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[译文]观察大脑的新工具

How the Brain Is Computing the Mind
大脑是如何计算意识的

作者:Ed Boyden @ 2016-02-12
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:Edge,http://edge.org/conversation/ed_boyden-how-the-brain-is-computing-the-mind

The history of science has shown us that you need the tools first. Then you get the data. Then you can make the theory. Then you can achieve understanding.
科学的历史告诉我们,首先你需要合适的工具,然后去收集数据,之后你就可以创造理论了,最终你才能获得对事物的理解。

Ed Boyden is a professor of biological engineering and brain and cognitive sciences at the MIT Media Lab and the MIT McGovern Institute. He leads the Synthetic Neurobiology Group.
Ed Boyden是MIT媒体实验室和MIT麦戈文研究院的一名生物工程和大脑与认知科学方向的教授。他领导着MIT合成神经生物学研究小组。

HOW THE BRAIN IS COMPUTING THE MIND
大脑是如何计算意识的

How can we truly understand how the brain is computing the mind? Over the last 100 years, neuroscience has made a lot of progress. We have learned that there are neurons in the brain, we have learned a lot about psychology, but connecting those two worlds, understanding how these computational circuits in the brain in coordinated fashion are generating decisions and thoughts and feelings and sensations, that link remains very elusive. And so, over the last decade, my group at MIT has been working on technology, ways of seeing the brain, ways of controlling brain circuits, ways of trying to map the molecules of the brain.

我们如何才能真正地认识到大脑是如何计算着意识的?在过去百年中,神经科学研究在这方面获得了长足进步。我们已经了解到大脑中有着巨量的神经元,也对心理学有了许多认识,但想要把这两个领域联系起来,去理解这些大脑中的计算电路是如何通过合作来产生决策、思想、感觉和情感,则并非易事,人们目前对其中的关联仍知之甚少。正因此,在过去十年中,我在MIT领导的研究小组一直致力于研究相关方面的技术,以期找到观测大脑,控制脑内回路,以及在大脑内部定位分子的方法。

At this point, what I’m trying to figure out is what to do next. How do we start to use these maps, use these dynamical observations and perturbations to link the computations that these circuits make, and things like thoughts and feelings and maybe even consciousness?

目前,我正在试图弄清我们下一步应该做些什么。我们能够如何利用这些分子定位图——也就是一些动态的观测和扰动——来将脑内电路的计算过程与思想,感觉,甚至是意识这些东西联系在一起?

There are a couple of things that we can do. One idea is simply to go get the data. A lot of people have the opposite po(more...)

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How the Brain Is Computing the Mind 大脑是如何计算意识的 作者:Ed Boyden @ 2016-02-12 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:Edge,http://edge.org/conversation/ed_boyden-how-the-brain-is-computing-the-mind The history of science has shown us that you need the tools first. Then you get the data. Then you can make the theory. Then you can achieve understanding. 科学的历史告诉我们,首先你需要合适的工具,然后去收集数据,之后你就可以创造理论了,最终你才能获得对事物的理解。 Ed Boyden is a professor of biological engineering and brain and cognitive sciences at the MIT Media Lab and the MIT McGovern Institute. He leads the Synthetic Neurobiology Group. Ed Boyden是MIT媒体实验室和MIT麦戈文研究院的一名生物工程和大脑与认知科学方向的教授。他领导着MIT合成神经生物学研究小组。 HOW THE BRAIN IS COMPUTING THE MIND 大脑是如何计算意识的 How can we truly understand how the brain is computing the mind? Over the last 100 years, neuroscience has made a lot of progress. We have learned that there are neurons in the brain, we have learned a lot about psychology, but connecting those two worlds, understanding how these computational circuits in the brain in coordinated fashion are generating decisions and thoughts and feelings and sensations, that link remains very elusive. And so, over the last decade, my group at MIT has been working on technology, ways of seeing the brain, ways of controlling brain circuits, ways of trying to map the molecules of the brain. 我们如何才能真正地认识到大脑是如何计算着意识的?在过去百年中,神经科学研究在这方面获得了长足进步。我们已经了解到大脑中有着巨量的神经元,也对心理学有了许多认识,但想要把这两个领域联系起来,去理解这些大脑中的计算电路是如何通过合作来产生决策、思想、感觉和情感,则并非易事,人们目前对其中的关联仍知之甚少。正因此,在过去十年中,我在MIT领导的研究小组一直致力于研究相关方面的技术,以期找到观测大脑,控制脑内回路,以及在大脑内部定位分子的方法。 At this point, what I’m trying to figure out is what to do next. How do we start to use these maps, use these dynamical observations and perturbations to link the computations that these circuits make, and things like thoughts and feelings and maybe even consciousness? 目前,我正在试图弄清我们下一步应该做些什么。我们能够如何利用这些分子定位图——也就是一些动态的观测和扰动——来将脑内电路的计算过程与思想,感觉,甚至是意识这些东西联系在一起? There are a couple of things that we can do. One idea is simply to go get the data. A lot of people have the opposite point of view. You want to have an idea about how the brain computes, the concept of how the mind is generating thoughts and feelings and so forth. Marvin Minsky, for example, is very fond of thinking about how intelligence and artificial intelligence can be arrived at through sheer thinking about it. 的确有一些我们能做的事情。其中的一个主意就只是从这些分子定位图中获取数据。但有很多人持有相反的意见。他们希望获得关于大脑是如何进行计算的,意识是如何产生出思想和感觉的,以及诸如此类的一些观点和概念。例如,Marvin Minsky(译者注:马文·明斯基,计算机科学家,人工智能领域的奠基人之一)就非常热衷于通过纯粹的思考来解决智能和人工智能是如何实现的这个问题。【编注:这句原文的字面意思是『Marvin Minsky就非常热衷于思考如何能够通过纯粹的思考来解决智能和人工智能是如何实现的这个问题』,Minsky的工作重点好像不是这种二阶思考,疑似作者笔误。】 On the other hand, and it’s always dangerous to make analogies and metaphors like this, but if you look at other problems in biology like, what is life? how do species evolve? and so forth, people forget that there are huge amounts, centuries sometimes but at least decades of data that was collected before those theories emerged. 但另一方面,做出这样的类比和隐喻总是十分危险的。如果你去看看生物学中的其它一些问题,例如“什么是生命?”“物种是如何进化的?”以及类似的种种,人们在提这些问题的时候忘记了一个事实:那就是在理论出现之前,研究者们已经收集了大量的数据,数据的时间跨度有时长达数个世纪,至少也有几十年。 Darwin roamed the Earth looking at species, looking at all sorts of stuff until he wrote the giant tome, On the Origins of Species. Before people started to try to hone in on what life is, there was the tool development phase: people invented the microscope. 达尔文在他的环球旅行中观察了许多物种,他仔细观察着关于这些物种的一切,最终写出伟大的巨著《物种起源》。在人们开始尝试研究“生命是什么”这个问题之前,必经的一步是工具的发展:有人发明了显微镜。 People started looking at cells and watching them divide and so forth, and without those data, it would be very hard to know that there were cells at all, that there were these tiny building blocks, each of which was a self-compartmentalized, autonomous building block of life. 在那之后人们才开始观察细胞,观察它们的分裂和其它种种行为,如果没有这些数据,人们甚至很难发现细胞的存在,而生命正是由这些微小的,独立自治的“小积木”搭建而来的。 The approach I would like to take is to go get the data. Let’s see how the cells in the brain can communicate with each other. Let’s see how these networks take sensation and combine that information with feelings and memories and so forth to generate the outputs, decisions and thoughts and movements. And then, one of two possibilities will emerge. 在这里,我想采用的方法是从其中获取数据。让我们来看看大脑中的细胞是如何彼此交流信息的,看看这些细胞构成的网络如何获得感觉,并将这种信息与感情,记忆,还有其它类似的东西组合在一起来生成输出信号,决策,思想和动作。之后,我们将会看到两种可能性之一的出现。 One will be that patterns can be found, motifs can be mined, you can start to see sense in this morass of data. The second might be that it’s incomprehensible, that the brain is this enormous bag of tricks and while you can simulate it brute force in a computer, it’s very hard to extract simpler representations from those datasets. 一种可能性是,我们可以从中发现一些模式,挖掘出一些主旨,并开始从这堆乱糟糟的数据中寻找一些理论了。另一种可能性则是,我们仍然无法理解其中的奥妙,由于大脑中所包含的复杂机制是如此之多,虽然我们可以简单粗暴地在计算机中进行模拟,但想要从这些数据集中抽取出一些相对简单一点的模型仍然是非常困难的。 In some ways, it has to be the former because it’s strange that we can predict our behaviors. People walk through a city, they communicate, they see things, there are commonalities in the human experience. So that’s a clue; that’s a clue that it’s not an arbitrary morass of complexity that we’re not going to ever make sense of. 从某种角度说,第一种可能性应该是对的,虽然很奇怪,但人们的确已经获得了预测自身行为的能力。人们会在城市中穿行,会相互交流,会看到形形色色的事物,在人类的生存体验中存在诸多这样的共同之处。所以现在我们至少有了点线索,我们知道自己所面临的并不是一堆混乱到我们完全无法搞清楚其中意义的随机复杂性。 Of course, being a pessimist, we should still always hold open the possibility that it will be incomprehensible. But the fact that we can talk in language, that we see and design shapes and that people can experience pleasure in common, that suggests that there is some convergence that it’s not going to be infinitely complex and that we will be able to make sense of it. 当然,从悲观主义者的视角来看,我们仍然需要对第二种可能性抱以开放的态度,也就是我们的确可能无法理解这个问题。但人们能够使用语言交谈,能够辨别并设计不同形状,还能够获得共同的愉悦体验,这些事实都表明我们所要研究的对象是存在一些收敛性质的,至少我们所面对的不是无穷无尽的复杂性,而我们也的确能够从中找到一些规律。 Biology and brain science are not fundamental sciences in the sense that physics is. In physics, there are particles and there are forces, and you could write down a very short list of those things. But if you’re thinking about the brain and the brain is going to have these cells called neurons, and the neurons have all these molecules that generate their electrical functions and their chemical exchanges of information, those are encoded for by the genome. 生物学和脑科学并不是像物理一样的基础科学。在物理学中有质点和各种力的概念,你可以很容易地将所有这些概念列在一张很短的清单上。但想想大脑吧,大脑中有一些被称为神经元的细胞,这些神经元又是由许多不同的分子构成的,神经元正是靠这些分子来产生电信号并通过化学递质交流信息,而所有这些分子则都被编码在了基因组中。 In the genome, we have, depending on who you ask, 20,000- to 30,000-odd genes, and those genes produce gene products like proteins, and those proteins generate the electrical potentials of neurons and they specify at least some parts of the wiring. The way that I look at it is we’re going to want to understand the brain in terms of these fundamental building blocks, and we can always try to ignore some detail, this concept of the abstraction layer. 基因组中大约有2万到3万个基因(研究者们在基因的具体数目这个问题上存在一些分歧),这些基因能够生产出像蛋白质这样的基因产物,而其中一些蛋白质又生成了神经元中的高低电位,因而它们也指定了神经电路中至少某些部分的构成方式。关于大脑,我认为目前我们所要了解的是这些基础的组成部件,而我们总是可以尝试去忽略掉一些细节,从抽象层上去理解其中的概念。 Can we ignore everything below a certain level of description and just focus on the higher level concepts? But modern neuroscience is now almost 130 years old, since the neuron was discovered, and so far, the attempts to ignore below certain levels of description have not yielded universally accepted and explanatory theories of how our brains are computing our thoughts or feelings or movements. 我们真的能够忽略掉某个特定描述层次之下的一切,而仅仅把注意力集中在更高层次的概念上吗?自从神经元被发现至今,现代神经科学的发展已经有近130年历史了,但那些尝试忽略掉某些特定描述层次以下的微观机制的努力,至今还没能产生出能够被广泛接受并具有解释力的理论,来回答大脑是如何计算出我们的思想、感受或是动作的这些问题。 The way that we approach things is pretty radically different from the past. The premise that I launched my research group at MIT on was that we needed new technology. The reason people are shying away from these very, very detailed measurements of brain function, getting the deep data, was because we didn’t have the tools. The history of science has shown us that you need the tools first. Then you get the data. Then you can make the theory. Then you can achieve understanding. No theory with no technology. It’s very difficult to know that you’ve solved it. 而我们团队目前处理问题的方式与之前的则有着非常明显的区别。我在MIT成立这个研究小组所基于的一个前提就是我意识到我们需要新的技术。人们之所以会回避这些对于大脑功能非常细节化的测量,原因在于我们并没有获得合适的工具。科学的历史告诉我们,首先你需要合适的工具,然后才能去收集数据,之后你就可以创造理论了,而最终你将获得对事物的理解。没有合适的技术就无法创造出好的理论。因为你很难确定自己的理论是否真的解决了问题。 Before Newton’s Laws, there were lots of people like Kepler and Galileo who were watching the planets, and they had decades and decades of data. Why don’t we have that for the brain? We need tools for the brain like the telescope and the microscope, and now, we need to collect the data, ground truth data, if you will, where we can see all those cells and molecules in action, and then, we’re going to see a renaissance in our ability to think of and learn about the brain at a very detailed level, but to extract true insight from these datasets. 在牛顿定律之前,很多人都曾经观察过行星的运动(例如开普勒和伽利略),而他们已经积累了数十年的数据。在针对大脑的研究中,我们为什么不做相同的事情呢?在对大脑的研究中,我们首先需要找到像天文学中的望远镜和生物学中的显微镜一样的有效工具,之后我们所要做的就是收集真实的基础数据,如果你愿意的话,我们现在已经能从数据中看到所有的那些细胞和分子的运动,之后,我们将能够欣喜地看到自己获得了从非常细节的层次上思考和学习大脑的能力,同时也能够从那些收集到的数据集中获得一些真正的洞见。 Let’s think for a second about the hypothesis that biology is not a fundamental science. If you think about books like The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, this and other attempts to explain the path of science, we often have these models: here’s my hypothesis, somebody comes along and disproves it, and if it’s a big enough disproof, you get a revolution. 让我们花点时间想想“生物学不是一门基础科学”这个假说。想象一下托马斯·库恩的《科学革命的结构》这本书,还有其他一些试图解释科学发展之路径的著作,在这些书中我们通常会看到这样的模式:首先我提出了一个假说,然后有人出来对这个假说提出反对意见,如果这个反对意见足够重大,那么这就可以被称之为一项“革命”。 But let’s think about biology: suppose I want to figure out how a gene in the genome relates to an emergent property like intelligence or behavior or a disease like Alzheimer's. There are so many genes in the genome, most hypotheses are probably wrong just by chance. What are the chances that you got the exact gene that’s most important for something? And even if you did, how do you know what other genes modulate it? It’s an incredibly complicated network. 但让我们想想生物学吧:假设我想要找到基因组中的某个基因是如何与某个重要属性(例如智力、行为或者是阿尔茨海默症这样的疾病)发生关联的。基因组中的基因数量如此之多,从概率上看,大多数假说大概都是错误的。对于某种属性,你能准确地找到对它而言最重要的那个基因的概率有多大?而即使你找到了这个基因,你又如何知道有哪些其它的基因会对它发挥调控作用?这个网络的复杂程度简直令人难以置信。 If you started thinking of how different genes of the genome, how their products interact to generate functions in cells or in neurons or networks, it’s a huge combinatorial explosion. Most hypotheses about what a gene is doing, or especially what a network of genes is doing, much less a network of cells in the brain, they’re going to be incorrect. That’s why it’s so important to get these ground truth descriptions of the brain. 而如果你开始思考基因组中的不同基因所生产出的基因产物之间是如何通过互动在细胞中,或者神经元和神经网络中,产生不同的功能的,那么你将面临一个组合大爆炸了。关于某个基因的功能是什么,尤其是某个基因网络的功能是什么,人们所提出的绝大多数假说都将被证明是错误的,更不用提大脑中的某个细胞网络的功能是什么了。这就是为什么我们需要获得真实的关于大脑的基础性描述的原因。 Why can't we map the circuits and see how the molecules are configured, and turn on or off different cells in the brain and see how they interact? Once you have those maps, we can make much better hypotheses. I don’t think the maps of the brain equal the understanding of the brain, but the maps of the brain can help us make hypotheses and make them less assumption-prone, make them less likely to be wrong. 为什么我们不能绘制出大脑中的神经电路并看看其中的分子是如何装配的,然后通过打开或者关闭大脑中的不同细胞来看看它们是如何交互的呢?一旦你能够绘制出这些电路图,我们就能够提出比现在好得多的假说了。我认为这种将大脑比作一张神经电路图的观点并不等于对大脑的正确理解,但将大脑比作神经电路图的做法的确能够帮助我们提出更好的假说,并让这些假说变得不那么依赖于前提假设,同时也降低它们的错误概率。 One thing that I hope a circuit description of the brain will help us understand about humanity is, as we know from psychology, there are countless unconscious processes that happen. One of the most famous such experiments is you can find regions of the brain or even single cells in the brain that will be active even seconds before people feel like they’re making a consciously-willed decision. That leads to what you might maybe slightly jokingly say, we have free will but we’re not conscious of it. Our brains are computing what we’re going to do, and that we’re conscious after the fact is one interpretation of these studies. 我希望这种关于大脑的神经电路式描述能够帮助我们理解人性,而其中一个方面就是我们已经从心理学中所了解到的无数无意识过程的发生。在这方面最著名的实验之一就是人们发现大脑中的某些区域或者甚至是某些细胞会在人们感受到自己正在做出一个意识清醒的决定的数秒之前就开始变得活跃。这让我们能够半开玩笑地说,人们的确拥有自由意志,只是自己还没意识到而已。对这些研究结果的一种解读方式是,大脑已经计算出了我们会在接下来做什么,而我们是在之后才意识到这一点。 What I suggest though is that if we peek under the hood, if we look at what the brain is computing, we might find evidence for the implementation or the mechanisms of feelings and thoughts and decisions that are completely inaccessible if we only look at behavior, or if we only look at the kinds of things that people do, whereas if you find evidence that something you’re about to do, something you’re about to consciously decide, your brain already has that information in advance. Wouldn’t it be interesting to know what’s generating that information? Maybe there are free will circuits, quote, unquote, in the brain that are generating these decisions. 但我想要建议的是,如果我们试着去一窥面纱之下的风景,去看看大脑到底在计算些什么的话,我们也许能够找到一些关于感受、思想和决策的实现方法或机制的证据,而仅仅通过观察人们的行为或是人们会做哪些事情是完全无法获得这些证据的,因为当你意识到你将会做某件事情,或者是清醒地做出某个决定的时候,你的大脑已经提前获得了这些信息。了解是什么产生了这些信息难道不是一件很有趣的事情吗?也许在大脑中存在着生成“ 自由意志”的神经电路来负责产生这些决策呢。 We know all sorts of other things that occur, feelings that our brains are generating, and we have no idea about what’s causing them. There are very famous examples where somebody who has an injury to a part of their brain that is responsible for conscious vision, but you tell them when you see something, I want you to have a certain feeling, or when you see something, I want you to imagine a certain kind of outcome, and people will have that occur even though they’re not consciously aware of what they’re seeing. 我们还知道很多大脑中会发生的其它事情,例如大脑会产生感受,但我们完全不知道是什么导致了这些事情的发生。在这些方面有些著名的例子,例如有些人大脑中负责有意识的视力的部分受到了损伤,但如果你告诉他们“当你看见某种东西的时候,我希望你能产生某种特定的感受”,或者“当你看见某种东西的时候,我希望你能够想象某种特定的结果”,那么他们就真的会产生这种感受或是想象出这种特定的结果,即使他们并不能清醒地意识到自己看见了什么。 There is so much processing that we have no access to, and yet, it’s so essential to the human condition for and decisions and thoughts, and if we can get access to the circuits that generate them, that might be the fastest route to understanding those aspects of the human condition. 至今我们仍然没有任何途径去研究大脑中很大一部分处理过程,然而它们对于人类的决策和思维至关重要,一旦我们能够找到办法去研究那些生成它们的神经电路,那么这也许将成为理解人类状态中的这些方面最快捷的途径。 I’ve been thinking a lot over the last decade primarily about the technology that helped us figure out what we need to understand about the brain in terms of circuits and how they work together. But now that those tools are maturing, I’m thinking a lot about how we use these tools to understand what we all care about. 在过去十年中,我花了很多时间去思考如何发展那些能够帮助我们从神经电路和它们共同工作的机制方面去理解大脑的技术。现在这些工具开始慢慢成熟了,我会花更多时间去思考我们能够如何利用这些工具去理解我们共同关心的那些问题。 Up until now, we mostly have been giving our tools out to other neuroscientists to use. We’ve been focusing very much on technology invention, and other groups have been discovering profound things about the brain. I’ll just give you a couple of examples. 目前为止,我们主要还是在将这些工具提供给其他的一些神经科学家使用。我们主要关注的是技术的研发,而其它一些研究小组则致力于探索关于大脑的一些意义重大的事情。这里我将举两个例子。 There’s a group at Caltech and they use one of our technologies, a technology that makes neurons activatable by pulses of light. They put these molecules into neurons deep, deep in the brain, and when you shine light, those neurons are electrically active, just like when they’re normally being used. They found that there are neurons deep in the brain that trigger aggression or violence in mice, so they would activate these neurons and the mice would attack whatever was next to them, even if it was just a rubber glove. 加州理工大学的一个研究小组使用了我们的一种技术,这种技术能够通过光脉冲让神经元处于可激活状态。他们将这些分子放置在大脑非常深处的神经元中,当你发出光信号时,这些神经元就会处于电活跃状态,就像它们平时发挥作用时一样。他们发现大脑深处的某些神经元会触发小白鼠的攻击性或暴力倾向,于是他们就激活了这些神经元,而之后小白鼠就会攻击它们身旁的一切东西,即使是一只橡胶手套。 I find it fascinating to think about something as ethically charged, as essential to the human condition, as involved with our justice system and all sorts of stuff, as violence. You can find a very small cluster of neurons that, when they’re activated, are sufficient to trigger an act of aggression or violence. So of course, now, the big question is what neurons connect to those? Are they violence detectors? Oh, here is the set of stimuli that makes us now decide, oh, I should go attack this thing next to me even if it’s just a glove. 我发现思考诸如暴力之类概念是一件非常令人着迷的事情,它们在道德上受到谴责,但对人类具有重要影响,并且被包含在我们的司法系统中。你能够找到一小簇神经元,当它们被激活时,就足以触发攻击性或是暴力行为。那么当然,现在最大的问题就是哪些神经元是与它们相关的?这些神经元能够用于探测暴力行为的发生吗?“噢,这儿有一组让我们马上作出决定的刺激信号,噢,我应该去攻击我身边的这个东西了,即使它是一只手套。” And then, of course, where do these neurons project? What are they driving? Are they driving an emotion, and downstream of that emotion comes the violent act? Or are they just driving a motor command: go attack the glove next to you? For the first time, you can start to activate very specific sets of cells deep in the brain and have them trigger an observable behavior, but you can also ask, what are these cells getting, what are these cells sending messages to, and looking at the entire flow of information. 然后,理所当然的问题就是这些神经元是在哪里得到表现的?它们驱动的又是什么?是它们驱动了某种情感,然后这种情感顺流而下的发展导致了暴力行为的发生吗?或者说它们只是驱动了某种机械指令:攻击你身边的那只手套!?有史以来第一次,你能够去激活大脑深处的那些特定的细胞组,并且触发它们的某种可观测的行为,但同时你还可以发问,这些细胞获得了什么,它们在向哪些对象发送消息,而你能够看到这其中完整的信息流。 I’ll give you another example that is fascinating. One of my colleagues at MIT, Susumu Tonegawa, trained mice on a learning task, so that certain neurons in the brain become activatable by light. They used some genetic tricks to do that. 还有另一个令人着迷的例子。我在MIT的一位同事,利根川进(译者注:日本生物学家,因“发现抗体多样性的遗传学原理”获1987年诺贝尔生理学或医学奖)用一个学习任务来训练小白鼠,使小白鼠脑内的某些特定神经元处于可被光信号激活的状态。他们使用了一些基因技巧来进行这个实验。 Now, what happens is those mice can be doing something else much later, they shine light on the brain, and those neurons, the ones that had been activated earlier when they were learning, they get reactivated and the mice make a memory recall. It’s like they were there in the earlier place and time. 而之后所发生的事情是,那些小白鼠在神经元处于该状态很久之后可能正在做着某些别的事情,但一旦研究者们在小白鼠的脑内点亮光信号,那些之前在它们进行学习任务时就已经被激活的神经元会被重新激活,而那些小白鼠则经历了一次记忆唤醒的过程,就像它们还处在之前的时间和地点一样。 That’s interesting because for the first time, they can show that you can cause the recall of a specific memory, and now they are doing all sorts of interesting things. For example, you can activate those cells again, and let’s say that’s a happy memory; let’s say it’s associated with pleasure or a reward. 这个例子的有趣之处在于,这些研究者们第一次证明了人们的确可以唤醒某段特定的记忆,而现在他们仍然在做着各种有趣的事情。例如,你能够再一次激活那些神经元,我们假设那代表着一段快乐的回忆,或者说它与愉悦感或是奖励是联系在一起的。 They have shown that that can have antidepressant effects, that you can have an animal recall, a memory when you shine light on certain neurons, now the memory that is recalled triggers happy emotions; this is how they interpreted it. And that can counteract other stressors or other things that make the animal normally feel not so good. 这些研究者们已经证明了这种记忆唤醒能够产生抗抑郁的效果,他们对此的解释是,你能够通过用光信号照射某些特定的神经元来唤醒动物的某段记忆,这段被唤醒的记忆会触发动物的一些欢快的情感,这些情感能够抵抗某些压力源或其它一些通常会让动物产生不良感受的东西。 Literally, hundreds and hundreds of groups are using this technology that we developed for activating neurons by light to trigger things that are of clinical and maybe even sometimes philosophical interest. 毫不夸张地说,现在已经有数以百计的研究小组采用了我们开发的这种通过光信号来激活神经元的技术,他们使用这种技术来触发一些具有临床意义,有时甚至具有哲学意义的东西。

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I studied chemistry and electrical engineering and physics in college, and decided that I cared about understanding the brain. To me, that was the big unknown. This will seem kind of cheesy, but I started thinking about how our brains understand the universe, and the universe, of course, gives us things like the laws of physics upon which are built chemistry and biology, upon which is built our brain. It’s kind of a loop. I was trying to think about what to do in a career; I thought, what’s the weak point in the loop? And it seemed like the brain was very unknown. 我曾在大学里学过化学,电气工程和物理学,而我最终认定自己最牵挂的是对于大脑的理解。对我来说,那是一个大大的未知领域。下面这段话可能看起来有点肉麻,但当时我开始思考我们的大脑是如何去理解宇宙的,正是宇宙给了我们物理定律,而化学和生物又是建立在这些物理定律的基础上的。这某种程度上构成了一个环。而我试图去思考在我的职业生涯中应该做些什么,我当时所想的是,在这些环节中最弱的一个是什么?看起来大脑是存在最多未知的地方。 I was very impressed by people who would go build technology to tackle big problems, sometimes very simple technology. All the chemists in the 1700s and 1800s who built ways of looking at pressure and volume and stoichiometry, without that, it’s inconceivable that we would have things like the Periodic Table of the Elements and quantum mechanics and so forth. 那些愿意去创造技术以解决重大问题的人们给我留下了深刻的印象,而有时那些技术其实非常简单。例如所有在18世纪和19世纪尝试用各种方法测量压力、体积和其他化学量的科学家们,没有他们的工作,难以想象我们今天能够拥有元素周期表,量子力学和其它的一些科学工具。 What stuck out in my mind was you need to have that technological era, and that then gives you the data that you want, that then yields the most parsimonious and elegant representations of knowledge. And for neuroscience, it seemed like we had never gone through that technological era. There were bits and pieces, don’t get me wrong, like electrodes and the MRI scanner, but never a concerted effort to be able to map everything, record all the dynamics, and to control everything. And that’s what I wanted to do. 当时我脑子里一个挥之不去的念头就是,你只有经历过一个那样的技术时代,才能获得自己想要的数据,然后才能从中产生出最精细最优雅的知识。对于神经科学来说,看起来我们还从未经历过一个那样的技术时代。别误会我的意思,当然我们已经拥有了一些零散的技术手段,例如电极技术和核磁共振扫描仪,但我们从未同心协力去努力获得定位大脑内部发生的一切,记录脑内的所有动态过程,并控制大脑的所有活动的能力。而那正是我想要做的事情。 At the time I started graduate school at Stanford, I went around telling everybody I wanted to build technologies for the brain and to bring the physical sciences into neuroscience. A lot of people thought it was a bad idea, frankly, and I think the reason why was at the time, many people who are physicists and inventors were trying to build tools for studying the brain. But they were thinking forwards from what was fun for them to do, and not backwards from the deep mysteries of the brain. 当时我刚开始在斯坦福大学的研究生生涯,我告诉身边的所有人我希望为探索大脑开发技术手段并将神经科学变成一门自然科学。老实说,当时有很多人都不认为这是个好主意,我觉得他们这么想的原因是,在当时,有许多物理学家和发明家都在试图为研究大脑创造工具,但是他们所想的都是向前看,去研究那些对他们而言有趣的事情,而并没有回过头去探索那些埋藏在大脑深处的谜题。 The key insight that I got during graduate school was if you don’t think backwards from the big mysteries of the brain, and you only think forwards from what you find fun in physics, the technologies you built might not be that important. They might not solve a big problem. What I learned was we have to take the brain at face value. We have to accept its complexity, work backwards from that, and survey all the areas of science and engineering in order to build those tools. 我在研究生阶段所获得的最重要的洞见就是,如果你不能回过头去思考那些关于大脑的谜题,而只是向前去思考那些让你在物理学中觉得有趣的东西,那么你所创造出来的技术可能就不那么重要,它们可能无法被用来解决大的问题。我所学到的是我们需要直面大脑本来的面目,要想创造出那些真正有用的工具,我们就需要接受大脑的复杂性,回过头来以此为目的去调研所有的科学和工程领域。 During the first decade that I’ve been a Professor at MIT, we have mostly been building tools. We built tools for controlling the brain, tools for mapping the detailed molecular and circuit structure of the brain, and tools for watching the brain in action. 在我成为MIT的一名教授之后的首个十年中,我们的主要精力都放在创造工具上。我们创造了用于控制大脑的工具,能够绘制大脑中具体的分子和神经电路结构的工具,还有用于观测大脑活动的工具。 Right now, we’re at a turning point; we’re ready to start deploying these tools systematically and at scale. Don’t get me wrong, the tools still need improvements to be equal to the challenge of studying the brain, but for small organisms like worms and flies and fish, or for small parts of mammalian brains, we’re ready to start mapping them and trying to understand how they’re computing. 现在我们来到了一个重要的转折点上,我们已经做好准备去系统化地大规模部署这些工具来研究大脑了。但请不要误解我的意思,这些工具目前仍然需要得到改进才能足以胜任研究人类大脑这一巨大的挑战性任务,但对于一些较小的有机体,例如蠕虫,蝇类和鱼类,以及哺乳类动物大脑中的一些较小部分,我们已经做好准备去绘制它们的结构并尝试去理解它们是如何进行计算的了。 The work progresses through primarily philanthropic as well as government grant funding. We have been very lucky that there has been a bit of an increase in people interested in funding high risk, high reward things. That’s one reason why I’m at the MIT Media Lab, and you might ask why is a neuroscience Professor in the School of Architecture at MIT? 这些工作的推进主要由慈善基金和政府资助基金提供资金上的支持。我们非常幸运,越来越多的人开始对资助这类高风险,高回报的研究项目感兴趣。而那也是我在MIT媒体实验室工作的原因之一,可能你想问为什么一个神经科学教授会在MIT的建筑学院任职。 As we were discussing earlier, neuroscientists long had a deep distrust of technology, that technologies often didn’t work, the brain was so complicated that the tools could only solve toy problems. When I was looking for a professor job, the search was hit-or-miss. 正如我们之前所讨论过的,神经科学家们长久以来都对技术怀有一种深深的不信任感,他们认为技术通常都起不了什么作用,而大脑是如此复杂,那些被创造出来的工具只能解决一些玩具般的小问题。当我在寻求教职的时候,找工作的过程不确定性很高。 My collaborator, Karl Deisseroth and I had already published a paper showing we could activate neurons with light, a technology that we’ve called ever since “optogenetics,” “opto” for light and “genetics” because it’s a gene that we borrow from a plant to make the neurons light-sensitive. 我和我的合作者Karl Deisseroth当时已经发表了一篇论文表明我们能够通过光信号来激活神经元,这项技术后来一直被我们称作“光基因”(optogenetics),”opto”代表“光”,而”genetics”则代表这是我们从一种植物中提取出的能够让神经元对于光信号敏感的基因。 But a lot of people at the time were still deeply skeptical: is this the real deal or is this yet more not-quite working technology that will be a footnote? I went to the Media Lab to complain about how political and complicated academia was, and I was very lucky; they were wrapping up a failed job search and they said, "Why don’t you come here?" And so I went, and we’ve been incubating a lot of neurotechnology there since then. 但当时很多人仍然对这项技术抱着深深的怀疑态度:这真的是一项重大的技术突破,还是又一种没什么用的仅仅会在将来成为一项脚注的技术?我去MIT的媒体实验室向他们抱怨学术圈的政治和勾心斗角,而这时我的运气来了,当时他们正在总结一次并不成功的求职,于是他们对我说,“要么你到我们这儿来吧?”于是我就去了他们实验室,从那以后我们就开始在这个实验室里培育一大堆的神经技术。 When I first got to Media Lab, a lot of people were deeply puzzled about what I would do there. Was I going to switch into, "classical publicly-perceived Media Lab technology," like would I have developed ways of having cell phones diagnose mental illness or other things like that? I wanted to get to the ground truth of the brain. 当我刚到MIT媒体实验室的时候,很多人都完全搞不清楚我会在那里做些什么。他们怀疑我会不会转向开发一些“经典的受到公众认可的‘媒体实验室技术’”,比如开发一些方法通过手机来诊断精神疾病,或者诸如此类的一些东西。而我所想做的是获得关于大脑的一些基础事实。 In some ways, the Media Lab was a perfect place to start. We could incubate these ideas, these tools out of the cold light of day until they were good enough that neuroscientists could see their value. And that took several years. 从某些角度上看,媒体实验室对我来说的确是一个完美的起点。我们可以避开人们的冷眼,专注于培育创意和技术,直到它们变得足够好,能够让那些神经科学家们看到它们的价值。而这一过程持续了好几年。 It was about a three-year period until this started to get mainstream acceptance, and then, there was another three-year period where people said, wow, how do we get more technology, and that led to initiatives like the Obama BRAIN Initiative, which is an attempt to get widespread technology development throughout neuroscience. 让我们的这些技术受到学界主流的认可花了大约三年时间,而又过了三年时间后有人开始问,哇,太棒了,我们怎么才能获得更多的这类技术?而这导致了之后的一些诸如奥巴马总统的BRAIN计划之类的项目,该计划试图在整个神经科学领域发展一些能够被广泛应用的技术。 The BRAIN Initiative started at the instigation of the Kavli Foundation. They were hosting a series of brainstorms about what nanoscientists and neuroscientists could do together, and Paul Alivisatos and George Church and Rafael Yuste and many people at that border were at these early sessions. BRAIN始于Kayli基金会的大力推动。他们举办了一系列的头脑风暴式的会议以讨论纳米科学家们能够和神经科学家们一同做些什么,Paul Aliyisatos,George Church, Refael Yuste还有其他一些相关领域的科学家们参加了这些早期的会议。 And in late 2012, I was invited to one of these sessions where many inventors were invited and we started talking about maybe brain activity mapping is great and all, but the technologies might be much more broad than that; you might need more than just maps. 2012年末,我应邀参加其中的一次会议。这次会议邀请了许多技术的发明者,我们开始谈论也许绘制出大脑活动的电路图是个伟大的主意之类的话题,但涉及其中的技术范围可能会更宽,因为我们需要的可能不仅仅是一些电路图。 You might need ways to control the brain, ways to rewire the brain. 我们可能需要一些能够控制大脑的方法,还有重连大脑电路的方法。 That was an interesting turning point because it went from activity mapping to broadly technology, and four or five months later, Obama announced this BRAIN initiative which, somewhat recursively, stands for Brain Research for Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies, and they are now devoting tens to hundreds of millions of dollars a year, depending upon which year, to try to get more technology made to help understand the brain. 那次会议是一个很有趣的转折点,因为从此之后,我们的工作从绘制大脑的电路图拓展到了更宽的技术领域,又过了四五个月,奥巴马总统宣布了他的BRAIN计划,这个计划的首字母缩写看起来像个递归——致力于推动创新神经科技的大脑研究(Brain Research for Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies),目前人们在这项计划中每年投入高达数千万甚至数亿美元的资金以获得更多能够帮助我们理解大脑的技术。 The BRAIN initiative now is run by different government agencies. They have their own priorities, so, for example, DARPA is very interested in short-term human prosthetics, for example, no surprise there. The National Science Foundation is interested in more basic science, and so forth. The different agencies have their own agendas now. 整个BRAIN计划目前由多个不同的政府机构负责运营。这些机构都有着自己的优先任务,例如,DARPA【编注:全称Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,美国国防部所辖研究机构】最感兴趣的是短期的人类大脑修复技术(这一点毫不令人惊讶),而国家科学基金会则对于更基础的科学课题更感兴趣,如此种种。而不同的机构现在也都有了他们自己的日程表。 IARPA is involved. They are trying to do a hard push for short-term mammalian brain circuit mapping based upon existing technology, and sort of a small part of that more on the technology development side. Most of the money is on the application side. But we have some new tools that we think can be very, very helpful. IARPA【编注:全称Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity,是美国国家情报总监辖下一个研究部门】也同样参与了进来。他们正在努力推进一个通过使用已有的技术绘制哺乳类动物大脑神经电路图的短期计划,其中的一小部分主要是关于技术开发的,而主要的资金则投入到了技术应用上。我觉得我们开发的一些新工具能够在其中派上很大用场。

