标被严格设定且企业在竞争中可以灵活发挥时,企业为达成这些目标通常会变得富有创造性。 Indeed, Porter argued that in a substantial number of cases, the innovations induced by the tough new environmental rules save enough money so that the rules end up imposing no economic costs at all. In the Fall 1995 Journal of Economic Perspectives, Michael E. Porter and Claas van der Linde make their case in "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship," (9:4, 97-118). 事实上,波特认为,在相当多的案例中,由严厉的环保新规所引发的创新能够省出足够的款项,使得这些规定最终不增加任何经济成本。在《经济展望杂志》1995/秋,波特和Claas van der Linde通过《环境/竞争力关系新概念一探》(9:4, 97-118)一文对此作了论述。 The authorial team of Karen Palmer, Wallace E. Oates, and Paul R. Portney respond in "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?" (9:4, 119-132). Oates and his co-authors took the position that while the costs of complying with environmental regulations do often turn out to be lower than industry predictions that were made when the rule was under discussion, it goes too far to say that environmental rules usually or generally don't impose costs. I wrote about some more recent evidence on this dispute in "Environmental Protection and Productivity Growth: Seeking the Tradeoff" (January 8, 2015). Karen Palmer、Wallace E. Oates和Paul R. Portney用《强化环保标准:收益/成本范式还是零成本范式?》(9:4, 119-132)一文做出回应。Oates和共同作者们的立场是:尽管遵守环保规制的成本最终总会低于起初制定时的业界预测,但却不能说它往往或一般情形下不会增加成本。我曾就此讨论提供了一些最新佐证,见《环境保护与生产率增长:寻找权衡》一文(2015-01-08) (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

黄金太贵

【2016-08-14】

@whigzhou: 只有将竞争在性别间完全隔离,才可能让男女运动员拿到数量大致相同的奖牌,同理,必须实行某种(有形或无形的)种族隔离制度,才可能让各种族在职业竞技场上获得大致相同的报酬和晋升机会,现在你们大概明白平权法的精髓所在了吧?

@去了哪儿的人: 不知道为吗没有这样的言论——某族人居然一块金牌都没,种族歧视啊,领这种奖是一种侮辱。

@whigzhou: 更奇怪的是竟然没有人主张将赛事分(more...)

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【2016-08-14】 @whigzhou: 只有将竞争在性别间完全隔离,才可能让男女运动员拿到数量大致相同的奖牌,同理,必须实行某种(有形或无形的)种族隔离制度,才可能让各种族在职业竞技场上获得大致相同的报酬和晋升机会,现在你们大概明白平权法的精髓所在了吧? @去了哪儿的人: 不知道为吗没有这样的言论——某族人居然一块金牌都没,种族歧视啊,领这种奖是一种侮辱。 @whigzhou: 更奇怪的是竟然没有人主张将赛事分成17个性别举行,可能是因为最近黄金太贵~  
总会起作用

【2016-08-10】

@海德沙龙 《噩梦般的底特律教育系统》 底特律自70年代以来就在持续衰败,居民不断逃离,工厂和住宅区一个个沦为废墟,犯罪率攀至榜首,随之一起沦落的还有它的公立教育系统,学生大量流失,出勤率、毕业率和学习成绩快速下降,然而这些学校的开支却并未减少,它正在从一个教育机构变成教师救济所…

@whigzhou: 选择机制总会起作用,问题是在哪个层次上起作用,假如你阻止自由市场在个体和企业层次上起选择作(more...)

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【2016-08-10】 @海德沙龙 《噩梦般的底特律教育系统》 底特律自70年代以来就在持续衰败,居民不断逃离,工厂和住宅区一个个沦为废墟,犯罪率攀至榜首,随之一起沦落的还有它的公立教育系统,学生大量流失,出勤率、毕业率和学习成绩快速下降,然而这些学校的开支却并未减少,它正在从一个教育机构变成教师救济所… @whigzhou: 选择机制总会起作用,问题是在哪个层次上起作用,假如你阻止自由市场在个体和企业层次上起选择作用,那么其他选择机制便会在产业、组织、城市、地区、国家等层次上起作用。  
比如暖球党

【2016-07-27】

@whigzhou: Yes,Minister里描绘的那种官僚机构捕获权力,事务官戏弄选举官员的情况,在美国不太严重,原因可能是大量非官方智库和游说机构的存在,将政治纲领转变成可操作的具体法案,是桩繁重的技术活,许多智库和游说机构就是帮政客干这活的,如果这些活都被拿政府经费的研究机构包揽了,情况就完全不同。

@whigzhou: 所以尽管游说活动有种种不好,那也比用官办研究机构取代它们好,这是(more...)

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【2016-07-27】 @whigzhou: Yes,Minister里描绘的那种官僚机构捕获权力,事务官戏弄选举官员的情况,在美国不太严重,原因可能是大量非官方智库和游说机构的存在,将政治纲领转变成可操作的具体法案,是桩繁重的技术活,许多智库和游说机构就是帮政客干这活的,如果这些活都被拿政府经费的研究机构包揽了,情况就完全不同。 @whigzhou: 所以尽管游说活动有种种不好,那也比用官办研究机构取代它们好,这是反对由政府资助研究活动的最重要理由,哪怕资助的是貌似与政治无涉的自然科学研究,最终也会变成权力捕获者,比如暖球党。 @whigzhou: 由此想到的一个问题是,川普上台后会找谁来干这活呢?那些多年来大力主张自由市场的保守派智库,难道真能厚着脸皮去帮川普草拟法案如何将关税提高到40%,如何惩罚拒绝将工厂搬回来的公司?如何解除美国对盟国的安全责任?依我看,他只能去左派那里找了。
统一与武德

【2016-07-27】

狄宇宙在《古代中国与其强邻》中提出的观点很有意思,列出的事实很明显,但之前好像没见过讨论,

1)秦赵燕三国在战国后期对北方非华夏的游牧或畜牧民族发动了大型征伐,将控制线向北推进了数百公里,
2)秦赵燕的长城远非农耕与草原的生态边界,而是大幅远离这条边界,深入草原,特别是赵长城,
3)所以长城并非防御性策略的结果,而是扩张政策的结果,
4)秦统一后延续了这一扩张政策,但随后局面发生了逆转,
5)秦汉之际和汉前期是一个华夏大幅退缩的阶段,
6)武帝发动的大型战争是对此退缩的反弹,其对非华夏区的征伐规模此后任何华夏政权再也没达到(more...)

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【2016-07-27】 狄宇宙在《古代中国与其强邻》中提出的观点很有意思,列出的事实很明显,但之前好像没见过讨论, 1)秦赵燕三国在战国后期对北方非华夏的游牧或畜牧民族发动了大型征伐,将控制线向北推进了数百公里, 2)秦赵燕的长城远非农耕与草原的生态边界,而是大幅远离这条边界,深入草原,特别是赵长城, 3)所以长城并非防御性策略的结果,而是扩张政策的结果, 4)秦统一后延续了这一扩张政策,但随后局面发生了逆转, 5)秦汉之际和汉前期是一个华夏大幅退缩的阶段, 6)武帝发动的大型战争是对此退缩的反弹,其对非华夏区的征伐规模此后任何华夏政权再也没达到过。 说几点我的看法: 1)统一集权帝国抵御游牧入侵的能力不如割据状态,原因之一是因为他不敢把重兵放在远离权力中心的边境上,蒙恬是第一个例子, 2)统一集权帝国对进攻性政策的意愿也弱于割据的边缘国,因为和亲纳贡政策对它来说相对成本更低,而边地的相对价值也更低, 3)汉武的成就看来是个特例,这一特例之所以出现,有两个较明显的原因:A)帝国历史不长,人口压力尚轻,因而可动员资源较多,B)伴随大型帝国的和平化时间较短,战士禀赋尚未大幅削弱, 4)唐帝国勉强维持了那么久而没被冲垮,是因为它的集权程度不太高,后期近乎于割据状态, 5)明帝国看起来是个反例,可能的解释是:A)小冰期游牧势力大幅退缩,B)迁都北京+大运河部分解决了(1)所提到的难题 @黄章晋ster: 处于割据对立时,很容易形成普鲁士林立的情形,一旦统一为一个中央集权帝国,大约百年后就进入无人知兵、柔弱不武的军力下滑通道。 @whigzhou: 对 @黄章晋ster:一个超大帝国保持稳定,只能依靠一个庞大的具有相同信仰的文官和精英建立统一认同才能做到,而这个组织系统和它的价值观必然是排斥职业军人的。这样的帝国几亿人和几千万并无区别。但在一个军事贵族集团统治的农业社会,有五百万人就足够对付铁木真了。 @whigzhou: 贵帝国的历史就是一个不断打压尚武文化的历史,到最后军户甚至都变成贱籍了  
会动摇多少结论呢

【2016-07-25】

@whigzhou: 以统计学方法为主导的研究有个问题是,容易让人忽视一些有着根本重要性但又缺乏统计差异的因素,比如身高,在一个儿童营养条件普遍得到保障的社会,研究者可能会得出『营养不是影响身高的重要因素』的结论,并且这一结论可能在很多年中都经受住了考验,直到有一天,某一人群经历了一次严重营养不良……

@whigzhou: 在可控实验中,此类问题可以通过对营养条件这一参数施加干预而得以避免,但社会科学领域常常不具备对参数进行任意干预的条件,只能用统计学方法来模拟可控实验,可是(more...)

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【2016-07-25】 @whigzhou: 以统计学方法为主导的研究有个问题是,容易让人忽视一些有着根本重要性但又缺乏统计差异的因素,比如身高,在一个儿童营养条件普遍得到保障的社会,研究者可能会得出『营养不是影响身高的重要因素』的结论,并且这一结论可能在很多年中都经受住了考验,直到有一天,某一人群经历了一次严重营养不良…… @whigzhou: 在可控实验中,此类问题可以通过对营养条件这一参数施加干预而得以避免,但社会科学领域常常不具备对参数进行任意干预的条件,只能用统计学方法来模拟可控实验,可是当某些变量的采样值缺乏多样性时,这一模拟便无法进行,于是便留下了盲点。 @whigzhou: 近年来有很多针对国别的政治学研究,量化了很多指标,统计学工具也用的挺熟练,但我总有种感觉,一些基本背景条件似乎没有得到足够关注,比如拿破仑战争之后各国政治的一个基本背景是英帝或美帝的存在,这一条件如此普遍而牢固乃至观察不到差异,一旦消除,会动摇多少结论呢? @whigzhou: 让问题变得更棘手的是那些存在足够大差异但『边际影响率从某个阈值开始骤减』的变量,比如钙摄入量与身高的关系,在『从零到适宜值』这个区间,钙摄入对身高影响显著,而从适宜值往上,边际影响率急减,几乎没影响,此时更容易得出错误结论。 @慕容飞宇gg: 是。类似的各种公立学校和私立学校的比较也存在类似问题,现有的结论都只适用于现在90%的学生上公立学校的基本背景。对李伯儒主导的学界来说这个基本背景是理所当然的。 @whigzhou: 嗯 @whigzhou: 我们经常听到诸如『某一特性差异60%归因于基因,40%归于环境』之类的说法,仿佛这一归因比例是某个固有值似的,而实际上,这些比例当然高度依赖于目标人群的生存条件,你把一个群体的铅污染全部消除,智力的环境影响『比重』立马就降低了。 @whigzhou: Taleb的《黑天鹅》想要谈论的就是这个主题,可是他太笨了,写了厚厚一本看起来很哲学的砖头书,结果也没说清楚。  
文化气味

【2016-07-23】

@linsantu 发表了博文《科学家和哲学家的宗教信仰》(6月24日改自去年知乎回答,7月10日发表于腾讯大家)一我们生活在一个科学主义的时代,科学家(尤其是自然科学家)常常被视为理性与真理的化身。因此一般人在讨论“神 http://t.cn/R5gmmgp

@Drunkplane-zny: @whigzhou 辉总也许会对这文章感兴趣。我感觉挺有趣的。

@whigzhou: 这主要是个文化现象,不从文化方面入手没啥意思

@whigzhou: 我见过一些信仰调查问卷,基本观(more...)