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Companies are great if you can work hard and be smart and solve the problem. But if you’re tackling something like the brain, or the biggest challenges in biology in general, a lot of it’s serendipity. A lot of it is the chance connections when you bring multiple fields together, when you connect the dots, when you kind of engineer the serendipity and make something truly unpredictable, and that’s hard to do if you have closed doors. That’s hard to do if you don’t allow open, free collaboration. 如果你工作足够努力并且有足够的聪明才智去解决问题,那么企业对你来说会是个不错的去处。但如果你的研究对象是大脑,则可以说是生物学史上最大的挑战,要想获得成功就必须依赖于一些意外的收获了。当你试图将多个领域的知识结合在一起,将点连成线,当你试图去驾驭偶然性并且做出一些真正不可预测的成果时,联系和接触的机会非常重要,如果你关起门来闭门造车,如果你不能允许开放而自由的合作,要想获得成功就太难了。 Our group is very big; I think we’re the second biggest research group at all of MIT. But we work with probably about 100 groups, people who are genomics experts and chemistry experts and people making nanodiamonds and all sorts of stuff. The reason is that the brain is such a mess and it’s so complicated, we don’t know for sure which technologies and which strategies and which ideas are going to be the very best. And so, we need to combinatorially collaborate in order to guarantee, or at least maximize the probability that we’re going to solve the problem. 我们的研究团队规模很大,我想它应该是整个MIT第二大的研究团队了。但我们还与大约100个其它的研究小组进行合作,这些小组中有染色体方面的专家,有化学专家,还有些人的工作是制造纳米金刚石,可以说研究什么的都有。这么做的原因在于,大脑是如此混乱而复杂的一个系统,我们并不能肯定哪些技术,哪些研究策略,哪些主意是最好的。所以,我们需要组合式的合作模式来保证问题被解决,或者至少是将解决问题的概率最大化。 You want to have academia for that serendipitous ability to connect dots and collaborate, and you want companies when it’s time to push hard and just get the thing done and scale up and get it out the door. What I would hope to engineer in the coming maybe decade or so are hybrid institutions where we can have people go back and forth because you might need to have an idea that would go back and forth a bit until it matures. 当你需要一些驾驭偶然性的能力以连点成线并推进合作时,学术圈的氛围是最合适的;但当你需要施加压力来搞定某件事情,并将技术推广以得到广泛应用时,企业又成了最合适的地方。在未来的也许十年中我希望能够做到的是建立起一个混合型的研究机构,这样我们就能够让研究者们在学术和企业的氛围之间迅速地切换,因为我们未来的研究思路可能也需要在两种模式间切换直到它变得足够成熟。 I’ll give you an example. We’re building new kinds of microscopes and new kinds of nanotechnologies to record huge amounts of data from the brain. One of our collaborators was estimating that soon some of these devices we’re making might need some significant fraction of the bandwidth of the entire internet in order to record all the brain data that we might be getting at some point. Now, we need some electronics, right? We need electronics to store all the data and computers to analyze the data. But that’s an industrial thing. 让我给你举个例子。我们正在制造一些新型的显微镜和一些新型的纳米技术以记录大脑中的海量数据。我们的一位合作者曾估计,我们正在制造的这些仪器可能很快就需要整个因特网带宽中不小的一部分以记录我们在某些关于大脑的研究过程中获得的所有数据。现在我们需要电子技术了,对吧?我们需要电子技术以记录所有这些数据,同时还需要足够强大的计算机来对这些数据进行分析。但这就是一个更适合让企业来解决的问题了。 It’s much easier to get that done in a company than in academia because people in industry can turn the crank and make incredible computers, so we started a collaboration. A small startup here in Cambridge, Massachusetts, does these computers with us. Now we’re working on the nanotechnologies, and that fusion of two different institutional designs allows us to rapidly move faster than companies alone or academics alone. These new hybrid models are going to be essential to balance the need for luck and the need for skill and ability. 在企业中搞定这类事情要比在学术界容易得多,因为在企业中人们能够开足马力制造出拥有令人难以置信的计算能力的电脑,所以我们启动了意向合作。在马萨诸塞州剑桥市的一家创业公司和我们合作开发了这些电脑。现在我们又开始研发纳米技术了,将企业和学术这两种类型的机构融合在一起则让我们的研究进程推进得比单独依靠企业或是单独依靠学术界要快得多。在对运气的需求与对技术和能力的需求间取得平衡来说,这类混合型机制将是必不可少的。 The thing that I’m excited about also is how do we get rid of the risk in biology and medicine? Most medicines, most strategies for treating patients, they are found in large part by luck. How do we get rid of the risk? We talked a bit about how there are fundamental sciences like physics, and then, you have higher order sciences like biology. Medicine also might have different scientific methods for different kinds of disease. We have made huge inroads against bacteria and viruses because of antibiotics, because of vaccines. 现在让我感到兴奋的是我们如何能够消除一些生物学和医学研究中的风险。目前多数的药物和治疗策略的发现,在很大程度上都是依靠运气。我们能够如何消除风险?我们之前曾经谈论过一点关于物理这样的基础科学的话题,而之后,我们又有了更高阶的科学领域,例如生物学。医学也同样可能在对待不同类型的疾病时使用不同类型的科学方法。由于有了抗生素和疫苗,我们在对抗细菌和病毒的战斗中获得了巨大的进展。 Why have these been so successful? It’s because we’re trying to help our body fight a foreign invader, right? But if you look at the big diseases, the ones that nobody has anybody clue what to do about, there are brain disorders, a lot of cancers, autoimmune conditions, these are diseases where it’s our body fighting ourselves, and that’s much harder because you can’t just give a drug that wipes out the foreign invader because the foreign invader is you. 为什么我们在这方面做得如此成功?这是因为我们在尝试帮助我们的身体对抗某种来自外界的入侵者,对吧?但其它的一些重大疾病,那些没人知道该怎么对付的疾病,例如大脑的功能紊乱,各种类型的癌症,还有自体免疫病,这些疾病实质上都是我们的身体在与自身进行对抗,要解决这些疾病就困难多了,因为如果入侵者就是你自身的话,你就无法为身体提供一种药物去清除这个入侵者。 How do we understand how to de-risk the tough parts of medicine? We have to think about drug development and therapeutic development from a different point of view. The models that give us new antibiotics and new vaccines and so forth might not be quite right for subtly shifting the activity levels of certain circuits in the brain, for subtly tuning the immune system to fight off a cancer but not so much that you’re going to cause an autoimmune attack, right? 我们该如何化解这些医学难点所蕴含的风险?我们必须从另外一个角度去思考药物和治疗方法的开发。那些引导我们研发出新的抗生素,疫苗和其它一些药物的模型也许在精细地切换大脑中的某些特定神经电路的活跃程度方面并不适用。它们或许也无法既精细地调整免疫系统以击败特定癌症,同时又避免引发对自身免疫系统的攻击,对吧? One thought is, well, if it’s your body fighting yourself, what you want is very deep knowledge about the building blocks of those cells and how they’re configured in the body. The basic premises behind ground truthing the understanding of the brain might be also right what we need in order to de-risk medicine, in order to understand how cells and organs and systems go awry in these intractable disorders. That’s something I’ve been thinking a lot about recently as well: how do we de-risk the goal and methodology and path towards curing diseases? 有一种想法是:如果身体在和自身作战,那就需要深入了解关于那些细胞的基础构成单元以及它们是如何在身体中配置成形的。对大脑的基础事实真正理解的一些基本前提也许在我们降低医学方面的风险,以及理解细胞,器官和组织是如何在顽疾中功能失调方面同样适用。这同样是我最近经常思考的一个问题:我们如何在治疗疾病方面降低那些蕴藏在目标,方法和实现路径之中的风险? There was just a study released about how taking a drug from idea to market can cost $2.5 billion now. And if you look at the really tough diseases like brain diseases, like cancers and so forth, the failure rate to be approved for human use is over 90 percent. 最近发表的一项研究成果显示现在研发一种药物从最初的想法开始到最终被推向市场可能需要花掉25亿美元。而如果你看看那些真正严重的疾病,例如大脑疾病和癌症等,治疗这类疾病的药物最终无法被批准投入使用的概率超过了90%。 This got me thinking that maybe this is the same kind of intellectual problem as why we don’t understand how brain circuits compute thoughts and feelings. We have these large 3D systems, whether it’s a brain circuit or a cancer or the immune system, and knowing how to tweak those cells, make them do the right thing, means finding the subtle differences that make those cells different from the normal cells in our body. I’ve been thinking a lot about how we can try to take these tools that we’ve been developing for mapping the brain, for controlling the brain, for watching the brain in action and applying it to the rest of medicine. 这些事实让我想到也许这与为什么我们无法理解大脑的神经电路是如何计算出思想和感受是同一类的问题。我们现在已经拥有了这些大型的3D系统,不论是大脑电路,癌症或是免疫系统,我们都能得到它们的3D图像,而了解如何通过牵引这些细胞让它们去做正确的事情则意味着找到这些细胞区别于正常细胞的细微不同之处。我花了很多时间思考如何使用这些我们开发的工具,将它们用于绘制大脑神经电路图,控制大脑,观察大脑的活动的工具,并将它们应用在其它医学领域。

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I can tell you about a collaboration that we have with George Church. George’s group for about fifteen years now has been trying to work on a technology called in situ sequencing, and what that means is can you sequence the genetic code and also the expressed genes, the recipes of cells, right there inside the cells? 我可以向你描述一下我们和George Church之间的一项合作。George的团队已经在一项名为“就地排序”的技术研究上花了大约十五年的时间,这项技术意味着你能够直接在细胞内部对遗传序列和那些被表达出来的基因——也就是细胞自身的配方——进行测序。 Now, why is that important? It’s important because if you just sequence the genome, or you sequence the gene expression patterns after grinding up all the cells, you don’t know where the cells are in three-dimensional space. If you’re studying that brain circuit and here is how information is flowing from sensation into memory regions towards motor areas, you’ve lost all the three-dimensionality of the circuit. You just have ground up the brain into a soup, right? 为什么这项技术如此重要?因为如果你只是对基因组进行测序,或者在破坏了细胞结构之后再将这些基因表达的模式进行测序,你就无法知道这些细胞在三维空间中的位置。如果你正在研究某个大脑神经电路,而恰好感觉中的信息正是经由这些细胞流入记忆区进而流向运动区,那么你就丢失了这一神经电路中的所有三维信息,因为你已经把大脑搅成了一锅粥。 Or for a tumor, we know that there are cells that are by the blood vessels, there are stem cells, there are metastasizing cells; if you just grind up the tumor and sequence the nucleic acids, you again have lost the three-dimensional picture. A couple years ago, George’s group published a paper where they could take cells in a dish and sequence the expressed genes. 或者举个肿瘤的例子,我们知道有些肿瘤细胞分布在血管附近,有些是肿瘤干细胞,还有些肿瘤细胞能够转移,如果你将肿瘤打碎并且将其中的核酸进行排序,你同样会丢失它的三维图像。几年前,George的研究团队发表了一篇论文表明他们能够在保持细胞完整性的同时对已经表达的基因进行测序。 That is, you have DNA in the nucleus, that expresses in terms of RNA, which is the recipe of that cell, and the RNA then drives all the downstream production of proteins and other biomolecules. The RNA is sort of in-between the genome and the mature phenotype of the cell. It's kind of the recipe. George’s group was sequencing the RNA. I thought that was amazing: you could read out the recipe of a cell. 也就是说,细胞核中有DNA,DNA通过转录会生成RNA,而RNA则是细胞的配方,在之后它会驱动下游的蛋白质和其它生物分子的生产过程。RNA可以看作某种基因组和细胞的成熟表现型之间的中间产物,它也是一种配方。当George的团队对RNA进行测序时,我觉得这有些不可思议,因为现在我们居然已经能够读懂细胞的配方了! Now, there was a tricky part: it didn’t work well in large 3D structures like brain circuits or tumors. Our group had been developing a way of taking brain circuits and tumors and other complex tissues and physically expanding them to make them bigger. What we do to make the brain or a tumor bigger is we take a piece of brain tissue and we chemically synthesize throughout the cells, in-between the molecules, around the molecules, in that piece of brain, a web of a polymer that’s very similar to the stuff in baby diapers. And then, when we add water, the polymer swells and pushes all the molecules apart, so it becomes big enough that you can see it even using cheap optics. 现在棘手的问题来了:这种技术在大脑神经电路和肿瘤这样的大型3D结构上的表现并不好。我们团队已经在研发了一种能在物理上将大脑神经电路,肿瘤和其它此类复杂组织进行放大的方法。我们用来放大大脑神经电路(或是肿瘤)的方法是获取其中的一小块脑组织,然后通过化学方法在这块脑组织的细胞内部分子之间和分子外部进行合成,最终得到一块像婴儿的纸尿裤一样的网状聚合物。然后我们在其中加入水,这块聚合物会膨胀,并将所有的分子推散,这样它就变得足够大了,即使用一些便宜的光学设备也能看清楚其中的结构。 One of my dreams is you could take a bacterium or a virus and expand it until you can take a picture on a cell phone. Imagine how that could help with diagnostics, right? You could find out what infection somebody has just by making it bigger, take a picture and you’re done. 我的梦想之一就是有一天我们可以将一个细菌或是病毒放大到你能够用手机给它拍照的程度。想想这能在多大程度上帮助人们进行诊断吧,在判断某个病人到底是被什么感染了这个问题时,你只需要将感染物不断地放大,然后给它拍张照片就搞定了。 We started talking with George: what if we can take our sample and expand it and then run their in situ sequencing method—because sequencing, of course, is really complicated. You need room around the molecules to sequence them. This is very exciting to me, if we can take stuff and expand it and then use George’s technology to read out the recipes of the cells, we could map the structure of life in a way. 于是我们去和George谈了这件事情:如果我们能够将我们所采集的样本放大,然后再对放大后的样本使用“就地测序”的方法——测序这项工作本身真的非常复杂,因为分子之间要有足够的空间。这对我来说是件令人兴奋的事情,如果我们能够将这些组织进行采样,然后将它们放大,再使用George发明的技术去读取这些细胞的“配方”,那么我们就能以某种方式绘制出生命的结构。 We can see how all the cells look in a complex brain circuit, or in a tumor, or in an organ that’s undergoing autoimmune attack like in type 1 diabetes. That’s one of the things that excites me most is this in situ sequencing concept. If we can apply it to large 3D structures and tissues, we might be able to map the fundamental building blocks of life. 我们可以看看在一个复杂的大脑神经电路中所有细胞到底是什么样子的,对于一个肿瘤或是一个正在遭受类似I型糖尿病这类自免疫攻击的器官,我们也可以做到同样的事情。这就是“就地测序”这一概念所能做到的最令我激动的事情之一。如果我们能够将这项技术应用到大型的3D结构和组织中,也许就能绘制出生命基本单元的样子。 Our current collaboration with George’s group has been focused very much on small pieces of tissue that we have: mouse brains probably, other model organisms in use in neuroscience. But we know that if they work in those systems, they’ll probably work in human tissues as well. 在目前与George的团队的合作当中,我们的关注点还主要集中在一些比较小的组织切片上:例如老鼠的大脑和其它一些在神经科学中常用的模式生物。但我们知道如果他们的技术在这样的系统中是有效的,那么这些技术大概在人体组织中也同样能发挥作用。 Imagine we get a cancer biopsy from somebody, we use our group’s technology to expand it physically, making everything big enough to see, and then, we can go in and use George’s in situ sequencing technology to read out the molecular composition. 想像一下,假如我们从某位患者身上获得了一块活体癌症组织,然后使用我们小组开发的技术将它在物理上进行放大,让其中所有东西都大到能够被观测到,那么我们就可以进入组织内部,使用George的“原地测序”技术读取其中的分子构成。 When we first published the idea of expanding something, a lot of people were very skeptical about it. It’s a very unconventional way of doing things. To convince people that it works, we went down [the following] line of reasoning: a design method. 当我们首次公开发表这项在物理上将某个活体组织进行放大的技术思路时,很多人都对此深表怀疑。因为这是一种非常不合传统的做法。为了让人们相信这种技术是可行的,我们采用了如下的论证路线,它是一种设计方法。 When we synthesized the baby diaper-like polymers inside the cells, we would anchor through molecular bonds specific molecules to the polymer, and then we would wipe up all the rest. We can use enzymes and so forth to chop up the rest. 当我们在细胞内部合成出那些像婴儿纸尿裤一样的网状聚合物时,我们会将整个分子键结构中的一些特定分子保留在聚合物的网状结构上,而去除掉其它的分子。我们可以使用一些酶和类似的化合物将其它的分子切掉。 That way, when we expand the polymer, our molecules that we care about are anchored and move apart, but the rest of the structure has been destroyed or chopped up so that it does not impede the expansion. That’s a key design element. 通过这种方式,当我们在放大网状聚合物时,我们所关心的那些分子都被原封不动地单独保留了下来,但剩下的那些结构则会被销毁或切除,这样它们就不会妨碍放大的过程。这就是其中关键的设计元素之一。 One way to think of this is—chemistry is a way of doing fabrication massively in parallel. So suppose that I want to see two things that are close together, like my two hands here. But of course, lenses cannot see very, very small things, right, thanks to diffraction. So what if we took my two hands and anchored them to these expandable polymers and then destroyed everything else? There might be a lot of junk here we don’t care about. 可以这样看——化学技术是一种并行地进行大规模制造的方法。假设我想要看清两件紧紧贴在一起的东西,就像我的两只放在一起的手。当然,由于衍射现象的存在,普通的镜头是无法看清非常非常小的东西的。但如果我把两只手都固定在这些可放大的网状聚合物上,然后将其它所有的东西都毁掉呢?因为其中可能包含了一大堆我们完全不关心的垃圾。 We add water and the polymer swells, moving my hands along with it until they’re far apart enough that we can see the gap between them. That’s the core idea of what we call expansion microscopy where we take the molecules in a cell or the molecules in a tissue, a brain circuit or a tumor, and we anchor those molecules to a swellable polymer. When we add water, the molecules we care about, the ones we’ve anchored—that we’ve nailed to the polymer, as it were, have moved apart until they’re far apart enough that we can see them using cheap, scalable, and easily deployed optics like you could find on an inexpensive microscope or even a webcam. 我们向网状聚合物中加水,然后它会膨胀,我的两只手也会随着它的膨胀发生移动,一直到它们的距离远到我们能够看清其中的缝隙。这就是被这项我们称为“放大显微术”的核心思路,我们从一个细胞或者一块组织——比如大脑的神经电路或者肿瘤——中选定一些分子,然后将它们固定在一块可膨胀的网状聚合物上,当我们向其中加水,那些我们所关心的被固定在聚合物上的原本贴在一起的分子就会互相分离,直到我们可以通过使用一些廉价的,可扩展并且容易部署的光学仪器——比如低端的显微镜,甚至是网络摄像头——将它们看清。 After we published our paper on expanding tissues, a lot of people started to apply them. For example, suppose you wanted to figure out how the cells are configured in a cancer biopsy. You can take the sample and if you look at it under a microscope, you can’t see the fine structures, but if you blow it up and make it bigger, maybe you could see the shape of the genome; maybe you could see that one cell is extending a tiny tendril, too tiny to see through other means, and maybe that’s the beginning of metastasis. 在我们发表了关于这项放大生物组织技术的论文之后,有许多人都开始将这项技术投入应用。举个例子,假如你想知道在一块活体癌症组织中细胞是如何构成的,你可以取下一块样本,如果你用一架显微镜去观察它,你根本无法看清其中的精细结构,但如果你能够将它放得更大,也许你就能看清其中基因组的形状了,也许你还能看见某个细胞在扩张一个细小的卷须状结构,但这个结构实在太小了,通过其它的任何方法你都无法看清它,而那可能正是一次癌细胞转移过程的开始。 A lot of people are trying to use our technology now for seeing things that you just can’t see any other way, and we’re finding a lot of interest not just from brain scientists because now you have a way of mapping brain circuits with nanoscale precision in 3D, but also from other brain-like problems: tumors and organs and development and so forth where you want to look at a 3D structure but with nanoscale precision. 现在有很多人在尝试使用我们的技术来看清那些他们无法通过其它方式看清的结构,而我们发现不仅仅只有脑科学家对它感兴趣——这项技术为脑科学家们提供了一种在纳米级精度上绘制3D大脑神经电路图的方法,而其它一些研究与大脑问题具有共性的课题的科学家们也对此感兴趣:在肿瘤和某些器官的发展过程和其它一些类似的课题中,人们也希望能够在纳米级的精度上看清3D结构。 We’ve spun out a small company to try to make kits and maybe provide this as a service so that people can use this widely. Of course, we’ve also put all the recipes on the Internet so people can download them, and hundreds and hundreds of groups have already started to play with these kinds of tools. 我们成立了一家小公司来尝试为这项技术制作一些工具套件,甚至是将它作为一项服务提供给需要的人以让这项技术能够被广泛地使用。当然,我们同样也在因特网上公开了这项技术的所有“配方”,人们可以下载它们。已经有数以百计的研究小组开始在他们的工作中使用这些工具。 We want to make the invisible visible, and it’s hard to see a 3D structure like a circuit that might store a memory or a circuit in the brain that might be processing an emotion, with the nanoscale resolution that you need to see neural connections and the molecules that make neurons do what they do. 我们希望能让那些原来看不到的结构被看清,要清晰地看到大脑中某个可能存储了记忆或是正在处理某种感情的神经电路的3D结构是非常困难的,你需要在纳米级的分辨率下才能看到神经元之间的连接和那些促使神经元发挥作用的分子结构。 The fundamental limit on how fine we can see things is related to a technical parameter called the mesh size; that is basically the spacing between the polymer chains. We think that the spacing between the polymer chains is about a couple nanometers; that is, around the same size as a biomolecule. If we can push all the molecules away from each other very evenly, it’s like drawing a picture on a balloon and blowing it up: you might be able to see all the individual particles and building blocks of life, but you know what? 决定我们能够在多高的清晰度下看清东西的基础限制是与一项被称为“网格尺寸”的技术参数相关的,这个参数的含义其实就是网状聚合物构成的链式结构之间的孔隙大小。我们认为这个空隙的大小大约是几纳米,也就是说,这和一个生物分子的大小差不多。如果我们能够将所有的分子按照非常接近的比例彼此推开,这就有点像在一个气球上画了一幅画,然后再将气球吹大,之后你就有可能看清所有的那些颗粒和组成生命的基础成分了。 We have to validate the technology down to that level of resolution. So far, we have validated it down to about a factor of ten bigger than that, in order of magnitude. But if we can get down to single molecule resolution, you could try to map the building blocks of living systems. We haven’t gotten there yet. 但你需要知道的是,我们还需要在生物分子级的分辨率上对这项技术进行验证,到目前为止,我们已经在比这高一个数量级的分辨率上成功地验证了这项技术。如果我们能够在单个分子的分辨率上验证这项技术,我们就能够绘制出活系统中的那些基础成分了,但目前我们还没能做到这一点。 I’ve been amazed at how fast neurotechnology has started to move. Ten years ago, we had relatively few tools for looking at and controlling the brain, and now, ten years later, we have our optogenetic tools for controlling brain circuits, this expansion method for mapping the fine circuitry, and also, we have developed 3D imagining methods that basically work the way that our eyes work to reconstruct 3D images of brain high speed electrical dynamics. 我对近来神经技术的发展速度感到吃惊。十年前,我们只有相对很有限的工具来控制大脑,而十年后的今天,我们已经拥有了像“光基因”这样的工具来控制大脑的神经电路,还有这种通过放大技术来绘制精细的神经电路的方法。此外,我们还开发了3D成像的方法来观测大脑内部的高速电子动态,其工作原理和我们的眼睛重建3D图像的方法是相同的。 In the coming fifteen years, two things are going to happen and a third thing, might happen. One thing that will happen is that our ability to map the fine details of neural circuits and see high speed dynamics and control it will probably be perfected; that might happen as soon as five years from now but definitely within fifteen years, I would predict that. 在接下来的十五年中,我认为会发生两件重大的事情,另外还有第三件事情也可能会发生。第一件事情是,我们绘制神经电路的精确细节,观测其中的高速动态,以及对它进行控制的能力将会得到完善,这些也许最快在今后的五年中就会发生,并且在十五年内几乎一定会发生,我可以肯定地这样预测。 The second thing is that we’re going to have some detailed-enough maps of small neural circuits that maybe we could even make computational models of their operation. For example, there is a small worm called C. elegans that has 302 neurons; maybe we can map all of them and their molecules and their dynamics and perhaps we can make a computational model of that worm. Or maybe a slightly larger brain: the larval zebrafish has 100,000 neurons, mice have 100 million—ballpark—and humans have 100 billion. You can see there are some multistage logarithmic jumps there that we have to make. 第二件事情是我们将绘制出一些细节足够丰富的小型神经电路图像,也许我们甚至可以据此开发出一些有关它们工作方式的计算模型。例如,有一种叫做秀丽隐杆线虫的蠕虫拥有302个神经元,也许我们能够绘制出它的所有神经电路图,以及其中的分子结构和电子动态,那么我们也许可以建立这种蠕虫的计算模型。如果扩展到大一点的大脑,斑马鱼拥有大约十万个神经元,而老鼠则拥有大约1亿个神经元,人类的神经元数目大约是一千亿。你可以从这里看出,在大脑规模从小到大的过程中,我们需要做很多次多级的对数跳跃。 The speculative thing is that we might have some tools that might let us look at human brain functions much, much more accurately. Right now, we have so few tools for looking at the human brain, there is functional MRI which lets you look at blood flow that is downstream of brain activity, but it’s very indirect and it’s very crude. The time resolution is thousands of times slower than in brain activity, and the spatial resolution, each little block that you see in these brain scans contains tens to hundreds of thousands of neurons, and we know that even nearby neurons can be doing completely different things. 而那件不太确定的事情则是我们也许会拥有一些能够让我们以远高于当前的精确程度观察人类大脑功能的工具。现在,能用来观察人类大脑的工具实在太少了,我们有一些功能性的核磁共振(MRI)设备能让我们观察某种大脑活动所引发的血液流动,但这种方式太间接了,同时也太不精确。这种工具的时间分辨率比大脑活动要慢上数千倍,从空间分辨率上说,你从MRI的扫描图像上看到的每个小方格都包含了数以百万计的神经元,而我们知道,即使是相邻的神经元也可能正在做着完全不同的事情。 What we most need right now, I would say, is a method for imaging and controlling human brain circuits with single cell, single electrical pulse precision, and the jury is out on how that could happen. There’s lots of brainstorming. I haven’t seen any technology generated so far that can probably do it although there’s lots of interesting speculation. That’s something I would love to see happen and we have started to work on some ideas that might allow you to do it. 我想说,我们当前最需要的,是一种能够在单个细胞,单个电子脉冲的精度上对大脑电路进行控制和成像的方法,而不确定的是这将会如何发生。我们已经进行过了很多次头脑风暴,但至今为止,虽然有许多有趣的可能性,我却并没有看出任何一种现有的技术能有很大的可能性做到这一点。我希望能够看到这件事情在不远的将来发生,而且我们已经开始将一些有前景的想法付诸实践了。 There’s a lot of speculation about whether there are quantum effects that are necessary for brain computations. At body temperature, it’s very likely that quantum effects, if any, are going to be very, very short-lived, maybe much shorter than the kinds of computations that are happening in the brain. It’s quite possible that if such effects are important, we would need far more powerful tools to see them, or perhaps you can explain all of the biophysics of neurons known to date, for the most part, with completely classical models. 关于大脑的计算过程中是否会用到量子效应这一问题有很多猜测。在人的体温之下,似乎量子效应即便存在也会非常非常短暂,其存续时间相对于发生在大脑之内的计算过程要短得多。如果此类效应的确是重要的,那么我们很可能就需要比当前强大得多的工具来观测它们。但实际上我们也可能完全能够通过一些经典模型来解释目前我们所知的绝大部分关于神经元的生物物理现象。 The thing that I loved about working on the quantum computation project, this was with Neil Gershenfeld back in the day, was this greater philosophy of how information and physics are linked. There are many theories of fundamental physical principles of computation; there is even the phrase, “it from bit,” where people talk about the fundamental thermodynamic limits of how information processing occurs in physical systems. 我之所以愿意投入时间在量子计算研究项目上,主要是早先在与Neil Gershenfeld一起工作的时候,受到了关于信息和物理学是如何紧密联系在一起的这一伟大哲学思想的影响。在计算的基础物理原则方面已经有了很多理论。当人们会谈论在物理学系统中发生的信息处理过程所受到的基础热力学限制时甚至有这样的谚语:“万物皆比特(it from bit)”。 For example, there are so many bits associated with a black hole, there is, based upon temperature, a fundamental amount of information that might be encoded in a specific transition. The brain for the most part is operating, because it’s at body temperature and all that, far above those physical fundamental limits in terms of information processing. 例如,与一个黑洞相关的比特数非常之多,在给定的温度下,一个基础量的信息可能会被编码到某个特定的转换过程中。而大脑在大多数情况下都在工作,因为它处于人体体温的环境下,而在这种温度下的信息处理则远远超过了那些物理上的基础限制。 On one level, the most parsimonious models of the brain are analogue because we know that there are different amounts of transmitters being released at synapses, we know that the electrical pulses that neurons compute can vary in their height and in their duration. 从某个层面上说,那些关于大脑的最简化模型都是模拟的(而非数字的),因为我们知道,大脑中的各突触所释放出的传导物质是不同的,我们也知道神经元所计算的不同电脉冲的强度和持续时间区别很大。 Of course, if you dig deep enough, you could say, well, you could just count the neurotransmitters, you could count the ions, and it becomes digital again, but that’s a much more detailed level of description that might not be the most parsimonious level because you had to count and localize every single sodium ion and potassium ion and chloride ion. Hopefully, we don’t have to go that far. But if we need to, we would probably have to build new technologies to do that. 当然,如果你功课做得够深,那你可以去数一下那些神经递质的数目,还有电脉冲中离子的数目,那么这个问题就又成为了数字的(而非模拟的)了,但那是一个细致得多的描述水平,而并不处在最简化层次上,因为你需要计数和定位每一个钠离子,钾离子和氯离子。希望我们不需要走得那么远,但如果真的有必要,我们还是很可能去创造一些新的技术来做到这些事情。 My co-inventor, Karl Deisseroth, and I both won Breakthrough Prizes in Life Sciences for our work together on optogenetics, this technology where we put molecules that are light sensitive into neurons and then we can make them activatable or silence-able with pulses of light. 我和我的合作者Karl Deisseroth由于我们在“光基因”技术上的合作成果共同获得了《生命科学》杂志所颁发的突破奖,在这项技术中,我们将一些光敏分子植入神经元中,然后我们就可以通过光脉冲来让它们在可激活状态和静息状态之间切换。 Our groups have sent these molecules out to literally thousands of basic as well as clinically interested neuroscientists, and people are studying very basic science questions like how is a smell represented in the brain? But they’re also trying to answer clinically relevant questions like where should you deactivate brain cells to shut down an epileptic seizure? I’ll give you an example of the latter since there is a lot of disease interest. 我们的小组已经将这样的分子提供给数千名基础神经科学家和临床神经科学家,其中有些科学家研究的是非常基础的科学问题,例如气味是如何在大脑中被表达出来的。还有一些科学家则试图回答一些临床相关的问题,例如应该在什么地方让大脑细胞停止活动以停止一次癫痫病的发作。下面我会给你举一个后者的例子,因为有很多人都对我们的技术在疾病研究方面的应用感兴趣。 People have been trying to shut down the over excitable cells during seizures for literally decades, but it’s so difficult because which part of the brain and which cells and which projections? It’s such a big mess, right, the brain? So a group at UC Irvine has been using our technologies to try to turn off different brain cells or even to turn on different brain cells, and what they’re finding is that some cells, if you activate them, can shut down a seizure in a mouse model. But still, who would have thought that activating a certain kind of cell would be enough to terminate a seizure? There is no other way to test that, right, because how do you turn on just one kind of cell? 人们在过去数十年中一直在尝试去关闭那些在癫痫病发作时过度活跃的细胞,这非常困难,因为很难弄清大脑中究竟是哪个部分的哪些细胞的哪些投射过于活跃了。要知道大脑看起来就是一团乱麻。一个来自加州大学尔湾分校的研究小组使用我们的技术试图关闭和激活大脑内部的不同细胞,而他们的研究成果表明的确存在某些细胞,通过激活它们可以在一个鼠脑模型中停止癫痫的发作。 What they did was there are certain classes of cell called interneurons, and they tend to shut down other cell types in the brain. What this group did is they took a molecule that we had first put into neurons about a decade ago, a molecule that, kind of like a solar panel, when you shine light on it, will drive electricity into the neuron. They delivered the gene for this molecule so that it would only be on in those interneurons, none of the other cells nearby, just the interneurons. And then, when they shine light, these interneurons will shut down their neighboring cells, and they showed you could terminate a seizure in a mouse model of epilepsy. 某些类型的细胞被称为中间神经元,它们所做的事情是尝试去关闭大脑内部其它类型的细胞。这个小组采用了我们十年前第一次植入神经元时所使用的一种分子,这种分子有点像一块太阳能电池板,当你将它置于光照下,它就会驱动神经元内部的电信号。他们将这种分子的基因植入了那些中间神经元,并保证除了这些中间神经元之外,附近的其它细胞内部都不存在这种分子。然后当他们点亮光线,这些中间神经元就会关闭它们相邻的细胞,他们的工作成果表明你能够在一只老鼠癫痫病发作时通过这种方法停止病症的发作。 That’s interesting because now, if you could build a drug that would drive those cells, maybe that would be a new way of treating seizures, or you could try to directly use light to activate those cells and build a sort of prosthetic that would be implanted in the brain and activate those cells near a seizure focus, for example. 这一结果十分有趣,因为现在你可以制造一种药物来驱动那些细胞,也许这会成为一种治疗癫痫病的新途径,或者你也可以尝试直接使用光来激活那些细胞,并制造出某种能够被植入大脑的假体,并通过它来激活癫痫病发作的核心区附近的那些细胞。 People are exploring both ideas. Could you use our optogenetic tools to turn on and off different cell types in the brain to find better targets, but then, treat those targets with drugs? Or could you use light to activate cells and directly sculpt their activity in real-time in a human patient? The latter, of course, is much higher risk, but it’s fun to think about for sure. And there are a couple companies that are trying to do that now. 以上两种思路都正处于人们的探索之中。人们是否能够使用我们的“光基因”工具来打开和关闭大脑内部不同类型的细胞功能以更好地发现目标,然后再使用药物对这些目标有的放矢呢?或者是否能够使用光来激活病人大脑中的某些细胞并且直接实时控制它们的行为呢?第二种做法无疑会带来很高的风险,但考虑这种可能性确实非常有趣。目前的确有一些公司在尝试这么做。 When we were talking about the Breakthrough Prize, I thought about the little speech I gave—they give you thirty seconds, but I thought about it for several weeks because I feel like there is such a push to cure things, a push to find treatments, but in some ways, by forcing it to go too fast, we might miss the serendipitous insights that are much more powerful. 谈到《生命科学》杂志的突破奖,我想到了我在获奖时所发表的一段简短讲话——他们只给了我三十秒,但我却考虑了几个星期,因为我觉得人们太过于急着去治疗疾病,找到好的疗法,但在某种情况下,如果我们强行地迅速推进这些事情,就很可能错过一些实际上要强大得多的只有通过机缘巧合才能发现的深刻洞见。 I’ll give you an example: in 1927, the Nobel Prize in Medicine was given to this guy who came up with a treatment for dementia. What this person did is, he would take people with dementia and he would deliberately give them malaria. Remember this is the greatest idea of its time, right? 让我来举个例子:1927年的诺贝尔医学奖颁发给了一位发现了一种痴呆症疗法的科学家。而他所做的事情则是故意让那些患有痴呆症的病人感染疟疾。记住,这可是那个时代最伟大的点子。 Now, why did it work? Well, malaria causes a very high fever. At that time, dementia was often caused by syphilis, and so, the high fever of malaria would kill the parasite that causes syphilis. Now, in 1928, one year later, antibiotics started to come online, and of course, antibiotics have been a huge hit and syphilis-related dementia is almost unheard of nowadays. 那么问题来了,为什么这种做法能够起效?其实是因为疟疾会导致非常严重的发热。而在当时,痴呆症则通常是由梅毒引起的,通过这种方法,疟疾所带来的高烧就能够杀死那些引起梅毒的寄生虫。而在一年后的1928年,抗生素开始得到普及,当然,抗生素所带来的影响的确非常深远,由梅毒所引起的痴呆症在最近几乎完全销声匿迹了。 The rush to get a short-term treatment, I worry, can sometimes cause people to misdirect their attention from getting down to the ground truth mechanisms of knowing what’s going on. It’s almost like people often talk about we’re doing all this incremental stuff, we should do more moon shots, right? I worry that medicine does too many moon shots. Almost everything we do in medicine is a moon shot because we don’t know for sure if it’s going to work. 我所担心的是,人们急于在短期内去寻求某种疗法的风潮有时会错误地将人们的注意力从脚踏实地去研究基础事实并弄清其中的机制上转移开。这就像人们所经常谈论的,我们总是做着这些循序渐进的事情,我们难道不应该把更多的精力花在探月这样的事情上吗?我担心医学界会关注太多这类“探月”式的大目标。我们目前在医学上所做的所有事情都是一次“探月”,因为我们并不能肯定我们所做的事情能够见效。 People forget. When they landed on the moon, they already had several hundred years of calculus so they have the math; physics, so they know Newton’s Laws; aerodynamics, you know how to fly; rocketry, people were launching rockets for many decades before the moon landing. When Kennedy gave the moon landing speech, he wasn’t saying, let’s do this impossible task; he was saying, look, we can do it. We’ve launched rockets; if we don’t do this, somebody else will get there first. 人们都是健忘的。当人类第一次踏上月球时,微积分已经发明了几百年了,所以他们拥有足够好的数学工具;而在物理上,人类也已经知道了牛顿定律;在空气动力学上,人们已经知道了如何飞行;在火箭技术上,登月前人们已经积累了数十年的发射火箭的经验。当肯尼迪发表登月演说时,他并不是在说,让我们来完成这项不可能完成的任务吧,他所说的是,看吧,我们能做到这件事情。美国人发射了登月火箭,如果我们不做这件事情,将会有别人捷足先登。 Moon shot has gone almost into the opposite parlance; rather than saying here is something big we can do and we know how to do it, it’s here is some crazy thing, let’s throw a lot of resources at it and let’s hope for the best. I worry that that’s not how “moon shot” should be used. I think we should do anti-moon shots! “探月”这个字眼现在的意思已经和当初完全颠倒过来了,现在它的意思已不再是“这是件大事,而且我们知道如何将它完成”,而变成了“这件事情很疯狂,让我们多投入些资源然后祈祷吧”。我所担心的正是对探月精神的这种误用,我觉得我们现在应该做的是反对这种“探月精神”,脚踏实地做更多的基础研究! (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]彩票会改变中奖者命运吗?

The Lottery
彩票

作者:Gregory Cochran @ 2015-04-22
译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen)
来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/04/22/the-lottery/

Lotteries can be useful natural experiments; we can use them to test the accuracy of standard sociological theories, in which rich people buy their kids extra smarts, bigger brains, better health, etc.

彩票可以视为一种有用的自然实验。我们可以用它们来检测标准社会学理论的准确度。这些理论认为,富人能给他们的孩子买到额外的智慧、更大的大脑和更健康的身体,等等。

David Cesarini, who I met at that Ch(more...)