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【2016-07-23】 @linsantu 发表了博文《科学家和哲学家的宗教信仰》(6月24日改自去年知乎回答,7月10日发表于腾讯大家)一我们生活在一个科学主义的时代,科学家(尤其是自然科学家)常常被视为理性与真理的化身。因此一般人在讨论“神 http://t.cn/R5gmmgp @Drunkplane-zny: @whigzhou 辉总也许会对这文章感兴趣。我感觉挺有趣的。 @whigzhou: 这主要是个文化现象,不从文化方面入手没啥意思 @whigzhou: 我见过一些信仰调查问卷,基本观感是,通常它们的问题都问的很蠢,让我无从回答,比如『你认为上帝存在吗?』这种问题,若不澄清其操作性含义,便毫无意义,『你有宗教信仰吗?』也差不多,『你觉得下列哪顶帽子更适合你:无神论者、怀疑论者、不可知论者、基督徒……』稍微好一点,但信息量也不大。 @whigzhou: 假如1950年的一位数学家说自己是基督徒,2010年的一位数学家说自己是无神论者,依我看,这一不同表态对于我们判断他们在基本哲学立场上有何差异毫无帮助。 @whigzhou: 因为如何表态主要取决于他们是否喜欢『基督徒』和『无神论者』这两个词所沾上的文化气味 @whigzhou: 宗教信仰主要是一种文化认同,跟哲学立场没什么关系,或者说两者间关系是高度任意的,『全知全能的上帝规定了物理定律并通过这些定律运行世界』和无神论有什么经验上可辨认差异吗?反之,无神论者照样可以相信灵性、感质和各种天钩。 @whigzhou: 所以,假如你要把宗教当成一个哲学问题来问,那么你的问题就不能这么幼稚或暗含立场,假如你要把它当成文化认同问题来问,那么像『你经常去教堂吗?』『假如你没受过洗,你会在未来受洗吗?』『你常阅读圣经吗?』『教会生活对你重要吗?』『你希望自己的葬礼遵循基督教仪轨吗?』之类的问题会更好。 @whigzhou: 当代美国社会的语境中,信仰问题其实已经收窄到了其伦理方面,即,争议参与者所关切的,主要是其伦理方面,其中要点可表述为:在判定某一人类行动应该与否时,除了个人欲望、理性及其集体表达之外,是否存在某个更高(或最高)的外部指引,若是,它具体给出了哪些指引? @whigzhou: 多数坚守信仰者所意图坚守的,其实是这个,尽管他们自己往往也表达不清楚。  
深红区

【2016-07-21】

@海德沙龙: 《牛仔:备受排挤的濒危物种》 2014年的内华达『邦迪对峙』和今年初的俄勒冈占领行动,让牛仔这个久已被遗忘的群体又进入了公众视野,本文是一位俄勒冈牧场主写给《华盛顿邮报》的一封信,讲述了近年来联邦政府的土地与环境政策如何影响着他们的生计。

@海德沙龙: 牧场主处境恶化只是这场对抗的背景之一,更大的背景是日益膨胀的国家主义与美国传统价值观的对立,『邦迪对峙』得到了众多民兵组织的支持,这些民兵组织代表了自由、独立、自治的古老美国传统,通过支持牧场主的行(more...)

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【2016-07-21】 @海德沙龙: 《牛仔:备受排挤的濒危物种》 2014年的内华达『邦迪对峙』和今年初的俄勒冈占领行动,让牛仔这个久已被遗忘的群体又进入了公众视野,本文是一位俄勒冈牧场主写给《华盛顿邮报》的一封信,讲述了近年来联邦政府的土地与环境政策如何影响着他们的生计。 @海德沙龙: 牧场主处境恶化只是这场对抗的背景之一,更大的背景是日益膨胀的国家主义与美国传统价值观的对立,『邦迪对峙』得到了众多民兵组织的支持,这些民兵组织代表了自由、独立、自治的古老美国传统,通过支持牧场主的行动,他们展示了不惜以武力对抗联邦政府权力扩张的决心。 @whigzhou: 牧区与深红区高度重合 @whigzhou: 牛仔最多的落基山东麓各州(爱达荷、蒙大拿、怀俄明、犹他)既是保守派势力最稳固的州,也是共和党初选中川普输的最惨的州,这不是巧合 @whigzhou: 90年代以来,美国学术界急剧左倾,但这一倾向并非均匀分布,左倾最严重的是新英格兰地区的大学,而落基山东麓各州的大学是唯一的例外,保守派比例不降反升,不想放弃学术的保守派都跑那儿去了 @whigzhou: 从下图可见,美国学术界近二十年的左倾化主要是新英格兰大学贡献的 http://t.cn/RtAxkDi Figure 2. Regional Ideological Variations of Americas Professors: 1989 – 2014 @whigzhou: 美国校园的革命小将再这么闹下去,说不定到最后就是这些对学术最没兴趣的落基州保存了美国的学术和思想自由,这不由让人想起瑞士,很难说瑞士山民对金融业有什么兴趣,但正是瑞士山民的彪悍、独立和对自由的执着,在动荡年代为欧洲金融业保存了一个避难所。  
活得好好的

【2016-07-19】

@隐藏的火星人:我就想问辉总,兼顾后果和公平的最好的策略是什么,对待绿化

@whigzhou: 宪法容许范围内可做的很多,比如停止穆斯林移民,犯罪移民驱逐出境(像瑞士),取缔国内赞助恐怖主义的组织,禁止国内政治组织接受伊斯兰主义组织或政权(比如沙特政府)的捐款,在公职人员中展开忠诚调查(即麦卡锡行动)

@whigzhou: 从佛罗里达Boca Raton伊斯兰中心 (ICBR)的例子可看出有多少早该做事情没(more...)

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【2016-07-19】 @隐藏的火星人:我就想问辉总,兼顾后果和公平的最好的策略是什么,对待绿化 @whigzhou: 宪法容许范围内可做的很多,比如停止穆斯林移民,犯罪移民驱逐出境(像瑞士),取缔国内赞助恐怖主义的组织,禁止国内政治组织接受伊斯兰主义组织或政权(比如沙特政府)的捐款,在公职人员中展开忠诚调查(即麦卡锡行动) @whigzhou: 从佛罗里达Boca Raton伊斯兰中心 ([[ICBR]])的例子可看出有多少早该做事情没做,ICBR与恐怖组织的关系确凿无疑,毫不掩饰,十几年来屡屡被联邦政府抓包和定罪,却始终活得好好的,不久前还被棕榈滩县选为投票点,直到本次惨案发生遭大量抗议后才换地方 http://t.cn/RtzHREz @whigzhou: 类似例子比比皆是,几乎是常态  
一颗要命丸

【2016-07-18】

@whigzhou: 凯末尔主义终结之后,土耳其的一些可能发展:离开北约(主动或被动),占领叙利亚的部分地区,攻击伊拉克库尔德地区,在高加索和中亚扶植马仔因而与俄国发生冲突,为争夺中东霸权而与伊朗和/或沙特发生冲突……

@whigzhou: 七年前的诺贝尔和平奖不愧为史上最具预见性和最具激励效果的诺贝尔奖~

@龙与羊驼: 凯末尔主义是和纳赛尔一样的工业党,为什么不能被终结?经济只有自由化才能最终推动政治自由化,不自由的经济根本不可能推进政治社会风气的开放。

@whigzhou: 绿化是『一颗要命丸』,都不用第二颗,跟这个抉择相比,其他都不重要了

@whigzhou: 宪政基础是根,经济表现是果,经济政策、自由化、私有化,都只是小枝桠而已,都是很容易逆转的事情,花枝插在花瓶里不也能绚烂几天嘛,鸟用

@blue-tomato: 像土尔其这么大的一个国家,而且是一个有着一定经济能力的宪政民主国家,还需要依靠军队的协助才能摆脱宗教(绿化)的入侵,这是否说明绿化的强大与及宪政民主的无能呢?

@w(more...)

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【2016-07-18】 @whigzhou: 凯末尔主义终结之后,土耳其的一些可能发展:离开北约(主动或被动),占领叙利亚的部分地区,攻击伊拉克库尔德地区,在高加索和中亚扶植马仔因而与俄国发生冲突,为争夺中东霸权而与伊朗和/或沙特发生冲突…… @whigzhou: 七年前的诺贝尔和平奖不愧为史上最具预见性和最具激励效果的诺贝尔奖~ @龙与羊驼: 凯末尔主义是和纳赛尔一样的工业党,为什么不能被终结?经济只有自由化才能最终推动政治自由化,不自由的经济根本不可能推进政治社会风气的开放。 @whigzhou: 绿化是『一颗要命丸』,都不用第二颗,跟这个抉择相比,其他都不重要了 @whigzhou: 宪政基础是根,经济表现是果,经济政策、自由化、私有化,都只是小枝桠而已,都是很容易逆转的事情,花枝插在花瓶里不也能绚烂几天嘛,鸟用 @blue-tomato: 像土尔其这么大的一个国家,而且是一个有着一定经济能力的宪政民主国家,还需要依靠军队的协助才能摆脱宗教(绿化)的入侵,这是否说明绿化的强大与及宪政民主的无能呢? @whigzhou: 说明宪政存续条件之苛刻 @blue-tomato: 非常有意思。如果是这样,谁人可以在规则既定的条件下,推翻规则,扮演最后的救世主,而且有充足的理由得到人们的信任?貌似魔兽里的守护者最终却是引进兽人的作恶者 @whigzhou: 以前是英帝,后来是美帝,现在,恐怕已经没了 @whigzhou: 多年来我已反复强调宪政基础相对于中短期变革与增长的重要性,复习一下:《从摊贩胜诉看印度法治》 《不必对南非期望太高》 《下一块金砖在哪里?》 @安德鲁杰克逊蓝卫兵:但是弗里德曼说只要经济自由,社会必定开放,政治必定自由,这个怎么讲? @whigzhou: http://headsalon.org/archives/7107.html  
先自己割了

【2016-07-17】

@whigzhou: 素食,反狩猎,反枪,反核,反帝反殖民,和平主义,支持同性婚姻,福利主义,奶嘴化教育……所有这些看似完全没关系的政治诉求,在现实中却是高度内聚的,能把这些串起来的因素,我能想到的只有阴柔化,这一点在绿党身上表现的最清楚。

@江南孤影月:漏了女权。

@whigzhou: 嗯,还有反死刑和反工业

@tuxt520:阴柔和同性恋婚姻的关系是什么?

@whigzhou: 阴柔化根本出发点就是反对传统男性角色,然后也延伸到各种让人联想到雄性力量的东西,比如枪支、核能和大型机械(more...)