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The Lottery 彩票 作者:Gregory Cochran @ 2015-04-22 译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen) 来源:West Hunter,https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/04/22/the-lottery/ Lotteries can be useful natural experiments; we can use them to test the accuracy of standard sociological theories, in which rich people buy their kids extra smarts, bigger brains, better health, etc. 彩票可以视为一种有用的自然实验。我们可以用它们来检测标准社会学理论的准确度。这些理论认为,富人能给他们的孩子买到额外的智慧、更大的大脑和更健康的身体,等等。 David Cesarini, who I met at that Chicago meeting, has looked at the effect of winning the lottery in Sweden. He found that the “effects of parental wealth on infant health, drug consumption, scholastic performance and cognitive and non-cognitive skills can be bounded to a tight interval around zero.” 在芝加哥那次会议上我遇到了David Cesarini。他研究了在瑞典中彩票的影响。他发现,“父母的财富对婴儿健康、药品消费、学业表现,以及认知和非认知技能的影响,仅在一个几乎为零的小区间内。” As I once mentioned, there was an important land lottery in Georgia in 1832. The winners received an 160-acre farm. But by 1880, their descendants were no more literate, their occupational status no higher. The families in the top 2/3rds of income managed to hang on to some of their windfall, but lower-income families did not. 我曾经提到过,1832年在佐治亚州有过一次重要的土地抽彩。中奖者们得到了160英亩的农场。但是到1880年,(和未中奖者相比),他们后代的教育水平并不更高,他们的职业地位也不更好。收入在前2/3的家庭设法保住了他们的一些意外之财,而低收入的家庭则没能如此。 This remind of a story by Gerald Kersh, “Whatever Happened to Corporal Cuckoo?” – About a medieval soldier who stumbled into immortality. Someone asks him (in 1945) – why hadn’t he saved his pay?  With compound interest, yaddaa yadda. 这让我想起Gerald Kersh写的一个故事,“Cuckoo下士怎么了?”——讲的是一个无意间获得了永生的中世纪士兵的故事。有人问他(在1945年),为什么不把工资存下来呢?有复利,等等等等。 “Why didn’t I save my pay? Because I’m what I am, you mug! Hell, once upon a time, if I’d stayed away from cards, I could’ve bought Manhattan Island for less than what I lost to a Dutchman called Bruncker drawing ace-high for English guineas!  Save my pay! If it wasn’t one thing it was another. I lay off liquor. Okay. So if it’s not liquor, it’s a woman. I lay off women. Okay. Then it’s cards or dice. I always meant to save my pay; but I never had it in me to save my pay!  Doctor Paré’s stuff fixed me–and when I say it fixed me, I mean, it fixed me, just like I was, and am, and always will be. ” “为什么我没有存下工资? 因为我就是我,你个傻瓜!见鬼,曾几何时,如果我离开了牌局,把和人玩‘A大’赌几尼时输给那个叫Bruncker的荷兰佬的钱省下来,那可是买下曼哈顿岛还有余。存钱!不是这事就是那事。我戒掉了酒。好吧,如果不是酒,那便是女人。我戒掉了女人。好吧,接着就是牌或者骰子。我总是想要存钱,但是我从来就不是存工资的人! Paré医生的药治好了我——当我说它治好了我,我的意思是,它装配好了我,就像我过去,现在,永远都是的那样。” Low leverage of wealth on your children’s traits is something that exists in a particular society, with a particular kind of technology. Back in medieval times, a windfall could have kept your kids alive in a famine, and that certainly had a long-term positive effect on their cognitive skills.  Dead men take no tests. The most effective medical interventions today are cheap – everyone in Sweden and the US already has them – but there are places where those interventions are not universally available. Some families in Mozambique can afford artemisin, some can’t – this must make a difference. 财富对儿童性格的低影响存在于拥有特定技术的特定社会。回到中世纪时代,一笔意外之财可以让你的小孩在饥荒中存活,这必然就会对他们的认知技能有长期的正面影响。死人不能参加测试。当今最有效的医疗干预措施是便宜的——在瑞典和美国人人都已经拥有了——然而还有些地方,这些干预并不是普遍可得的。莫桑比克的一些家庭可以负担得起青蒿素『译注:一种有效的抗疟疾药物』,另一些则负担不起——这肯定会有重大影响。 Suppose we had a method of dramatically improving a kid’s genetic potential for intelligence and success, one that cost five million dollars a pop: then wealth could influence the next generation in ways that it can’t today. In other words, Cesarani’s conclusions are correct for Sweden-now (but not for Sweden in 1700), probably correct for the US today, but maybe not true tomorrow. 假设我们有一种特效药可以显著提高孩子在智力和成就方面的遗传潜力,五百万美元一针;那么财富将可以以现在不能的方式影响下一代。换句话说,Cesarani的结论对今天的瑞典来说是正确的(但不是1700年的瑞典),可能对今天的美国也是对的,但未来却不一定正确。 It is not just wealth that has a small effect on your kid’s potential: playing Mozart doesn’t help either. Other than locking away the ball-peen hammers, it’s hard to think of any known approach that does have much effect – although we don’t know everything, and maybe there are undiscovered effective approaches (other than genetic engineering). For example, iodine supplements have a good effect in areas that are iodine-deficient. We now know (since 2014) that bromine is an essential trace element – maybe people in some parts of the world would benefit from bromine supplementation. 不仅仅是财富对小孩的潜能影响甚微:练习莫扎特也没有什么帮助。除了锁起圆头锤【编注:意思大概是可以防止孩子把自己的脑袋敲破】,很难想象任何已知的方法会有很大的影响——虽然我们不知道所有的事情,或许有未被发现的有效方法(除基因工程以外)。比如,碘补充剂对碘缺乏地区有很好的效果。现在(2014年之后)我们知道,溴也是一种必要的微量元素——或许在这个世界的一些地方人们会受益于溴补充。 What about the social interventions that people are advocating, like Pre-K?  Since shared family effects (family environment surely matters more than some external social program) are small by adulthood, I think they’re unlikely to have any lasting effect.  We might also note that the track record isn’t exactly encouraging. If there was a known and feasible way of boosting academic performance, you’d think that those teachers in Atlanta would have tried it. Sure beats prison. 人们提倡的社会干预怎么样呢,比如学前教育?由于共享家庭的影响(家庭环境肯定比一些外部社会项目更重要)到成年时已经很小,我认为他们不太可能会有持久的影响。我们可能也已注意到这方面的跟踪研究并不那么令人鼓舞。如果有一个已知且可行的方法来提高学习成绩,我想那些亚特兰大的教师们大概已经试过了。当然,肯定比监狱强多了。 Maybe there’s an effective approach using fmri and biofeedback – wouldn’t hurt to take a look.  But even if it did work, it might simply boost everyone equally, and obviously nobody gives a shit about that. 或许有一个有效的方法使用功能性磁共振成像(fmri)和生物反馈——看一看无妨。但是即便可以,它可能只是平等的提高每个人,但显然没有人在乎这一点。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]好莱坞如何改编故事

好莱坞的误导历史
Hollywood’s misleading history

作者:Peter J. Wallison @ 2016-2-29
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:Tankman
来源:American Enterprise Institute,http://www.aei.org/publication/hollywoods-misleading-history/

The film called The Big Short differs in a significant way from the book of the same name on which it is based, and this difference reveals how the film-makers made it more politically charged in order to blame Wall S(more...)

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好莱坞的误导历史 Hollywood’s misleading history 作者:Peter J. Wallison @ 2016-2-29 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:Tankman 来源:American Enterprise Institute,http://www.aei.org/publication/hollywoods-misleading-history/ The film called The Big Short differs in a significant way from the book of the same name on which it is based, and this difference reveals how the film-makers made it more politically charged in order to blame Wall Street for the financial crisis. 《大空头》这部电影与其同名报告文学在历史叙事上有着很明显的不同,而且这一差异揭示了电影制作者是如何使这部影片更充满政治意味,从而把金融危机归咎于华尔街。 In the book, the Wall Street experts who were approached to bet against the housing market almost all refused. 在那本书中,几乎所有被问及是否做空房产市场的华尔街专家们都给出了否定答案。 This showed something that was true, and for that reason interesting: that even people on Wall Street, always on the lookout for a money-making opportunity, could not believe the housing market was in any danger of collapse. In the film, this was demonstrated by the skepticism of the FrontPoint group that was initially approached as investors, as well as the eagerness of the financial firms such as Goldman Sachs and others to take the other side of the bet against the housing market. 这显示了一些有趣的事实,那就是,即使是成天盯着捞钱机会的华尔街精英也无法相信(当时的)房市会有任何崩溃的风险。而在电影中,这被演绎成投资者FrontPoint集团的怀疑立场,以及像高盛集团那样的金融机构们对于做多房地产市场的渴望。 In the book, the tension in the narrative was created when the book’s protagonists — the first people to bet against the housing market — had persuaded their investors to place bets against the housing market many months before the coming failures actually became evident. As a result, in the book their financial backers became impatient. The predictions of a collapse did not happen fast enough, and they sought to withdraw their funds. Some of this impatience was present in the film, but the context was changed. 在书中,整个故事的紧张之处体现在主人公——作为第一个开始做空房地产市场的人——在金融海啸变成现实之前很多个月,就说服了他们的投资者来做空房市。结果,他们的财务支持者们变得不耐烦了,预言中的崩塌没有足够快的发生,于是他们计划撤资。电影中部分展现了这一不耐烦的情节,然而其情境却被改写了。 In the film, the collapse actually occurred, but the there was no movement in the market prices of the privately-issued mortgage-backed securities or the credit default swaps that were used to bet against them. This was attributed in the film to a conspiracy among the big banks on Wall Street: they somehow kept the market from moving against them while they sold off their holdings to less informed buyers. 在影片中,房产市场的崩溃如期发生了,但是私下发行的MBS(住房抵押贷款证券)和用来做空他们的CDS(信用违约掉期)的市场价格并没有变化。这在影片中被归结于华尔街上大银行的共谋:他们以某种方式稳定住了市场,直到把自己持有的资产卖给那些知情较少的买家。 It should be obvious that a conspiracy like this is impossible. There are too many buyers and sellers in the financial markets for something like the price of mortgage-backed securities or credit defaults swaps to be rigged. In reality, as soon as an index of housing defaults began to signal danger, investors fled the market. 显然像这样的阴谋是不可能成功的。在金融市场像CDS和MBS这类金融工具所涉及到的买家和卖家实在是太多了,以至于其价格很难被操纵。事实上,一旦房贷违约的指数开始发出危险信号,投资者马上就逃离了这个市场。 If the film had simply followed the book, it would have been a tale about how some very smart and gutsy traders outwitted Wall Street and faced down investors who had lost faith in them to win big in the end. It could have been an uplifting story that would have shone an unflattering light on the supposedly smart guys on Wall Street. 如果该影片只是简单地遵循同名报告文学的叙事,那将只会是一个某些既聪明绝顶又胆大包天的交易员以其聪明才智胜过华尔街,以及让那些对他们失去信心的投资者羞愧万分,从而在最后赢得巨额回报的故事。这或许会成为一个真实报道华尔街上的聪明伙计的励志故事。 But that was not enough for Hollywood. In Hollywood’s telling, the bad guys had to be villains, not just dumb. So the film-makers concocted a plot in which Wall Street successfully kept the market from moving against them in order to save themselves. 但这对好莱坞来说可远远不够。在好莱坞的通常叙事中,坏家伙们必须是十足的恶棍,而不是随便冒出来的草包。所以电影制作人们编造了一个情节:为了拯救自身,华尔街成功阻止了不利于自身的市场运动。 In reality, of course, Wall Street was not saved. Many of the major firms got into serious trouble when the housing bubble collapsed. Several failed and others suffered major losses. 当然,实际上华尔街并没有被拯救。房产泡沫崩溃时很多主要金融机构陷入了严重的困境。有一些破产了,剩下的也遭受到了极其严重的损失。 The lesson here is to approach Hollywood’s versions of real life events with caution. They can be good entertainment, but badly misleading history. 这里的教训是要对好莱坞版本的现实事件保持警惕。他们可以是很好的娱乐,但同时可能会严重的误导历史。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]重新审视六度分隔理论

How small is the world, really?
世界何其小,真的吗?

作者:Duncan Watts @ 2016-02-10
译者:龟海海
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:七分钟阅读,https://medium.com/@duncanjwatts/how-small-is-the-world-really-736fa21808ba

Last week’s finding by a team of data scientists at Facebook that everyone in the social network is connected by an average of 3.5 “intermediaries” has renewed interest in the longstanding “Six Degrees of Separation” hypothesis: that everyone in the world is connected by some short chain of acquaintances.

上周,一个脸书数据分析专家小组发现,社交网络中的每个人都可经由平均3.5个“媒介好友”而联系起来,这一发现刷新了之前长期流行的“六度分隔”理论,即世上任何两人皆可通过某条较短的熟人链条连接起来。

Not surprisingly, the attention has focused on the plausible assertion that online social networks like Facebook have made the world smaller: that whatused to be six degrees is now almost half that. But really what it has revealed is how little we understand this intriguing phenomenon and what it might mean for our world.

无出意外,人们的注意力被吸引到了一个看似可能的判断上:像脸书这样的社交网络让世界变得更小:以前的六度现在一半就足够。但它真正揭示的是,对此令人神迷的现象和它对我们世界的意义何在,我们的理解何等浅薄。

This “small world” hypothesis, as it is known in sociology, has been percolating in popular culture for a long time. Almost a century ago the Hungarian poet Frigyes Karinthy wrote a short story called “Chain Links” in which he claimed he could reach anyone in the world, whether a Nobel Prize winner or a worker in a Ford auto factory, through a series of no more than five intermediaries.

在社会学领域内,大家都已了解,这个“小小世界”假说久已渗透进我们的文化之中。早在一个世纪前,匈牙利诗人Frigyes Karinthy就写了一则题为“链接”的小故事,文中他声称可以通过一系列不超过5个的“媒介”,联络到世界上任何人,无论是诺奖得主,或是一名福特工厂的工人。

Subsequently, writers like Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell have periodically reinvigorated the idea with their own colorful characters and fantastical speculations about who really runs the world.

此后,像Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell等等作家时不时的通过他们自己书中丰富的人物重塑了这一假说,并天马行空的猜测究竟是谁在真正掌控这个世界。

But arguably no one has had more impact on the question of how small the world is than Stanley Milgram, a Harvard psychologist who in the 1960s conducted an ingenious experiment to test it (Milgram is even more famous for another experiment of his, on obedience to authority, but that’s for another day).

但是,毋庸置疑,没有人对此“小小世界”问题的影(more...)

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How small is the world, really? 世界何其小,真的吗? 作者:Duncan Watts @ 2016-02-10 译者:龟海海 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:七分钟阅读,https://medium.com/@duncanjwatts/how-small-is-the-world-really-736fa21808ba Last week’s finding by a team of data scientists at Facebook that everyone in the social network is connected by an average of 3.5 “intermediaries” has renewed interest in the longstanding “Six Degrees of Separation” hypothesis: that everyone in the world is connected by some short chain of acquaintances. 上周,一个脸书数据分析专家小组发现,社交网络中的每个人都可经由平均3.5个“媒介好友”而联系起来,这一发现刷新了之前长期流行的“六度分隔”理论,即世上任何两人皆可通过某条较短的熟人链条连接起来。 Not surprisingly, the attention has focused on the plausible assertion that online social networks like Facebook have made the world smaller: that whatused to be six degrees is now almost half that. But really what it has revealed is how little we understand this intriguing phenomenon and what it might mean for our world. 无出意外,人们的注意力被吸引到了一个看似可能的判断上:像脸书这样的社交网络让世界变得更小:以前的六度现在一半就足够。但它真正揭示的是,对此令人神迷的现象和它对我们世界的意义何在,我们的理解何等浅薄。 This “small world” hypothesis, as it is known in sociology, has been percolating in popular culture for a long time. Almost a century ago the Hungarian poet Frigyes Karinthy wrote a short story called “Chain Links” in which he claimed he could reach anyone in the world, whether a Nobel Prize winner or a worker in a Ford auto factory, through a series of no more than five intermediaries. 在社会学领域内,大家都已了解,这个“小小世界”假说久已渗透进我们的文化之中。早在一个世纪前,匈牙利诗人Frigyes Karinthy就写了一则题为“链接”的小故事,文中他声称可以通过一系列不超过5个的“媒介”,联络到世界上任何人,无论是诺奖得主,或是一名福特工厂的工人。 Subsequently, writers like Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell have periodically reinvigorated the idea with their own colorful characters and fantastical speculations about who really runs the world. 此后,像Jane Jacobs, John Guare, and Malcolm Gladwell等等作家时不时的通过他们自己书中丰富的人物重塑了这一假说,并天马行空的猜测究竟是谁在真正掌控这个世界。 But arguably no one has had more impact on the question of how small the world is than Stanley Milgram, a Harvard psychologist who in the 1960s conducted an ingenious experiment to test it (Milgram is even more famous for another experiment of his, on obedience to authority, but that’s for another day). 但是,毋庸置疑,没有人对此“小小世界”问题的影响超过1960年代任教于哈佛大学的心理学家史丹利·米尔格拉姆,他进行了一个原创试验来测试此理论(米尔格拉姆其实有另一个更加有名的试验,“权力服从研究”,这个我们改天再谈)。 In brief, Milgram chose a single person, an acquaintance of his who was a stockbroker living in Sharon Mass, just outside of Boston, to be the “target” of the experiment. In addition he chose roughly 300 others — 100 from Boston itself and the other 200 from Omaha Nebraska, which Milgram figured was about as far away from Boston, socially and geographically, as one could get within the US. 简言之,米尔格拉姆选择他的一位朋友作为其实验的“靶标”,他是一位股票经纪人,住在波士顿城外的Sharon Mass。另外,他还另外选择了约300名实验对象——其中100名来自波士顿,其他200名来自内布拉斯加的奥马哈市,米尔格拉姆认为,就美国境内而言,奥马哈无论在社会关系上还是在地理上,都距离波士顿足够远。 Milgram then sent these 300 subjects special packets containing a good deal of information about the target — his name, address, occupation, etc. — and also instructions that they were to try to get the packet to him. But there was a catch: they could only send the packet to him if they knew him personally, meaning on a first-name basis. 随后,米尔格拉姆为这300名实验对象送出了特殊的包裹,其中包涵他这名股票经纪人(靶标)的许多信息——他的名字,地址,职业,等等——以及一些让他们试着将包裹寄给他的提示。但是,这儿有个坑:他们只能在个人直接认识他的情况下才能寄出包裹。 In the overwhelmingly likely event that that they did not, they were instead to send to someone they did know on a first name basis and who was closer to the target than they were themselves. These new participants would then get the same packet with the same instructions, and the process would repeat until — hopefully — some of the packets reached the target. 而实际上,在绝大部分情况下,他们不满足这一条件,所以只能将包裹寄给某位他们直接认识并且和靶标的关系距离更近一层的人。而这个收到包裹的新参与者,得到的是同样的包裹和提示,这一过程会一直持续循环下去,直到——幸运的话——有些包裹能顺利到达“靶标”。 Milgram’s question then was: for successfully delivered packets, how long would the chains be? Curiously, before he ran the experiment Milgram asked lots of people to guess the answer. Many assumed it wasn’t possible while others figured it would take hundreds of steps. So when Milgram found that not only did 64 packets, roughly one fifth of the initial sample, reached the target, but that the average length of the successful chains was just 6, he knew it would surprise many people. 米尔格拉姆接下来的问题是:如果包裹递送成功,那么这些链条有多长呢?有趣的是,在米尔格拉姆进行此实验之前就让很多人猜过答案。一些人表示根本不可能送达目标,另一些则认为至少得通过成百上千个步骤。所以,当米尔格拉姆得知不仅64个包裹(占初始样本的五分之一)到达了靶标,而且这些成功链条的平均长度仅仅为6。他知道这会让许多人咋舌。 In many ways, it still does. Although the phrase “Six Degrees of Separation” has become a cliché, when pressed many people still find it difficult to imagine how they could really reach anyone — not just someone like them or someone near to them, but anyone at all in the whole world — in something like six steps. 从许多方面看,这仍然令人惊奇。虽说“六度分隔”已经成了陈词滥调,但这一结果发布之后,许多人仍难以相信自己仅仅只需六步即可链接到世界上的任何人——不仅是自己一个圈子的人,或是周边的人,而是整个世界的任何人。 Understandably then, the Facebook result also attracted some resistance: “Facebook is an unrepresentative sample of the population;” “Facebook friends aren’t real friends” and so on. But although these critiques may have merit, they miss the point. In reality, the 3.5 number is simply incomparable to Milgram’s 6 for three reasons. 所以不难理解,脸书的研究结果发布后吸引了许多反对声音:“脸书是个不具代表性的人口样本;”“脸书的朋友并非真朋友”等等。虽说这些批评也许有可取之处,但是他们没抓住要点。实际上,这个3.5不能和米尔格拉姆的“六度”直接对比,理由有三: First, the number 3.5 counts intermediaries not degrees of separation. If I am “one degree” from someone I know them directly; there are zero intermediaries between me and them. Likewise, there is one intermediary between me and my “two degree” neighbors, and so on. 首先,3.5这个数字计算的是“媒介”的数量,而不是分隔度数。如果我是某人的“一度”友邻,我就直接认识此人;我和他们间没有“媒介”。类似的,我和我的“二度”友邻之间存在一个“媒介”,以此类推。 In general, therefore, an average of 3.5 intermediaries corresponds to 4.5 degrees of separation, which is almost exactly what Facebook itself found when it performed a similar exercise a few years ago. Conversely, Milgram’s six degrees result corresponds to five intermediaries, which is actually the number he reported in his original paper with Jeffery Travers. So already the difference is one less than it appears. 因此,平均3.5个“媒介”对应的是“4.5度分隔”,这和几年前脸书自己通过类似实验得出的发现几乎相同。反之,米尔格拉姆的“六度”所对应的是5个“媒介”——其实他和Jeffery Travers发表的文章中所用的正是这个数字。所以上述差异比表面看起来就已经少了1 。 Second, though, Milgram’s experiment was a subtly but importantly different test than the one run by Facebook. Whereas the latter measured the length of the shortest possible path between two people — by exhaustively searching every link in the underlying Facebook graph — the former is simply the shortest path that ordinary people could find given very limited information about the underlying social network. 第二,虽然米尔格拉姆的试验很巧妙,但是,和脸书做的这个测试有重要差异。后者度量的是两个人之间的最短可能路径的长度——通过穷举搜索脸书关系图上的每条链接,而前者则是普通人基于其所掌握的极为有限的社会关系信息而能够找到的路径长度。 There are, in other words, two versions of the small-world hypothesis — the “topological” version, which refers only to underlying network structure, and the “algorithmic” version, which refers to the ability of people to search this underlying structure. 换言之,其实“小世界假说”有两个版本:“拓扑版”,它度量的是社会关系网络结构,和“算法版”,它度量的则是人们在此网络中进行搜索的能力。 From these definitions, it follows that algorithmic (search) paths cannot be shorter than topological paths and are almost certainly longer. Saying that the world has gotten smaller because the shortest topological path length is 4.5 not 6 therefore makes no sense — because the equivalent number would have been smaller in Milgram’s day as well. 从这些定义得出,“算法版”(搜索)路径不可能短于“拓扑版”。仅仅因为最短拓扑路径的长度是4.5而非6就说世界变小了,这么说毫无意义——因为米尔格拉姆时代的相应数字同样小于6。 Finally, the number 6 is also in some respects too small. As has been pointed out many times since Milgram’s experiment, only about 20% of the letters made it to their target. More importantly, these letters were almost certainly on shorter paths than the ones that didn’t make it, meaning that estimates of path length that don’t take into account the missing data are almost certainly biased downwards. 最后,从某些角度看,数字6也太小了。因为自从米尔格拉姆试验后就被很多人指出,仅有20%的信封送到了靶标。更重要的是,这些信所通过的途径几乎肯定短于那些没有到达靶标的,这就意味着那些投递失败的长链条在估算链条长度时没有被计算在内,这肯定会造成向下偏差。 Fortunately it is possible to correct for this bias using standard statistical methods. In a 2009 paper my colleagues and I performed exactly this analysis both on Milgram’s original data and also on our data from a similar — but much larger — experiment that we had conducted ourselves in 2003. 有幸的是,我们可以通过标准的统计算法来更正这一偏差。在2009年的一篇论文中我和我的同事们对米尔格拉姆的原始数据和我们自己在2003年做的一个大得多的类似试验的数据进行了恰如上面所述的分析。 Remarkably we found that after the correction, both experiments yielded similar results: the median shortest path was 7, meaning that 50% of chains should complete in 7 or fewer steps while the other 50% would be longer. Many people find this result surprising because it seems so clear that the world has gotten smaller in the last 50 years. 我们惊喜的发现,在矫正了数据后,两个试验得出相似的结果:最短链条的中位值是7,即50%的链条会7步或少于7步时完成,而另外50%则会更长。许多人觉得这个结果不思议,因为过去50年世界变得更小了这个事实看起来如此明白无误。 Yet this apparent stability is exactly what one would predict from my early theoretical work with Steven Strogatz back in the late 1990’s. In a nutshell what we showed is that it is easy to turn a “large” world into a “small” one, just by adding a small fraction of random, long-range links, reminiscent of Mark Granovetter’s famous “weak ties.” 但这一明显的稳定性正是我和Steven Strogatz在1990年代后期的理论研究中预见到的。简言之,我们要证明的是,只需要在“大”世界中加入一小部分随机的“长范围”链接,就可以把世界变“小”,这让人联想起马克·格兰诺维特著名的“弱关系”理论。 The flip side of our result, however, is that once the world has already gotten small — as it was already by the 1960's — it is extremely hard to make it smaller. Obviously Facebook did not exist in 2003 so possibly since then something has indeed changed. But I suspect that the difference will be small. 实际上,这一结果反过来说就是,一旦世界变小之后——其实它在60年代已经变小了——想要把它变得更小就极为困难。很明显,脸书2003年并不存在,所以有可能某些东西真的已经改变了。但是我估计这个变化是微小的。 Why does any of this matter? There are three reasons. First, the two versions of the small-world hypothesis — topological and algorithmic — are relevant to different social processes. The spread of a sexually transmitted disease along networks of sexual relations, for example, does not require that participants have any awareness of the disease, or intention to spread it; thus for an individual to be at risk of acquiring an infection, he or she need only be connected in the topological sense to existing infectives. 何以见得这些差异是要紧的呢?理由有三:第一,两个版本的“小世界假说”——拓扑版和算法版——关乎不同的社会过程。例如,就像性病通过两性关系而传播,这并不需要参与者意识到疾病的存在或者拥有传播它的意图,而仅需要他或她在拓扑上链接到既有的感染者即可。 On the contrary, individuals attempting to “network” — in order to locate some resources like a new job or a service provider — must actively traverse chains of referrals, and thus must be connected in the algorithmic sense. Depending on the application of interest, therefore, either the topological or algorithmic distance between individuals may be more relevant — or possibly both together. 相反,若是个人想要“建立链接”寻找资源,比如找工作,寻找服务商,则必须积极的遍历中间人链条,因而必须在算法上建立链接。所以,根据实际应用中的关注重点,有些情况下个体之间的拓扑距离更切题,有时则算法距离更切题,或者两者同时切题。 Second, whereas the topological hypothesis has been shown to apply essentially universally, to networks of all kinds, the algorithmic hypothesis is largely (although not exclusively) concerned with social networks in which human agents make decisions about how to direct messages. 第二,拓扑版小世界假说已经表明普遍适用于所有类型的网络结构,而算法版假说则大致上量(虽然不完全)适用于社交网络,在这些网络中,人类主体就如何引导信息流向做出决定。 And third, whereas the topological version is supported by an overwhelming volume of empirical evidence — hundreds of studies, if not thousands — have found that nodes in even the very largest known networks are connected by short paths, the practical difficulty of running “small-world” experiments of the sort that Milgram conducted in the 1960s has meant that much less is known about the algorithmic version. 第三,鉴于“拓扑版”得到了压倒性数量的经验证据——来自数百甚至数千项研究——支持这些证据表明,即使在最大的关系网中,节点之间也可通过较短路径相连接,进行像米尔格拉姆在1960年代所做的那种“小世界效应”试验的实际困难意味着,我们对“算法版”的情况其实所知不多。 On this last point, for example, our 2009 analysis also found evidence that some of the longer paths could be much longer than the median, adding weight to the skeptics’ claims that in spite of the small-world phenomenon, some people remain socially isolated. 有关最后这一点,(例如)我们2009年的分析同样发现了证据表明,一些长路径可以远远长于中位值,这为那些怀疑者的主张提供了依据:即使存在小世界现象,总有些人在社会关系上是保持孤立的。 Given the importance of social networks in determining life outcomes, it would be extremely interesting and useful to understand better who these people are and why they are isolated. Is it something to do with their underlying networks or is it that their search strategies are somehow less effective? 考虑到社会关系网在决定生活质量上的重要性,研究并理解这些孤立者是谁,为何变得孤立,将是件极为有趣且有用的事情。这跟他们的下层关系网有关?【编注:此处underlying networks应是指亲戚、邻里等个人被预先给定的被动关系,相对于个人主动寻求建立的社会关系】还是他们的搜索策略不够有效? Could it be, as my coauthors and I speculated many years ago, some kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the perception of social isolation discourages one from searching one’s network, and that the resulting lack of success reinforces the original perception of isolation? 有没有可能,正如多年前我和我的共同作者所推测的那样,是某种自我实现的预言?即,对社会孤立的感知,使得个人不愿意搜索自己的关系网,由此导致的关系建立失败进而强化了对孤立的最初感知? Answering these questions would require new experiments that are only now just becoming possible. But the answers would not only be of academic interest — they could also potentially help many people access currently inaccessible reserves of “social capital” thereby improving their lives. Far from being settled, the small-world problem still has much to teach us about the world, and ourselves. 要回答这些问题需要更新的试验,而此类实验直到最近才变得可行。但是,这些问题的答案不仅仅是满足学术兴趣——它们同样可能帮助很多人得以访问目前对他们来说还不可触及的“社会资本”储备,从而来改善他们的生活。 小世界问题还远未解决,在未来,它仍将为我们带来有关这个世界以及我们自身的诸多教益。 Duncan Watts is a principal researcher at Microsoft and author of Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (WW Norton, 2003). 邓肯·J·瓦茨是微软首席研究员和《六度分隔理论》作者 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]为何影视业拿了这么多税务补贴?

No Matter Who Wins at the Oscars, Taxpayers Lose on Film Subsidies
不管奥斯卡花落谁家,纳税人在电影补贴上都是输

作者:Jared Meyer @ 2016-02-26
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:Reason ,http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/26/no-matter-who-wins-at-the-oscars-taxpaye

Big screen and small get big benefits at taxpayer expense.
纳税人埋单,荧屏业大获其利

Sunday night brings the 89th Academy Awards, and many are wondering what film will take home the Oscar for Best Picture. No matter what film wins, one group of people should be thanked during the acceptance speech—taxpayers.

本周日将举办第89届奥斯卡金像奖,许多人都在猜测最佳影片将会花落谁家。但不管哪部影片得奖,获奖感言里都应该感谢一个群体:纳税人。

Film is a heavily subsidized industry, and the majority of states have tax incentive programs that lower the cost of production. These tax credits are determined by production costs, not profits, and many credits are transferrable or refundable. When a film’s tax liabilities are below its allotted refundable credits, taxpayers end up directly paying film companies the difference.

电影行业得到的补贴极大,大部分州都设置有税收激励计划,以降低制片成本。这类税收抵免额度由制片成本而非影片收益决定,而且其中许多都可以转移或补差【译注:指如果抵免额高于应税额,纳税人不但不用纳税,还能倒拿差额】。如果一部影片的应税额低于它所得的可补差抵免额,那就相当于纳税人直接向电影公司支付差额。

The Big Short, one of this year’s nominees, cost $28 million to produce and was filmed in California, Nevada, and Louisiana. All three states have film tax credit programs, but Louisiana’s 40 percent partially-transferable credit is the largest. The film’s producers made a movie about Wall Street greed, but they clearly had no problem making taxpayers pay for their production costs.

今年获提名的影片《大空头》制作成本为2800万,在加利福尼亚、内华达和路易斯安那三地拍摄。三个州都有电影业税收抵免计划,不过,路易斯安那的40%部分可转移税收抵免仍属其中翘楚。制片人拍摄了一部讲述华尔街之贪婪的电影,但在让纳税人为其制片成本埋单的时候,他们显然心安理得。

New York’s fully-refundable 30 percent film tax credit is the most generous in the nation, with an annual limit of $420 millionBrooklyn and Bridge of Spie(more...)

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No Matter Who Wins at the Oscars, Taxpayers Lose on Film Subsidies 不管奥斯卡花落谁家,纳税人在电影补贴上都是输 作者:Jared Meyer @ 2016-02-26 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:Reason ,http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/26/no-matter-who-wins-at-the-oscars-taxpaye Big screen and small get big benefits at taxpayer expense. 纳税人埋单,荧屏业大获其利 Sunday night brings the 89th Academy Awards, and many are wondering what film will take home the Oscar for Best Picture. No matter what film wins, one group of people should be thanked during the acceptance speech—taxpayers. 本周日将举办第89届奥斯卡金像奖,许多人都在猜测最佳影片将会花落谁家。但不管哪部影片得奖,获奖感言里都应该感谢一个群体:纳税人。 Film is a heavily subsidized industry, and the majority of states have tax incentive programs that lower the cost of production. These tax credits are determined by production costs, not profits, and many credits are transferrable or refundable. When a film’s tax liabilities are below its allotted refundable credits, taxpayers end up directly paying film companies the difference. 电影行业得到的补贴极大,大部分州都设置有税收激励计划,以降低制片成本。这类税收抵免额度由制片成本而非影片收益决定,而且其中许多都可以转移或补差【译注:指如果抵免额高于应税额,纳税人不但不用纳税,还能倒拿差额】。如果一部影片的应税额低于它所得的可补差抵免额,那就相当于纳税人直接向电影公司支付差额。 The Big Short, one of this year’s nominees, cost $28 million to produce and was filmed in California, Nevada, and Louisiana. All three states have film tax credit programs, but Louisiana’s 40 percent partially-transferable credit is the largest. The film's producers made a movie about Wall Street greed, but they clearly had no problem making taxpayers pay for their production costs. 今年获提名的影片《大空头》制作成本为2800万,在加利福尼亚、内华达和路易斯安那三地拍摄。三个州都有电影业税收抵免计划,不过,路易斯安那的40%部分可转移税收抵免仍属其中翘楚。制片人拍摄了一部讲述华尔街之贪婪的电影,但在让纳税人为其制片成本埋单的时候,他们显然心安理得。 New York’s fully-refundable 30 percent film tax credit is the most generous in the nation, with an annual limit of $420 millionBrooklyn and Bridge of Spies, two of this year’s nominees, were filmed in New York, and their budgets were $12 million and $40 million, respectively. 要论慷慨,全国之最当数纽约的30%全额可补差电影业税收抵免,每年最高限额是4.2亿。本年度有两部提名电影在纽约拍摄,《布鲁克林》和《间谍之桥》,费用分别达到1200万和4000万。 States are starting to realize that the economic benefits of film tax credits are pure fantasy, like some movie plots. In 2012, 40 states offered tax incentives, at a total cost of $1.4 billion, but since then some states have decided that maintaining roads, funding schools, staffing police departments, and letting residents keep more income are better uses of funds. Since last year’s Oscars, Alaska, Michigan, and Illinois all ended their film tax credit programs. (See my testimony for the Alaska Senate on the false promise of film tax credits here). 许多州已经开始意识到,电影业税收抵免的经济利好效应就跟某些电影情节一样纯属空想。2012年,有40个州提供此类税收激励,总共耗费14亿。但自此以后,一些州已经决定,维护公路、资助学校、充实警力以及让居民手中存留更多收入才是对资金的更好使用。上届奥斯卡以来,阿拉斯加、密歇根和伊利诺伊等州都已经终止了电影业税收抵免计划。(可参考我在阿拉斯加州议会上就电影业税收抵免之虚假承诺所做的证言) In contrast, California tripled its non-refundable film tax credit budget to $330 million in an effort to lure more film production back to Hollywood. 加利福尼亚则反其道行之,为吸引更多影片返回好莱坞制作,该州已经将其用于不可补差电影业税收抵免的预算增加了三倍,达到3.3亿。 It is not only Oscar-nominated movies that receive sweetheart tax deals. Television shows, including HBO’s VEEP and Netflix’s House of Cards, are two examples. 获得这种甜蜜的减税待遇的并不是只有奥斯卡提名影片。电视剧也是如此,HBO的《副总统》和Netflix的《纸牌屋》就是其中两个例子。 When Maryland did not increase its fully-refundable film tax incentive program in 2014, Netflix executives went all Frank Underwood on former governor Martin O’Malley and threatened to leave the state. Political pressure, including a Kevin Spacey visit to Annapolis, convinced Maryland to raid other funds in order to double its film tax credit budget to $15 million. This does not include the $4 million in annual lost revenue from sales tax exemptions for film production companies. 2014年,在马里兰州尚未在其全额可补差电影业税收激励计划上增加力度之际,Netflix的总监们就在前任州长Martin O’Malley面前扮演“弗兰克·安德伍德”(译注:《纸牌屋》主角,马基雅维利式政客),并且威胁要撤离该州。凯文·史派西(译注:安德伍德的扮演者)到访安纳波利斯,在诸如此类的政治压力之下,马里兰州将其电影业税收抵免预算增加一倍,达到1500万,为此砍掉了许多其他方面的资金。这还没把电影制片公司所享受的营业税免征额包含在内,每年因此少征的税收可是有400万。 Even though film tax credits are often sold as a way to help small producers, 98 percent of Maryland’s film tax credit budget over the last three years has been taken up by House of Cards and VEEP. The increased tourism argument that film tax credit proponents constantly use clearly does not apply for two shows that are set in Washington, D.C. Similarly, no one thinks of Louisiana while they are watching The Big Short. 尽管电影业税收抵免经常顶着帮助小制片公司的名头做游说,但在过去三年中,马里兰州98%的电影税收抵免款都进了《纸牌屋》和《副总统》的兜里。电影业税收抵免的鼓吹者们经常使用的抵免带动旅游业的论证,显然在这里也并不适用,因为两部剧的背景都设定在华盛顿特区。同样,在观看《大空头》时,根本没人会想起路易斯安那州。 Maryland’s handouts were still not enough to convince HBO executives to keep filming VEEP in Maryland. VEEP’s production moved to California after the state offered the show a $6.5 million tax credit. 即便如此,马里兰州的馈赠仍然不足以说服HBO的总监们继续在该州拍摄《副总统》。该片将搬到加利福利亚制作,因为加州将为该剧提供650万的税收抵免。 The Maryland Department of Legislative Services found that the state’s film tax incentive program only returns 6 cents for every dollar spent. While this return is particularly poor, the best return in any state is still less than 30 cents on the dollar. 马里兰州立法服务部发现,该州的电影业税收激励计划每花掉1美元,只能收回6美分。这么低的回报当然很极端,但各州回报表现最好的也仍然不到每美元30美分。 Jobs in the film industry are highly skilled and mobile, which means they do not create lasting economic benefits. If another state rolls out an even more generous tax credit, film production can simply pack up and leave for another soundstage. States that decide to shower the film industry with taxpayer funds are in a race to the bottom, as no credit is high enough to satisfy Hollywood executives. 电影行业所提供的工作都是技术岗位,且流动性很高,这就意味着该行业并不能创造持久的经济效益。如果另外一个州推出了更为慷慨的税收抵免计划,电影制片商只需要打个包,就能换个摄影棚。各州如果决心花纳税人的钱来馈赠电影行业,它们就是加入了一场竞相逐底的比赛,因为抵免额度无论多高都无法满足好莱坞的总监们。 Maryland’s experience of losing film productions and wasting taxpayer dollars on its program is not unique. Every independent study of film tax credits have found that the programs come nowhere close to paying for themselves. But this reality has not stopped proponents from making fanciful predictions. The Maryland Film Industry Coalition—a group dedicated to promoting the film industry—claims that each dollar in tax credits leads to $1.03 in tax revenue. 马里兰州遭制片公司抛弃、在补贴计划上浪费纳税人税金的上述经历并不罕见。所有关于电影业税收减免的独立研究都已发现,各种补贴计划均远远无法实现收支平衡。但这一事实并没能阻止其鼓吹者提出各种白日梦般的预测。“马里兰州电影行业联盟”——一个旨在促进电影行业发展的组织——宣称,税收抵免每花1美元都能带来1.03美元的税收。 The Tax Foundation’s Joseph Henchman points out that if these fanciful projections were taken seriously, the United States could pay off its national debt by simply giving the film industry $1 trillion. “税务基金会”的Joseph Henchman指出,如果我们拿这种白日梦似的测算当真,那么美国只需要给电影行业派送1万亿,就能偿清它的全部国债了。 One study that was funded by the Motion Picture Association of American assumes that every dollar in tax credits creates $17.75 in economic activity, which leads to $1.88 in new tax revenue for the state. These claims are less realistic than the science-fiction films the credits support. 由“美国电影协会”赞助实施的一项研究提出,税收抵免每花掉1美元,就能创造出17.75美元的经济活动,而这又会为所在州形成1.88美元的新税收收入。这类说法比那些获得税收抵免补贴的科幻电影还要不切实际一些。 Film tax credit programs do not pay for themselves. They do not create long-term jobs, nor do they have tourism benefits. All film tax incentives do is provide opportunities for politicians to rub elbows with movie stars. 电影业税收抵免计划无法实现收支平衡。他们无法创造长期岗位,也不会带来旅游收益。电影业税收激励所能做的,无非是给政客们提供了和电影明星亲密往来的机会。 With the hundreds of millions of dollars that taxpayers gift the film industry each year, perhaps it is time for the Academy Awards to create an Oscar for Best Tax Break. If nothing else, taxpayers at least deserve a shout-out during Sunday’s award ceremony. 纳税人每年都向电影行业派送数亿美元的礼包,也许金像奖是时候设立一个“奥斯卡最佳减税奖”了。如果啥都没有,那么纳税人至少也应出现在周日颁奖典礼的致谢词中。 Jared Meyer is a fellow at Economics21 at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. You can follow him on Twitter here. Jared Meyer是曼哈顿政策研究所Economics21分部的研究员。你可以到这里关注他的Twitter账号。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]战争如何推动社会合作

《超级社会:人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评
Review of “Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth”

作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2
译者:Veidt(@Veidt)
校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster)
来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/

Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader.

Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中,通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析,来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果,让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。

What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation.

什么是历史动力学?我能给出的最佳定义是:这是一种研究历史的科学方法,它试图通过量化的方法去检验,排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。

Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours.

Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣:是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力,完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢?他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年,也就是超过260亿工时。

The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale.

下一个容易想到的问题就是,这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢,例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔,还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场,以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式,是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上(more...)

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《超级社会:人类是如何在一万年来的战争中被塑造成地球上最伟大的合作者的》书评 Review of "Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth" 作者:Cameron K. Murray @ 2016-2-2 译者:Veidt(@Veidt) 校对:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/review-of-ultra-society-how-10000-years-of-war-made-humans-the-greatest-cooperators-on-earth/ Professor Turchin’s new book Ultrasociety identifies the causal mechanisms hidden in the twists and turns of human civilisation by quantifying the rise and fall of empires. The book translates some of Turchin’s academic work on cliodynamics, making it accessible to the interested lay reader. Turchin教授在他的新书《超级社会》中,通过对帝国兴衰的量化分析,来辨识出隐藏于曲折跌宕的人类文明史中的决定性机制。这本书深入浅出地阐述了Turchin教授在历史动力学领域的一些学术成果,让那些对此感兴趣的普通读者也能领会其中的奥妙。 What is cliodynamics? My best translation is that it is the scientific study of history that seeks to use quantification to test, eliminate and open new competing hypotheses about the evolution of human civilisation. 什么是历史动力学?我能给出的最佳定义是:这是一种研究历史的科学方法,它试图通过量化的方法去检验,排除和发掘关于人类文明演化的诸多相互竞争的假说。 Turchin draws the reader in with a puzzle. What social and psychological mechanisms give people the ability to contribute towards such enormous cooperative endeavours, like building the international space station? Turchin estimates that the total quantity of hours of human work and toil dedicated by the global workforce involved in the mammoth cooperative task of building the space station is around three-million people-years, or over 26 billion work hours. Turchin教授提出了一个难题以吸引读者的兴趣:是哪些社会和心理机制让人们拥有了大规模协作的能力,完成了诸如建设国际空间站这样的宏伟目标呢?他估计全球劳动力投入在协作建设国际空间站这个庞大任务上的总人类工时大约是300万人年,也就是超过260亿工时。 The obvious next question is how this compares with the other great cooperative feats of history, like the 400,000 people-years required to build the Great Pyramid of Giza, or the 100,000 people years to build the Coliseum in Rome, and whether these long run patterns signal an increase in humanity’s ability to cooperate at a vast scale. 下一个容易想到的问题就是,这相比于人类历史上其它依靠协作完成的伟大工程又如何呢,例如需要花费40万人年修建的吉萨大金字塔,还有需要花费10万人年修建的罗马大竞技场,以及以上这些长期以来反复再现的模式,是否显示了人类在大规模协作能力上的进步呢? As an economist my bias is to see human actions in terms of self-interest, competition and conflict, where through the invisible hand the interaction of self-interested individuals can lead to productive outcomes. But like the fish who is blind to the vast ocean of water they live in, I realised I was blind to the ocean of cooperation that was the back-drop to my focus on self-interest and competition. 作为一个经济学家,我倾向于通过自利、竞争和冲突的视角来看待人类行为,在这些视角之下,自利个体之间能够通过“看不见的手”达致有效率的经济产出。但就像大海里一条对于自己所生存的广阔水域一无所知的鱼一样,我意识我对于合作行为这片广阔的大海实际上几乎一无所知,而这是我所关注的自利和竞争的基础。 In “Ultrasociety” Turchin provides a way to see and measure cooperation – to quantify its existence on a massive scale. Once you are able to see the great ocean of cooperation that dominates human society, it leads you to interesting and challenging lines of scientific inquiry. The puzzling question is then how a world dominated by ultra social human cooperation can also frequently succumb to large scale war and conflict? 在《超级社会》一书中,Turchin教授提供了一种看待并衡量合作的方式——在大尺度上将它的存在进行量化。当你能够看清合作这片统治着人类社会的汪洋大海,它就会将你的引向有趣而又富有挑战性的科学探索。之后的一个问题就是:为什么一个充盈着超大型社会合作的人类世界还会经常屈就于大规模的战争和冲突? Turchin’s answer, and one of the big ideas in the book, is that war between social groups is the mechanism by which cooperative behaviour develops “within groups”. It is a fundamental evolutionary process happening between societies at a large scale. He elevates war as a selection mechanism for cooperation, and values it above many of the technological factors like domestication of plants and the advent of agriculture. Turchin对这个问题的答案,同时也是本书的主要观点之一,是认为社会群体之间的战争是合作行为在群体内部发展的机制。它是一种基础性进化过程,发生于在各社会之间的大尺度上。他提升了战争在历史进程中的地位,将其视为对合作行为的一种选择机制,并且将其价值置于许多技术性因素之上,例如植物的驯化和农业的出现。 Turchin debunks many standard stories that “explain” the path to civilisation and eliminates glaring inconsistencies in the archaeological record. The naive view that the invention of agriculture “…set the ball rolling, and the entire history of civilisation followed from that” is a satisfying common story. But it seems a stretch to claim that the small scale practice of seasonally collecting and planting seeds nearby small permanent settlements, leads directly to the large-scale institutions observed in ancient civilisations. Turchin推翻了许多自称能够“解释”通向文明路径的标准叙事,认为它们忽视了自身与显而易见的考古学事实之间的重大矛盾。有一种天真的观点认为,农业的发明“……让雪球滚动了起来,而整个文明的历史则随之展开”,这是一种令很多人满意的常见叙事。但是,认为小规模永久定居点附近季节性的收集和播种行为可以直接导致古代文明中所呈现的一些大规模社会制度,这似乎有点太过牵强了。 The “agricultural snowball” story is also hampered by the fact that early agricultural societies had “a markedly negative effect on human health” as the poorer nutrition compared to hunter gatherers lead to smaller stature, higher sickness and the spread of pathogens through the high density settlements. Yet agriculture did spread and ultimately outcompeted nomadic hunter-gather societies. 早期的农业社会“对人类的健康水平产生了显著的负面影响”这一事实也削弱了“农业的雪球”这一叙事的说服力,相比于狩猎-采集社会,农业社会更差的营养水平导致了更小的体形,更多疾病,以及高密度的聚居区内病原体的传播。尽管如此,农业社会的确在之后得到了扩张并最终超过了游动性的狩猎-采集社会。 I have long been hesitant about “just so” explanations of social institutions based on historic physical and technological conditions that turn simple correlations into plausible causal mechanisms. Turchin provides the evidence that although all early large scale civilisations had agriculture, it was not the agriculture alone that directly caused large scale civilisation. 这种对于社会制度“原来如此”解释【编注:『原来如此故事』又称特例假设(ad hoc hypothesis),是一种为某一解释设置无法或难以验证的特殊条件,从而消除或降低该解释之可证伪性的做法。】,立足于物质和技术方面的历史条件,把简单的相关性当成了煞有其事的因果关系,我因此而一直对此抱有怀疑态度。Turchin教授提供了证据以显示虽然所有早期的大型文明都拥有农业,但并不是农业这一单一因素直接导致了大型文明的出现。 I felt foolish to have not recognised the array of “just so” stories in the study of history before Turchin pointed them out. In my field of economics, the existence of money is still explained in the textbooks as arising automatically once someone in human prehistory realised that some kind of currency made commerce easier than trying to directly trade a quarter of a cow for three baskets of vegetables. 对于没能在Turchin教授指出之前认出这些“原来如此”故事,我感到自己有点傻。在我所研究的经济学领域中,货币的存在仍然在教科书中被解释为在史前时代的某个时刻有当人意识到某种形式的通货比直接使用四分之一头牛去交换三筐蔬菜变得更加容易的时候自动产生的。 Yet many alternative social arrangements also solve the physical problem of a “double coincidence of wants”. We need look no further than current tribal societies that do not have or desire money despite their specialisation into many roles. They have instead resolved their double coincidence of wants dilemma through various other rituals, hierarchies, and institutions. 然而,许多其他的社会安排也同样解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这个实际问题。我们只需要看看一些现存的部落社会,虽然这些社会中已经出现了众多专业化的分工角色,但他们至今既没有货币,也看不出对货币有任何需求。取而代之的是,这些部落社会通过多种仪式,层级结构和社会制度的安排解决了“双方需求的巧合匹配”这一困境。 Turchin, through his cliodynamics research agenda, aims to rid the historical study of civilisation from these “just so” explanations. In the aim of scientific progress this research agenda uses quantifiable historical data to pit multi-level selection theory and its various components against many others, and in doing so eliminate bad theories and open up new avenues of inquiry. Most chapters of the books contain references to this emerging field of research which themselves are intriguing and enlightening. Turchin教授希望通过他的历史动力学使文明史的研究摆脱这些“原来如此”解释。为了推进研究的科学化进程,他的研究里使用了可量化的历史数据让多层次选择理论以及它的不同组成部分与众多其它的理论进行竞争,通过这种做法排除那些较差的理论并为之后的研究打开新方向。书中的大多数章节都包含了对这一蓬勃发展的研究领域的描述,而这本身已经足够有趣和富有启发性了。 Turchin argues that human societies, tribes, and groups, did not simply take a linear path from small hunter-gatherers tribes to large-scale civilisations. It was the competition through conquest and war between societies that lead to those with more effective weaponry and military organisations arising from greater internal cooperation, to survive at the expense of others. Turchin认为,人类社会,部落和群体并不是简单地通过一条线性的道路从小规模的狩猎-采集部落发展为大型文明的。不同社会之间在相互征服和战争中所展开的竞争,使得那些通过更好的内部合作发展出了更高效的武器和军事组织的社会生存了下来,而代价则是其对手的消亡。 The following excerpt summarises: 以下引文对此作了总结: “Here’s how I think these peaceful, stable societies came about. As war created large states, empires, and nation-states, societies evolved measures to suppress internal conflict and violence. Reduced internal violence is the obverse of increased cooperation. “我认为这些和平而稳定的社会是以这样的方式诞生的。随着战争创造出大型的城邦,帝国和民族国家,社会也演化出了一些压制自身内部的冲突和暴力的机制。内部暴力行为减少的另一面是更多的内部合作。 “Surprising as it may seem, the trend towards greater peace was already noticeable during the Ancient and Medieval historical eras, long before the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Of course, wars between empires dwarfed intertribal conflicts in scale. Huge armies fought increasingly bloody battles, and the numbers of casualties mounted. “也许看起来让人吃惊,但向更加和平的状态演化的趋势,实际上在古代和中世纪这些历史时期中就已经显而易见了,这要远远早于18世纪的启蒙运动。当然,帝国之间的战争在规模上让部落间冲突相形见绌。大型军队间战争的血腥程度持续上升,而战争中的伤亡人数也随之水涨船高。 “But the key point is that these wars moved away from imperial centers, towards the frontiers. More and more people—those living far from frontiers where battles were fought—never experienced conflict, and could enjoy relative prosperity. “但关键在于这些战争不再发生于帝国的中心区域,而被移到了前线。越来越多的人——那些生活在远离战争发生的前线地区的人——从来没有经历过冲突,他们享受到了相对的繁荣。 “There is no contradiction between larger armies and larger butcher’s bills from warfare, on the one hand, and on the other, a greater part of the population enjoying peace. What is important from the point of view of quality of life is not how many people, in total, are killed, but what the chances are that I (or you, or someone you care about) will be killed. In other words, the important statistic is the risk of violent death for each person.” “一方面,军队规模更大,战争的死亡人数更高,而另一方面,总人口中更大比例的人群却能够享受和平,这两点并不冲突。从生活质量的角度来看,重要的并不是总体上有多少人在战争中被杀死,而是作为社会中的个体,我(或者是你,或者是你所关心的人)有多大的可能被杀死。换句话说,对每个人而言,更重要的统计量是死于暴力的风险大小。” The power of this view is in the way the apparent contradiction of how war leads to peace becomes obvious once understood through an evolutionary lens. It changed my mental model of history from a series of inevitable linear events, to one of a branching tree of evolutionary paths, complete with many dead-ends of failed civilisations and their cultures, with many more merging and growing from conquest. 这一观点的强大之处在于,“战争是如何导向和平的?”这一看似矛盾的问题一旦通过进化的视角来理解,其中的逻辑就显而易见了。它将我理解历史的心智模型从一系列不可避免的线性事件的串联转变为一棵包含多种进化路径的分叉树,这棵树的许多分支都终结于失败的文明及其文化,但更多的分支则是通过征服合并在一起并继续成长的文明。 In short, I have shifted away from the popular but incorrect view of evolution as linear and subject only to environmental stresses rather than intra-species conflict. The left panel of the below image epitomises this popular confusion that I ignorantly held in the context of the study of history. 简而言之,我已经摒弃了那种流行却是错误的以线性视角看待文明演化的方式,该方式认为它仅仅受到外部环境的压力影响而不理会种群内部冲突的作用。下图左边的部分代表了之前的我出于无知而在历史研究中所采用的这种带有很强迷惑性的流行视角。 A more correct view of biological evolution is in the right panel, complete with mixing of genes and extinctions. It is more subtle and complex view, but provides a more useful story of the path of history, the dying out of civilisations and merging of cultures as a result of inter-group warfare. 而下图中右边的部分则代表了一种更加准确的看待生物进化的视角,进化是在众多基因的混合与消亡中完成的。这是一种更加精细也更加复杂的视角,但它提供了一种对历史路径更加有用的叙事,文明的消亡和文化的合并实际上是族群间战争的结果。 Screen-Shot-2016-02-02-at-3.47.06-pm Even more interesting is that when there is little external warfare and competition, the successful groups find it difficult to curtail infighting amongst sub-groups within their society, and their lack of internal cooperation begins to make them vulnerable to attack from outsiders. In Turchin’s own words, from Chapter 2: 更有趣的是,当来自外部的战争和竞争压力较小时,那些成功的族群会发现控制自身内部小群体间的明争暗斗变得更困难了,而缺乏内部合作将会让这些曾经成功的族群在面对外来者的攻击时变得脆弱。用Turchin在书中第二章的话来说就是: “Here’s how war serves to weed out societies that “go bad.” When discipline, imposed by the need to survive conflict, gets relaxed, societies lose their ability to cooperate. A reactionary catchphrase of the 1970s used to go, “what this generation needs is a war,” a deplorable sentiment but one that in terms of cultural evolution might sometimes have a germ of cold logic. “战争是以这样的方式淘汰掉那些“衰朽腐败”的社会的。当因生存压力而施加的纪律开始变得松弛的时候,社会就失去了合作的能力。1970年代曾经有一句反动标语,“这代人需要经历一场战争,”虽然这句话里满是可悲的情绪,但从文明进化的角度上说,也许其中的确包含着一些冷冰冰的真知灼见。 At any rate, there is a pattern that we see recurring throughout history, when a successful empire expands its borders so far that it becomes the biggest kid on the block. When survival is no longer at stake, selfish elites and other special interest groups capture the political agenda. The spirit that “we are all in the same boat” disappears and is replaced by a “winner take all” mentality. As the elites enrich themselves, the rest of the population is increasingly impoverished. Rampant inequality of wealth further corrodes cooperation. 无论如何,我们都能看到历史中不断重演的一种模式,当一个成功的帝国将自己的疆域扩展得如此之广以至于它成了“街区里的孩子王”,当生存的压力已不再迫在眉睫,那些自私的精英和其它一些特定的利益集团就会夺取帝国的政治议程。“大家同处一条船”的精神消失了,取而代之的是“赢者通吃”的心态。随着精英们发家致富,其它人则持续地变得更加贫困。肆无忌惮的贫富不均进一步腐蚀了合作的基础。 Beyond a certain point a formerly great empire becomes so dysfunctional that smaller, more cohesive neighbors begin tearing it apart. Eventually the capacity for cooperation declines to such a low level that barbarians can strike at the very heart of the empire without encountering significant resistance. 在超过一个临界点之后,一个曾经的伟大帝国就会变得机能失调,以至于它的那些更小但更具凝聚力的邻居们开始将它分裂。最终帝国内部的合作能力降到了一个太低的水平,以至于外来的野蛮人可以在几乎遇不上任何值得一提的抵抗的条件下直捣帝国的心脏。 But barbarians at the gate are not the real cause of imperial collapse. They are a consequence of the failure to sustain social cooperation. As the British historian Arnold Toynbee said, great civilisations are not murdered – they die by suicide.” 但那些“门口的野蛮人”并不是帝国崩溃的原因。他们的入侵只是帝国没能维持内部社会合作的结果。正如英国历史学家阿诺德·汤因比所言,伟大的文明从来不会被谋杀——他们全都死于自杀。” I have explored this process of disintegration of groups into competing clans in small scale in experiments before. Yet I failed to see the link to the large scale selection processes occurring even at such large scales at the nation-state. The talk of sclerosis and the death of large scale cooperation made me recall the chart below on the growth of partisan policy in the US which shows the striking decline in cross-party cooperation on legislative changes. 我之前曾经用小规模实验的方式研究过族群瓦解为多个相互竞争的部落的情况。但我并没有意识到,即使在民族国家这么大的尺度上,也有类似的选择过程发生。书中关于社会固化和大规模合作的消亡的讨论,让我联想起了下面这幅关于美国党派政策演化的图中所显示出在立法变更上的党际合作水平的显著下降。 Each node in the visual is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1949–2012, with Republicans in red and Democrats in blue. Edges are drawn between members who agree on legislative decisions more often than expected by chance, and the nodes are spaced out in a way so that those with more edges connecting them are closer together. The clustering therefore visualises who is cooperating with who in terms of developing legislation. 图中每个节点都代表美国在1949-2012年间的一位众议院议员,红色代表共和党人,而蓝色则代表民主党人。如果两位议员在立法决策上达成一致的频率高于由随机概率所预期的水平,那么他们所对应的节点之间就会被一条线连接,节点在图中的排列方式使得那些相互之间有更多连接的议员靠得更近。这样图中的聚类就从视觉上反映出了哪些议员在推进立法上相互合作。 Without the external threats to the nation as a whole after WWII, and later the Cold War, the ability to maintain a cohesive national whole in political terms appears to have broken down into partisan scrambling. No longer can we see a cooperative whole, but instead competing fairly arbitrary tribes of blues and reds. 在第二次世界大战和随后的冷战结束后,来自外部的对于美国作为一个整体的威胁都不复存在了,而从政治角度上看,似乎维系一个有凝聚力的国家整体的能力也随之分崩离析,取而代之的则是喋喋不休的党派纷争。在图中我们不再能看到一个富有合作性的整体,而是一些分别由红点和蓝点组成的武断分隔的竞争部落。 journal.pone.0123507.g002 I was left in a state of deep reflection after reading the book. Many other big ideas are woven through it to make you reconsider the popular but overly simplistic stories we tell ourselves to explain historical events. From the long term Z-shaped arc of quantifiable violence in human civilisation, to the role of horses, long range weaponry and population size in the success of inter-group warfare, and finally to the rise of God-kings and oppressive hierarchies. 在读完这本书后,我陷入了深刻的反思。本书中还贯穿了许多其它重要想法,它们会让你重新思考我们在解释历史事件时所常用的那些流行但过分简化的叙事。从人类文明中以可量化方式衡量的暴力水平在长期中所呈现出的Z型曲线,到马、远程武器和人口规模在族群间战争中所发挥的作用,以及最后君神合一政体和统治阶级的崛起。 Even Turchin’s incidental detours explore rather significant questions, such as in Chapter 4 when he clarifies a point about culture in human societies with the off-handed comment “Incidentally, why do we have culture? ” 即使是Turchin教授在书中偶然从主线上岔出的一些分支也讨论了相当重要的问题,例如在第四章中澄清关于人类社会中文化的作用的一个观点时,他随性地评论道“顺便问一句,为什么人类会拥有文化?”。 The same lesson applies in economics. Firms in highly competitive markets constantly face threats to their existence, leading to a type of destructive creation that ensures that surviving firms are internally highly cohesive and cooperative; economically efficient. 同样的道理也适用于经济学领域。高度竞争市场中的企业经常会面临威胁到自身生存的问题,这导致了一种毁灭性的创造过程以保证最终生存下来的企业在内部都具有极强的凝聚力和合作能力,我们称之为经济效率。 Yet the process of competition is highly inefficient in economic terms as only very slightly different production facilities are duplicated by competitors. For me the trade-off is rather radical just to think about. That the gains to internal cohesion require a cost of an external threat or else large-scale groups will be undermined by the interests of sub-groups within them. 然而从经济角度上说,竞争本身是非常低效的,因为众多互相竞争的对手所复制的生产设备之间的差别其实非常小。对我来说,其中的利弊权衡已经是一个相当深刻的问题了。即获得内部凝聚力所带来的收益需要以面对外部威胁为代价,否则大规模的群体将会被内部众多小团体的利益慢慢腐蚀。 Like any books that cover grand ideas about human civilisation there are probably some finer details to squabble about. I certainly don’t have the expertise to do so. Instead I want to share some of the thoughts that occupied my mind after reading Ultrasociety. These thoughts and comments should sufficiently signal the compelling nature of the discussions and ideas of the book. 与任何涉及关于人类文明的宏大观点的著作一样,书中几乎肯定会有一些值得争论的细节。我显然不具备足够的专业水平来这么做。但我希望与各位分享在读完《超级社会》这本书之后一直占据我脑海的一些想法。这些想法和评论应该足够说明这部大作的引人入胜之处以及其中的一些主题。 First, if sustained group cooperation relies on external competition, is there value in creating fictitious interstellar enemies to sustain better global cooperation? I’m thinking here of the film The Village, where the elders invented an outside enemy to sustain internal peace. The idea of creating an enemy for solidarity is popular, and even gets a run in the economics comics. 首先,如果持续的群体合作依赖于外部竞争,那么创造一些假想中的外星敌人是否对于维持更好的全球合作具有价值呢?这让我想起了一部名为《神秘村》的电影,在这部电影中,老人们创造出了一个外部敌人来维持村子内部的和平。为了维持团结而创造出一个敌人的想法现在很流行,即使在一些经济学漫画中也能看到它的影子。 Or perhaps the major modern religions fulfil this type of role so well that they can’t be displaced[1]? And surely it is the moral thing to do to promote human cooperation on an even larger scale without actual conflict and violence, if that indeed is possible. 或者也许主要的现代宗教已经扮演了这一角色而因此变得无可取代[1]? 毫无疑问,在不引发实际的冲突和暴力的前提下推进更大规模的人类合作在道德上是无可厚非的,如果这真的可能的话。 Second, and following directly on from the first, the use of the term morality is widely used with its common meaning as conforming to the cooperative norms of a group. Yet I can’t shake the nagging feeling that, like Darwin’s work on evolution, the idea that war with outsiders promotes peace is ripe to be corrupted for political gain because it can be so easily argued to be a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ position. 第二,紧跟第一点的思路,现在人们对于“道德”的惯常理解与维持社会的合作规范是一致的。然而我还是无法摆脱一种令人不安的感觉,正如达尔文在进化论上的贡献一样,认为与外来者的战争能够推进内部和平这一观点很容易被政治利益所利用,因为它很容易被说成是一种“自然的”或是“道德的”立场。 Third, how are these great feats of cooperation realised in practice? Is there a common recipe that can be adopted into 21st public policy? There is a brief mention of how tribes and groups ‘tag’ each other with signals of group membership as one way to create cooperation in the following passage from Chapter 10. 第三,这些宏大的合作是如何在实践中实现的?对于21世纪的公共政策而言,存在一种通用的实践模式吗?书中第十章的以下段落简要地提到了部落和群体是如何用“标签”来标识彼此群体身份的方式来创造合作的。 “An important evolutionary breakthrough was the capacity to tag cooperating groups with symbolic markers such as language and dialect, styles of clothing and ornamentation (including tattoos), and behavioral characteristics—for example, participation in collective rituals. Symbolically-tagged cooperative groups, or tribes and nations, allowed us to increase the scale of cooperation beyond the circle of people personally known to us. Of course, the downside of increasing cooperation within a tribe or a nation was greater intensity of conflict with other tribes and nations.” “一个进化上的重大突破就是人们通过诸如语言和方言,衣着和装饰(包括纹身)的风格,以及行为特征——举例来说,对于集体仪式的参与——这些符号化的标记来为与自己合作的群体贴上标签的能力。通过符号化标签来标记与自己合作的群体,或者部落和国家,让我们能够在熟人小圈子之外扩大合作的规模。当然,在部落或国家内部增进合作的负面效应是与其它部落和国家之间冲突强度的加剧。” But like many of the minor points in the book, this single paragraph opens, then closes, a massively interesting puzzle about how humans actually organise into tribes at all levels. While as outsiders we easily observe tags, or the signals and rituals of a cultural group, as insiders we often overlook the amount of resources devoted to these tagging rituals. 但与书中其它一些次要观点一样,书中的这个段落首先提出了一个重要而有趣的难题,也就是人类是如何在实际中被组织为各种层次的“部落”的,并在之后回答了这个问题。作为外人,我们很容易观察到一个文化群体的标签,或者信号和仪式,但作为群体内部的人,我们却通常会忽视投入到这些标记仪式上的大量资源。 The whole fashion industry is almost exclusively about signalling social status, religious, sporting, or gender loyalties. People don’t buy cars just for transport; otherwise there would be little demand for more than a few different models. 整个时尚产业的存在几乎就是为了标识人们的社会地位,宗教信仰,体育爱好或性别取向。人们买车的目的并不仅仅是为了交通,否则除了有限的几种不同车型之外,不会有多少对其它车型的需求。 Instead we buy into marketing messages about how purchasing different types of cars tag us with different traits in the minds of others. At a national sale with have flags, anthems, national colours, sports teams and more that promote a sense of belonging. 但实际上人们买车也是在购买一种营销符号——通过对不同车型的选择而为自己贴上标签——你开的车显示出你是什么样的人。而国家则通过国旗,国歌,国家的代表性颜色,各种体育项目的国家队以及诸如此类的东西来让人们产生认同感。 While I’ve always considered much of our conspicuous consumption to be wasteful, in the same way that the devotion of military resources often appears wasteful on the surface, a picture is emerging of the amazing gains from these types of tagging behaviours and rituals in terms of promoting high levels of cooperation. While not the direct focus of the book, I think more details on this part of the evolutionary view of cooperation and conflict would have been valuable. 虽然我之前一直认为大多数炫耀性消费都很浪费,正如我们投入在军事上的资源通常从表面上看来都很浪费一样,但一幅由这类“贴标签”的行为和仪式通过在更高层次上提升合作水平而带来巨大收益的图景正在我的脑海中浮现。虽然这并不是本书直接关注的内容,但我认为,就有关合作和冲突的进化观点的这一侧面挖掘更多细节将是非常有价值的。 Fourth, what role does the massive advance in long-range weaponry since the dawn of the nuclear age mean for inter-group warfare? Turchin explains vividly how technology that allows for killing enemy combatants from a distance was a recipe for success in most warfare; starting with our evolved physical ability to accurately throwing rocks and spears, to the invention of bows and arrows, to the use of horses to mobilise armies over great distances. In the age of intercontinental missiles, drones, and nuclear weapons, how does the function of long-range of weaponry play out when the whole world can be anyone’s target? 第四,自从核武时代以来,远程武器技术的巨大进步将在群体间战争中扮演怎样的角色?Turchin教授在书中生动地描述了为什么那些能够在远程杀死敌军战士的技术在大多数战争中都是制胜的法宝,从早期人类演化出的准确投掷石块和长矛的能力,到弓和箭的发明,到使用马匹来让军队获得远程的机动性。在这个洲际导弹,无人机和核武器的时代,当整个世界都可以成为任何人的打击目标,远程武器又将如何发挥其作用? Fifth, if the cooperative effort required to wage large scale war is a major part of the causal story of the history of civilisation, how significant is the legacy of previous wars in the current economic landscape? I have in mind the major industries of modern society, such as passenger airlines arising from industrial investment in aerial warfare, and the digital age legacy of military investment in remote communications. 第五,如果合作的努力是为大规模战争服务的这一因果叙事的确占据了大部分的文明史,那么之前的战争所留下的遗产在当今经济版图中又有着怎样的重要性?我所能想到的现代社会的一些重要产业,例如客运航空业,就是从对空中战争的产业投资中崛起的,而当今的数码时代也起源于军工行业对远程通信技术的投资。 Most major industrial firms of the modern age were intricately involved as military suppliers or were privatised former military organisations. Many modern cities only exist because of the strategic benefits of their local military bases, while public major works such as highway and rail systems, ports and airports, were products of military strategy more than peaceful economic investment. 现代大多数主要工业企业都曾经以各种复杂的方式扮演过军队供应商的角色,或者本身就是由之前的军工组织私有化而来。许多现代城市存在的原因就是处于当地的军事基地所带来的战略性优势,而高速公路,铁路系统,港口和机场这类重大的基础设施则更多都是军事战略的产物,而非和平时期经济投资的产物。 And, surprisingly to me, the cooperative legacy of previous wars is not simply technological, but also institutional; from the organisational structures of firms, to the welfare state, to international treaties on money and trade. The employer-worker relationship looks a lot like the soldier-army relationship, requiring induction, uniforms, codes of conduct, and hierarchal rule. 让我感到意外的是,之前的战争所带来的合作遗产并不仅仅存在于技术方面,它同样存在于组织制度中,从现代公司的组织结构,到福利国家,到国际货币和贸易条约。雇主和工人的关系看起来很像军队与士兵的关系,两者都要求正式入职程序,统一制服,行为准则以及层级化管理。 Modern provisions of the welfare state, including housing, health services and cash payments, were often originally created for returned soldiers following wars. It is no leap to suggest that our international monetary system, and the various international organisations and treaties that accompany it, is the direct result of resolutions in the shadow of the WWII. And perhaps the apparent breakdown of the social equality nurtured by post-war institutions observed since the late 1970s in many western countries is merely there result of the absence of external threats which breed infighting and abuses of power. 当代福利国家提供的各种供应品,包括住房,医疗服务和现金支付,最初通常都是在战后提供给退役士兵的。当今的国际货币体系以及与之配套的各种国际组织和条约,都是在第二次世界大战的阴影之下所达成的一系列决议的直接后果,这并不是什么新鲜的观点。而也许从1970年代晚期开始,许多西方国家中由战后建立的机构所导致的社会平等局面的崩塌,也仅仅是因为外部威胁的缺失为它们提供了内部斗争和权力滥用的温床。 As you can see, “Ultrasociety” will leave you pondering many big questions you may never have thought to ask before. I certainly see the world differently now. And that, to me, is the sign of a profound and insightful work. 正如你所看到的,《超级社会》这本书将会让你去深思一些之前不曾想到过的大问题。在读完这本书后,我眼中的世界变得明显不同了。对我来说,这意味着我读到了一部意义深远而富有洞见的大作。 尾注: Turchin cites Ara Norenzayan’s book Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict when explaining the role of religion in large scale cooperation, and I recommend reading it as well. 在解释宗教在大规模合作中所扮演的角色时,Turchin引用了Ara Norenzayan的著作《大神:宗教是如何改变合作与冲突的》一书中的内容,我也推荐读者阅读这本书。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]如何运用市场机制分发慈善品

Free Market Food Banks
自由市场中的救济食品发放中心

作者:Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-11-03
译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢)
校对:龙泉(@ L_Stellar)
来源:http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/free-market-food-banks.html

Feeding America, the third largest non-profit in the United States, distributes billions of pounds of food every year. Most of the food comes from large firms like Kraft, ConAgra and Walmart that have a surplus of some item and scarce warehouse space. Feeding America coordinates the supply of surplus food with the demand from food banks across the U.S..

作为美国第三大非营利性机构,“喂饱美国”每年要分发数十亿磅食品。大多数食品来自像克拉夫特、康尼格拉和沃尔玛这样产品过剩且仓储不足的大型食品公司。“喂饱美国”可调节过剩食品供给和全美救济食品发放中心【以下简称“救济中心”】需求之间的关系。

Allocating food is not an easy problem. How do you decide who gets what while taking into account local needs, local tastes, what foods the bank has already, what abilities the banks have to store food on a particular day, transportation costs and so forth. Alex Teytelboym writing at The Week (more...)

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Free Market Food Banks 自由市场中的救济食品发放中心 作者:Alex Tabarrok @ 2015-11-03 译者:尼克基得慢(@尼克基得慢) 校对:龙泉(@ L_Stellar) 来源:http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/free-market-food-banks.html Feeding America, the third largest non-profit in the United States, distributes billions of pounds of food every year. Most of the food comes from large firms like Kraft, ConAgra and Walmart that have a surplus of some item and scarce warehouse space. Feeding America coordinates the supply of surplus food with the demand from food banks across the U.S.. 作为美国第三大非营利性机构,“喂饱美国”每年要分发数十亿磅食品。大多数食品来自像克拉夫特、康尼格拉和沃尔玛这样产品过剩且仓储不足的大型食品公司。“喂饱美国”可调节过剩食品供给和全美救济食品发放中心【以下简称“救济中心”】需求之间的关系。 Allocating food is not an easy problem. How do you decide who gets what while taking into account local needs, local tastes, what foods the bank has already, what abilities the banks have to store food on a particular day, transportation costs and so forth. Alex Teytelboym writing at The Week points out: 分配食品不是一件容易的差事。在同时考虑当地需求、当地口味、救济中心已有食品、救济中心在特定日期储存食品的能力和运输成本等因素时,你如何决定什么人得到什么食物呢?Alex Teytelboym在《周报》上指出:
…Before 2005, Feeding America allocated food centrally, and according to its rather subjective perception of what food banks needed. Headquarters would call up the food banks in a priority order and offer them a truckload of food. Bizarrely, all food was treated more or less equally, irrespective of its nutritional content. A pound of chicken was the same as a pound of french fries. …在2005年之前,“喂饱美国”根据对救济中心需求颇为主观的感知来集中分配食物。总部会按优先顺序致电救济中心,并给他们提供一大卡车食物。离奇的是,不论营养成分如何,所有食品或多或少都被同等处理了。一磅鸡肉等同于一磅炸薯条。 If the food bank accepted the load, it paid the transportation costs and had the truck sent to them. If the food bank refused, Feeding America would judge this food bank as having lower need and push it down the priority list. Unsurprisingly, food banks went out of their way to avoid refusing food loads — even if they were already stocked with that particular food. 如果一家救济中心接受了配送,总部会付给运费让卡车把食品送给接受的中心。如果一家救济中心拒绝了,“喂饱美国”会视这家救济中心需求量较低,并把它从优先列表中除去。不出所料,所有的救济中心都特意避免拒绝食品配送——即使某类食物它们已经储存了很多。 This Soviet-style system was hugely inefficient. Some urban food banks had great access to local food donations and often ended up with a surplus of food. A lot of food rotted in places where it was not needed, while many shelves in other food banks stood empty. Feeding America simply knew too little about what their food banks needed on a given day. 这种苏联式的系统非常低效。一些城市的救济中心有很多当地的食品捐赠渠道,因此经常出现食品过剩。很多食品腐烂在不需要它们的地方,而别处救济中心的很多架子仍是空的。“喂饱美国”连某一天救济中心的需求都知之甚少。
In 2005, however, a group of Chicago academics, including economists, worked with Feeding America to redesign the system using market principles. Today Feeding America no longer sends trucks of potatoes to food banks in Idaho and a pound of chicken is no longer treated the same as a pound of french fries. 然而在2005年,一群包括经济学家在内的芝加哥学者用市场准则帮助“喂饱美国”重新设计了分配系统。今天的“喂饱美国”不会再给爱达荷州的救济中心送去一车土豆了,而且一磅鸡肉跟一磅炸薯条也不再同等对待。 Instead food banks bid on food deliveries and the market discovers the internal market-prices that clear the system. The auction system even allows negative prices so that food banks can be “paid” to pick up food that is not highly desired–this helps Feeding America keep both its donors and donees happy. 救济中心转而对食品运送进行竞拍,而且市场发现了理顺整个系统的内部市场价格。这个拍卖系统甚至允许负价格,以便于救济中心可以为取走需求量不大的食物而获得报酬——这帮助“喂饱美国”同时取悦捐赠者和受捐者。 Food banks are not bidding in dollars, however, but in a new, internal currency called shares. 然而救济中心并不用美元竞拍,而是用一种新的名叫“股份”的内部货币。
Every day, each food bank is allocated a pot of fiat currency called “shares.” Food banks in areas with bigger populations and more poverty receive larger numbers of shares. Twice a day, they can use their shares to bid online on any of the 30 to 40 truckloads of food that were donated directly to Feeding America. The winners of the auction pay for the truckloads with their shares. 每个救济中心每天都会分配到一壶名为“股份”的法定货币。人口和穷人较多地区的救济中心会收到数量较多的“股份”。他们隔天就可以用自己的“股份”在线竞拍30到40卡车食品中的任意一车,这些食品都是直接捐赠给“喂饱美国”的。赢得拍卖的一方要为那车食品支付其“股份”。 Then, all the shares spent on a particular day are reallocated back to food banks at midnight. That means that food banks that did not spend their shares on a particular day would end up with more shares and thus a greater ability to bid the next day. 然后,一天内花掉的所有“股份”都会在半夜重新分配给救济中心。这意味着这一天没有花掉股份的救济中心最后会有更多“股份”,并因此在来日有更大的竞标能力。 In this way, the system has built-in fairness: If a large food bank could afford to spend a fortune on a truck of frozen chicken, its shares would show up on the balance of smaller food banks the next day. Moreover, neighboring food banks can now team up to bid jointly to reduce their transport costs. 通过这种方式,系统拥有了内在的公平性:如果一家大型救济中心在一车冻鸡肉上花了大价钱,它的“股份”就会在来日出现在小型救济中心的股份账户上。而且,临近的救济中心现在可以组团共同竞标来降低运输费用。 Initially, there was plenty of resistance. As one food bank director told Canice Prendergast, an economist advising Feeding America, “I am a socialist. That’s why I run a food bank. I don’t believe in markets. I’m not saying I won’t listen, but I am against this.” 起初有很多阻力。正如一位救济中心的主管对Canice Prendergast——一位经济学家,“喂饱美国”的顾问——所说,“我是个社会学家。这是为何由我来运营一家救济中心的原因。我不相信市场。我不是说我不会听取你们的建议,但我反对这一举措。” But the Chicago economists managed to design a market that worked even for participants who did not believe in it. Within half a year of the auction system being introduced, 97 percent of food banks won at least one load, and the amount of food allocated from Feeding America’s headquarters rose by over 35 percent, to the delight of volunteers and donors. 但是这位芝加哥经济学家尽力设计了一个连不相信它的参与者都适用的市场【编注:此处疑似埋了Niels Bohr的马蹄铁梗】。在引入拍卖系统的半年内,97%的救济中心至少竞标成功过一车食品,而且从“喂饱美国”总部分配的食品总量增长了超过35%,这是志愿者和捐赠者喜闻乐见的。
Teytelboym’s very good, short account is working off a longer, more detailed paper by Canice Prendergast, The Allocation of Food to Food Banks. Teytelboym出色简短的描述都出自Canice Prendergast一篇更长更细致的论文,《救济中心的食品配给》。 Canice’s paper would be a great teaching tool in an intermediate or graduate micro economics class. Pair it with Hayek’s The Use of Knowledge in Society. Under the earlier centralized system, Feeding America didn’t know when a food bank was out of refrigerator space or which food banks had hot dogs but wanted hot dog buns and which the reverse–under the market system this information, which Hayek called “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” is used and as a result less food is wasted and the food is used to satisfy more urgent needs. Canice的论文会是一份很棒的中级或者高级微观经济学课程的教学材料。最好配上哈耶克的《知识在社会中的应用》一文。在早前的集中式系统中,“喂饱美国”并不知道某个救济中心何时冰箱没空间了,或者哪家救济中心有热狗却想要热狗面包而哪家正相反——在市场系统中,这类信息——哈耶克称为“有关特定时空情境的知识”——被利用起来,因此浪费的食物更少,食物用来满足更急切的需求。 The Feeding America auction system is also the best illustration that I know of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. “喂饱美国”的拍卖系统也是我所知的对福利经济学第二基本定理的最好诠释。 Even monetary economics comes into play. Feeding America created a new currency and thus had to deal with the problem of the aggregate money supply. How should the supply of shares be determined so that relative prices were free to change but the price level would remain relatively stable? How could the baby-sitting co-op problem be avoided? Scott Sumner will be disappointed to learn that they choose pound targeting rather than nominal-pound targeting but some of the key issues of monetary economics are present even in this simple economy. 甚至货币经济学派上了用场。“喂饱美国”创造了一种新货币并且因此必须处理总货币供应量的问题。应如何决定“股份”的供应量以使相关价格能够自由变动而价格水平保持相对稳定?如何避免保姆合作社问题?Scott Sumner将会失望地发现,救济中心选择了以紧盯镑重而不是名义镑重为政策指引【编注:此处疑似在调戏Sumner,后者提倡一种紧盯名义GDP的货币政策。】,但是货币经济学的一些关键问题出现在了这个甚为简单的经济体中。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]一场轰轰烈烈的反娼妓战争

The War on Sex Trafficking Is the New War on Drugs
反性贩运战争就是新的禁毒战争

作者:Elizabeth Nolan Brown @ 2015-11
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/09/30/the-war-on-sex-trafficking-is

And the results will be just as disastrous, for “perpetrators” and “victims” alike.
它将走向同样悲惨的结局,对“犯罪者”和“受害者”均是如此。

“Sex Trafficking of Americans: The Girls Next Door.”