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【2016-07-17】 @whigzhou: 素食,反狩猎,反枪,反核,反帝反殖民,和平主义,支持同性婚姻,福利主义,奶嘴化教育……所有这些看似完全没关系的政治诉求,在现实中却是高度内聚的,能把这些串起来的因素,我能想到的只有阴柔化,这一点在绿党身上表现的最清楚。 @江南孤影月:漏了女权。 @whigzhou: 嗯,还有反死刑和反工业 @tuxt520:阴柔和同性恋婚姻的关系是什么? @whigzhou: 阴柔化根本出发点就是反对传统男性角色,然后也延伸到各种让人联想到雄性力量的东西,比如枪支、核能和大型机械 @人格显示器: 阴柔化的原因是不是因为城市生活让人远离了耕作、狩猎、以及战争? @whigzhou: 依我看,首要原因是社会的和平化,降低了战士禀赋的社会需求,其次是机械化降低了对肌肉的需求,总之,阳刚和雄性力量不像过去那么值钱了 @tuxt520:传统男性角色也可以是同性恋啊 @whigzhou: 将古代男风等同于现代同性文化的说法很流行,但那是错误的,前者并不对婚姻和家庭构成冲击,并不挑战男性角色和雄性力量 @abada张宏兵:这些在ISIS国很推崇很值钱 @whigzhou: 没错,坏就坏在这里,当今西方物质实力如此强大,只因文化之阴柔,意志之虚弱,连几只臭虫都踩不死 @whigzhou: 1)认为某件事E不好,并认为其原因是C,不等于反对C,我当然不会反对和平化和机械化,2)指出某邪恶人群也拥有特性P,并不能驳斥『特性P是可贵的』这一论点,假如恐怖分子都爱吃肉,我们就不吃了?强奸犯都还长着鸡鸡呢不是?要反强奸就先自己割了?【这么简单的道路都需要解释,实在令人失望】  
[译文]摘下德国的小绿帽看看

Looking Under Germany’s “Green” Hood
摘下德国的“小绿帽”看看

作者:Jamie Horgan @ 2016-05-27
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:babyface_claire (@许你疯不许你傻)
来源:The American Interest,http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/05/27/looking-under-germanys-green-hood/

Germany has tripled its renewable power production over the past decade. But how green is its energiewende, really?
过去十年间,德国可再生能源生产增加了三倍。但是,德国的“能源转型”(energiewende)到底有多绿色?

There’s no denying that the energiewende—Germany’s much ballyhooed and supposedly green energy transition—has accomplished a great deal in recent years, but whether the country (and the environment) is better off for it requires a closer examination. Let’s start with the good news and focus on the extraordinary growth of renewable energy in Germany over the past decade.

毫无疑问,“能源转型”——德国大肆宣扬的所谓绿色环保的能源转变计划——在过去数年间达成了很多目标,但该国(及其环境)是否因此而变好了,则需要更细致的考察。我们首先来看看好消息,关注一下过去十年间德国可再生能源的非凡增长。

According to data compiled in a recent briefing by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “[e]lectricity generated from renewable sources has tripled in Germany over the past 10 years.” Most of that added capacity has come from new wind and solar farms (a direct result of energiewende policies) and Berlin hopes to rely on renewables for more than four-fifths of its power by 2050—a remarkably ambitious goal.

根据美国能源情报署(EIA)最近发布的一份简报上搜集的数据,“过去十年间,德国的可再生能源发电量增加了三倍。”这种新增发电能力大部分来自于新建的风力发电厂和太阳能发电厂(这正是“能源转换”政策的直接成果),而且柏林还期望到2050年时其电力需求的五分之四能够依赖可再生能源——一个非常野心勃勃的目标。

But as much of a reach as that mid-century target appears to be, what Germany has already accomplished is nothing short of striking. Most of the time when we hear about the growth of renewables(more...)