“Sex-trafficking sweep nets arrests near Phoenix truck stops.”

“Man becomes 1st jailed under new human trafficking law.”

“性贩运美国人:邻家女孩。”

“凤凰城卡车停靠站附近扫网式逮捕性贩运。”

“性贩运新法实施后首人收监。”

Conduct a Google news search for the word trafficking in 2015 and you’ll find pages of stories about the commercial sex trade, in which hundreds of thousands of U.S. women and children are supposedly trapped by coercion or force.

2015年,在Google上用trafficking一词做新闻搜索,你将找到大量关于商业化性交易故事的页面,据称,成千上万的美国妇女儿童正陷于强制或暴力之困。

A few decades prior, a survey of “trafficking” headlines would have yielded much different results. Back then, newspapers recounted tales of “contemporary Al Capones trafficking illegal drugs to the smallest villages and towns in our heartland,” and of organized “motorcycle gangs” trafficking LSD and hashish.

几十年前,如果对包含“trafficking”一词的头条新闻做一番考察,结果会大不相同。那时候,报纸上详细讲述的是“当代的阿尔·卡彭【译注:Al Capone,上世纪二、三十年代芝加哥黑手党头目】们已将非法毒品贩卖至我们心脏地带的小村小镇”,以及有组织的“摩托党”贩卖LSD和印度大麻。

“Many young black men in the ghetto see the drug trade as the Gold Rush of the 1980s,” the Philadelphia Inquirer told readers in 1988. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) warned of a “nationwide phenomenon” of drug lords abducting young people to force them into the drug trade. Crack kingpins were rumored to target runaways, beating them if they didn’t make drug sales quotas.

1988年,《费城问询报》对读者说:“众多贫民区黑人青年将毒品交易视为1980年代的淘金热。”全国失踪与受剥削儿童中心(NCMEC)曾发出警告称,毒枭们绑架年轻人并强迫他们加入毒品交易是一种“全国性现象”。当时还有传言称,可卡因头目会瞄准离家出走者,如果他们没能售出足额毒品就会殴打他们。

Such articles offered a breathless sense that the drug trade was booming, irresistible to criminals, and in desperate need of child foot soldiers. Lawmakers touted harsher penalties for drug offenses. The war on drugs raged. New task forces were created. Civilians were trained how to “spot” drug traffickers in the wild, and students instructed how to rat out drug-using parents. Politicians spoke of a drug “epidemic” overtaking America, its urgency obviously grounds for anything we could throw its way.

此类文章令人窒息,让人觉得毒品交易兴旺繁荣,能令犯罪分子利欲熏心,且对儿童兵的需求极为迫切。立法者们兜售各种针对毒品犯罪的更严厉惩罚。禁毒战争风起云涌。新的特遣部队成立了。平民受到训练,学习如何在野外“认出”毒品贩子;学生得到指导,学习如何告发吸毒的父母。政客们都在谈论一场正在袭击美国的毒品“传染”,其严峻性使得我们能够采纳的任何阻止措施均有不言而喻的理由。

We know now how that all worked out.

我们如今已知道这些事情的结局如何。

The tactics employed to “get tough” on drugs ended up entangling millions in the criminal justice system, sanctioning increasingly intrusive and violent policing practices, worsening tensions between law enforcement and marginalized communities, and degrading the constitutional rights of all Americans.

为“严打”毒品而采取的种种策略,结果使得数百万人受困于刑事司法系统,鼓励了日益扰民而有害的政策措施,恶化了执法机构与边缘社群之间的紧张关系,并且损害了全体美国人的宪法权利。

Yet even as the drug war’s failures and costs become more apparent, the Land of the Free is enthusiastically repeating the same mistakes when it comes to sex trafficking. This new “epidemic” inspires the same panicked rhetoric and punitive policies the war on drugs did—often for activity that’s every bit as victimless.

但尽管是禁毒战争的失败和代价日益昭然,当遇到性贩运问题时,美国这片自由之地仍旧在满腔热情地重复同样的错误。如同禁毒战争中曾经发生的那样,新的“传染病”鼓动了同样的恐慌修辞,激发了同样的惩罚政策——通常针对的都是从头到尾找不到受害者的行为。

Forcing others into sex or any sort of labor is abhorrent, and it deserves to be t(more...)

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The War on Sex Trafficking Is the New War on Drugs 反性贩运战争就是新的禁毒战争 作者:Elizabeth Nolan Brown @ 2015-11 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:Reason,https://reason.com/archives/2015/09/30/the-war-on-sex-trafficking-is And the results will be just as disastrous, for "perpetrators" and "victims" alike. 它将走向同样悲惨的结局,对“犯罪者”和“受害者”均是如此。 "Sex Trafficking of Americans: The Girls Next Door." "Sex-trafficking sweep nets arrests near Phoenix truck stops." "Man becomes 1st jailed under new human trafficking law." “性贩运美国人:邻家女孩。” “凤凰城卡车停靠站附近扫网式逮捕性贩运。” “性贩运新法实施后首人收监。” Conduct a Google news search for the word trafficking in 2015 and you'll find pages of stories about the commercial sex trade, in which hundreds of thousands of U.S. women and children are supposedly trapped by coercion or force. 2015年,在Google上用trafficking一词做新闻搜索,你将找到大量关于商业化性交易故事的页面,据称,成千上万的美国妇女儿童正陷于强制或暴力之困。 A few decades prior, a survey of "trafficking" headlines would have yielded much different results. Back then, newspapers recounted tales of "contemporary Al Capones trafficking illegal drugs to the smallest villages and towns in our heartland," and of organized "motorcycle gangs" trafficking LSD and hashish. 几十年前,如果对包含“trafficking”一词的头条新闻做一番考察,结果会大不相同。那时候,报纸上详细讲述的是“当代的阿尔·卡彭【译注:Al Capone,上世纪二、三十年代芝加哥黑手党头目】们已将非法毒品贩卖至我们心脏地带的小村小镇”,以及有组织的“摩托党”贩卖LSD和印度大麻。 "Many young black men in the ghetto see the drug trade as the Gold Rush of the 1980s," the Philadelphia Inquirer told readers in 1988. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) warned of a "nationwide phenomenon" of drug lords abducting young people to force them into the drug trade. Crack kingpins were rumored to target runaways, beating them if they didn't make drug sales quotas. 1988年,《费城问询报》对读者说:“众多贫民区黑人青年将毒品交易视为1980年代的淘金热。”全国失踪与受剥削儿童中心(NCMEC)曾发出警告称,毒枭们绑架年轻人并强迫他们加入毒品交易是一种“全国性现象”。当时还有传言称,可卡因头目会瞄准离家出走者,如果他们没能售出足额毒品就会殴打他们。 Such articles offered a breathless sense that the drug trade was booming, irresistible to criminals, and in desperate need of child foot soldiers. Lawmakers touted harsher penalties for drug offenses. The war on drugs raged. New task forces were created. Civilians were trained how to "spot" drug traffickers in the wild, and students instructed how to rat out drug-using parents. Politicians spoke of a drug "epidemic" overtaking America, its urgency obviously grounds for anything we could throw its way. 此类文章令人窒息,让人觉得毒品交易兴旺繁荣,能令犯罪分子利欲熏心,且对儿童兵的需求极为迫切。立法者们兜售各种针对毒品犯罪的更严厉惩罚。禁毒战争风起云涌。新的特遣部队成立了。平民受到训练,学习如何在野外“认出”毒品贩子;学生得到指导,学习如何告发吸毒的父母。政客们都在谈论一场正在袭击美国的毒品“传染”,其严峻性使得我们能够采纳的任何阻止措施均有不言而喻的理由。 We know now how that all worked out. 我们如今已知道这些事情的结局如何。 The tactics employed to "get tough" on drugs ended up entangling millions in the criminal justice system, sanctioning increasingly intrusive and violent policing practices, worsening tensions between law enforcement and marginalized communities, and degrading the constitutional rights of all Americans. 为“严打”毒品而采取的种种策略,结果使得数百万人受困于刑事司法系统,鼓励了日益扰民而有害的政策措施,恶化了执法机构与边缘社群之间的紧张关系,并且损害了全体美国人的宪法权利。 Yet even as the drug war's failures and costs become more apparent, the Land of the Free is enthusiastically repeating the same mistakes when it comes to sex trafficking. This new "epidemic" inspires the same panicked rhetoric and punitive policies the war on drugs did—often for activity that's every bit as victimless. 但尽管是禁毒战争的失败和代价日益昭然,当遇到性贩运问题时,美国这片自由之地仍旧在满腔热情地重复同样的错误。如同禁毒战争中曾经发生的那样,新的“传染病”鼓动了同样的恐慌修辞,激发了同样的惩罚政策——通常针对的都是从头到尾找不到受害者的行为。 Forcing others into sex or any sort of labor is abhorrent, and it deserves to be treated like the serious violation it is. But the activity now targeted under anti-trafficking efforts includes everything from offering or soliciting paid sex, to living with a sex worker, to running a classified advertising website. 强迫他人进行性交易或任何种类的劳动都很令人痛恨,理应和其他严重侵害一样得到处理。但目前的反贩运行动的目标所指,则包括了从提供或招揽有偿性行为,到与性工作者同居,再到运营一家分类广告网站等所有一切活动。 What's more, these new laws aren't organic responses by legislators in the face of an uptick in human trafficking activity or inadequate current statutes. They are in large part the result of a decades-long anti-prostitution crusade from Christian "abolitionists" and anti-sex feminists, pushed along by officials who know a good political opportunity when they see it and by media that never met a moral panic they didn't like. 此外,这些新法规并不是立法者在遭遇人口贩运行为增加或现行法律不足问题之后的自然回应。它们大部分都是基督教“废奴主义者”和反性女权主义者数十年来的反卖淫斗争的结果,其推手包括从中看到了良好政治机遇的官员,以及只要有道德恐慌就会来劲的媒体。 The fire is fueled by federal money, which sends police departments and activist groups into a grant-grubbing frenzy. The anti-trafficking movement is "just one big federal grant program," Michael Hudson, a scholar with the conservative Hudson Institute, told the Las Vegas Review-Journal. "Everybody is more worried about where they're going to get their next grant" than helping victims, Hudson said. 联邦资金则是火上添油,它将各个警局和行动组织都卷入了一场争取拨款的狂潮。保守派智库哈德逊研究所的学者Michael Hudson对《拉斯维加斯评论杂志》说,反贩运行动“只是一个大型联邦拨款项目”。他说:“大家更关心的是到哪里去找下一份拨款”,而不是帮助受害者。 Because of the visceral feelings that the issue of paid sex has always provoked, it's easy for overstatements and false statistics to go unchallenged, winning repetition in congressional hearings and the press. Yet despite all the dire proclamations, there's little evidence of anything approaching an "epidemic" of sexual slavery. 由于有偿性交易通常总能唤起一些本能的道德感,因此,过分夸大和错误统计总是容易避开质疑,得以反复出现在国会听证会和新闻媒体上。然而,尽管存在各种可怕的宣告,并没有什么证据表明性奴役这一“传染病”正在发生。 THE NUMBERS DON'T ADD UP 经不起推敲的数字 From 2000 to 2002, the State Department claimed that 50,000 people were trafficked into the U.S. each year for forced sex or labor. By 2003, the agency reduced this estimate to 18,000–20,000, further reducing it to 14,500–17,500 in subsequent reports. That's a 71 percent decrease in just five years, though officials offered no explanation as to how they arrived at these numbers or what accounted for the drastic change. These days, federal agencies tend to stick to the vague "thousands" when discussing numbers of incoming victims. 自2000年至2002年,国务院宣称,每年有5万人被贩运到美国从事强迫性行为或强迫劳动。到2003年,该机构将这一估计缩小到18000到20000人,在后续的报告中又进一步缩小为14500到17500人。五年间降低了71%,尽管官方没有给出解释说明他们是如何得出这些数字以及为何变化如此之大。现在,在讨论入境受害者数量时,联邦机构更愿意坚持使用模糊的“数千”一词。 Globally, some 600,000 to 800,000 people are trafficked across international borders each year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates. But the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2006 described this figure as "questionable" due to "methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and numerical discrepancies," including the rather astonishing fact that "the U.S. government's estimate was developed by one person who did not document all his work." And even if he had, there would still be good reasons to doubt the quality of the data, which were compiled from a range of nonprofits, governments, and international organizations, all of which use different definitions of "trafficking." 全球来看,据国土安全部(DHS)估计,每年约有60至80万人遭到跨国界贩运。但政府问责办公室(GAO)2006年曾说,这一数字是“有问题的”,原因在于“方法论缺陷、数据缺失以及数值矛盾”,其中还包括一个令人乍舌的事实——“美国政府的这项估计是由一个人完成的,而且他并没有对其所有工作存档”。即便他存档了,我们也有很好的理由怀疑数据的质量,因为它们收集自各种各样的非营利组织、政府机构和国际组织,运用的“贩运”定义各不相同。 Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post's "Fact Checker" columnist, began digging into government-promulgated sex-slavery numbers last spring and discovered just how dubious many of them are. "Because sex trafficking is considered horrific, politicians appear willing to cite the flimsiest and most poorly researched statistics—and the media is content to treat the claims as solid facts," Kessler concluded in June. 《华盛顿邮报》的“事实核查者”专栏作家Glenn Kessler去年春开始钻研政府发布的性奴役数字,发现大量数字无比可疑。六月份,Kessler总结到:“由于性贩运被认为是骇人听闻的,所以政治家们似乎都愿意引用一些最经不起推敲、研究质量最糟糕的统计数字——而媒体则很乐意将这些断言当做确凿事实。” For instance, Rep. Joyce Beatty (D–Ohio) declared in a May statement that "in the U.S., some 300,000 children are at risk each year for commercial sexual exploitation." Rep. Ann Wagner (R–Mo.) made a similar statement that month at a congressional hearing, claiming the statistic came from the Department of Justice (DOJ). The New York Times has also attributed this number to the DOJ, while Fox News raised the number to 400,000 and sourced it to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 比如,众议员Joyce Beatty(民主党—俄亥俄)在五月份的一份声明中宣称,“在美国,每年约有30万儿童遭遇商业化性剥削的威胁。”同月,众议员Ann Wagner(民主党—密苏里)在一场国会听证会上做出了类似声明,宣称统计数据来自司法部(DOJ)。《纽约时报》也将这一数字溯源于司法部,而《福克斯新闻》则将数字提升到40万,并将来源定为卫生部(HHS)。 But not only are these not DOJ or HHS figures, they're based on 1990s data published in a non-peer-reviewed paper that the primary researcher, Richard Estes, no longer endorses. The authors of that study came up with their number by speculating that certain situations—i.e., living in public housing, being a runaway, having foreign parents—place minors at risk of potential exploitation by sex traffickers. They then simply counted up the number of kids in those situations. To make a bad measure worse, anyone who fell into more than one category was counted multiple times. 然而,它们不仅不是司法部或卫生部提供的数字,而是基于一个1990年代发表于一篇未经同行评议的论文中的数据,而且其主要研究者Richard Estes现在都不再支持这一数据。完成该研究的几位作者如此推测:某些特定情形——如居住于廉租房、离家出走或父母为外国人等——会使未成年人面临被性贩子剥削的潜在风险,并由此来得出他们的数字。然后,他们就简单地把所有遭遇这类情形的孩子数量进行了一下加总。使这一糟糕估算变得更加糟糕的是,每个同时属于多种情形类别的人都被多次计算了。 "PLEASE DO NOT CITE THESE NUMBERS," wrote Michelle Stransky and David Finkelhor of the respected Crimes Against Children Research Center in 2008. "The reality is that we do not currently know how many juveniles are involved in prostitution. Scientifically credible estimates do not exist." Michelle Stransky和David Finkelhor在2008年曾写道:“请不要引用这些数字”,两人均是广受尊敬的“针对儿童犯罪研究中心”成员。“现实情况是,我们目前并不知道有多少青少年卷入了卖淫业。科学上可信的估算尚不存在。” A lengthy 2013 report on child sex trafficking from the Justice Department concluded that "no reliable national estimate exists of the incidence or prevalence of commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking of minors in the United States." 司法部2013年的一份关于儿童性贩运的长篇报告得出结论:“关于美国境内涉及未成年人的商业化性剥削和性贩运的发生频率或普遍程度,尚没有可靠的全国性估算。” Common sense should preclude believing the 300,000 number in the first place. If even a third of those "at risk" youth were peddled for sex in a given year, we'd be looking at nearly 110,000 victims. And since advocates often claim that victims are forced to have sex with 10, 20, or 30 clients a day, that would be—using the lowest number—1.1 million commercial child rapes in America each day. Even if we assume that child rapists are typically repeat customers, averaging one assault per week, that would still mean nearly 8 million Americans have a robust and ongoing child rape habit, in addition to the alleged millions who pay for sex with adults. 本来,从一开始,常识就应该能够阻止人们相信30万这个数字。即便这些“有风险”的少年人某年只有三分之一遭遇性贩运,我们看到的就会是11万受害者。又由于鼓吹者们通常宣称受害者被迫每天接客10、20、30人,那就是说,美国每天发生——用最小值计算——110万起商业性的强奸儿童案。即便我们假定儿童强奸犯都是典型的回头客,平均每周犯案一次,那也将意味着有近800万美国人拥有强烈且持久的儿童强奸嗜好,此外据称还有数百万美国人与成人发生过有偿性行为。 Common sense should also immediately cast doubt on another frequently cited statistic: that the average age at which females become victims of sex trafficking is 13. "If you think about it for half a minute, this statistic makes little sense," wrote Kessler. "After all, if it is the 'average,' then for all those who entered trafficking at age 16 or 17, there have to be nearly equivalent numbers who entered at age 9 or 10. But no one seriously believes that." 本来,常识还应该能够迅速令人对另一个经常被引用的统计数据起疑:女性成为性贩运受害者的平均年龄是13岁。“只要你花半分钟时间想想,这个数据就完全说不通”,Kessler写到,“要知道,如果它确实是‘平均数’,那么对应于所有那些16或17岁时遭遇贩运的人,必须得有几乎同等数量的人在9或10岁时就有此遭遇。没人会真诚的相信这一点。” Still, the obvious implausibility of the statistic—and its routine debunking—hasn't stopped it from reaching the upper echelons of public discourse. Kessler's own Washington Post ran it uncritically in 2014. Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D–Minn.) made the claim on the Senate floor this year, citing the FBI. 这种数据明显不可信,且反复遭到驳斥,然而,这仍然无法阻止它们进入公共讨论的顶层。Kessler所在的《华盛顿邮报》本身就在2014年不加鉴别地登载过这一数据。今年,参议员Amy Klobuchar(民主党—明尼苏达)在参议院也做出同样的断言,引用的是FBI。 The DHS also asserts that "the average age a child is trafficked into the commercial sex trade is between 11 and 14 years old," sourcing it to the DOJ and the government's NCMEC. Yet none of these federal agencies take responsibility for this stat. 同样,卫生部也声称“儿童被贩运进入商业化性交易的平均年龄在11至14岁之间”,并称其来源为司法部政府的全国失踪与受剥削儿童中心。然而,上述联邦机构中没有一个表示为这一数据负责。 When Kessler followed the facts down the rabbit hole, the original source in all cases was...the self-disowned Estes paper, in which interviews with 107 teens doing street-based prostitution in the 1990s determined that their average age of entry into the business was 13. 当Kessler追问事实,一直钻进“兔子洞”【译注:《爱丽丝漫游奇境记》典故】之后,才发现所有这些证词的最初来源都是……Estes那篇已被作者本人否定的论文;在该文中,针对1990年代107位从事站街卖淫活动的青少年的访谈就确定了他们的平均入行年龄为13岁。 "So one government agency appears to cite two other government entities—but in the end the source of the data is the same discredited and out-of-date academic paper," wrote Kessler. "It would be amusing if it were not so sad." “所以,看似是一个政府机构引用另外两个政府部门——但最终的数据来源则是同一篇已遭否定的过时学术论文,”Kessler写到,“真是令人啼笑皆非。” Author and former sex worker Maggie McNeill has traced other uses of the age-13 figure back to a similarly narrow and unrepresentative study, this one looking at underage streetwalkers in 1982 San Francisco ("Victimization of Street Prostitutes" by M.H. Silbert and A.M. Pines). Among these interview subjects from three decades ago, the average age of their first noncommercial sexual experience was 13. The average age of entry into prostitution was 16, and the report made no mention of sex trafficking at all. 从前曾为性工作者的作家Maggie McNeill也追踪考察了其它对于13岁这个数据的用法,发现它源自一个同样狭隘且不具代表性的研究。该项研究考察的是旧金山1982年的未成年街头妓女(M. H. Silbert和A. M. Pines的《街头卖淫的牺牲》)。在这些三十年前的受访者中,第一次非商业的性经历平均发生于13岁时。进入卖淫业的平均年龄是16岁,并且这篇报告压根没有提及性贩运。 Surveys of adults working in the U.S. sex trade have yielded much higher average starting ages. A 2014 Urban Institute study involving 38 sex workers found that only four began before age 15, 10 started between the ages of 15 and 17, another four started in their 30s, and the remaining 20 began sex work between the ages of 18 and 29. A 2011 study, this one from Arizona State University, found that of more than 400 women arrested for prostitution in Phoenix, the average age of entry was about 25. 针对美国成年性交易从业者的研究得出的首次从业年龄要高得多。城市研究所2014年一项涉及38位性工作者的研究发现,只有4个入行年龄小于15岁,有10个开始于15至17岁,另有4个是30岁后才开始的,剩下的20个是在18至29岁之间开始从事性工作。另一项亚利桑拿州立大学2011年所做的研究发现,在凤凰城因卖淫被捕的400多名妇女中,平均入行年龄约为25岁。 "Regardless of whether the number is 300,000 or 30,000, something must be done to protect these children at risk of exploitation and trafficking," said Moira Bagley Smith, a spokeswoman for Rep. Wagner, when Kessler challenged the figure. But it's exactly this kind of thinking that inflicts real-world policy damage. 当Kessler对前述数据提出质疑时,众议员Wagner的发言人Moria Bagley Smith说:“不管数字是30万还是3万,我们必须采取适当措施来保护这些处于被剥削和被贩运风险中的儿童。”但正是这种思维方式导致了真实世界的政策代价。 Whether there are 30,000 or 300,000 crime victims makes a great deal of difference in terms of fashioning an appropriate response, as does the context of the victims' circumstances. Separating the mythology of sex trafficking from the facts is crucial for addressing problems as they exist, not problems as we might want, fear, or imagine them to be. 在设计恰当的应对办法时,犯罪受害者是3万还是30万,区别很大,正如受害人的环境背景影响很大一样。将有关性贩运的神话和事实加以区分,对于处理现实存在的问题——而非我们想要、惧怕或者想象中的问题——至关重要。 WILLFUL HYPERBOLE 恣意夸张 A 2010 study from Rutgers University professors James Finckenauer and Ko-lin Chin took an in-depth look at Chinese women working in America's illicit massage parlors, which are routinely denounced by politicians as hotbeds of sexual slavery. 罗格斯大学James Finckenauer和Ko-lin Chin教授2010年的一项研究深入考察了在美国非法按摩院中工作的中国妇女;此类按摩院经常被政客们指斥为性奴役的温床。 Indeed, Finckenauer noted that 93 percent of the women he interviewed would be considered sex trafficking victims under common legal definitions, which include any person who arrives in a foreign country for sex work regardless of whether force or coercion is involved. 事实上,Finckenauer指出,在他所访谈的妇女中,有93%会被通行的法律定义界定为性贩运受害者,因为这一定义包括了进入异国从事性工作的任何人,不管其中有没有涉及暴力或强制。 Yet not one of the 149 Chinese women interviewed said she was sold into prostitution, and only one reported being forced or coerced into it. "There is more diversity among the parties involved in prostitution than is commonly supposed, and to portray them all in the same way as victims is an oversimplification," the researchers concluded. 但受访的149位中国妇女中,没有一位说自己是被卖为妓女的,且只有一位报告说自己是被殴打或强制沦为妓女的。两位研究者的结论是:“卖淫业涉及的各方参与者比通常所认为的具有更多的差异性,以同一种方式将他们作为受害者来描绘,这是一种过分简化。” Under federal law and most state laws, anyone under 18 who is engaged in prostitution is considered a sex trafficking victim. But study after study has found most youths in the sex trade do not have "pimps." And if they are forced or coerced into the work, it's often at the hands of a family member or romantic partner, not some child-snatching stranger. 在联邦法律和绝大多数州法之下,18岁以下从事卖淫业的任何人都被视为性贩运受害者。但一项又一项研究都发现,性行业中的绝大多数少年人都没有“皮条”。如果他们是被强制或胁迫进入这一行的,那么施暴者通常是某个家庭成员或情人,而非绑架儿童的陌生人。 trafficking-coercion Pimps themselves claim to steer clear of underage sex workers. In interviews with 73 people who had been incarcerated for crimes such as promoting, profiting from, or compelling prostitution, the Urban Institute found that most tried to avoid business relationships with teens (though these respondents, along with the police officers Urban interviewed, also claimed it was common for teenagers to lie about their ages). 皮条客自己也宣称,他们会避开未成年性工作者。城市研究所曾对73个因助推卖淫、获利于卖淫或强迫卖淫等类罪行而入狱的罪犯进行访谈,发现其中绝大多数都避免和青少年建立业务关系(当然这些受访者和城市研究所访问的警官们也都提到,青少年谎报年龄的情况很常见)。 "I was determined to stay away from the younger bitches; 16 gets you 20," said one respondent. "Bitch better have a felony charge and stretch marks to mess with me," said another. "I know she is grown and been to jail." 某受访者说:“远离低龄婊子,这一点我很坚决;16岁能给你带来20年牢。”另一个则说:“要跟我搞,那些婊子最好能身背重罪、长妊娠纹”,“这样我就知道她是成人,坐过牢”。 "This particular business ain't about pimps going to high school and recruiting a girl," said a third. "Government don't understand how this game original come about. Girl run away from home, look older than what she is. They think pimps are going out and enticing them." 另有一个则说:“这个特殊行当,不是说皮条客去高中招募少女”,“政府没搞明白这个游戏是怎么来的。这帮女孩自己跑出家门,打扮得比实际成熟。政府觉得是皮条客们四处出动、诱拐少女。” By any estimation, teen runaways make up a major proportion of underage individuals in prostitution, forced or otherwise. Runaways are especially likely to engage in what sociologists call "survival sex"—exchanging sex not for a set fee, but for food and a place to crash. 无论采取何种方式估计,离家出走的青少年都是从事卖淫的未成年人(无论被迫与否)的主要部分。离家出走者特别容易加入社会学家所称的“生存卖淫”——并不是为了固定的价格而出卖肉体,而是为了食物或过夜之处。 Sixty-eight percent of minors engaged in street-based prostitution in New York City say they've sought help from youth services organizations, according to Kate D'Adamo of the Sex Workers Project. "New York City funds roughly 200 beds for a population of 4,000 unaccompanied, homeless youth," D'Adamo told TechCrunch. "When all the beds are full, it is street economies like the sex trade which they turn to in order to provide basic needs. If we want to identify the most vulnerable, all we have to do is provide support when someone stands up and says 'I need a place to sleep tonight.'" 据“性工作者计划”的Kate D'Adamo所说,在纽约市从事站街卖淫的未成年人中,有68%自称曾向青年服务组织寻求帮助。D'Adamo向科技博客TechCrunch说:“纽约市向4000名孤独无家的年轻人资助提供了约200个床位”,“如果床位满了,为了满足基本需求,这些人就会求助于街头经济如性交易。如果我们想要找出最容易受害的人,我们只要做到一条:有人站起来说‘我今晚需要找个地方睡’的时候,我们能提供些帮助。” Instead, we fund police task forces to monitor Internet ads for weeks in search of suspect code words or tattoos. We pass laws mandating more prison time for pimps. We set up elaborate sting operations for both sex workers and their customers. 然而,我们却在资助警察特遣队持续数周对网络广告进行监视,搜寻可疑的暗号或纹身。我们立法要求延长皮条客坐牢年限。我们精心设计种种针对性工作者及其顾客的诱捕行动。 We hang "Are you being trafficked?" signs at strip clubs and highway rest stops, and train airport staff on how they can spot the signs of sex trafficking. We act as if sex traffickers are organized, jet-setting, diabolical, and legion. We are chasing our own mythology, to the detriment of actual results. 我们在脱衣舞酒吧和高速公路停车区悬挂“你是否遭到贩运?”的标牌,向机场工作人员提供如何发现性贩运迹象的培训。我们采取种种行为,好像性贩子们组织严密、生活奢华、暴虐残忍且数量众多一样。我们所追捕的,只是我们自己编的神话,真正的结果则是有害的。 A look at human trafficking investigations in the U.S. makes this clear. In July 2015, for instance, Homeland Security, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and other Arizona state agencies conducted a joint "human trafficking enforcement operation" that involved randomly stopping commercial trucks as well as running the license plates of passersby. 看看美国的人口贩运调查就清楚了。比如,国土安全部、亚利桑那州公共安全部及其它州政府机构于2015年7月共同实施了一项“人口贩运执法行动”,措施是随机拦截商用货车并检查过路者的牌照。 The 30-agent, nine-hour stunt resulted in 28 stops, the checking of 5,576 license plates...and zero arrests for human trafficking. Police did arrest one woman for prostitution, however, and are continuing to investigate another who said she worked in "adult entertainment." 这场由30名执法官持续9小时的噱头行动拦截车辆28次,检查牌照5576次……而因贩运人口被捕的人数为零。不过,确实有一名女性因卖淫而被警察逮捕,另一名自称从事“成人娱乐”的妇女也将继续接受调查。 Last April, the FBI released its first crime data on state-based trafficking investigations. In the 13 states reporting for last year, law enforcement looked into a total of 14 human trafficking incidents, ultimately making a grand total of four arrests. 去年四月,FBI首次发布了各州贩运调查的犯罪数据。在去年提交报告的13个州中,执法者总共调查了14起人口贩运案件,最终共计拘捕4人。 Between 2008 and 2010, federally funded task forces investigated 2,515 suspected incidents of human trafficking, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. An "investigation" was defined as "any effort in which the task force spent at least one hour investigating" the incident. Of these cases, only 6 percent led to arrests. 根据司法统计局数据,在2008至2010年间,得到联邦资金资助的特遣部队共调查了2515起涉嫌人口贩运的案件。其中“调查”的定义是,“特遣部队至少花了一个小时来努力调查”某案件。在这些案子中,只有6%以拘捕结束。 From 2007 to fall 2008, federal dollars funded 38 sex-trafficking task forces, of which 15 found no confirmed victims or suspects, 14 reported between one and four cases, and nine reported more than five. Of the total 1,229 suspected incidents that year, sex cops found just 14 underage victims. 自2007年至2008年秋,联邦为38个性贩运特遣部队提供了资金,其中的15个没有发现任何经确认的受害者或嫌疑人,有14个报告了1至4起案子,9个所报案件在5个以上。在当年共计1229件涉嫌案件中,性警察们只找出了14名未成年受害人。 "Given the obstacles to locating victims in black markets" some disparity between estimated numbers and confirmed cases should be expected, wrote the sociologist Ronald Weitzer in a 2011 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology paper. But "a huge disparity between the two should at least raise questions about the alleged scale of victimization." 2011年,社会学家Ronald Weitzer在《刑法与犯罪学杂志》上的一篇论文中写道:“考虑到在黑市中找受害者要面临种种障碍”,估算数字和确证案件之前存在一定差别,这是可以预料的。但是,“两者之间的巨大悬殊至少应该引发人们的疑惑,反思此前宣称的受害者规模。” UNNECESSARY LEGISLATION 毫无必要的立法 Of all the myths and misinformation about sex trafficking in America, the most pernicious may be that our current laws are insufficient. Pushing his new Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, which passed last May, Sen. John Cornyn (R–Texas) declared that it would "provide law enforcement with the tools" to hold human traffickers accountable. 在关于美国性贩运的种种迷思和误报中,最有害的可能是,宣称现行法律不完善。参议员John Cornyn(共和党—德州)在推动其《贩运受害者正义法案》这一新法(已于今年五月通过)时曾宣称,该法案将“为执法机构提供了工具”,使他们能将人贩子绳之以法。 Another co-sponsor, Sen. Mark Kirk (R–Ill.), said the bill "gives police and prosecutors the tools they need to go after sex traffickers." Such statements—and there are plenty more—imply that we currently lack tough anti-trafficking laws. Yet for at least 15 years, federal policy makers and agencies have been continually strengthening these laws and increasing funding for their enforcement. 另一名联署人,参议员Mark Kirk(共和党—伊利诺伊),则称该法案“向警察和检察官们提供了追捕性贩子所必须的工具”。这些说法——还有很多——暗示,我们原先缺乏严厉的反贩运法规。然后,至少在过去15年间,联邦政策制定者和联邦机构一直在持续强化此类法律,并不断增加其执法资金。 Things really got going with the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000, though before this federal agents could bring human trafficking charges under various statutes, including the Mann Act (passed in 1910 to prohibit transporting a minor across state lines for the purposes of engaging in prostitution), the Tariff Act (passed in 1930 to ban importing goods made with forced or indentured labor), and various laws related to peonage, indentured servitude, and slavery. 这事在2000年就已经真正启动,当年通过了《贩运受害者保护法案》(TVPA);即便在此之前,联邦机构也能通过各种不同法令对人口贩运提起控告,包括《曼恩法案》(1910年通过,禁止州际之间运送未成年人为娼)、《关税法案》(1930年通过,禁止进口由强迫劳工或契约奴工制造的产品)及其它各种与劳动偿债制、契约奴工制和奴隶制有关的法律。 But the TVPA, signed by President Bill Clinton in the waning days of his presidency, specifically established as federal crimes "forced labor," "sex trafficking," and "unlawful conduct with respect to documents in furtherance of trafficking." It also created a national Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and gave the feds authority to seize traffickers' assets. 但是,由比尔·克林顿总统在其任期的没落时期所签署的《贩运受害者保护法案》,明确将“强迫劳动”、“性贩运”和“事涉各类文件的助推贩运的非法行为”确定为联邦犯罪。它还创设了一个全国性的“监测和打击人口贩运办公室”,并授权联邦政府官员可没收人贩子的财产。 The TVPA's 2003 reauthorization gave law enforcement the ability to use wiretapping to investigate sex trafficking and child sexual exploitation, increased the minimum and maximum sentencing requirements for a variety of sex offenses, and instituted a "two strikes, you're out" rule requiring mandatory life imprisonment upon a second sex offense involving a minor, "unless the sentence of death is imposed." 《贩运受害者保护法案》的2003年再授权法案赋予执法机构以监听调查性贩运和儿童性剥削的能力,提高了一系列性侵犯的最低和最高刑罚要求,并建立了一条“两次就出局”的规则,要求对涉及未成年人的性侵犯再犯实施刚性的终身监禁,“除非已经处以死刑”。 The 2005 reauthorization added human trafficking to crimes that can trigger the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) law, expanded asset forfeiture possibilities, and directed the CIA to study "the interrelationship between trafficking in persons and terrorism." It also increased funding for the prosecution of "persons who engage in the purchase of commercial sex acts." 2005年的再授权法案将人口贩运添加到了可以触发联邦《反欺诈与腐败组织》(RICO)法的罪行之列,扩大了财产没收的可能性,并命令CIA研究“人口贩运与恐怖主义之间的相互关系”。它还为起诉“参与购买商业化性行为的人”增加了资金。 In 2008, legislators enhanced criminal penalties for human trafficking and expanded what qualifies to include several new areas, including anyone who "obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of" anti-trafficking laws. It specified that in minor sex trafficking cases, "The Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years." And it significantly increased federal funding—doubling some appropriations and more than tripling others—for anti-trafficking efforts at home and abroad. The 2013 reauthorization increased federal involvement with state and local anti-trafficking efforts. 2008年,立法者提高了人口贩运的刑事惩罚,并扩大了限定条件,使之包含了几个新的领域,包括任何“阻扰、试图阻扰或以任何方式干扰或阻止”反贩运法规“实施”的人。它明确,在未成年性贩运案件中,“政府无需证明被告人知道该人未满18岁。”并且显著增加了国内外反贩运斗争的联邦资金——部分拨款是此前的两倍、其它则是此前的三倍以上。2013年的再授权法案增加了联邦在各州和各地方反贩运斗争中的参与度。 This year's Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act made soliciting paid sex from a minor a form of federal sex trafficking; established a Domestic Trafficking Victims' Fund into which anyone convicted of trafficking must pay $5,000; and lowered the evidentiary standard for proving trafficking charges. 今年的《贩运受害者正义法案》把引诱未成年人从事有偿性交易确定为联邦性贩运的一种形式;建立了一个“国内贩运受害者基金”,每个被定罪的人贩子都必须向其缴纳5000美元;并降低了证明贩运指控的证据标准。 The act also established that websites and publishers—from classified ad sites such as Craigslist to social media services such as Twitter and Reddit—may be charged with sex trafficking if any victim is found to have advertised there. And it created a "HERO corps" of military veterans who will work with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agents to fight cybercrime, including "digital intellectual property theft" and "hidden marketplaces." 这一法案还明确,网站和出版商——从分类广告网站如Craigslist到社交媒体服务如Twitter和Reddit——一旦被发现有曾登过任何受害者的广告,则有可能面临性贩运指控。它还组建了一队由退伍老兵组成的“英雄警察”,与移民和海关执法局官员合作打击网络犯罪,包括“数字知识产权盗窃”和“隐蔽市场”。 trafficking-age Sen. Cornyn called it a "first step." 参议员Cornyn把这称为“第一步”。 The State Department's 2014 Trafficking in Persons report states explicitly that our current penalties for human trafficking "are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious offenses." Penalties for forced labor, involuntary servitude, or peonage range from five to 20 years without aggravating factors; possible life imprisonment with them. Sex traffickers can receive up to life imprisonment, and are required to serve at least 10 years in prison if the victim is under 17 and 15 years if the victim is under 14. Victims may also independently file a civil cause of action; something 117 have done since 2003, with a 75 percent success rate. 国务院2014年《人口贩运》报告明确说明,我们对于人口贩运的现行惩罚“足够严厉,与为其它严重罪行规定的惩罚相当。”在没有加刑因素的情况下,对于强迫劳动、非自愿劳役或劳役偿债的惩罚是5到20年;如果有加刑因素,可判终身监禁。性贩子最高可获终身监禁;如果受害者小于17岁,要求至少狱中服刑10年;如果受害者小于14岁,则是15年。受害者还可以独立提起民事诉讼;自2003年以来已有大概117起,其中75%成功。 In addition to federal anti-trafficking laws, states have been adopting a flurry of their own measures. In 2014 alone, 31 states passed new laws concerning human trafficking. Since the start of 2015, at least 22 states have done so. 在联邦反贩运法律之外,各州本身也一直在采用大量措施。仅2014年就有31个州通过了涉及人口贩运的新法律。2015年开年以来,已有至少22个州这么做了。 Echoing the policy choices of the drug war, one common trend in these laws has been harsher sentences for trafficking offenses, including new mandatory minimums. In Florida, helping a minor engage in prostitution in any way now comes with mandatory life imprisonment. In Louisiana, labor trafficking of a minor comes with a five-year mandatory minimum, and sex trafficking of a minor 15 years. In New Jersey, soliciting a minor for paid sex comes with a minimum $15,000 fine. Some states have also started adding "aggravating" factors that trigger higher penalties, such as the offense taking place within a certain distance of a school or group home. 如同禁毒战争中的政策选择一样,上述法律中的一个普遍趋势是,对贩运罪行采取更为严厉的刑罚,包括制定新的刚性最低刑期。在弗罗里达州,以任何方式协助未成年人进入卖淫业如今都将面临刚性终身监禁。在路易斯安那州,贩运未成年劳动力将面临最少5年的刚性刑期,而性贩运未成年人则是15年。在新泽西州,引诱未成年人进行有偿性交易将面临最低15000美元的罚款。有些州还开始增加能够触发更高刑罚的“加刑”因素,包括侵害发生于离学校或集体宿舍一定距离以内。 trafficking-wiretapping Another trend is adding trafficking-related offenses to those that get perps on sex-offender registries. Last January, Arkansas passed a bill requiring anyone convicted of trafficking in persons or "patronizing a victim of human trafficking" to register as a sex offender. Increasing criminal penalties on patrons, or "johns," has been hot in state legislatures, too. 另一个趋势是,将与贩运有关的犯罪行为归为需要对罪犯进行性犯罪者登记之列。去年一月,阿肯色州通过一项法案,要求一旦被定罪为贩运人口或“光顾人口贩运受害者”,就必须登记为性犯罪者。对顾客即“嫖客”加重刑事惩罚也一直是各州立法的热点。 In 21 states, "sex trafficking laws have been amended or originally enacted with the intent to decisively reach the action of buyers of sex," according to the anti-trafficking nonprofit Shared Hope International. In 2014, Michigan changed soliciting someone under 18 for sex from a misdemeanor to a felony sex offense. Florida recently stipulated that people found guilty of soliciting prostitution (from someone of any age) must do 100 hours of community service and attend "john school," where they will be educated on "the negative effects of prostitution and human trafficking." 据反贩运非营利组织“国际共同希望”称,在21个州中,“对性贩运法律的修订或全新颁布,意在决定性地打击性服务买家的行为。”2014年,密歇根州将引诱未满18岁者发生性关系由轻罪改为性侵犯重罪。弗罗里达州最近规定,犯有招妓罪(无论对象是何年龄)的人都必须做满100小时社区服务,并参加“嫖客学校”,在里面接受有关“卖淫和人口贩运的负面影响”的教育。 trafficking-asset Expanding police/prosecutorial power to fight and profit from trafficking is also common. At least 21 states now allow police to use wiretapping in trafficking investigations. And many states allow asset forfeiture for those convicted of sex trafficking or prostitution. For instance, in Colorado, "every building or part of a building including the ground upon which it is situated and all fixtures and contents thereof, every vehicle, and any real property" are up for grabs if they've been used in conjunction with prostitution of any kind. 扩大警察和检察官打击贩运并从中获利的权力,这种做法也很常见。至少有21个州现已允许警察在贩运调查中使用监听手段。此外,许多州允许对获得性贩运或卖淫定罪的人实施财产没收。比如,在科罗拉多州,“每栋建筑或建筑的任一部分,包括建筑所在的土地,以及此建筑内的所有固定装置和内容物品,每辆车和所有不动产”都可以被拿走,只要它们曾被用于任何形式的卖淫活动。 The final category of popular new state laws seems predominantly concerned with "raising awareness," be it via classes for hotel employees, programs in school curricula, or signs posted in strip clubs. Dozens of states now require certain entities—from adult-entertainment businesses and job-placement firms to hospitals, rest stops, and airports—to post the National Human Trafficking Hotline number, or face penalties. In Georgia, failure to do so can result in fines of between $500 and $5,000. 各州流行的最后一类新法似乎主要注重“提高觉悟”,可能是通过为宾馆雇员开培训班,在学校课程中设置有关课程,或在脱衣舞夜总会悬挂标牌等。如今已有几十个州要求某些机构——从成人娱乐行业和职业介绍所到医院、停车场和机场——张贴“全国人口贩运热线”电话,否则就会被罚款。在佐治亚州,没做到这一点可能面临500至5000美元的罚款。 Federal agencies are also in the trafficking publicity game. In July 2015, the DHS announced the expansion of "awareness efforts to major airports, truck stops, and motorist gas stations across the country," where it will fund messages describing "the signs of human trafficking" on signs, video monitors, and shopping bags. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission conducted more than 250 human trafficking "outreach events" in 2013 alone. 联邦机构也参加了这一对人口贩运进行曝光的游戏。2015年7月,卫生部宣布要“在全国的主要机场、货车停车区和机动车加油站扩大提高觉悟的工作”,它将提供资金,在这些地方的标牌、显示器和购物袋上发布信息,内容则是“关于人口贩运的标志”。就业机会平等委员会仅2013年就举办了250多场人口贩运“宣讲活动”。 REFRAMING PROSTITUTION 重新界定卖淫 If there's no empirical evidence that domestic human trafficking is increasing, and the State Department says we already have adequate laws to go after traffickers, then what's driving this current legislative frenzy? 如果没有经验证据表明国内人口贩运在增加,且国务院说过我们已有足够法律来追捕人贩子,那么究竟是什么东西在驱动当下的这场立法狂潮? One factor is opposition to prostitution, even between consenting adults. Since the 1990s, a coalition of Christian and radical feminist activists has been working to redefine all prostitution as sex trafficking. While the Clinton administration was unsympathetic to their efforts, they found a friend in President George W. Bush. 其中一个因素是对卖淫(即便是成人之间的自愿卖淫)的反对。自1990年代以来,由基督徒和激进女权主义者结成的联盟一直在努力,试图将所有卖淫都重新界定为性贩运。克林顿政府对这一活动并不热心,但他们在小布什总统那里找到了知音。 In a 2002 National Security Presidential Directive, the White House stated that prostitution was "inherently harmful and dehumanizing." Hence the administration's new rule: Non-governmental organizations receiving federal funds to fight human trafficking (or AIDS) must explicitly oppose prostitution. 在2002年的一份国土安全总统指令中,白宫宣布卖淫“本质上有害且令人丧失人性”。于是有了该届政府的新规则:接受联邦资金从事反人口贩运(或反艾滋病)事业的非政府组织必须明确反对卖淫。 "Prostitution is not the oldest profession, but the oldest form of oppression," a State Department publication from 2004 reads. The agency stated that "the vast majority of women in prostitution don't want to be there," that "few activities are as brutal and damaging to people as prostitution," and that "prostitution leaves women and children physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually devastated," with damage that "can never be undone." “卖淫并非最古老的职业,而是最古老的压迫形式”,国务院2004年的一份出版物如是说。该机构称,“从事卖淫的绝大部分女性都不愿意如此”,且“没有什么行为比卖淫更残忍、对人更具损害性”,以及“卖淫让妇女和儿童在生理上、心理上、情感上以及精神上受到摧残”,其伤害“永不可能恢复”。 "Since the early 2000s, anti-prostitution policies at the federal level have translated into increasingly aggressive state and local-level policing of sex workers and their customers," wrote Kari Lerum, Kiesha McCurtis, Penelope Saunders, and Stephanie Wahab in a 2012 article for Anti-Trafficking Review. Kari Lerum、Kiesha McCurtis、Penelope Saunders和Stephanie Wahab 2012年发表于《反贩运评论》上的一篇文章写道:“自21世纪初以来,联邦层面的反卖淫政策已经转变为州层面和地方层面针对性工作者及其顾客的日益严厉的整顿。” This conflation of trafficking and prostitution "has allowed for federal dollars to be used locally for anti-prostitution purposes," the authors noted. "Anti-trafficking raids, such as Operation Cross Country held annually since 2006, have resulted in the arrest of many sex workers nationwide using federal anti-trafficking dollars." 上述几位作者提到,这种对人口贩运和卖淫的归并处理,“已使得各地方将联邦资金用在了反卖淫这一目的上”,“反贩运搜查,比如自2006年以来每年进行的‘横越美国行动’,花费了联邦反贩运资金,结果只是全国范围内众多性工作者被捕。” The goal of Operation Cross Country, according to the FBI's website, is "to recover victims of child sex trafficking." In 2014, more than a dozen cities took part. Knoxville, Tennessee, to cite one participant, uncovered zero underage victims of sex trafficking, but it did arrest eight women for prostitution, four women for promoting prostitution, two women for human trafficking, and four men for solicitation. 根据FBI网站,“横越美国行动”的目标,是“找回儿童性贩运的受害者”。2014年有十几个城市参加了这一行动。只举一个参与城市为例,田纳西州的Knoxville,没有找到一个未成年的性贩运受害者,但确实因卖淫逮捕了8名妇女,因协助卖淫逮捕了2名妇女,因贩卖人口逮捕了2名妇女,因引诱卖淫逮捕了4名男子。 In Newark, New Jersey, one 14-year-old victim was identified and 45 people were arrested for prostitution or pimping. Richmond, Virginia, found no child victims but charged 26 people with prostitution and two with pimping. In Atlanta, dozens were arrested for prostitution, loitering, soliciting, and drug possession. 在新泽西州的Newark,确认了一名14岁的受害者,有45人因卖淫或拉皮条而被逮捕。在弗吉尼亚州的Richmond,没有找到一个受害儿童,不过有26人因卖淫、2人因拉皮条遭到控告。在亚特兰大,数十人因卖淫、街头游荡、招嫖及持有毒品而被捕。 Phoenix officials announced the most victims recovered: five minors and 42 adults. But dig beyond the press release and you'll see the adult "victims" included women willingly working in prostitution. Officers posing as clients answered these women's online ads and then apprehended them. 凤凰城的警官所宣布的受害者解救数目最大:5个未成年、42个成人。但往新闻发布之外再挖一挖,你会发现所谓成人“受害者”中包括了自愿卖淫的妇女。警官们假装顾客,回应这些妇女的线上广告,然后再逮捕她们。 One 20-year-old "victim" had her arm broken by the cops when she tried to flee. A 16-year-old victim was booked on prostitution charges when she refused to let officers contact her parents. After failing to secure emergency shelter for two adult victims who had no money and no identification, police returned them to the motel where they'd been apprehended "so they could try and arrange funds to get back" home. 某位20岁的“受害者”在试图逃跑时还被警察把手臂给扭断了。当一位16岁的受害者拒绝让警官联系其父母时,她被登记为受到卖淫指控。在为两名成年受害人寻找临时住所失败之后,由于两人既无钱财也无身份证明,警察又把她们送回了逮捕她们的同一家汽车旅馆,“这样她们能试着筹集回家的钱”。 INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A MORAL CRUSADE 道德圣战的制度化 In a 2012 paper published in Politics & Society, Ronald Weitzer suggested that the 1990s anti-prostitution crusade has become fully "institutionalized" in the 21st century. "Institutionalization by the state may be limited or extensive—ranging from consultation with activists, inclusion of leaders in the policy process, material support for crusade organizations, official endorsement of crusade ideology, resource mobilization, and the creation of legislation and new agencies to address the problem," Weitzer wrote. Sound familiar? 在一篇2012年发表于《政治与社会》杂志的论文中,Ronald Weitzer认为,1990年代的反卖淫斗争在21世纪已经完全“制度化”了。他写道:“州层面的制度化既可能是有限性质的,也可能是全面彻底的——其内容包括征求活跃分子意见、将其领导人纳入政策过程、向斗争组织提供物质支持、为其斗争意识形态提供官方背书、资源动员、为处理这个问题而创设法律和新的机构等。”听着是不是很熟悉? "Some moral crusades are so successful that they see their ideology fully incorporated in government policy and vigorous efforts by state agencies to combat the problem on their own," he noted. In other words, "the movement's central goals become a project of the government." 他还提到,“某些道德圣战如此成功,以至于它们的结果是,州立机构已经将这一斗争的意识形态完全纳入了政府政策和强力措施,自己扛起了与此问题作战的任务。”换句话说,“这一任务的核心目标已经变成了一项政府规划。” It's hard to think of a better representative of this institutionalization than the Polaris Project, one of America's biggest anti-trafficking groups. Founded by a man who now runs the website Everyday Feminism and a woman who now works for the federal government, Polaris has drafted multi-pronged model legislation for the taking. Compare Polaris' recommendations with state trafficking laws, and you'll find near verbatim language in some, and shared assumptions and goals in almost all. 很难想到还有什么例子能比“北极星项目”更好代表这种制度化了。它是美国最大的反贩运团体之一,其创立者为一男一女,前者目前运营着一家叫做“每日女权主义”的网站,后者现为联邦政府工作。“北极星”已经起草了多管齐下的示范法案,供人参考。拿“北极星”的建议与州反贩运法做个比较,你就能发现部分句子几乎一字不差,而且绝大部分辞句有着共同的预设前提和目标。 How did Polaris gain such influence? One way is through state "report cards." Advertised as a measure of states' commitment to fighting human trafficking, it's basically a measure of how closely their laws hew to the Polaris policy wishlist. Among the must-haves: a law requiring the display of the national human trafficking hotline number, which Polaris runs with funding from Health and Human Services. States that fail to enact all of the Polaris-endorsed policies wind up with bad grades, which the organization then publicizes extensively. “北极星”这么大的影响力是怎么来的?其中一个途径是通过发布各州“成绩单”。据宣传,这是对各州投身反人口贩运斗争努力程度的一种测量,但基本上测量的是各州法律在多大程度上遵守“北极星”的政策意愿清单。必要部分中有一条:立法要求张贴全国人口贩运热线电话,而这个热线是由“北极星”用来自卫生部的资金运营的。有些州没能将“北极星”支持的政策全部立为法律,最终得分就很差劲,并被该组织广为宣传。 Another driver of state trafficking policies is the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), a nonpartisan organization that drafts model state legislation in a variety of areas. In 2010, ULC was asked by the American Bar Association to prepare a plan for tackling human trafficking. The result was drafted in collaboration with Polaris, Shared Hope International, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the U.S. State Department, then approved by the bar association in 2013. 各州制定此类贩运政策的另一个推动力来自“统一法律委员会”(ULC),这是一个致力于在诸多领域起草示范性州法的无党派组织。2010年,美国律师协会请统一法律委员起草一个规划,以应对人口贩运问题。最终成果是由统一法律委员会与“北极星”、“国际共同希望”、“全国首席检察官联合会”以及美国国务院共同起草的,并于2013年获得律师协会认可。 In the first half of 2015, two states enacted laws based on ULC's model legislation and four others introduced them. Four states enacted ULC-based trafficking laws in 2014 with 10 more attempting to. 2015年上半年,已有2个州根据统一法律委员会的示范法案制定法律,另有4个州已发起提议。2014年有4个州颁布了以统一法律委员会为参考基础的贩运法规,另有10个州还在为此努力。 Among the model legislation's main tenets are court-ordered forfeiture of real and personal property for traffickers, providing "immunity to minors who are human trafficking victims and commit prostitution or nonviolent offenses," and imposing "felony-level punishment when the defendant offers anything of value to engage in commercial sexual activity." 该示范立法的核心原则之一是由法院下令对人贩子的不动产和个人财产实施没收,并“为本身为人口贩运受害者,同时犯有卖淫罪或非暴力罪行的未成年人”提供“豁免”,以及“当被告提供了任何有价值物品以进行商业化性行为时”,对其加以“重罪水平的惩罚”。 That last bit is part of what's known as the "end-demand" strategy, or the "Nordic model," which focuses heavier penalties on sex buyers than sex sellers. Popularized by Nordic feminists, it's since become the law of the land in Canada and is rapidly influencing American policy, with many religious-based anti-trafficking groups also adopting its rallying cry. As a result, cities and states around the country have begun increasing penalties for prostitution clients and rebranding them as sexual predators. In Seattle, for instance, the crime of "patronizing a prostitute" was recently rechristened "sexual exploitation." 这最后一点是所谓“终结需求”策略的体现之一,该策略又称“北欧模式”,注重对性服务买家而非卖家施加重罚。最早由北欧女权主义者普及,该策略在加拿大成为当地法律,并正在加速影响美国政策,许多从宗教角度反贩运的团体也在采用这一战斗口号。结果是,全国境内的诸多城市和州政府都已开始加大对嫖客的惩罚力度,并将他们改称为色情魔。比如,在西雅图,“光顾妓女”罪最近已被改名为“性剥削”。 The theory behind "end demand" is that if only we arrest enough patrons or make the punishments for them severe enough, people will stop trying to purchase sex. Voila! No more prostitution, no more sex trafficking. If that sounds familiar, perhaps you're old enough to remember the '80s, when a similar approach was supposed to bring down the drug trade. “终结需求”策略背后的理论是,只有逮捕足够多的顾客或对他们施加足够严厉的惩罚,人们才会停止去买春。瞧!卖淫不再有,性贩运也不再有。如果你对此听着耳熟,可能是因为你足够年长,还记得80年代的事,当时曾用过类似的办法,认为它能打倒毒品交易。 "Ending the demand for drugs is how, in the end, we will win," President Ronald Reagan declared in 1988. Indeed, it was how we were already winning: "The tide of the battle has turned, and we're beginning to win the crusade for a drug-free America," Reagan claimed. 罗纳德·里根总统1988年宣布:“终结毒品需求将是我们最终取得胜利的办法。”不,它是当时正取得的节节胜利的缘由所在,里根声称:“战争的风向已经变了,我们已经开始赢得这场斗争,走向一个无毒美国。” In reality, the number of illicit drug users in America has only risen since then, despite the billions of dollars spent and hundreds of thousands of people locked away. In 1990, for instance, 7.1 percent of Americans had used some sort of illegal drug in the past month, according to the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. By 2002 it had risen to 8.3 percent, and by 2013 to 9.4 percent. 事实上,从那时候至今,美国人中的非法毒品使用者数量只增不降,尽管我们花费了数十亿美元,关押了数十万人。比如,根据国家毒品滥用家庭调查,1990年有7.1%的美国人在过去一个月曾服用某种非法毒品。而到2002年,这一数字已经上升到8.3%,到2013年则升到了9.4%。 The utter failure to "end demand" for drugs hasn't dented optimism that we can accomplish the trick with prostitution. During the "National Day of John Arrests" each year, police pose as sex workers online and then arrest would-be clients. Each year, hundreds of men are booked in these stings and charged with offenses ranging from public indecency and solicitation to pimping and sex trafficking. If these anti-trafficking efforts sound a lot like old vice policing, that's because the tactics, and results, are nearly identical. 针对毒品的“终结需求”策略的彻底失败,并没能减少那种认为我们能够在卖淫问题上实现这一计策的乐观主义。在每年的“全国抓嫖日”期间,警察在网上假扮性工作者,然后逮捕企图嫖娼的客户。每年都有好几百男人落入这种圈套,然后被控犯罪,罪名从公共场合猥亵、招嫖到拉皮条、性贩运不等。如果这类反贩运做法听起来特别像是以前那种腐化警察,那是因为两者在策略和结果上都接近于雷同。 In a study released last year by Shared Hope International and Arizona State University, researchers examined end-demand efforts in four metro areas over a four-month period. Between 50 and 60 percent of these efforts involved police decoys pretending to be teens, and no actual victims. A typical tactic is for police to post an ad pretending to be a young adult sex worker, and once a man agrees to meet, the "girl" indicates that she's actually only 16 or 17. 在国际共同希望和亚利桑那州立大学于2014年发布的一项研究中,研究者们考察了四个大都市区的终结需求式措施,历时四个月。其中有50-60%涉及警察设套假扮青少年,没有实际的受害者。一个惯常策略是由警察登一个广告,假扮年轻的成年性工作者,要是有男人同意见面,该“女孩”再表明她实际只有16或17岁。 Shared Hope is candid about the fact that most of the men soliciting sex here are not pedophiles and not necessarily seeking out someone underage. But "distinguishing between demand for commercial sex acts with an adult and demand for commercial sex acts with a minor is often an artificial construct," its report asserted. 共同希望坦白承认一个事实,即此中招嫖的绝大部分男人并非恋童癖,也并不一定是在寻觅未成年人。但上述报告断言,“对两种需求加以区分,一边是与成人进行商业化性行为的需求,一边是与未成年人进行商业化性行为的需求,这种做法通常只是一种人为建构”。 So to save the children, we need to prosecute men who have no demonstrated interest in children, because in the future they may seek sex with adults who could actually turn out to be old-looking teens—got that? 因此,为了拯救孩子,我们需要起诉那些还没有表露出他们对儿童有兴趣的人,因为将来他们可能会与一些成人发生性关系,而后者可能只是看起来比较成熟的青少年而已——能看懂这种逻辑不? "One shortcoming of the reverse sting approach is that no live victims are rescued from trafficking," Shared Hope admitted. "But it does take intended perpetrators of child sex trafficking off the Internet and off the streets." 共同希望承认:“这种反向设局策略的一个缺陷是,没能救出陷于贩运之中的真正受害者”。“但它确实能将具有儿童性贩运犯罪意图的人从网上和街上移除。” Bipartisan Paranoia 双党妄想症 A federal war on prostitution doesn't play well with large segments of Americans. Fighting human trafficking, on the other hand, is a feel-good cause. At a 2012 Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) speech, President Barack Obama insisted that we must call human trafficking "by its true name—modern slavery." And what kind of monster would be against ending slavery? Which brings us to another factor driving all this trafficking action: It makes politicians look good. 美国人中的很大部分对一场针对卖淫的联邦战争并不感冒。但是,打击人口贩运,则是一项令人观感良好的事业。在巴拉克·奥巴马总统于2012年“克林顿全球倡议”(CGI)会议上发表的一场演说中,他强调我们必须“按照其真实名称”来称呼人口贩运——“现代奴隶制”。你要是竟然反对结束奴隶制的斗争,你将是何等邪恶?这就给我们带来了驱动以上种种反贩运行动的另一个因素:它能让政客们很好看。 At a time when Republicans and Democrats can barely agree on anything, human trafficking bills have attracted huge bipartisan support. Here is an area where enterprising legislators can attach their names to something likely to pass. And if it doesn't pass, for whatever reason, it's ripe for demagoguery: "My opponent voted against a bill to fight modern slavery!" Tough-on-crime policies, particularly tough-on-drugs policies, used this tactic for decades, until mass incarceration finally lost its luster. 在这个共和党和民主党几乎不能在任何事情上取得一致的时代,人口贩运法案获得了极大的两党共同支持。这是一个法案还有可能获得通过的领域,有进取心的立法者们有可能将其名字附加在这些法案上。如果它没能通过,无论出于任何原因,它都很适合用于煽动群众。“我的对手投票反对了打击现代奴隶制的法案!”严打犯罪的政策,特别是严打毒品的政策,曾经将这个策略用了数十年,直到大规模收监办法最后黯然收场。 Undoubtedly, many lawmakers do legitimately want to help trafficking victims and hold bad guys accountable; political point-scoring is just a happy side effect. But a less happy side effect is a slew of bad laws, violated rights, and squandered money. The federal government has given away scores of millions in grant dollars for this quixotic crusade. 毫无疑问,确实有许多立法者真正地想要帮助贩运受害者,想要将坏人绳之以法;政治上得分只是一个喜闻乐见的副作用。但是还有个不那么喜闻乐见的副作用,即一连串的糟糕法律、受侵犯的权利和金钱浪费。为了这场唐吉可德式的十字军圣战,联邦政府已经拨出了成千上百万美元的款项。 The resources spent on prostitution stings and public awareness campaigns are resources diverted from mundane but more effective strategies for helping at-risk youth, such as adding more beds at emergency shelters. The State Department's latest Trafficking in Persons report notes that "shelter and housing for all trafficking victims, especially male and labor trafficking victims, continue to be insufficient." Advocates routinely say the biggest barrier to escape for many trafficking victims is simply a lack of places to go. 用于钓鱼抓嫖和提高公共觉悟活动的资源,转移自那些在帮助面临危险的青少年方面看起来单调平凡但也更为有效的策略,比如在应急收容所添加更多床位。国务院最新的《人口贩运》报告指出:“对于所有贩运受害者,特别是男性受害者和劳力贩运受害者,收容住所持续不足。”提倡者反复说过,对于许多贩运受害者而言,逃跑的最大障碍很简单,就是无处可去。 "Studies focused on New York City consistently report that homeless youth often trade sex for a place to stay each night because of the absence of available shelter beds," noted the Urban Institute in a report last year. "These figures are even more striking for LGBTQ youth...According to a survey of nearly 1,000 homeless youth in New York City, young men were three times more likely than young women to have traded sex for a place to stay, and LGBTQ youth were seven times more likely than heterosexual youth to have done so. Transgender youth in New York City have been found eight times more likely than non-transgender youth to trade sex for a safe place to stay." “聚焦于纽约市的研究一致表明,无家可归的青少年通常每晚都会以性关系换取住所,因为可用的收容床位不足。” 城市研究所去年发布的一份报告如此写道。“对于LGBTQ青少年群体来说,这个数字更为惊人……根据一份对纽约市近1000名无家可归青少年的调查,少男为找到住所而出卖性关系的可能性要比少女高出3倍,而LGBTQ青少年做这种事的可能性又要比异性恋青少年高出7倍。研究发现,纽约市的变性青少年为了安全住所而出卖性关系的可能性比非变性青少年要高8倍。” What's more, many of the policies in place to fight trafficking actively work against their own stated mission. The criminalization of prostitution keeps sex workers from reporting abuse and keeps clients from coming forward if they suspect someone is being trafficked. Victims themselves are afraid to go to police for fear they'll be arrested for prostitution—and indeed, they often are. 此外,已经实施的、用于打击贩运的许多政策明显对它们意图实现的使命产生了负面作用。卖淫入罪妨碍了性工作者报告所受虐待,并妨碍了怀疑某人遭到贩运的嫖客挺身而出。受害者本人也不敢去找警察,因为担心因卖淫被捕——他们确实经常因此被捕。 In 2012, 579 minors were reported to the federal government as having been arrested for prostitution and commercialized vice. Prosecutors say they need this as a "bargaining chip" to make the victims testify against their perpetrators. We're just using state violence and the threat of incarceration against children in order to save them! 2012年,在联邦政府收到的报告中,有579名未成年人因卖淫和商业化卖春而遭逮捕。检察官称,他们需要这么做,这是种“议价筹码”,能促使受害者出来为其作案者的罪行作证。为了拯救孩子们,我们正在使用国家暴力和收监威胁来对付他们! Another misguided government target is the classified advertising website Backpage, home to many an "escort" ad. Lawmakers accuse the site of "profiting off of child exploitation," even though only a miniscule percentage of Backpage ads—which anyone can put up—are posted by traffickers rather than adult sex workers. 政府的另一个误导性靶子是分类广告网站Backpage,那是许多“应召”广告的老巢。立法者们指责该网站“从对儿童的剥削中牟利”,尽管网站上只有极小部分广告——任何人都可以发布——是由人贩子而非成人性工作者所发布的。 Both legislators and anti-trafficking groups have long been intent on shutting the site down. Yet "street-based sex workers, across studies, face much higher rates of violence than indoor sex workers," says Serpent Libertine, a Sex Workers Outreach Project (SWOP)-Chicago board member. "It's hard to understand how eliminating a low-barrier way to work indoors would promote safety." 立法者和反贩运团体一直以来都想要关闭这个网站。不过,Serpent Libertine却说:“不同研究都表明,站街的性工作者比室内性工作者遭受暴力的可能性大得多”,Libertine是“扩大对性工作者服务项目”(SWOP)芝加哥分支的董事会成员。“通过清除低门槛的室内工作途径,如何能够增进妓女安全呢,这委实难以理解。” Vera Lamarr, also with SWOP-Chicago, pointed out that Backpage cooperates with law enforcement in the U.S. more than many other sites do. "It's hard to understand the desire to take down a website that voluntarily supports efforts against trafficking and willingly cooperates with law enforcement," Lamarr says. "If Backpage closes, their user base could easily migrate to a less cooperative site" or be forced back out on the streets, where traffickers don't leave digital records. 同在SWOP工作的Vera Lamarr指出,Backpage与美国执法机构的合作比其它许多网站都要多。“很难理解为什么要关闭一个主动支持反贩运事业并愿意与执法机构合作的网站”,Lamarr说。“如果Backpage关掉,那他们的用户群可能会轻松地转移到另一个不那么合作的网站去”,或者被迫重新回去站街,街上的人贩子可不会留下什么数字信息记录。 But at least we're getting the really bad guys, right? That's also up for debate. Peruse trafficking arrest records and you'll find many folks like Amber Batt, an Alaska woman who faces 10 to 25 years in federal prison (plus a lifetime on the sex-offender registry) for running an escort service featuring adult women who freely elected to work there. 但至少我们正在抓那些真正的坏蛋,对吧?这一点也有待讨论。细检反贩运逮捕记录,你会找到许多人,比如Amber Batt,她是一位经营应召服务的阿拉斯加妇女,推销的是自愿选择在那里工作的成年妇女,她因此需要在联邦监狱服刑10至25年(再加上终身登记为性犯罪者)。 Or Julie Haner, a 19-year-old Oregon sex worker who was charged with trafficking after taking her 17-year-old friend with her to meet clients. Or Aimee Hart, 42, who served seven months in prison and faces 15 years on the sex-offender registry for driving her adult friend to a prostitution job. Or Hortencia Medeles-Arguello, a 71-year-old Houston bar owner arrested as the leader of a "sex trafficking conspiracy" because she allowed prostitution upstairs. 又如Julie Haner,她是俄勒冈一位19岁性工作者,因带着她17岁的朋友一起见客而被控贩运罪。又如Aimee Hart,42岁,因开车送其成年朋友去卖淫,已在监狱服刑7个月,并将持续15年被登记为性犯罪者。又如Hortencia Medeles-Aguello,休斯顿一位71岁的酒吧店主,因在其楼上容留卖淫,她被当作“性贩运团伙”的头目而遭逮捕。 There's Trenton McLemore, 29, who faces federal sex trafficking charges for "facilitating" the sex work of his 16-year-old girlfriend by purchasing the girl a cellphone and sometimes texting clients for her. He faces a mandatory minimum of 10 years and possible life in prison, thanks to a joint effort of Irving, Texas, police; Homeland Security; and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 还有Trenton McLemore,29岁,他因给他16岁的女友买了一个手机,有时还帮她给客户发短信,被认为“协助”其从事性工作,面临联邦性贩运指控。在德克萨斯Irving市警察、国土安全部、美国移民和海关执法局的共同努力下,他要面对的刚性最短刑期为10年,最高可能为终身监禁。 And Alfonso Kee Peterson, 28, arrested in July for telling a 17-year-old on Facebook that he could help her earn a lot of money from prostitution. The "teen" turned out to be a police decoy. Despite the absence of any real victim or any activity beyond speech, Peterson was charged with one felony count of human trafficking of a minor, one felony count of pandering, and one felony count of attempted pimping; he faces up to 12 years in prison. This important sting apparently warranted the work of several local police departments, the California Highway Patrol, and the FBI. 还有Alfonso Kee Peterson,28岁。因在Facebook上告诉一个17岁女孩他可以帮她通过卖淫赚一大笔,他于今年7月被捕。结果这个“青少年”是个警察诱饵。尽管没有任何真正的受害人,除言论之外也没有任何行动,Peterson仍被控三项重罪罪名,分别是性贩运未成年人、唆使作恶和试图拉皮条;他最高面临12年监禁。这个重要圈套显然让当地几个地方警局、加州公路巡警和FBI的共同工作看起来有了正当理由。 Even if we grant that some of this activity is unsavory, is it really the sort of behavior that warrants lengthy prison sentences and attention from federal agents? Since when is what adults—or even teenagers—willingly do with their genitalia a matter of homeland security? Is this really what President Obama had in mind at the CGI conference when he compared anti-trafficking laws to the Emancipation Proclamation? 即便我们承认上述某些行为确实令人讨厌,它们是否真的属于那种应该处于长期监禁惩罚、需要联邦机构来调查的行为?成年人——或者甚至包括青少年——愿意如何利用他们的生殖器这个问题,从什么时候开始已经成为国土安全事务了?这真的是奥巴马总统在“克林顿全球倡议”会上将反贩运法律和《解放黑奴宣言》作比较时心中所想吗? "To be sure, linking trafficking and slavery could, in theory, surface important similarities between political economies of chattel slavery (largely) of the past, and modern-day trafficking," the American University law professor Janie Chuang wrote in a paper published in the American Journal of International Law last year. 去年,美利坚大学法学教授Janie Chuang在《美国国际法杂志》上发表了一篇文章,其中写道:“诚然,将贩运和奴隶制联系起来,在理论上可以使(大致上)发生于过去的传统奴隶制和现代贩运之间在政治经济结构上的重要相似点浮出水面。” "Drawing out such nuanced comparisons is not, however, the current trajectory of slavery creep. Instead, this version promotes an understanding of trafficking as a problem created and sustained by individual deviant actors, and thus best addressed through aggressive crime control measures." “但是,描绘这种微妙的对照并不是奴隶制恐慌的当下方向。相反,目前的恐慌助推了一种看法,认为贩运是由变态的个体行动者导致和维持的问题,因此最好用严厉的犯罪控制措施来处理。” For a fraction of the money spent on these measures, state governments or private foundations could fund more beds at emergency shelters. The resources that churches, charities, and radical feminists use trying to convince people that all sex workers are victims (and their clients predators) could go toward helping that minority of sex workers who do feel trapped in prostitution with job placement or getting an education. 只需拿出用于上述措施中的资金的一部分,州政府或私人基金就能为应急收容所提供更多床位。教会、慈善组织和激进女权主义者花了大量资源试图告诉人们,所有性工作者都是受害者(且他们的所有顾客都是侵害者),而这些钱本可以用于帮助性工作者中真正觉得自己受困于卖淫的少数人,帮她们介绍工作或接受教育。 For the vast majority of vulnerable sex workers, the greatest barriers to exit aren't ankle-cuffs, isolation, and shadowy kidnappers with guns, but a lack of money, transportation, identification, or other practical things. Is helping with this stuff not sexy enough? 对于绝大多数容易受到伤害的性工作者来说,离开这一行的最大障碍并非脚链、隔离或如影随形的持枪劫持者,而是没有钱、交通工具、身份证明和其它实用之物。在这些事务方面提供帮助是不是不够性感? As it stands, many of those "rescued" by police or abolitionist groups find that their self-appointed saviors can't actually offer them housing, food, a job, or anything else of urgent value in starting a life outside the sex trade. Awareness doesn't pay the bills. 事实上,许多被警察和废奴主义团体所“营救”出来的人发现,她们面对的这些自命救世主实际上不能给她们提供住所、食物、工作或任何其它在性交易之外重新开始生活时紧迫需要之物。觉悟并不能用来支付账单。 Kamylla's story typifies this rescue paradox. A Texas mother who had fallen on hard times after an injury ended her construction career, she started working in prostitution last year. One day, producers from the A&E television series 8 Minutes contacted her, having seen her ad on Backpage. Kamylla的故事代表了这种拯救悖论的典型。Kamylla是一位德克萨斯母亲,她的建筑事业因一场事故而被迫终结,生活陷入困境,去年开始从事卖淫业。某天,因为在Backpage上看到了她的广告,A&E电视台的《八分钟》系列节目联系了她。 Though 8 Minutes was marketed as a reality show where a rogue pastor found and "saved" sex trafficking victims in real time, Kamylla and others (who were selling sexual services willingly, even if their situation wasn't optimal) actually talked with producers several times beforehand. The show promised to help with her overdue rent and finding a job, she says. After filming, they gave her $150 and told her they'd be in touch soon about further assistance. 这档节目是以真人秀的形式播出的,一位流氓牧师在其中发现并及时“拯救”了性贩卖受害者。但事实上,Kamylla和其他几个人(尽管她们的境况并不理想,但均为自愿出售性服务)事前已经多次与制片人交谈过。她说,这个节目答应会帮她解决房租逾期问题,并为她找个工作。拍摄之后,电视台给了她150美元,告诉她他们很快就会与她联系,商量后续援助问题。 They never called. When Kamylla followed up, the producers referred her to the same unhelpful social services she'd already tried on her own. Eventually Kamylla returned to Backpage, posting an ad using the same phone number that the producers had used to contact her. The first call she received was from an undercover cop, who arranged to meet her and another sex worker at a motel. Once the women agreed to oral sex for money, "he opened the door and nine police officers came inside the room," she says. Both women were taken to jail and booked on prostitution charges. 他们再没有给Kamylla打过电话。她去追究,制片方就让她去找她自己已经试过、但并不管用的社会服务机构。最终,Kamylla回到了Backpage,所登广告上使用的电话号码正是制片方曾拿来联络她的那个。她接到的第一个电话来自一个卧底警察,后者约她和另外一个性工作者在一家汽车旅馆见面。两个女人才答应收钱给他做口交,“他就把门打开了,一下进来9个警官”,她说。两人均被关进监狱,并以被控卖淫而被登记在案。 In a world with no gray areas—one where traffickers are always evil predators and victims always utterly helpless, where sex workers are never ambivalently engaged with their work, and the bright line between teendom and adulthood is always apparent and meaningful—in this world, the raid-and-rescue model of addressing sex trafficking may make some sense. You don't give a girl chained to a bed a condom and call it a day. 在一个没有灰色地带的世界里——里面的人贩子总是邪恶的侵害者,受害者总是彻底无助,性工作者从事其工作从未进退两难,青少年和成年之间的明确界限总是清楚明晰——在这样的世界中,处理性贩运问题时采用“搜捕拯救”模式可能还有道理。你不会丢个避孕套给一个被锁在床上的女孩,然后收工回家。 But in the world as it exists, sometimes a 17-year-old runaway chooses prostitution because it's better than living in an abusive foster home. Sometimes a sex worker gives all her money to a man because she loves him or thinks she needs him, or that he needs her. Sometimes a struggling mother doesn't love the sex trade, but finds it the best option to feed her kids. 但在现实存在的世界中,有时候,17岁的离家出走者会选择卖淫,因为这比生活于一个残暴虐待的寄养家庭要好。有时候性工作者会把她所有的钱财全部交给一个男人,因为她爱他,或者觉得她需要他或他需要她。有时候,一个苦苦挣扎的母亲并不喜欢性交易,但她觉得这是养活她孩子的最好办法。 Sometimes an immigrant would rather give hand jobs to strangers than face whatever drove her to leave her own country. Harm reduction strategies like handing out condoms in popular prostitution areas, offering STD tests, or even just facilitating online advertising (rather than street work) could prove lifesaving to these women. 有时候,某个移民宁愿给陌生人手交,也不愿意面对那些驱使她离开自己祖国的事情。降低危害的种种策略,比如在卖淫盛行地区分发避孕套,提供性传播疾病检查,甚至仅仅只是促进网上广告(而非站街工作),对这些女人来说,都可能是活命之举。 Yet when it comes to the way we talk about commercial sex, you have to be a victim or a predator. We've created a narrative with no room for nuance. We traffic not in facts but in melodrama. In TV broadcasts, campus panels, and congressional hearings, the most lurid and sensational stories are held up as representative. Legislators assure us that their intent is noble and pure. 但在我们讨论商业化性行为的方式里头,你必须要么是受害者,要么是侵害者。我们所创造出来的是一种没有给微妙差别留下任何空间的叙事。我们不是在事实中、而是在传奇剧中穿梭。在电视节目上、在校园会议上、在国会听证上,被拿出来作为代表的都是那些最为耸人听闻、最具轰动效应的故事。立法者向我们保证,他们的意图高贵而纯洁。 But remember: Tough-on-drugs legislation was never crafted or advertised as a means to send poor people to prison for life over a few grams of weed. It was a way to crack down on drug kingpins, violent gang leaders, evil crack fiends, and all those who would lure innocent children into addiction, doom, and death. 但是,请记住:立法严打毒品,从来就不是为了仅因几克大麻就把穷人终身关进监狱,这类法律并不是为此制定的,也没人这样宣称。它是为了镇压大毒枭、暴力团伙头目、邪恶的可卡因成瘾者和所有那些会引诱无辜少年毒品成瘾、遭遇厄运、走向死亡的人。 Yet in mandating more police attention for drug crimes, giving law enforcement new technological tools and military gear with which to fight it, and adding ever-stricter prison sentences and punishments for drug offenders, we unleashed a corrupt, authoritarian, biased, and fiscally untenable mess on American cities without any success in decreasing drug rates or the violence and danger surrounding an activity that human beings stubbornly refuse to give up. 但是,通过责令警方更加注意毒品犯罪,通过赋予执法机构新的技术工具和军需用品以打击毒品犯罪,通过前所未有地提高毒品犯罪分子的刑期和惩罚,我们在美国各城市释放出了一种腐败、专断、偏执并且在财政上无法维持的糟糕局面,却没能取得任何成功,无论是在减少毒品用量方面,还是在减少围绕这一人们坚决拒绝抛弃的活动而产生的暴力和危险方面。 Unless we can learn the lessons of our past failed crusades, the war on sex trafficking could result in every bit as much misery as its panicky predecessors. Here's hoping it won't take us another four decades to realize that this prohibition doesn't work either. 除非我们能从过去失败的圣战中吸取教训,反性贩运的战争就有可能以一种完全一模一样的结局收尾,其可悲之处与其恐慌前例会是一样的。只希望我们不会又一次再花40年才能意识到,这种禁令同样行不通。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]食品营养标签有用吗?