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Looking Under Germany’s “Green” Hood 摘下德国的“小绿帽”看看 作者:Jamie Horgan @ 2016-05-27 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:babyface_claire (@许你疯不许你傻) 来源:The American Interest,http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/05/27/looking-under-germanys-green-hood/ Germany has tripled its renewable power production over the past decade. But how green is its energiewende, really? 过去十年间,德国可再生能源生产增加了三倍。但是,德国的“能源转型”(energiewende)到底有多绿色? There’s no denying that the energiewende—Germany’s much ballyhooed and supposedly green energy transition—has accomplished a great deal in recent years, but whether the country (and the environment) is better off for it requires a closer examination. Let’s start with the good news and focus on the extraordinary growth of renewable energy in Germany over the past decade. 毫无疑问,“能源转型”——德国大肆宣扬的所谓绿色环保的能源转变计划——在过去数年间达成了很多目标,但该国(及其环境)是否因此而变好了,则需要更细致的考察。我们首先来看看好消息,关注一下过去十年间德国可再生能源的非凡增长。 According to data compiled in a recent briefing by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “[e]lectricity generated from renewable sources has tripled in Germany over the past 10 years.” Most of that added capacity has come from new wind and solar farms (a direct result of energiewende policies) and Berlin hopes to rely on renewables for more than four-fifths of its power by 2050—a remarkably ambitious goal. 根据美国能源情报署(EIA)最近发布的一份简报上搜集的数据,“过去十年间,德国的可再生能源发电量增加了三倍。”这种新增发电能力大部分来自于新建的风力发电厂和太阳能发电厂(这正是“能源转换”政策的直接成果),而且柏林还期望到2050年时其电力需求的五分之四能够依赖可再生能源——一个非常野心勃勃的目标。 But as much of a reach as that mid-century target appears to be, what Germany has already accomplished is nothing short of striking. Most of the time when we hear about the growth of renewables, the numbers only look impressive when you discuss them in terms of growth, and tend to pale in significance when you place them in the wider context of an energy mix. 虽然这个截至本世纪中叶的目标看起来很宏伟,但德国目前所取得的成绩也是十分夺目的。多数情况下,当我们听到可再生能源的发展时,只有在当你讨论增长时数字才令人印象深刻。如果把这些数字放到能源结构这一更大的背景中去,它的重要性往往就会相形见绌。 For example, there have been plenty of headlines recently about the stellar year renewables had here in the United States in 2015, with wind and solar respectively accounting for 41 and 26 percent of new electricity generation capacity. But looking under the hood, we find that after all of that growth, renewable energy sources still account for just 7 percent of our nation’s overall power generation (wind is at 4.7 percent while solar produces a measly 0.6 percent), a pittance next to real green workhorses like nuclear power (20 percent) or natural gas (33 percent). 比方说,我们已经在报纸上看过很多头条文章,谈论2015年是美国可再生能源的闪亮年份——风能和太阳能分别占到新增发电能力的41%和26%。但是揭开帽子一看,我们就会发现,在经历所有这些增长之后,可再生能源在全国发电总量中仍然只占有7%(风力发电占4.7%,而太阳能发电更是只有可怜的0.6%),与真正的绿色老马如核电(20%)或天然气(33%)相比差距甚远。 However in Germany, renewables contributed to a whopping 31 percent of electricity generation in 2015, and on particularly windy or sunny days that number spiked much higher. Environmentalists around the world are jumping up and down, pointing at this progress as evidence that renewables’ day has finally come. Still, most other countries aren’t exactly chomping at the bit to replicate energiewende strategies. Why is that? 但是在德国,可再生能源为2015年发电量贡献了31%,占比非常之高。而且,赶上风特别大或光照特别充足的日子,这个数字还能爬得更高。全球的环保主义者都手舞足蹈,认为这种变化正是可再生能源全盛之日终于来临的证据。然而,大部分其他国家却并没有迫不及待地想要复制“能源转型”这一战略。原因何在? The growth of renewables didn’t occur because of market forces—wind and solar aren’t out-competing fossil fuels on price. Rather, Berlin had to subsidize their growth through the use of feed-in tariffs, which essentially guaranteed wind and solar producers privileged grid access and long-term, above-market rates for their power. The costs of these feed-in tariffs have been passed along to German consumers in the form of a green surcharge on their electricity bills. 因为,可再生能源的增加并不是市场作用的结果,风力和太阳能并不是通过价格优势而战胜化石燃料的。为了增加可再生能源发电量,柏林必须通过强制价回购政策(feed-in tariffs)对其进行补贴。这种补贴政策实质上为风力和太阳能发电厂提供了入网特权,并且让他们能在很长时间内以高于市场价的价格售电。这类强制价回购政策的成本被转嫁到德国消费者身上,他们的电费账单上因此增加了一种绿色附加费。 You don’t have to be a beltway insider to see how politically poisonous a policy predicated on higher power bills might be to leaders looking at their own energy mixes elsewhere in the world. At a time when oil and gas markets are fairly flooded with supplies and prices are correspondingly low, it’s an even harder sell for policymakers: “never mind that cheap (and relatively clean burning) natural gas. Here, have some expensive wind power.” 对于世界其他地方的政治领导人来说,面对他们国家的能源结构,这种只能由更高的电费账单才能维持的政策在政治上将会多么有害,你无需是个官场老手也能想明白。特别是,现在石油和天然气市场供给泛滥,因此价格相应很低,要说服政策制定者接受上述政策就更是难上加难了:“别理那些便宜(且相对而言更能清洁燃烧的)天然气了。来,用用更贵的风力发电。” These aren’t nominal price hikes, either. Feed-in tariffs double the average German household’s power bill, and according to the EIA, they’re spiraling up: 而且,这并非名义物价上涨。强制价回购政策使得德国家庭的平均电费上涨了一倍。根据EIA,目前它还在螺旋上升:
[O]ne surcharge for renewable electricity increased from 8.8% of the residential electricity price in 2010 to 17% in 2013…In 2014, the average sales-weighted retail price for residential consumption in Germany was about 35 cents/kWh, while the average residential retail price in the United States was about 13 cents/kWh. Along with Denmark, Germany has among the highest residential electricity prices in Europe. “民用电价格中因可再生能源而产生的一项附加费从2010年的8.8%上涨到2013年的17%……2014年,德国的民用电零售价格依销售额加权平均后为35美分/千瓦时,而美国的民用电平均零售价约为13美分/千瓦时。在民用电价格方面,德国与丹麦同居全欧之首。”