The Surprising Failure Of Food Labeling
食品标签的意外失败

作者:Omri Ben-Shahar @ 2016-06-28
译者:Shawn Lai(@NiGuoNiGuoNi)
校对:王涵秋
来源:promarket.org,https://promarket.org/surprising-failure-food-labeling/

If lawmakers want to improve the dietary choices of Americans, the first thing they need to recognize is that the problem is not information.
如果法律制定者想要改善美国人的膳食选择,他们首先要意识到问题不是出在信息上。

Food labeling is one of the least objectionable types of regulation bursting into the scene in recent decades. It is also one of the least successful.  It is also one of the least successful.

食品标签是近几十年来闯入市场的管制政策中争议最少的一种,同时也是最失败的一种。

The ongoing explosive debate about labeling foods produced from genetically engineered crops, known as GMOs, is a testament to how important food labeling is perceived. Congress is currently in the midst of tight legislative battle on the enactment of a national GMO labeling bill, to override state labeling laws. But GMO labeling is only one front in the food labeling agenda.

最近的关于标签转基因食品(也就是GMO)的火热争论证实了食品标签多么被看重。为了取代各州原有的标签法案,国会目前正处于一场关于制定全国性转基因标签法案的激烈立法战争之中。但是转基因标签只是食品标签议程表的一个方面。

“Labelists” (folks who embrace mandated labeling as an effective form of regulation) have successfully pushed for an assortment of food labels over the past two decades. Obamacare, for example, requires (as do many local laws) the prominent posting of calories in restaurants.

“标签主义者”(那些认为强制性标签是一种有效管制的人)已经在过去二十年中成功推进了各种食物的标签立法。举例来说,奥巴马医改要求(很多地方法律也是如此)将食品的卡路里张贴在餐馆的显眼处。

First Lady Michelle Obama, a well-intentioned food labelist, is promoting what she regards as a labeling success—the “Nutrition Facts” chart found on every packaged food. Many cities in the U.S. have adopted a new hygiene labeling  for restaurants—mandatory signs displaying a sanitation grade of A, B, or C.

作为一个出于好意的食品标签主义者,第一夫人米歇尔·奥巴马正在推动一项她所认为的标签事业胜利的项目——在所有包装食品上标注“营养价值”表。很多美国城市都为餐馆采用了一种卫生标签——强制性地将卫生情况分为A, B, C。

And numerous other labels are mandated or proposed: country of origin labels, safe-handling labels, food justice, even “activity equivalent” labels that would tell consumers the number of minutes they would have to jog to burn the calories eaten!

除此之外,还有大量其他标签是强制性的或建议性的:原产地标签,安全使用标签,食品正义性标签【译注:证明食品的(more...)

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The Surprising Failure Of Food Labeling 食品标签的意外失败 作者:Omri Ben-Shahar @ 2016-06-28 译者:Shawn Lai(@NiGuoNiGuoNi) 校对:王涵秋 来源:promarket.org,https://promarket.org/surprising-failure-food-labeling/ If lawmakers want to improve the dietary choices of Americans, the first thing they need to recognize is that the problem is not information. 如果法律制定者想要改善美国人的膳食选择,他们首先要意识到问题不是出在信息上。 Food labeling is one of the least objectionable types of regulation bursting into the scene in recent decades. It is also one of the least successful.  It is also one of the least successful. 食品标签是近几十年来闯入市场的管制政策中争议最少的一种,同时也是最失败的一种。 The ongoing explosive debate about labeling foods produced from genetically engineered crops, known as GMOs, is a testament to how important food labeling is perceived. Congress is currently in the midst of tight legislative battle on the enactment of a national GMO labeling bill, to override state labeling laws. But GMO labeling is only one front in the food labeling agenda. 最近的关于标签转基因食品(也就是GMO)的火热争论证实了食品标签多么被看重。为了取代各州原有的标签法案,国会目前正处于一场关于制定全国性转基因标签法案的激烈立法战争之中。但是转基因标签只是食品标签议程表的一个方面。 “Labelists” (folks who embrace mandated labeling as an effective form of regulation) have successfully pushed for an assortment of food labels over the past two decades. Obamacare, for example, requires (as do many local laws) the prominent posting of calories in restaurants. “标签主义者”(那些认为强制性标签是一种有效管制的人)已经在过去二十年中成功推进了各种食物的标签立法。举例来说,奥巴马医改要求(很多地方法律也是如此)将食品的卡路里张贴在餐馆的显眼处。 First Lady Michelle Obama, a well-intentioned food labelist, is promoting what she regards as a labeling success—the “Nutrition Facts” chart found on every packaged food. Many cities in the U.S. have adopted a new hygiene labeling  for restaurants—mandatory signs displaying a sanitation grade of A, B, or C. 作为一个出于好意的食品标签主义者,第一夫人米歇尔·奥巴马正在推动一项她所认为的标签事业胜利的项目——在所有包装食品上标注“营养价值”表。很多美国城市都为餐馆采用了一种卫生标签——强制性地将卫生情况分为A, B, C。 And numerous other labels are mandated or proposed: country of origin labels, safe-handling labels, food justice, even “activity equivalent” labels that would tell consumers the number of minutes they would have to jog to burn the calories eaten! 除此之外,还有大量其他标签是强制性的或建议性的:原产地标签,安全使用标签,食品正义性标签【译注:证明食品的生产过程中不涉及不平等或违反人权的情况】,甚至还有告诉消费者需要慢跑多少分钟来消耗他们所摄入卡路里的“同等运动量”标签! Big Hopes For Labels 寄托于标签的希望 There is a widespread belief that food labeling would do social good. The First Lady predicts that nutrition labeling will “make a big difference for families all across this country” and “help solve the problem of child obesity.” The NYC Commissioner of Health is confident that restaurant hygiene labels “gives restaurants the incentive to maintain the highest food safety practices.” And the Royal Society for Public Health in England claims that the activity-equivalent labels would “prompt people to be more mindful of the energy they consume” and “encourage them to be more physically active.” 很多人认为食品标签对社会有益。第一夫人预言营养标签会“对全国各地的家庭产生重大影响”并且“帮助解决儿童肥胖问题”。纽约市的卫生局局长确信餐馆的卫生标签“激励了餐馆保持最高的食品安全水平”。英国皇家公共卫生协会宣称“活动等同量”标签会“激励人们更多地关注他们所摄入的能量”并且“鼓励他们去更多地活动身体”。 It is easy to see why labelists hang such high hopes on labels. People are motivated to eat well, so if they make poor food choices it must be because they have poor information. The solution seems obvious: deliver simple information. This would offset the half-truths and misleading messages that food advertising and front-of-the-package claims make. Indeed, when surveyed, consumers often nod in agreement and support more labels and more information, further kindling labelists’ conviction in the value of their enterprise. 很容易看出为什么标签主义者在标签上寄托了那么多的希望。人们都想吃的好,所以如果他们在食品方面选择不当一定是因为他们得到的信息不到位。如此一来解决方案显而易见:传递全面的信息。这些会抵消食品广告和包装封面上的宣传所带来的误导。事实上,调查显示消费者通常也认同更多的标签和更多的信息,这进一步助长了标签主义者对他们事业的自信。 Disappointing Reality 令人失望的现实 But in reality there is little to celebrate: food labels don’t work! Study after study shows that labels have failed to promote even modest dietary improvements. Perhaps most surprising is the failure of calorie labeling. When fast food chains were ordered to post calorie counts, everyone expected a drop in calories consumed and in serving sizes. 但是事实上却没有什么好高兴的:食品标签根本没有用!大量研究显示标签根本没能推动哪怕一点膳食方面的进步。也许最让人吃惊的是卡路里标签的失败:当快餐连锁店被命令标注卡路里数值时,所有人都以为卡路里消费量和食物的大小都会下降。 But no! Research found almost no significant change. Even when minor reduction was spotted, it was not clinically meaningful. A modest exception is Starbucks: with labeling, customers were found to consume 6% fewer calories per transaction (interestingly, the effect is due to food, not beverage choices). 但是并不是这样。研究显示几乎没有显著变化。即使有微量的减少,也不具备任何临床上的意义。有一个不大不小的例外发生在星巴克:当使用标签时,消费者平均每单消费减少了6%的卡路里(有趣的是,这些变化是发生在食物而非饮料的选择上)。 But even such small effect does not carry over beyond the elite food market. Calorie labels have of no effect on low income people or on adolescents. A survey of all the evidence concludes “calorie labeling does not have the intended effect of decreasing calorie purchasing or consumption.” 但是即使是这么小的效果在高端食品市场以外却没有发生。卡路里标签在低收入群体和年轻人身上没有效果。一项证据完备的调查总结道:“卡路里标签没有达成预期的减少卡路里消费或摄入的效果。” Take another example, perhaps the crown jewel of food labelism: the Nutrition Data box on packaged food. It is widely thought successful, because people notice and use these labels to compare food products. It is even regarded a model for labeling reforms in other areas—a template for improved financial or data privacy disclosures. 举另一个也许是食品标签主义最核心的例子:包装食品上的营养数据表。这个标签被广泛认为是成功的,因为人们可以用这些标签去比较不同的食物产品。这甚至被认为是一个其他领域标签改革的模范——一个先进的金融或数据隐私公开的模版。 Unfortunately, despite their prominence, Nutrition Data labels have not delivered the desired effect. People might choose to eat fewer calories per meal, but then remain hungrier for snacks. Indeed, in the past generation—the time during which these labels were perfected—the number of average “eating occasions” per day increased from 3½ to 5, and the overall daily consumption of calories increased by 400. Not exactly a resounding success. 不幸的是,尽管非常出名,营养数据标签并没有起到想要得到的作用。人们可能会选择每餐摄入较少的卡路里,但是因此他们会更饥饿然后去吃零食。实际上,在上一代人中——那是标签最完美的时代——平均每天“进食次数”从3.5次上升到了5次,总计每天卡路里摄入量增加了400,可见这并不是一个令人瞩目的成功。 The disappointing performance of food labels is confirmed in other contexts. Despite early enthusiasm about the perceived success of restaurant hygiene grades in Los Angeles, newer and more comprehensive data collected by Stanford’s Daniel Ho suggests that grades have not made restaurants cleaner or reduced the incidence of foodborne illness. Similarly, the “organic” label had the unintended effect of lowering the quality of organic foods. And the list of failed labels and disclosures extends well beyond the food area, and has been documented thoroughly. 食品标签令人失望的表现也在其他背景下得到了证实。尽管人们对于早期洛杉矶餐馆的卫生评级方面的成功抱有极大的热枕,但由斯坦福大学的Daniel Ho搜集的更新的和更加全面的数据表明,卫生评级并没有让餐馆变得更加干净或是减少食物传播疾病的发生率。无独有偶,“有机”标签起到了降低有机食物质量的反作用。各种失败标签以及其他失败的公开信息的案例远不仅限于食品领域,并且被详细记录。 Beyond Food Labels 食品标签之外 If lawmakers want to improve the dietary choices of Americans, the first thing they need to recognize is that the problem is not information. Unlike choosing mortgages or colleges, choosing healthy food is not complicated. People have enough experience to know that a double cheeseburger with bacon (1400 calories at Hardee’s) is not healthy, even without labels that quantify this intuition. For many, the problem is commitment. Another diet book or better labeling is a superfluous response to what is at core a question of willpower. 如果法律制定者想要改善美国人的膳食选择,他们首先要意识到问题不是出在信息上。不同于选择贷款或大学,选择健康食物并不复杂。人们已经有足够的经验来判断一个夹了培根的双层芝士汉堡(在Hardee’s卖的那种有1400卡路里)并不健康,并不需要标签来量化这个直觉。对于大多数人,问题在于坚持。再多一本关于膳食的书或是更好的标签都是徒劳无功的,因为关键在于一个人的意志力。 Tax on unhealthy food may help, as it did with cigarettes, but also ignite too much political resentment. For consumers in under-served communities where obesity is prevalent, the problem is lack affordable supply of better food. Here, social policy should begin by improving access to grocery choices. 对不健康食物征税可能有用,正如同征税对减少吸烟有用一样,但是这同时引起了很多政治争端。对于那些住在超重问题普遍,生活不便的社区的人们来说,问题是缺少负担得起的健康食物的供应。在这种地方,社会政策应该始于增加购物的渠道。 But access is not enough. Healthy food has to be affordable, suggesting that some type of need-based subsidy is required. Access and subsidies are effective but expensive policies. They require budgets. This explains why labelism is winning the day: for the government, food labels are really cheap. 但是光有渠道不够。健康的食物必须不能太贵,这意味着有些基础需求的补贴是需要的。渠道和补贴确实有效,但是代价高昂,因此需要政府的预算。这解释了为什么现在标签主义占上风:对于政府来说,食品标签实在是太便宜了。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]当代人吃了太多红肉?

How Americans Got Red Meat Wrong
美国人对红肉的理解怎么错了

作者:Nina Teicholz @ 2014-06-02
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:The Atlantic,http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/how-americans-used-to-eat/371895/

Early diets in the country weren’t as plant-based as you might think.
我国的早期饮食并不像你所想的那样以植物为主。

The idea that red meat is a principal dietary culprit has pervaded our national conversation for decades. We have been led to believe that we’ve strayed from a more perfect, less meat-filled past. Most prominently, when Senator McGovern announced his Senate committee’s report, called Dietary Goals, at a press conference in 1977, he expressed a gloomy outlook about where the American diet was heading.

几十年来,红肉乃饮食首恶的观念一直在我们国家的争论中普遍流行。有人告诉我们,现在我们已经偏离了过去那种更为健康、吃肉更少的传统。最出名的一件事是,在1977年一次媒体发布会上,参议员McGovern代表其所在的参院委员会宣读了名为《膳食指导》的报告。会上他曾对美国人饮食的演变提出了一种非常悲观的展望。

“Our diets have changed radically within the past 50 years,” he explained, “with great and often harmful effects on our health.” These were the “killer diseases,” said McGovern. The solution, he declared, was for Americans to return to the healthier, plant-based diet they once ate.

“过去50年,我们的饮食发生了剧烈变化,”他解释道,“对我们的健康构成了巨大且往往是有害的影响。”McGovern还说,“这些都是致命的疾病”。他宣称,解决办法就是:美国人要回归他们以前食用的那种更为健康、以植物为主体的饮食。

The justification for this idea, that our ancestors lived mainly on fruits, vegetables, and grains, comes mainly from the USDA “food disappearance data.” The “disappearance” of foo(more...)

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How Americans Got Red Meat Wrong 美国人对红肉的理解怎么错了 作者:Nina Teicholz @ 2014-06-02 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:The Atlantic,http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/how-americans-used-to-eat/371895/ Early diets in the country weren't as plant-based as you might think. 我国的早期饮食并不像你所想的那样以植物为主。 The idea that red meat is a principal dietary culprit has pervaded our national conversation for decades. We have been led to believe that we’ve strayed from a more perfect, less meat-filled past. Most prominently, when Senator McGovern announced his Senate committee’s report, called Dietary Goals, at a press conference in 1977, he expressed a gloomy outlook about where the American diet was heading. 几十年来,红肉乃饮食首恶的观念一直在我们国家的争论中普遍流行。有人告诉我们,现在我们已经偏离了过去那种更为健康、吃肉更少的传统。最出名的一件事是,在1977年一次媒体发布会上,参议员McGovern代表其所在的参院委员会宣读了名为《膳食指导》的报告。会上他曾对美国人饮食的演变提出了一种非常悲观的展望。 “Our diets have changed radically within the past 50 years,” he explained, “with great and often harmful effects on our health.” These were the “killer diseases,” said McGovern. The solution, he declared, was for Americans to return to the healthier, plant-based diet they once ate. “过去50年,我们的饮食发生了剧烈变化,”他解释道,“对我们的健康构成了巨大且往往是有害的影响。”McGovern还说,“这些都是致命的疾病”。他宣称,解决办法就是:美国人要回归他们以前食用的那种更为健康、以植物为主体的饮食。 The justification for this idea, that our ancestors lived mainly on fruits, vegetables, and grains, comes mainly from the USDA “food disappearance data.” The “disappearance” of food is an approximation of supply; most of it is probably being eaten, but much is wasted, too. Experts therefore acknowledge that the disappearance numbers are merely rough estimates of consumption. 我们的祖先主要吃水果、蔬菜和粮食,这种想法的依据主要来自美国农业部的“食物消散数据”。食物的“消散”只是供给量的近似值;其中大部分大概是被食用了,但也有许多是被浪费了。因此,专家们承认,食物消散数据只是对食物消费量的大概估计。 "I hold a family to be in a desperate way when the mother can see the bottom of the pork barrel." “我认为,如果一个主妇的猪肉桶都见底了,那这个家庭应该很窘迫。” The data from the early 1900s, which is what McGovern and others used, are known to be especially poor. Among other things, these data accounted only for the meat, dairy, and other fresh foods shipped across state lines in those early years, so anything produced and eaten locally, such as meat from a cow or eggs from chickens, would not have been included. McGovern和其他许多人使用的数据来自1900年代,这些数据质量之糟糕是出了名的。不说其他,这些数据只体现了早年间跨州贩卖的肉类、乳品和其他新鲜食物。因此,本地生产并消耗的一切东西,比如牛所产之肉或母鸡所产鸡蛋,都没有计算在内。 And since farmers made up more than a quarter of all workers during these years, local foods must have amounted to quite a lot. Experts agree that this early availability data are not adequate for serious use, yet they cite the numbers anyway, because no other data are available. And for the years before 1900, there are no “scientific” data at all. 由于那时候农牧民在劳动力中占到了四分之一强,因此本地食品总量必定相当大。尽管专家们同意,早期的这一食物可获得性数据并不能够用于严肃场合,可他们还是会引用这些数字,因为没有其他数据可用。至于1900年之前,那就根本没有任何“科学”数据了。 In the absence of scientific data, history can provide a picture of food consumption in the late-18th- to 19th-century in America. 尽管缺乏科学数据,但有关18世纪晚期至19世纪美国的食物消费,历史仍能给我们提供一幅画面。 Early Americans settlers were “indifferent” farmers, according to many accounts. They were fairly lazy in their efforts at both animal husbandry and agriculture, with “the grain fields, the meadows, the forests, the cattle, etc, treated with equal carelessness,” as one 18th-century Swedish visitor described—and there was little point in farming since meat was so readily available. 根据许多记录,早期的美洲殖民者都是“漫不经心”的农牧民。不管是在牲畜饲养,还是在农业种植方面,他们的工作都相当懒惰。正如18世纪一位瑞士访客所说,他们“对于粮田、牧场、森林和牲畜等等,都一样的随意对待”。由于肉食唾手可得,费力农牧也没多大意义。 Settlers recorded the extraordinary abundance of wild turkeys, ducks, grouse, pheasant, and more. Migrating flocks of birds would darken the skies for days. The tasty Eskimo curlew was apparently so fat that it would burst upon falling to the earth, covering the ground with a sort of fatty meat paste. (New Englanders called this now-extinct species the “doughbird.”) 在殖民者的笔下,此地的野生火鸡、鸭子、松鸡、野鸡等等都异常丰富。迁徙的鸟群遮天蔽日,好几天都没完。极北杓鹬美味可口,而且极为肥硕,掉到地上竟然还会炸开,能让泥土表面盖上一层肥腻的肉糊。(新英格兰人将这一现已灭绝的物种称作“面团鸟”。) In the woods, there were bears (prized for their fat), raccoons, bobo­links, opossums, hares, and virtual thickets of deer—so much that the colo­nists didn’t even bother hunting elk, moose, or bison, since hauling and conserving so much meat was considered too great an effort. A European traveler describing his visit to a Southern plantation noted that the food included beef, veal, mutton, venison, turkeys, and geese, but he does not mention a single vegetable. 森林里还有熊(因其肉肥而贵重)、浣熊、食米鸟、负鼠、野兔以及跟灌木一样密集的野鹿——猎物如此繁多,以至于殖民者都不愿意费力去捕杀麋鹿、驼鹿或野牛,因为他们觉得要把这么多肉拖回家保存实在太费劲了。一位造访南部某种植园的欧洲旅客提到,当地人的食物包括牛肉、小牛肉、羊肉、鹿肉、火鸡和鹅,他可没有提及任何一种蔬菜。 Infants were fed beef even before their teeth had grown in. The English novelist Anthony Trollope reported, during a trip to the United States in 1861, that Americans ate twice as much beef as did Englishmen. Charles Dickens, when he visited, wrote that “no breakfast was breakfast” without a T-bone steak. Apparently, starting a day on puffed wheat and low-fat milk—our “Breakfast of Champions!”—would not have been considered adequate even for a servant. 小孩子牙都还没长齐,就已经开始喂食牛肉。英国小说家Anthony Trollope于1861年造访美国后曾说,美国人所吃牛肉是英国人的两倍。Charles Dickens访美后则写道,如果没有一块T骨牛排,“早餐就不成其为早餐”。显然,即便是对仆人而言,早上吃点膨化小麦和低脂牛奶——我们的“早餐之冠”——也是不够的。 Indeed, for the first 250 years of American history, even the poor in the United States could afford meat or fish for every meal. The fact that the workers had so much access to meat was precisely why observers regarded the diet of the New World to be superior to that of the Old. 实际上,在美国人最初的250年历史中,即便是国内最穷的人,每顿也能吃得起肉或者鱼。劳动者如此容易吃上肉,这一事实正是当时的观察者认为新大陆饮食优于旧大陆的原因所在。 “I hold a family to be in a desperate way when the mother can see the bottom of the pork barrel,” says a frontier housewife in James Fenimore Cooper’s novel The Chainbearer. “我认为,如果一个主妇的猪肉桶都见底了,那这个家庭应该很窘迫。”在James Fenimore Cooper的小说《戴锁链的人》中,一位西部边疆家庭主妇如此说道。 In the book Putting Meat on the American Table, researcher Roger Horowitz scours the literature for data on how much meat Americans actually ate. A survey of 8,000 urban Americans in 1909 showed that the poorest among them ate 136 pounds a year, and the wealthiest more than 200 pounds. 研究者Roger Horowitz在其著作《把肉食端上美国餐桌》中四处搜求文献,想要找到美国人到底食用多少肉食的数据。1909年针对8000位美国城市居民的一份调查显示,受访者中最贫穷的每年食肉136磅,最富裕的则超过200磅。 A food budget published in the New York Tribune in 1851 allots two pounds of meat per day for a family of five. Even slaves at the turn of the 18th century were allocated an average of 150 pounds of meat a year. As Horowitz concludes, “These sources do give us some confidence in suggesting an average annual consumption of 150–200 pounds of meat per person in the nineteenth century.” 在1851年发表于《纽约论坛报》上的一份食品预算中,一个五口之家每天可以得到2磅肉。在18世纪初,即便是奴隶,每年平均也可以得到150磅肉。正如Horowitz所总结的,“这些资料让我们可以多少有点自信地推测:在19世纪,每年的人均肉食消耗量平均大概是150至200磅。” About 175 pounds of meat per person per year—compared to the roughly 100 pounds of meat per year that an average adult American eats today. And of that 100 pounds of meat, about half is poultry—chicken and turkey—whereas until the mid-20th century, chicken was considered a luxury meat, on the menu only for special occasions (chickens were valued mainly for their eggs). 也就是说,每人每年大概175磅肉。与之对比,平均每个成年美国人现在每年大概食肉100磅。在这100磅肉中,大概有一半是禽肉——即鸡肉和火鸡。与之相比,在20世纪中叶以前,鸡肉一直被视作为奢侈肉类,只在特殊场合才能进菜谱(母鸡因为能生蛋而价值颇高)。 Yet this drop in red meat consumption is the exact opposite of the picture we get from public authorities. A recent USDA report says that our consumption of meat is at a “record high,” and this impression is repeated in the media. 然而,红肉消耗量下降这一事实,与我们从公共权威那里得到的印象大相径庭。美国农业部近期的一份报告说,我们的肉食消耗量正处于“历史最高记录”,而且这一说法还在媒体上反复流传。 It implies that our health problems are associated with this rise in meat consumption, but these analyses are misleading because they lump together red meat and chicken into one category to show the growth of meat eating overall, when it’s just the chicken consumption that has gone up astronomically since the 1970s. The wider-lens picture is clearly that we eat far less red meat today than did our forefathers. 这一说法暗示,我们的健康问题与肉食消耗量增加有关。但是这种分析是误导性的,因为它们将红肉和鸡肉并为一类、混为一谈,以此来证明总体食肉量的增加。实际上,只有鸡肉消耗量才于1970年代以后出现了极大增长。把视野放宽的话,图景很清晰:今天我们所食用的红肉量远远不能与我们的祖先相比。 867fe71bcMeanwhile, also contrary to our common impression, early Americans appeared to eat few vegetables. Leafy greens had short growing seasons and were ultimately considered not worth the effort. And before large supermarket chains started importing kiwis from Australia and avocados from Israel, a regular supply of fruits and vegetables could hardly have been possible in America outside the growing season. 同时,还有一件事也与我们通常的印象相反,早期美国人似乎蔬菜吃得很少。绿叶蔬菜生长季节短,人们最终觉得它们不值得费心种植。而且在大型连锁超市为我们从澳大利亚进口猕猴桃、从以色列进口鳄梨之前,只要生长季节一过,要想在美国实现果蔬的常规供应就几乎不可能了。 Even in the warmer months, fruit and salad were avoided, for fear of cholera. (Only with the Civil War did the canning industry flourish, and then only for a handful of vegetables, the most common of which were sweet corn, tomatoes, and peas.) 即便是在温暖的月份,因为担心霍乱,人们也会避开水果和生吃蔬菜。(罐头行业只是内战以后才开始兴盛起来,而且那也只是罐装少量蔬菜,最常见的主要有甜玉米、西红柿和豌豆。) So it would be “incorrect to describe Americans as great eaters of either [fruits or vegetables],” wrote the historians Waverly Root and Rich­ard de Rochemont. Although a vegetarian movement did establish itself in the United States by 1870, the general mistrust of these fresh foods, which spoiled so easily and could carry disease, did not dissipate until after World War I, with the advent of the home refrigerator. By these accounts, for the first 250 years of American history, the entire nation would have earned a failing grade according to our modern mainstream nutritional advice. 所以,历史学家Waverly Root和Richard de Rochemont说,“认为美国人是水果或蔬菜的大量食用者,这种说法是错的”。尽管美国在1870年确实出现了一次素食运动,但美国人对这类非常容易腐烂、可能携带疾病的新鲜食物普遍存疑,这种疑虑直到一战以后随着家用冰箱的出现方才消散。根据这些资料,在美国历史的头250年,要是参照我们现在主流的营养学建议,整个国家得分都会不及格。 During all this time, however, heart disease was almost certainly rare. Reliable data from death certificates is not available, but other sources of information make a persuasive case against the widespread appearance of the disease before the early 1920s. 然而,在整个这一时期,心脏病几乎难得一见。基于死亡证明的可靠数据现在还没有,但其他方面的信息令人信服地证明,在1920年代前期以前,心脏病并没有大面积出现。 Fat intake rose 12 percent from 1909 to 1961, but it was owing to an increase in the supply of vegetable oils, which had recently been invented. 从1909年至1961年,脂肪摄入量提高了12%,但这是因为人类新近发明了植物油,其供给增加了。 Austin Flint, the most authoritative expert on heart disease in the United States, scoured the country for reports of heart abnormalities in the mid-1800s, yet reported that he had seen very few cases, despite running a busy practice in New York City. Nor did William Osler, one of the founding professors of Johns Hopkins Hospi­tal, report any cases of heart disease during the 1870s and eighties when working at Montreal General Hospital. 19世纪中期,美国最权威的心脏病专家Austin Flint曾在全国上下搜集心脏异常病例的报告,最后却说案例寥寥无几,尽管他当时在纽约的生意非常繁忙。约翰·霍普金斯医院的创始教授之一William Osler,在他于1870年代及1880年代在蒙特利尔综合医院工作期间,也未提及任何心脏病案例。 The first clinical description of coronary thrombosis came in 1912, and an authoritative textbook in 1915, Diseases of the Arteries including Angina Pectoris, makes no mention at all of coronary thrombosis. On the eve of World War I, the young Paul Dudley White, who later became President Eisenhower’s doctor, wrote that of his 700 male patients at Massachusetts General Hospital, only four reported chest pain, “even though there were plenty of them over 60 years of age then.” 关于冠状动脉血栓的首份临床描述出现于1912年,而1915年的一本权威教材——《动脉疾病及心绞痛》——则根本没有提及冠状动脉血栓。一战前夜,年轻的Paul Dudley White(后来曾为艾森豪威尔总统担任医生)写道,他在马萨诸塞综合医院的700名男性病人中,只有4个报告有胸痛,“尽管他们中许多人已经过了60岁年纪。” About one fifth of the U.S. population was over 50 years old in 1900. This number would seem to refute the familiar argument that people formerly didn’t live long enough for heart disease to emerge as an observable problem. Simply put, there were some 10 million Americans of a prime age for having a heart attack at the turn of the 20th century, but heart attacks appeared not to have been a common problem. 1900年,美国人口中大约有五分之一超过50岁。有种常见的论调认为,以前的人寿命不够长,所以心脏病根本还来不及成为一个显著问题。不过上述数字似乎能够驳斥这种论调。简单地说,在20世纪初,大约有1000万美国人已经到了容易发生心脏病的年纪,但那时候心脏病似乎并不是一个常见问题。 Ironically—or perhaps tellingly—the heart disease “epidemic” began after a period of exceptionally reduce meat eating. The publication of The Jungle, Upton Sinclair’s fictionalized exposé of the meatpacking industry, caused meat sales in the United States to fall by half in 1906, and they did not revive for another 20 years. 讽刺地是,或者说颇能说明问题的是,心脏病的“流行”发生在食肉量出现异常减少之后。Upton Sinclair出版的《屠宰场》一书以小说形式对肉类加工业进行了揭露曝光,导致1906年美国肉类销售量直接减半,此后20年都没能恢复。 In other words, meat eating went down just before coronary disease took off. Fat intake did rise during those years, from 1909 to 1961, when heart attacks surged, but this 12 percent increase in fat consumption was not due to a rise in animal fat. It was instead owing to an increase in the supply of vegetable oils, which had recently been invented. 换句话说,食肉量的减少恰好发生于冠心病猛增之前。1909年到1961年期间,当心脏病出现激增时,脂肪摄入量确实也增加了,但是脂肪消耗量上增加的这12%并不来自动物脂肪的增加。相反,它来自植物油供给的增加,后者新近才被发明出来。 Nevertheless, the idea that Americans once ate little meat and “mostly plants”—espoused by McGovern and a multitude of experts—continues to endure. And Americans have for decades now been instructed to go back to this earlier, “healthier” diet that seems, upon examination, never to have existed. 尽管如此,美国人过去吃肉很少、“主要吃植物”的观念——McGovern和许多专家都信奉这一点——还在继续流传。而且,过去几十年,美国人接受的指导一直是,他们应该回归这种更早、“更健康”的饮食。只不过,经验证发现,这种饮食习惯从未存在过。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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[译文]窗户税的故事

The Window Tax: A Tale of Excess Burden
窗户税:税收超额负担的一个案例

作者:Timothy Taylor @ 2015-11-06
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar)
二校:慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:Conversable Economist,http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-window-tax-tale-of-excess-burden.html

For economists, the “excess burden” of a tax refers to the idea that the cost of a tax isn’t just the amount of money collected–it’s also the ways in which taxpayers alter their behavior because the tax has changed their incentives. A moderately well-known classroom and textbook example is the “window tax,” first imposed in England in 1696 by King William III, and not definitively repealed until 1851. The excess burden of the window tax was that lower-income people ended up living in rooms with few or no windows.

经济学家用税收“超额负担”指称这样一种概念:纳税的成本并不只在于所缴税费的数额——还在于纳税人受缴税影响而做出的行为改变。一个大家比较熟知的例子,就是课堂上常提到的“窗户税”。该税从1696年在威廉三世命令下开征,直到1851年才彻底消失。这里的超额负担在于,低(more...)

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The Window Tax: A Tale of Excess Burden 窗户税:税收超额负担的一个案例 作者:Timothy Taylor @ 2015-11-06 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:龙泉(@L_Stellar) 二校:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:Conversable Economist,http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-window-tax-tale-of-excess-burden.html For economists, the "excess burden" of a tax refers to the idea that the cost of a tax isn't just the amount of money collected--it's also the ways in which taxpayers alter their behavior because the tax has changed their incentives. A moderately well-known classroom and textbook example is the "window tax," first imposed in England in 1696 by King William III, and not definitively repealed until 1851. The excess burden of the window tax was that lower-income people ended up living in rooms with few or no windows. 经济学家用税收“超额负担”指称这样一种概念:纳税的成本并不只在于所缴税费的数额——还在于纳税人受缴税影响而做出的行为改变。一个大家比较熟知的例子,就是课堂上常提到的“窗户税”。该税从1696年在威廉三世命令下开征,直到1851年才彻底消失。这里的超额负担在于,低收入人群就此选择生活在很少或没有窗户的房间里。 Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab review the history of the window tax and provide actual estimates of how it affected the number of windows per house in their article, "The Window Tax: A Case Study in Excess Burden," which appeared in the Winter 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (where I have toiled in the fields as Managing Editor since 1987). Wallace E. Oates 和Robert M. Schwab在《经济展望杂志》(2015/冬)的《窗户税:超额负担之案例分析》一文中回顾了窗户税历史,并给出了其影响家庭平均窗户数的估测值(我自1987年起担任杂志总编)。 The article popped back into my mind earlier this week when I learned that Oates, a highly distinguished economist based at the University of Maryland since 1979, died last week. One of Oates's specialties was the area of local public finance, and his 1972 book on Fiscal Federalism, is a classic of that subfield. 前几天,我听说Oates已于上周去世,心里不禁又浮现起这篇文章。这位卓越的经济学家自1979年起一直任教于马里兰大学。他擅长的领域之一是地方公共财政,其1972年出版的《财政联邦主义》正是这一领域中的经典。 Here are some facts about the historical window tax, courtesy of Oates and Schwab. 下面引用Oates与Schwab写到的一些历史。
  • William III intended it as a temporary tax, just to help out with the overhang of costs from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the most recent war with France. But it ended up lasting 150 years.
  • 威廉三世原本只是为了摆脱1688年光荣革命和上一次英法战争带来的财务超支而暂时实行窗户税,不料它最后却延续了150年。
  • "An important feature of the tax was that it was levied on the occupant, not the owner of the dwelling. Thus, the renter, not the landlord, paid the tax. However, large tenement buildings in the cities, each with several apartments, were an exception. They were charged as single residences with the tax liability resting on the landlord. This led to especially wretched conditions for the poor in the cities, as landlords blocked up windows and constructed tenements without adequate light and ventilation ..."
  • “该税的一个重要特征是:征收对象是住户而非房产所有者。因此,纳税人是租户而非房东。不过城区多套房公寓楼是例外。收税官将多套间整体看做单元住宅向房东征税。这就使得城市贫民的生活状况非常悲惨,因为房东们会把窗户封起来,所修套间的光照和通风都不足……”
  • The window tax was thought of as improvement on the "hearth tax," that Charles II had imposed in 1662. "The tax was very unpopular in part because of the intrusive character of the assessment process. The `chimney-men' (as the assessors and tax collectors were called) had to enter the house to count the number of hearths and stoves, and there was great resentment against this invasion of the sanctity of the home. The window tax, in contrast, did not require access to the interior of the dwelling: the “window peepers” could count windows from the outside, thus simplifying the assessment procedure and obviating the need for an invasion of the interior."
  • 窗户税是被当作“炉灶税”的一个改良版本而提出来的,后者由查理二世于1662年开征。“炉灶税极度招人厌,部分原因在于评估过程的侵犯性。‘烟囱工’(当时对估税员和收税员的称呼)必须进到房间里面数壁炉和火炉的数目。对于这种侵犯产权神圣性的做法,人们怨声载道。与之相比,窗户税则不需要进入住所内部:‘窥窗工’从外头就可以数清窗户数目,从而简化了评估程序,无需再闯进房内。”
  • The window tax was intended as a visible measure of ability to pay: that is, a high-income person would live in a place with more windows than a low-income person. But at the time, it was widely recognized that windows were a very imperfect proxy for wealth. Adam Smith wrote about this problem of window tax in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations: “A house of ten pounds rent in the country may have more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much poorer man than that of the latter, yet so far as his contribution is regulated by the window-tax, he must contribute more to the support of the state.”
  • 窗户税的本意是用有形的手段判断有支付能力的人:即高收入者所住之处的窗户多过低收入者。但在当时,普遍认为,拿窗户作为财富的表征并不十分完善。亚当·斯密1776年在《国富论》中就窗户税的这一问题写道:“乡间10镑租金的房屋,有时比伦敦500镑租金房屋的窗户还要多。前者的住户比后者的住户通常要穷得多,但尽管如此,只要是由窗户税来规定捐额,前者就得贡献更多金钱以支援国家。”
  • When the rates on the window tax went up, it was common for owners of homes and apartments to block or build over many or all of their windows. The results on human well-being were severe. "A series of studies by physicians and others found that the unsanitary conditions resulting from the lack of proper ventilation and fresh air encouraged the propagation of numerous diseases such as dysentery, gangrene, and typhus. ... A series of petitions to Parliament resulted in the designation of commissioners and committees to study the problems of the window tax in the first half of the 19th century. In 1846, medical officers petitioned Parliament for the abolition of the window tax, pronouncing it to be `most injurious to the health, welfare, property, and industry of the poor, and of the community at large'."
  • 一旦窗户税的税率上涨,宅子和公寓的所有者定会大量甚或全部封堵或筑死其窗户。人的福祉受到严重影响。“医疗工作者和其他许多人所做的一系列研究发现,缺乏适当通风和新鲜空气的不卫生环境,助长了如痢疾、坏疽和斑疹伤寒等众多疾病的蔓延……议会收到大量请愿书。于是在19世纪上半叶,众多专员和委员会得以受指派着手研究窗户税的问题。1846年,卫生部门官员向议会申请废除窗户税,称其‘对于贫民及整个社群的卫生、福祉、产权和勤勉极其有害’。”
  • Here's Charles Dickens writing in 1850 about the window tax in Household Words, a magazine that he published for a number of years: “The adage ‘free as air’ has become obsolete by Act of Parliament. Neither air nor light have been free since the imposition of the window-tax. We are obliged to pay for what nature lavishly supplies to all, at so much per window per year; and the poor who cannot afford the expense are stinted in two of the most urgent necessities of life.”
  • 1850年,查尔斯·狄更斯在他多年主持出版的杂志《家常话》中如此描写道:“‘像空气一样自由’这条谚语已经因议会而过时。自窗户税开征后,无论是空气还是光线都不曾免费过【译注:“自由”与“免费”的英文都是free】。我们被迫为大自然慷慨的恩赐付费,只要时间、窗户还在,而无法承担这笔开支的穷人,只能在这两样至关紧要的生活必需品上节约。”
Oates and Schwab work with a mix of data on the number of windows in a sample of houses in Shropshire and economic theory about household behavior when confronted with taxes to generate an admittedly rough estimate that on average, collecting a certain amount of money through the window tax created an excess burden--in terms of the costs of living in a place with fewer windows--equal to an additional 62% of the value of the tax. Oates和Schwab将什普罗郡样本住宅的窗户数据和面对个税居民行为经济理论结合起来,得出一个粗略的估计:整体说来,因窗户税那笔钱产生的超额负担——就人们选择住在窗户较少的住所这一行为成本而言——相当于税赋的62%。 Oates and Schwab ask why the window tax lasted so long, give its many problems, and offer an appropriately cynical answer: "Perhaps the lesson here is that when governments need to raise significant revenue, even a very bad tax can survive for a very long time." 既然窗户税问题如此之多,Oates和Schwab就追问为何它能持续如此之久。他们给出的回答是一种恰到好处的冷嘲:“也许,此处的教益就是,如果政府需要显著增加收入,那么即便是极为恶性的税种也能存活很长一段时间。” I didn't know Oates personally, but I had one other job-related interaction with him back. Along with his work in local public finance, Oates was also well-known as an environmental economist. His 1975 book, The Theory of Environmental Policy (written with William Baumol) was highly influential in setting the direction of what at the time was a fairly new and growing field. 我私下里和Oates并无深交,但之前曾因工作关系和他有过另外一次互动。除了在地方公共财政领域的成绩以外,Oates还以环境经济学家的身份知名。他1975年的著作《环境经济理论与政策设计》(与William Baumol合著)影响极大,为当时这个相当年轻、正在成长的领域设定了方向。 In 1995, Oates was a co-author in one of the most downloaded and cited exchanges the JEP has ever published on the subject of what is sometimes called the "Porter hypothesis." 1995年,以人称的“波特假说”为主题,Oates与人合作,为《经济学展望杂志》写了一篇文章,成为该刊史上下载和引用得最多的文章之一。 Michael Porter made the argument--bolstered by a large number of case studies, that when environmental goals are set in a strict way, but firms are allowed flexibility in how to achieve those goals in the context of a competitive market environment, firms often become quite innovative in meeting those environmental goals. 以大量案例研究为支撑,迈克尔·波特提出了如下论点:当环境目标被严格设定且企业在竞争中可以灵活发挥时,企业为达成这些目标通常会变得富有创造性。 Indeed, Porter argued that in a substantial number of cases, the innovations induced by the tough new environmental rules save enough money so that the rules end up imposing no economic costs at all. In the Fall 1995 Journal of Economic Perspectives, Michael E. Porter and Claas van der Linde make their case in "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship," (9:4, 97-118). 事实上,波特认为,在相当多的案例中,由严厉的环保新规所引发的创新能够省出足够的款项,使得这些规定最终不增加任何经济成本。在《经济展望杂志》1995/秋,波特和Claas van der Linde通过《环境/竞争力关系新概念一探》(9:4, 97-118)一文对此作了论述。 The authorial team of Karen Palmer, Wallace E. Oates, and Paul R. Portney respond in "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?" (9:4, 119-132). Oates and his co-authors took the position that while the costs of complying with environmental regulations do often turn out to be lower than industry predictions that were made when the rule was under discussion, it goes too far to say that environmental rules usually or generally don't impose costs. I wrote about some more recent evidence on this dispute in "Environmental Protection and Productivity Growth: Seeking the Tradeoff" (January 8, 2015). Karen Palmer、Wallace E. Oates和Paul R. Portney用《强化环保标准:收益/成本范式还是零成本范式?》(9:4, 119-132)一文做出回应。Oates和共同作者们的立场是:尽管遵守环保规制的成本最终总会低于起初制定时的业界预测,但却不能说它往往或一般情形下不会增加成本。我曾就此讨论提供了一些最新佐证,见《环境保护与生产率增长:寻找权衡》一文(2015-01-08) (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]北欧的顶层为何坐得那么安稳

北欧的1%比美国的1%待遇更好
Scandinavia treats its 1% even better than the US

作者:Allison Schrager @ 2016-05-13
译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Quartz,http://qz.com/528594/scandinavia-treats-its-1-even-better-than-the-us/

Young voters in America are growing skeptical of their country’s brand of capitalism. Their enthusiasm for Bernie Sanders suggests they crave something different, a romanticized version of Nordic socialism, with its generous welfare state and high tax rates.