Cheap energy is foundational for economic growth, and expensive electricity can be seen as a regressive tax on poorer households. Upper class homes might not notice their power bill doubling as a result of green surcharges because it makes up a much smaller slice of their monthly budget, but for working class families the cumulative effect of paying off that eco-premium can be devastating. 廉价能源对于经济增长具有基础性作用,而昂贵的电费则可以被看作是加于贫困家庭身上的一种累退税。电费账单因为绿色附加费而上涨一倍,这一点上层阶级家庭可能不会注意到,因为电费在他们的每月开支中只占到很小一部分,但对于工人阶级家庭而言,持续支付这种生态附加费的累积后果则非常大。 And that’s just the beginning of the energiewende‘s problems. Wind and solar power are by their very nature intermittent energy sources, meaning they can only supply the grid when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining. That’s a big problem for grid operators, because above all else, society needs its electricity supply to be dependable. 而这在“能源转型”所面临的诸多问题中还只是个开头。就其性质而言,风能和太阳能都只是间歇性的能量来源,只有刮风或出太阳的时候才能给电网供电。这对电网运营企业来说是个大麻烦,因为社会需要其电力供应稳定可靠,这一点至关重要。 Moreover, wind and solar farms tend to be much smaller and more numerous than coal- or gas-fired power plants or nuclear reactors (more on those later). The inconsistency of these renewables and their more distributed siting pattern both pose big challenges to grids, and Germany hasn’t updated its electricity transmission systems at the same pace as it has incentivized the development of green energy. 另外,相较于燃煤或燃气发电厂或者核电站(下文再详述),风力发电厂和太阳能发电厂一般都更小、更多。这些可再生能源发电厂的不稳定,以及更为分散的选址,都对输电网带来了极大的挑战,而德国虽然一直在刺激绿色能源发展,但并没有同步更新其电力输送网络。 As you might expect, that’s proving problematic. As seems to be the case with any new energy project, NIMBY-ism reared its head. Local German communities vigorously protested the construction of high-voltage transmission lines that would have brought power from offshore wind farms in the Baltic and North Seas southward. 不难预料,这必定是个麻烦事。跟几乎任何新建能源项目都会遭遇的一样,邻避一族首先出来阻扰。为了将电力从位于波罗的海和北海海边的离岸风力发电厂往南输送,需要修建高压输电线,而这在德国遭到了各地方社区的猛烈抵制。 Grid problems extend beyond the country’s borders to Germany’s neighbors, too. The Czech Republic and Poland have had to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to protect their own grids from surging German power on those especially sunny and breezy days. As the Czech Permanent Representative to the EU, Martin Povejšil, put it last summer, “if there is a strong blow of the wind in the North, we get it, we have the blackout.” 电网问题还越过国界,影响到了德国的邻国。为了保护各自的电网抵御大风或烈日天气里来自德国的电压突增问题,捷克共和国和波兰都已经花费了数亿美元。捷克驻欧盟的常任代表Martin Povejšil去年夏天就说:“如果北欧刮大风,我们有体会,我们会停电。” As Germany’s energiewende leads it down that road to 80+ percent renewables, these intermittency issues will become even more extreme. To get an idea of just how unreliable the German power supply has become, intraday energy trading in the German power market is now too volatile for humans to keep up, so traders have to rely on algorithms to do their jobs for them. 随着德国的“能源转型”政策朝着可再生能源发电占比80%以上的目标一路进发,上述因发电间歇而导致的问题将会愈演愈烈。为了了解一下德国的电力供应已经变得多不稳定,我们可以看个例子。德国电力市场的当日能源交易波动之大,单凭人脑已经无法跟踪,所以交易员们只能依靠计算机算法来做事。 But wait! There’s more. In some bizarre twist of tortured green logic, Germany’s “clean” energy transition also included the shuttering of the country’s only source of baseload (read: consistent) source of zero-emissions power: its fleet of nuclear reactors. This move was hastened by the 2011 Fukushima disaster, despite the fact that Germany, unlike Japan, straddles no tectonic boundary and therefore faces none of the same environmental challenges that the island nation does. 等一下!这还没完。在扭曲的绿色逻辑的古怪推理之下,德国的“清洁”能源转型还包括关闭该国唯一的零排放基载(即稳定可靠)电力来源——核反应堆机组。因2011年福岛事件爆发,这一举动得以加速,尽管德国跟日本不同,并不位于任何地质构造边界之上,因此也并不面临日本这一岛国所面临的任何类似环境挑战。 Whether you ascribe Berlin’s decision to snub nuclear power to fear or base political pandering to clueless environmentalists that have long held an anti-nuclear bias, the end result has been a loss of clean power, and most of that lost capacity has been replaced by the dirtiest fossil fuel around, coal—and not just any coal, but one of the dirtiest varieties of the sooty rock called lignite. 不管你认为柏林作出停止核能发电的决策是出于恐惧还是出于对愚蠢的环保主义者(他们从来都在偏执地反对核能)的可耻政治迎合,最终结果都很明白,那就是清洁电力变少了,而损失的发电量绝大多数又是由各种化石燃料中最脏的一种来填补的,那就是煤——而且不仅仅是普通的煤,而是这类乌黑矿石中最脏的一种,叫做褐煤。 Coal accounted for a plurality of Germany’s power production last year, a whole 44 percent of it, and until researchers discover a technological fix for the intermittency of wind and solar power, there’s not a great deal renewables can do to encroach on Old King Coal’s fiefdom. 煤炭在德国去年的电力生产中占比最高,总共达到44%。而且,除非研究者找到了风力和太阳能发电间歇性问题的技术解决办法,否则可再生能源要想蚕食“煤炭老国王”的领地,恐怕将无处下手。 energiewendeIf Germany was really serious about working towards a clean energy mix, they’d be spending less on propping up today’s generation of renewables and more on the research and development of the next generation of wind turbines, solar panels, and energy storage options that could allow those green energy sources to compete with fossil fuels on their own merit. 如果德国确实真的想要塑造出一个清洁能源结构,他们就应该少在扶持这一代可再生能源发电上花钱,多在研究开发下一代风轮机、太阳能电池板和储能设备等方面花钱,以便这些绿色能源能够凭自身的长处和化石能源进行竞争。 If Germany was really interested in acting as an eco-friendly example for the rest of the world, it would be embracing nuclear power (and investing in the next generation of nuclear technologies) with both arms, rather than shunning it in favor of lignite coal. 如果德国确实真的有心想要为世界其他地方做一个生态友好的典范,它就应该张开手臂拥抱核能(并在下一代核技术上增加投资),而不是有意回避核能,偏向褐煤。 Berlin hoped to set an example for the world with its energiewende, and there’s no denying that it has done just that—ten years ago, most would have scoffed at the notion that Germany could grow its renewable power generation as quickly as it has. However the German example isn’t a positive one, but rather a cautionary tale to world leaders of what can happen when you let environmentalist biases guide strategic energy planning. 柏林意图将“能源转型”政策树立为全世界的典范,而且无可置辩实现了这一目的——十年前,如果有人说德国的可再生能源发电量增长速度会有实际这么快,大多数人都会嗤之以鼻。但是,德国的样本并不是正面的。对于世界各国的领导人来说,它更像是一则警示寓言,提醒他们一旦让环保主义偏见主导战略性能源规划会有什么后果。 We can applaud the motivations of the energiewende—creating a sustainable energy mix is going to be a top priority not just for Germany but for our species over the coming decades—while still criticizing the tools it has tried to use to accomplish that goal. Regrettably, for all the impressive (and costly) progress Germany has made growing its renewable energy sector, it hasn’t seriously committed itself to the pursuit of an actually sustainable energiewende, hype be damned. 我们赞赏“能源转型”政策的动机。在未来数十年内,创建一个可持续的能源结构不但将是德国,而且将是整个人类种族的头等大事。但是,我们仍然可以批评德国用以实现这一目标的工具。尽管德国的可再生能源部门取得了引人注目(且昂贵的)长足增长,但遗憾的是,德国并没有认真地致力于追求一个真正可持续的“能源转型”,该死的炒作! (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]北欧的顶层为何坐得那么安稳

北欧的1%比美国的1%待遇更好
Scandinavia treats its 1% even better than the US

作者:Allison Schrager @ 2016-05-13
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Quartz,http://qz.com/528594/scandinavia-treats-its-1-even-better-than-the-us/

Young voters in America are growing skeptical of their country’s brand of capitalism. Their enthusiasm for Bernie Sanders suggests they crave something different, a romanticized version of Nordic socialism, with its generous welfare state and high tax rates.

美国的年轻选民们正在逐渐对他们国家的资本主义招牌产生怀疑。他们对民主党总统候选人Bernie Sanders的热情暗示了他们渴求某种不同的东西,一种浪漫化的、慷慨大方的北欧式社会主义高税率福利国家。

It is true that Nordic countries have a more equal distribution of wealth and income. They also have 标签: | |

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北欧的1%比美国的1%待遇更好 Scandinavia treats its 1% even better than the US 作者:Allison Schrager @ 2016-05-13 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Quartz,http://qz.com/528594/scandinavia-treats-its-1-even-better-than-the-us/ Young voters in America are growing skeptical of their country’s brand of capitalism. Their enthusiasm for Bernie Sanders suggests they crave something different, a romanticized version of Nordic socialism, with its generous welfare state and high tax rates. 美国的年轻选民们正在逐渐对他们国家的资本主义招牌产生怀疑。他们对民主党总统候选人Bernie Sanders的热情暗示了他们渴求某种不同的东西,一种浪漫化的、慷慨大方的北欧式社会主义高税率福利国家。 It is true that Nordic countries have a more equal distribution of wealth and income. They also have more economic mobility than the US. But what we admire about Nordic countries frays when you dig into their wealthiest 1%. 北欧国家确实有着更平均的财富和收入分配。他们在经济流动性方面也比美国表现得更好。但是当我们深入了解北欧国家的那1%最富有的人群时,我们的上述赞誉便可能遭到严重动摇。 Economists Simon Halphen, Wojciech Kopczuk, and Claus Thustrup Kreiner studied wealth among Danes(pdf). They observed that the extraordinary mobility found at lower levels disappears once you get into the very top of the wealth distribution. 三位经济学家Simon Halphen,Wojciech Kopczuk和Claus Thustrup研究了丹麦人的财富。他们观察到,丹麦较富及以下阶层中能看到的那种极高的经济流动性,在财富金字塔的最高层是不存在的。 If you are born into a family in the top 1% of wealth, odds are pretty good, you’ll end up there too. They estimate having parents in the 1% makes you 18 times more likely to be in the top 1% yourself; the odds double if your grandparents and parents were also in the 1%. 如果你出生在前1%的最富裕家庭,那么你就很可能一直留在这一阶层直到离世。他们估计,如果你的父母属于最富1%,那你进入最富1%的可能性就会增加18倍;如果你的祖父母和父母都属于最富1%,那么这一可能性会再增加一倍。 Studies also find that if a man’s father was not in the 0.1% he can forget about reaching the 0.1% in Sweden. The very wealthy ranks in Sweden tend to be dominated by the same family dynasties each generation. 研究还发现,对于一个普通瑞典人来说,如果他父亲不在财富积累的前0.1%,那么他自己也就别想着进入这0.1%的群体了。瑞典的财富排行榜往往被同样的豪族世家一代代把持着。 Nordic tax policy protects the wealthiest 1% by placing very high taxes on income and, by American standards, modest taxes on large inheritances. The high income taxes make it harder for a successful Scandinavian entrepreneur to earn his way into the top 1%. The low inheritance taxes make it relatively easy to pass on large estates. In America, income taxes are lower, and estate taxes higher on wealthy fortunes are higher. 北欧的税收政策保护最富有的1%人群,这体现在所得税极高,而大额遗产税与美国标准相比则要轻些。高所得税把斯堪迪纳维亚的成功企业家们拦在了1%的大门外。相对较低的遗产税给巨额遗产继承提供了方便。相较之下,美国的所得税较轻,而越富裕的人群所面对的遗产税也越高。 Tax policy may make it harder for rich Americans to maintain a spot in the top 1% generation after generation. It is hard to make a simple comparison between Nordic countries because American tax returns don’t include wealth holdings until people die and taxes are paid on their estates. But there is some evidence the richest Americans are more likely to be self-made entrepreneurs rather than members of family dynasties. 这样的税收政策可能使得富有的美国人难以一代代保持住财富最顶端1%的位置。但我们很难将北欧国家同美国简单地做比较,因为美国的纳税申报表是直到纳税人离世后征收遗产税时才会将持有财富计入征收。不过有一些证据表明最富有的美国人更多是白手起家的企业家,而不是富豪世家的成员。 A study by Kopczuk and Lena Edlund looked at estate tax data and observed that there are fewer women in the top 0.01% than in the 1960s. They argue that this is evidence of more self-made people cracking the 0.01% because heirs are equally likely to be male or female, but successful entrepreneurs tend to be male. Kopczuk和Lena Edlund所做的一项针对遗产税数据的研究显示,现在(美国的)财富顶端0.01%的人群中女性比例比1960年代时更少了。他们认为这是许多白手起家的人们挤进0.01%财富榜的表现,因为财富继承人总是男女均衡的,而成功的(白手起家)企业家则往往是男性。 The turnover in America’s top 0.01% comes from some combination of new entrepreneurs accumulating more wealth than established wealthy families, multiple heirs dividing fortunes, and estate taxes eroding family fortunes (though Kopczuk cautions there’s a lot of tax evasion when it comes to inheritances). 美国财富顶端的0.01%的流动是多重因素作用的结果,包括新晋企业家财富积累速度比老牌富豪家族更快、多个继承人分割财富和遗产税对于家族财富的侵蚀等(虽然Kopczuk告诫称美国的遗产税方面有相当程度的漏税逃税情况)。 Since most of the population lives outside the 1%, the mobility among the poor and middle class in Scandinavia is enviable and probably more important. But if you think the biggest threat to the economy is wealth concentration among the 1% being limited to a few powerful families, Scandinavia is not the utopia people make it out to be. 由于绝大多数人群与1%无关,北欧地区的贫穷和中产阶层的高流动性确实值得羡慕,或许也更为重要。但是如果你认为经济发展所面临的最大威胁是财富金字塔的顶层被极少数世家豪族霸占,那么北欧国家着实不是人们期盼的乌托邦。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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