美国的年轻选民们正在逐渐对他们国家的资本主义招牌产生怀疑。他们对民主党总统候选人Bernie Sanders的热情暗示了他们渴求某种不同的东西,一种浪漫化的、慷慨大方的北欧式社会主义高税率福利国家。

It is true that Nordic countries have a more equal distribution of wealth and income. They also have 标签: | |

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北欧的1%比美国的1%待遇更好 Scandinavia treats its 1% even better than the US 作者:Allison Schrager @ 2016-05-13 译者:Luis Rightcon(@Rightcon) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Quartz,http://qz.com/528594/scandinavia-treats-its-1-even-better-than-the-us/ Young voters in America are growing skeptical of their country’s brand of capitalism. Their enthusiasm for Bernie Sanders suggests they crave something different, a romanticized version of Nordic socialism, with its generous welfare state and high tax rates. 美国的年轻选民们正在逐渐对他们国家的资本主义招牌产生怀疑。他们对民主党总统候选人Bernie Sanders的热情暗示了他们渴求某种不同的东西,一种浪漫化的、慷慨大方的北欧式社会主义高税率福利国家。 It is true that Nordic countries have a more equal distribution of wealth and income. They also have more economic mobility than the US. But what we admire about Nordic countries frays when you dig into their wealthiest 1%. 北欧国家确实有着更平均的财富和收入分配。他们在经济流动性方面也比美国表现得更好。但是当我们深入了解北欧国家的那1%最富有的人群时,我们的上述赞誉便可能遭到严重动摇。 Economists Simon Halphen, Wojciech Kopczuk, and Claus Thustrup Kreiner studied wealth among Danes(pdf). They observed that the extraordinary mobility found at lower levels disappears once you get into the very top of the wealth distribution. 三位经济学家Simon Halphen,Wojciech Kopczuk和Claus Thustrup研究了丹麦人的财富。他们观察到,丹麦较富及以下阶层中能看到的那种极高的经济流动性,在财富金字塔的最高层是不存在的。 If you are born into a family in the top 1% of wealth, odds are pretty good, you’ll end up there too. They estimate having parents in the 1% makes you 18 times more likely to be in the top 1% yourself; the odds double if your grandparents and parents were also in the 1%. 如果你出生在前1%的最富裕家庭,那么你就很可能一直留在这一阶层直到离世。他们估计,如果你的父母属于最富1%,那你进入最富1%的可能性就会增加18倍;如果你的祖父母和父母都属于最富1%,那么这一可能性会再增加一倍。 Studies also find that if a man’s father was not in the 0.1% he can forget about reaching the 0.1% in Sweden. The very wealthy ranks in Sweden tend to be dominated by the same family dynasties each generation. 研究还发现,对于一个普通瑞典人来说,如果他父亲不在财富积累的前0.1%,那么他自己也就别想着进入这0.1%的群体了。瑞典的财富排行榜往往被同样的豪族世家一代代把持着。 Nordic tax policy protects the wealthiest 1% by placing very high taxes on income and, by American standards, modest taxes on large inheritances. The high income taxes make it harder for a successful Scandinavian entrepreneur to earn his way into the top 1%. The low inheritance taxes make it relatively easy to pass on large estates. In America, income taxes are lower, and estate taxes higher on wealthy fortunes are higher. 北欧的税收政策保护最富有的1%人群,这体现在所得税极高,而大额遗产税与美国标准相比则要轻些。高所得税把斯堪迪纳维亚的成功企业家们拦在了1%的大门外。相对较低的遗产税给巨额遗产继承提供了方便。相较之下,美国的所得税较轻,而越富裕的人群所面对的遗产税也越高。 Tax policy may make it harder for rich Americans to maintain a spot in the top 1% generation after generation. It is hard to make a simple comparison between Nordic countries because American tax returns don’t include wealth holdings until people die and taxes are paid on their estates. But there is some evidence the richest Americans are more likely to be self-made entrepreneurs rather than members of family dynasties. 这样的税收政策可能使得富有的美国人难以一代代保持住财富最顶端1%的位置。但我们很难将北欧国家同美国简单地做比较,因为美国的纳税申报表是直到纳税人离世后征收遗产税时才会将持有财富计入征收。不过有一些证据表明最富有的美国人更多是白手起家的企业家,而不是富豪世家的成员。 A study by Kopczuk and Lena Edlund looked at estate tax data and observed that there are fewer women in the top 0.01% than in the 1960s. They argue that this is evidence of more self-made people cracking the 0.01% because heirs are equally likely to be male or female, but successful entrepreneurs tend to be male. Kopczuk和Lena Edlund所做的一项针对遗产税数据的研究显示,现在(美国的)财富顶端0.01%的人群中女性比例比1960年代时更少了。他们认为这是许多白手起家的人们挤进0.01%财富榜的表现,因为财富继承人总是男女均衡的,而成功的(白手起家)企业家则往往是男性。 The turnover in America’s top 0.01% comes from some combination of new entrepreneurs accumulating more wealth than established wealthy families, multiple heirs dividing fortunes, and estate taxes eroding family fortunes (though Kopczuk cautions there’s a lot of tax evasion when it comes to inheritances). 美国财富顶端的0.01%的流动是多重因素作用的结果,包括新晋企业家财富积累速度比老牌富豪家族更快、多个继承人分割财富和遗产税对于家族财富的侵蚀等(虽然Kopczuk告诫称美国的遗产税方面有相当程度的漏税逃税情况)。 Since most of the population lives outside the 1%, the mobility among the poor and middle class in Scandinavia is enviable and probably more important. But if you think the biggest threat to the economy is wealth concentration among the 1% being limited to a few powerful families, Scandinavia is not the utopia people make it out to be. 由于绝大多数人群与1%无关,北欧地区的贫穷和中产阶层的高流动性确实值得羡慕,或许也更为重要。但是如果你认为经济发展所面临的最大威胁是财富金字塔的顶层被极少数世家豪族霸占,那么北欧国家着实不是人们期盼的乌托邦。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]弗格森的一半黑人男青年不见了

Half Of Ferguson’s Young African-American Men Are Missing
弗格森的半数非洲裔年轻男子不见了

作者:Adam Ozimek @ 2015-03-18
译者:bear
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Forbes,http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2015/03/18/half-of-fergusons-young-african-american-men-are-missing/

Michael Brown’s tragic death, violent protests including the shootings of police officers, a Justice Department investigation describing a pattern and practice of disc(more...)

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Half Of Ferguson's Young African-American Men Are Missing 弗格森的半数非洲裔年轻男子不见了 作者:Adam Ozimek @ 2015-03-18 译者:bear 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Forbes,http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2015/03/18/half-of-fergusons-young-african-american-men-are-missing/ Michael Brown’s tragic death, violent protests including the shootings of police officers, a Justice Department investigation describing a pattern and practice of discrimination in the Ferguson police department, and the resignation of six city officials, including the police chief, have focused attention on racial divisions in this St. Louis suburb.  The Justice Department investigation alleges that the lack of diversity in the Ferguson police department, only 4 of 54 commissioned officers are African American compared to 67% of the town’s population, undermines the community’s trust of law enforcement. 圣路易斯郡郊区小镇弗格森的种族分裂近来一直极受关注,起因包括一系列事件:麦克·布朗悲剧性的死亡,暴力示威、包括对警察的枪击,司法部调查认为弗格森警察局存在歧视惯例和行为,包括警长在内的6名市政官员辞职。司法部的调查结果声称,全社区对执法的信任度受损,是由于弗格森警察局内缺乏种族多样性:54名现任警官中仅有四名非洲裔美国人,而该镇67%的人口是非洲裔。 An important but unreported indicator of Ferguson’s dilemma is that half of young African American men are missing from the community.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, while there are 1,182 African American women between the ages of 25 and 34 living in Ferguson, there are only 577 African American men in this age group.  In other words there are more than two young black women for each young black man in Ferguson.  The problem of missing black men extends to other age groups.  More than 40% of black men in both the 20 to 24 and 35 to 54 age groups in Ferguson are missing. 关于弗格森困境,一个重要但未被报道的指标是,这一社区中有一半的黑人年轻男性消失无踪了。根据美国人口统计局的数据,有1182名25至34岁的黑人女性生活在弗格森,但同年龄段的黑人男性只有557名。换句话说,弗格森的黑人年轻人中,每名男性都对应着2名以上女性。黑人男性缺席的问题也出现在别的年龄段。20岁至24岁段和35岁至54岁段都有超过40%的黑人男性不见了。 It is worth noting that there are approximately equal numbers of African American boys and girls, under the age of 20, in Ferguson (2,332 boys and 2,341 girls).  What has happened to young African American men in Ferguson?  There are several possibilities.  First, the Census counts only the civilian population, and excludes individuals serving in the Armed Forces.  Second, tragically, some of these young men have already died.  Third, Census figures do not include individuals who are incarcerated at the time of the survey.  Finally, the Census Bureau may undercount homeless men, men who are marginally attached to the community, and men who are primarily engaged in criminal behavior. 值得注意的是,黑人男孩和女孩的数量几乎是相等的,在20岁以下年龄段,弗格森有2332名黑人男孩和2341名黑人女孩。弗格森的年轻黑人男性到底去哪了?有几种可能。第一,统计局的数据仅仅包括了平民,不包括军中服役的。第二,十分悲惨,其中一些年轻男性已经死了。第三,人口统计数据没有包括调查时正在服刑的人员。最后,人口统计局低估了流浪汉的数量,这些男性生活在社会边缘,大多数都涉及犯罪活动。 While the problem of missing African American men is especially severe in Ferguson, young black men are absent from most U.S. cities.  In the neighboring cities of East St. Louis, IL and St. Louis, about 38% and 24% of African American men age 25 to 34 are absent from their communities, respectively.  On average, about 18 percent of young African American men are absent from large cities.  (This calculation is based on the combined population of 33 cities with the largest African American populations, home to about one quarter of African Americans in the U.S.)  In contrast, outside of large cities only about 4% of young black men are absent from their communities.  The challenges posed by an absence of black men in Ferguson are problems faced primarily by larger cities. 尽管黑人男性缺席问题在弗格森特别严重,但在大多数美国城市中,年轻黑人男性消失无踪的情况都存在。在伊利诺斯州的东圣路易斯市和圣路易斯市两个临近城市中,社区里分别大约有38%和24%的25至34岁黑人男性消失了。平均而言,大城市中大约有18%的年轻黑人男性缺席。(这个结果是根据33个黑人人口最多的城市计算出来的,覆盖了大约美国四分之一的非洲裔人口)作为对比,在大城市之外,只有4%的年轻黑人男性不在其社区之内。弗格森这种因年轻黑人男性缺席而造成的挑战,主要是较大城市面临的问题。 Outside of large cities the absence of young African American men is explained by gender differences in mortality rates and military service.  Almost two percent of African Americans between the ages of 25 and 34 are in the active military, and about 85% are men, so military service can explain a two percent shortfall in the civilian black male population. 除开大城市以外,其他地方的年轻黑人男性缺席现象可以用死亡率和军队服役上的性别差异来解释。25至34岁的美国黑人中,有大约2%在军中服役,其中约85%是男性,所以军队服役状况能够解释2%的男性黑人平民的数量差额。 Vital Statistics data indicate that about 96% of African American men will survive to the age of 30 compared to 98% of women.  Shorter life expectancies can explain why an additional two percent of young African American men are missing.  After adjustments for gender differences in mortality rates and military service, 14% of African American men age 25 to 34 are missing from our largest cities, and 47% are missing from Ferguson. 人口动态统计数据显示,大约有96%的美国黑人男性能活到30岁,而女性则有98%。男性相对更短的预期寿命可以再解释两个百分点的年轻黑人男性缺席现象。基于死亡率和军中服役状况上的性别差异进行调整后,我国大城市中有14%的25至34岁的黑人男性缺席,而弗格森则达47%。 Incarceration is the primary reason why young black men are missing from our largest cities.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics about 9.4% of African American men age 25 to 34 are incarcerated, compared to 0.6% of African American women.  However, an incredibly high incarceration rate would be necessary to account for all of Ferguson’s missing young black men.  Ferguson’s challenge is likely the result of a combination of problems including incarceration, criminal behavior, homelessness and substance abuse. 服刑是我国大城市中年轻黑人男性缺席的主要原因。根据司法统计局的数据,大约9.4%的25至34岁美国黑人男性正在服刑,而黑人女性则只有0.6%。然而,只有高到令人难以置信的服刑率,才能够解释弗格森年轻黑人男性缺席的总量。弗格森面临的挑战可能是一系列麻烦综合导致的结果,包括服刑、犯罪行为、无家可归和滥用药物。 It will be difficult for Ferguson to prosper economically as long as half of young black men are absent from the community.  According to Census data 60% of households with children in Ferguson are headed by women and 48% of these female-headed households are below the poverty line. 只要社区中始终有一半的年轻黑人男性不见踪影,弗格森的经济发展就会很困难。根据人口统计数据,在弗格森,60%的有孩子家庭由妇女当家,而这些由妇女当家的家庭中又有48%生活在贫困线以下。 Although the Justice Department views the racial disparity among Ferguson’s police officers as a potential cause of racial unrest in the community, the dearth of black police officers is also a consequence of the socioeconomic problems facing Ferguson’s African American community.  While there have been important changes in the past few decades, law enforcement is an occupation disproportionately represented by younger men.  According to the Census Bureau over 85% of police officers in the U.S. are men and only 13% are age 55 and above. 尽管司法部认为弗格森警察构成中的种族不平衡是该社区内种族矛盾的潜在原因之一,但黑人警察不足也是弗格森的黑人社区所面临的社会经济问题的结果。尽管在过去几十年有一些重大的改变,但执法行业依旧不成比例地由年轻男性主导。根据人口统计局,超过85%的美国警察是男性,只有13%是55岁以上的。 As Ferguson strives to achieve greater racial diversity in its police force, one of the first problems civic leaders will face is a shortage of young African American men from Ferguson who can fill positions in the police department.  Many of the socioeconomic problems that have caused these young men to be absent from their community will also make it difficult, if not impossible, for these men to pursue a career in law enforcement. 弗格森正在努力强化其警力配置中的种族多样性,但是,市政领导人将要面临的一个头等难题是:弗格森没有足够的年轻黑人男性来充任警察局的岗位。导致这些年轻人在各自社区中缺席的社会经济问题,同样也会使这些男性很难去从事执法行业,如果不是不可能的话。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]被遗忘的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀

New documents allege Mugabe’s complicity in 1980s massacres
新文档指证穆加贝参与了80年代的一系列屠杀

作者:STUART DORAN @ 2015-05-18
译者:Tankman
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:Dailymaverick,http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-05-18-new-documents-allege-mugabes-complicity-in-1980s-massacres/#.V0ShIfkrKwU

Thousands of historical documents are becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and allege what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Robert Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of Matabeleland’s mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed.

导言:海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文档涉及多个领域,并指证了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑:罗伯特·穆加贝,当时的总理,可能是精心策划并得以系统性实施的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的主要策划者。

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New documents allege Mugabe’s complicity in 1980s massacres 新文档指证穆加贝参与了80年代的一系列屠杀 作者:STUART DORAN @ 2015-05-18 译者:Tankman 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:Dailymaverick,http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-05-18-new-documents-allege-mugabes-complicity-in-1980s-massacres/#.V0ShIfkrKwU Thousands of historical documents are becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and allege what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Robert Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of Matabeleland's mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed. 导言:海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文档涉及多个领域,并指证了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑:罗伯特·穆加贝,当时的总理,可能是精心策划并得以系统性实施的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的主要策划者。

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From January 1983, a campaign of terror was waged against the Ndebele people of western Zimbabwe, an outbreak of obscene violence that remains the darkest period in the country’s post-independence history, notwithstanding the bloody notoriety of the last decade-and-a-half. 自1983年一月,一场针对津巴布韦西部恩德贝勒人的恐怖运动被发起,这是一场不堪入目的暴行的开端,至今仍是这个国家独立后历史中最黑暗的时期。尽管该国近十五年来的历史之血腥也已臭名昭著。【译注:2000年该国政府启动了强制土改政策。】 But now, the new light is being shed on these days of horror. 但是现在,这些恐怖的岁月正被重新审视。 Thousands of historical documents that appear to expose the perpetrators are now becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and include, among others, diplomatic correspondence, intelligence assessments and raw intelligence garnered by spies recruited from within the Zimbabwean government. 海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文件似乎揭示了屠杀的真凶。这些文件涉及多个领域,包括但不限于:外交文书,情报评估和津巴布韦政府内部线人收集的原始情报。 These papers—augmented by the testimony of Zimbabwean witnesses finding courage in old age—appear to substantiate what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed. 一些津巴布韦目击者在晚年鼓起勇气做出的证言进一步增加了这些文档的分量。目前看来,这些文件证实了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑:罗伯特·穆加贝,当时的总理,可能是精心策划并被系统实施的大屠杀的主要策划者。 The documents appear to show that the massacres were closely associated with an effort by Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party to eliminate opposition groups in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s independence. Zapu, a party led by nationalist rival, Joshua Nkomo, represented the main obstacle to that objective. Given that Zapu enjoyed overwhelming support among Ndebele, the Ndebele as a whole came to be seen as an impediment. In the words of Mugabe, the people of Matabeleland needed to be “re-educated”. 这些文件似乎表明,大屠杀和穆加贝的政党——津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线(简称津民盟)——在国家独立后试图消灭反对派的努力紧密相连。津巴布韦非洲人民联盟(简称津人联)是由对手、民族主义者加西亚·恩科莫领导的政党,是津民盟达到该目标的主要障碍。津人联在恩德贝勒人中拥有压倒性优势,故而恩德贝勒人整体被视作一种障碍。按照穆加贝自己的话说,马塔贝莱兰当地人需要被“再教育”。 The little that Mugabe has said since the 1980s on this taboo subject has been a mixture of obfuscation and denial. The closest he has come to admitting any form of official responsibility was at the death of Nkomo (1999), when he remarked that the early 1980s was a “moment of madness”—an ambivalent statement that perhaps reflected a fear of Ngozi (avenging spirits) more than anything else and one he has not repeated. More recently, he blamed the killings on armed bandits who were allegedly coordinated by Zapu (the original smokescreen) along with occasional indiscipline among soldiers of the army’s North Korean-trained 5 Brigade. 自1980年代以来,穆加贝甚少谈及这个禁忌话题。他对此事的稀少评论,其实是混淆和否认的混合物。他最接近于承认官方对屠杀负有任何责任的一次,是在恩科莫1999年过世时。当时他评论说,八十年代早期是个“疯狂时刻”——这个暧昧的表述也许反映了他对怨灵复仇的恐惧甚于其他任何事,而且此后他也再未提过。后来,他将杀戮的责任归咎于据称由津人联负责协调的武装土匪(这是最早释放的迷雾),以及军队第五旅士兵偶发的违纪行为,该旅是朝鲜训练出来的。 In the documents, his alleged co-conspirators tell a different story. In doing so, they controvert theories that Mugabe was poorly informed about the activities of errant subordinates. By March 1983, when news of the atrocities had leaked, prompting Western ambassadors and others to ask awkward questions, government ministers who were overseeing the operation quickly pointed to Mugabe, documents allege. 在文档中,穆加贝所称的阴谋分子讲述了一个不同的故事。他们否定了有关穆加贝对下属违纪行为知之甚少的说法。文档称,到1983年3月,暴行的消息已经走漏,促使西方大使们和其他人问起令人尴尬的问题,监督行动的政府部长们很快指向穆加贝。 Sydney Sekeramayi, the minister in Mugabe’s office with responsibility for Defence, was one. In a conversation with Cephas Msipa, one of the few remaining Zapu ministers of what had been a government of national unity, Sekeramayi, said that “not only was Mugabe fully aware of what was going on—what the 5th Brigade was doing was under Mugabe’s explicit orders.” Msipa later relayed this discussion to the Australian High Commission, which in turn reported it to headquarters in Canberra. 悉尼·塞克拉马伊,穆加贝内阁负责防务的部长,是其中之一。矶法·姆西帕是早先的联合政府中仍在位的少数几个津人联部长之一,在一次与他的对话中,塞克拉马伊说穆加贝“不仅完全知道事件的状况——而且第五旅的所为乃是基于穆加贝的明确命令。”之后姆西帕把这次讨论发送给澳大利亚高级专员公署,后者随即向堪培拉总部做了报告。 Msipa appears to be a credible witness in view of his amicable relationship with Mugabe. He had, for instance, shared a room with Mugabe for two years during their earlier career as teachers. Msipa had also welcomed Mugabe into his home when the latter returned from Ghana in 1960 and joined the struggle against white rule. 从和穆加贝的友好关系来看,姆西帕似乎应是可信的证人。例如,在两人早年一起当教师时,他和穆加贝做过两年室友。1960年,穆加贝从加纳回国加入反对白人统治的斗争时,姆西帕也欢迎他住在自己家。 Between 1980 and 1982, when tensions were rising between Zapu and Zanu, Msipa had served as a regular go-between and had spoken to Mugabe often. He continued to do so during the killings. Within Zapu, Msipa, a Shona-speaker, had consistently advocated amalgamation with Zanu, a line that had attracted the ire of Ndebele-speaking colleagues. 在1980年到1982年间,当津人联和津民盟关系紧张时,姆西帕常常作为一位中间人,频繁的和穆加贝对话。他在屠杀期间也继续这么做。在津人联中,姆西帕作为说绍纳语的一位,一贯支持和津民盟的合并,这一立场曾引起了很多说恩德贝勒语的同事的愤怒。 He was, therefore, considerably more sympathetic to Zanu and its leader than most in Zapu. And yet, after speaking to Sekeramayi and others in Zanu, he was convinced (as he told the Australians) that “the Prime Minister was right behind what had been happening in Matabeleland.” He added that he had never before had such a “crisis of my conscience” about remaining in government. 所以相比于大多数津人联成员,他明显更加同情津民盟及其领导人。然而,在和塞克拉马伊和一些津民盟成员对话之后,他确信(正如他告诉澳大利亚方面的那样)“站在马塔贝莱兰事件后面的正是总理。”他补充道:对于留在政府内任职,他以前从未有过现在这样严重的“良心挣扎”。 Sekeramayi was more circumspect in direct discussions with Western representatives, but nevertheless made clear that the massacres were no accident. The “army had had to act ‘hard’”, he told the British defence attaché, “but … the situation was now under control”. Later, Sekeramayi admitted to the British High Commissioner that “there had been atrocities”. 塞克拉马伊在直接和西方社会代表讨论此事时说话更为谨慎,但他还是很清楚地表明,大屠杀不是意外事件。“军队不得不采取‘酷烈’行动”,他告诉英国武官,“但是……现在形势已经得到了控制”。后来,塞克拉马伊向英国高级专员公署承认“曾有暴行发生”。 The documents also record that Msipa talked to other members of Zanu who revealed that the killings were not simply the whim of a small coterie, but the result of a formal and broad-based decision by the leadership of Zanu-PF. Eddison Zvobgo, a member of Zanu’s 20-member policy-making body, spoke of a “decision of the Central Committee that there had to be a ‘massacre’ of Ndebeles”. That statement squared precisely with 5 Brigade’s ethnocentric modus operandi. 文档也记录了姆西帕和其他津民联成员的谈话,那些成员揭露出屠杀绝不是一个小团伙的心血来潮,而是出自津民联领导层正式且广泛认同的决定。艾迪森·祖沃布戈,津民盟的二十人决策层之一,提到了一份“中央委员会的决定:必须要有一场针对恩德贝勒人的‘屠杀’”。这一说法和第五旅种族中心主义的作案手法完全吻合。 Mugabe’s heir apparent, the current First Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was a member of the Central Committee. But so, too, were others who have subsequently developed a reputation for moderation, not least because of their latter-day rivalry with Mnangagwa. Former Vice President Joice Mujuru heads that list. 穆加贝的指定继承人,现任第一副总统的埃默森·姆南加古瓦曾是中央委员会的一员。当然,后来展现出温和形象的许多其他人当时也在中央委员会中,他们之所以变温和,相当程度是因为他们此后需要与姆南加古瓦竞争。前副总统乔伊斯·穆朱鲁在这份名单上居首位。 The army commanders who directed the killings, many of whom still retain key positions in a security sector that underwrites the regime, are also shown in the documents to have been eager accomplices. Zvobgo commented that the first commander of 5 Brigade, Perence Shiri, had said the “politicians should leave it to us” with regard to “settling things in Matabeleland”. 文件也曝光了指导屠杀的部队司令官是积极的从犯,其中不少人仍然在强力部门身居高位,维持着这个政权的统治。祖沃布戈提到第五旅的司令官佩伦斯·希里曾说过,对于“搞定在马塔贝莱兰的事情”,“政治家们应该交给我们去做”。 Shiri is now the head of Zimbabwe’s air force. 希里目前是津巴布韦的空军司令。 Testimony from witnesses provides evidence that Shiri worked closely with many former members of Mugabe’s guerilla army, Zanla, notwithstanding a myth that 5 Brigade operated separately from the rest of the army. Those who assisted Shiri allegedly included the now chief of Zimbabwe’s defence forces, Constantine Chiwenga, who was this month awarded a doctorate in ethics by the University of KwaZulu–Natal. 证人证言提供证据说明:希里曾和许多穆加贝游击部队——津巴布韦民族解放军——的前成员密切共事,尽管仍有传言说第五旅是脱离全军单独行动的。那些据称曾协助希里的人包括现任津巴布韦国防部长康斯坦丁·奇温加。他在这个月被夸祖鲁-纳塔尔大学授予了伦理学博士学位。 During the killings, Shiri frequently consulted with Chiwenga, who was then using the nom de guerre Dominic Chinenge and was head of 1 Brigade based in Bulawayo. Chiwenga’s unit also provided a range of practical assistance, including logistical support for 5 Brigade and a base from which Shiri’s men operated when they made punitive raids on Bulawayo’s townships. 在屠杀期间,希里经常向奇温加请教,后者那时化名多米尼克·奇内格,是驻扎在布拉瓦约的第一旅的旅长。奇温加的部队也提供了各种实际支持,包括对第五旅的后勤支持,以及在希里士兵向布拉瓦约的城镇发动惩戒性打击时,为其提供基地。 The first six weeks of 5 Brigade’s attacks were massive in their intensity, but the documentary record shows that an order was given to curtail this phase after news of the massacres began to leak to the outside world. However, the killing did not end, but was instead scaled back and conducted in a more covert manner. 在第五旅袭击的头六周,攻击的烈度极大。但文档记录显示,当大屠杀的消息开始往外界泄露时,上面有命令要求进行收缩。然而,屠杀并没有终止,只是缩小了规模,采取了更秘密的形式。 Estimates of the death toll are frequently put at 20,000, a figure first mooted by Nkomo when the campaign was still underway. But on-the-ground surveys have been piecemeal and vast areas of Matabeleland remain under-researched. Fear and the death of many witnesses provide further challenges. 通常的估计认为死者有约两万人,这个数字最早是恩科莫提出来的,当时屠杀还在进行中。然而现场调查一直是零星散乱的,而且马塔贝莱兰很大部分区域仍未被调查。人们的恐惧,加之很多目击者死亡,也增加了调查难度。 A forensically-accurate number will never be possible, yet it seems possible that the standard estimate is too conservative. Oral testimony from Zimbabweans who were in key government positions during the 1980s disinters a host of killings that were previously unknown. Cumulatively, this testimony suggests that the breadth of the violence and the extent of official involvement could have been significantly underestimated. 一个法医学标准的精确数字也许永远不可能得到,然而通常的估计可能太过保守。1980年代在津巴布韦政府重要岗位任职的一批人的口头证言揭示了许多以前不为人知的杀戮事件。总的来说,这证言暗示暴力的程度和官方牵涉的程度可能被显著低估了。 Observers have always wondered how much of this was known to Western governments—and what they did about it. It is clear from the documents that they knew a great deal, even if some of the detail remained obscure. It is also clear that the polite questions asked by diplomats were—along with courageous representations by churchmen and their allies in Zimbabwe—pivotal to the government’s decision to reduce the violence. 观察家一直好奇于对此事西方社会的政府已经知晓多少?他们对此又做了什么?文档显示,他们无疑知道很多,即使细节仍不清楚。文档也很清楚的表明,外交官有礼节的质询,和教会人士及其津巴布韦盟友们的勇敢发声,这些是政府决定收敛暴行的关键。 Up to that point, there was no indication that the brutal force of the massacres would be curtailed. Nevertheless, Western governments did little once the massacres were brought down to a lower, but still savage, intensity. Perhaps as a sign that Western censure had its limits, the campaign in Matabeleland North continued during the remainder of 1983; 5 Brigade was redeployed further south in 1984. 到那时为止,没有迹象表明当时大屠杀的野蛮暴力会终止。但是一旦大屠杀的烈度变低,即使其仍然残酷,西方社会的政府却没什么作为了。在1983年剩下的时间,北马塔贝莱兰省的战争一直在持续,这仿佛代表了西方抗议的局限性;第五旅在1984年被重新部署到更南部。 It is a fact that the Western response to violence toward black countrymen in the 1980s was a pale shadow of the reaction to his attack on white farmers in 2000. Many Ndebele remain bitter about this inconsistency. While historians debate the dimensions of Zanu’s violence, for Western policy-makers and the domestic constituencies that are meant to hold them to account there's a need to reflect again on the price of inconsistency in the developing world. Aside from the human cost, Western advocacy of democracy and international justice will continue to be viewed with skepticism while such glaring contradictions remain. 事实上,西方对2000年时穆加贝袭击白人农场主做出了强烈反应,与之相比,他们在1980年代针对黑人村民所遭受暴行的反应要小得多。许多恩德贝勒人仍对这种前后不一心怀怨愤。当历史学家争辩津民盟暴力的程度时,西方的政策制定者和想让他们承担责任的国内选民则需要再次反思这种在发展中国家采取双重标准的代价。如果这么显眼的自相矛盾继续存在,除了生命成本外,西方对民主和国际正义的支持也会继续被人怀疑。 At the same time, an inordinate focus on the international dimensions of the Matabeleland massacres is to miss the point. Mugabe has instinctively sought to racialise and internationalise internal controversies of which he is the principal author or to invoke the spectre of neo-colonialism in the hope of support from fellow African leaders. 同时,对马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的关注过多聚焦于国际视角,这没有切中要害。出于本能,穆加贝常把主要由他引起的国内争端国际化和种族化,或者试图召唤新殖民主义的幽灵,希望借此获得非洲领袖们的支持。 Zimbabwe’s Second Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko recently made the claim that the Matabeleland massacres were “conspiracy of the West” and that Mugabe had nothing to do with them. Yet the new documentary material appears to underline once more that post-independence Zimbabwe’s greatest crimes and deepest wounds lie squarely at the feet of Mugabe and Zanu-PF. 津巴布韦的第二副总统费列克佐拉·姆波科最近声明:马塔贝莱兰大屠杀是“西方的阴谋”,穆加贝和此事没有任何干系。然而新的文档材料似乎再次昭示穆加贝和津民盟-爱国阵线应该为津巴布韦独立后最大的罪行和最深的创伤负责。 The documents appear to show that the killings were an internal affair, neither provoked nor sustained by outsiders, and that the atrocities were driven from the top by Zanu-PF in pursuit of specific political objectives. 现在看来,文档揭示了屠杀是个内政事件,并非由外部力量发起或支持,而且是津民盟-爱国阵线的领袖为了达到特定政治目的而发动。 Viewed across a period of several years and hundreds of files, the documents appear to provide evidence that—far from being a “moment of madness” in which supporters of rival parties went at each other— the massacres were but one component of a sustained and strategic effort to remove all political opposition within five years of independence, as Zanu leaders were determined to secure a “victory” against non-existent opposition in elections scheduled for 1985, after which there would be a “mandate” from the people to impose a one-party state. 经几年时间把数百份文件放在一起审阅,文档似乎证明了大屠杀绝对不是所谓的对立政党支持者相互攻击的“疯狂时刻”。津民盟领袖决意要压制尚未出现的反对,确保在计划于1985年举行的大选中“取得胜利”,以便之后顺应“人民的选择”施行一党专制,因此,大屠杀只是独立后五年内消灭一切政治反对派的持续行为和战略努力中的一环。 Dr Stuart Doran is an independent historian and author of a forthcoming book based on the new documentary material—Kingdom, power, glory: Mugabe, Zanu and the quest for supremacy, 1960–87. 【作者】斯图加特·道朗博士是一位独立历史学家,基于新的文档材料,他所著的《国度,权柄,荣耀:穆加贝,津民盟和对权力巅峰的追求,1960-87》一书即将问世。 Photo: A file picture dated 25 March 2005 shows Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe gesturing during a ZANU-PF rally near the town of Mbaira south of Harare, Zimbabwe. EPA/STR 【图注】一份摄于2005年3月25日的档案照片显示,在哈拉雷以南的玛巴拉镇,津巴布韦总统罗伯特·穆加贝在津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线(ZANU-PF)的集会上振臂高呼。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]什么鸭玩意儿!

What the Duck?
你鸭的!

作者:Drew Magary @ 2013-11-17
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
来源:GQ,http://www.gq.com/story/duck-dynasty-phil-robertson

How in the world did a family of squirrel-eating, Bible-thumping, catchphrase-spouting duck hunters become the biggest TV stars in America? And what will they do now that they have 14 million fervent disciples? Our Drew Magary toured the Louisiana backwater with Phil Robertson and the Duck Dynasty gang to find out.

究竟是出于什么缘故,才会使得这样一个捕食松鼠、大肆宣扬圣经、口头禅滔滔不绝的猎鸭大家庭成了全美最耀眼的电视明星?现拥1400万狂热信徒,他们又会做些什么?为解答这些问题,本刊记者Drew Magary在路易斯安那的穷乡僻壤走访了Phil Robertson及《鸭子王朝》一伙人。

……

Let’s start with the crossbow, because the crossbow is huge. I’m sitting in the passenger seat of a camo-painted ATV, rumbling through the northern Louisiana backwoods with Phil Robertson, founder of the Duck Commander company, patriarch at the heart of A&E’s smash reality hit Duck Dynasty, and my tour guide for the afternoon.

首先说说手弩,因为它实在太大了。当时我坐在一辆涂了迷彩的全地形车的副驾位置上,跟Phil Robertson一起颠簸在路易斯安那北部的老林中。Robertson是“鸭司令”公司的创始人,A & E有线台极为轰动的热播真人秀《鸭子王朝》的核心家长,也是我本次午后之旅的导游。

There are seat belts in this ATV, but it doesn’t look like they’ve ever been used. Phil is not wearing one. I am not wearing one, because I don’t want Phil to think I’m a pussy. (Too late!) The crossbow—a Barnett model equipped with a steel-tipped four-blade broadhead arrow—is perched on the dash between us. It looks like you could shoot through a goddamn mountain with it.

车上配有安全带,但似乎从来没人用过。Phil没系。我也没系,因为我可不想让Phil看扁。(然而太迟了……)手弩就趴在我俩之间的仪表板上。那是只巴内特弩,装备有一根箭头钢制、四向开刃的阔首箭。它看上去会让你觉得拿着它就可以他妈的射穿一座山。

“That’ll bury up in you and kill you dead,” Phil says.

“这东西能把你射穿,彻底干掉你”,Phil说。

The bow is cocked and loaded, just in case a deer stumbles in front of us and we need to do a redneck drive-by on the poor bastard, but the safety is on. SAFETY FIRST. Still, Phil warns me, “You don’t want to be bumping that.”

弓已装好,扳机已扣上,万一有野鹿突然跑到我们的车子面前,那我们就需要在这倒霉蛋身上玩一场红脖式飞车射击了。但保险栓还是拉上了。安全第一!不过,Phil还是告诫我,“你最好还是不要碰到它。”

As we drive out into the woods, past a sign that reads parish maintenance ends, Phil is telling me all about the land around us and how the animals are a glorious gift from God and how blowing their heads off is part of His plan for us.

随着我们驱车驶入丛林,把一个写着“县政府维护界”的牌子甩在后面,Phil(more...)

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7290
What the Duck? 你鸭的! 作者:Drew Magary @ 2013-11-17 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 来源:GQ,http://www.gq.com/story/duck-dynasty-phil-robertson How in the world did a family of squirrel-eating, Bible-thumping, catchphrase-spouting duck hunters become the biggest TV stars in America? And what will they do now that they have 14 million fervent disciples? Our Drew Magary toured the Louisiana backwater with Phil Robertson and the Duck Dynasty gang to find out. 究竟是出于什么缘故,才会使得这样一个捕食松鼠、大肆宣扬圣经、口头禅滔滔不绝的猎鸭大家庭成了全美最耀眼的电视明星?现拥1400万狂热信徒,他们又会做些什么?为解答这些问题,本刊记者Drew Magary在路易斯安那的穷乡僻壤走访了Phil Robertson及《鸭子王朝》一伙人。

……

Let's start with the crossbow, because the crossbow is huge. I'm sitting in the passenger seat of a camo-painted ATV, rumbling through the northern Louisiana backwoods with Phil Robertson, founder of the Duck Commander company, patriarch at the heart of A&E's smash reality hit Duck Dynasty, and my tour guide for the afternoon. 首先说说手弩,因为它实在太大了。当时我坐在一辆涂了迷彩的全地形车的副驾位置上,跟Phil Robertson一起颠簸在路易斯安那北部的老林中。Robertson是“鸭司令”公司的创始人,A & E有线台极为轰动的热播真人秀《鸭子王朝》的核心家长,也是我本次午后之旅的导游。 There are seat belts in this ATV, but it doesn't look like they've ever been used. Phil is not wearing one. I am not wearing one, because I don't want Phil to think I'm a pussy. (Too late!) The crossbow—a Barnett model equipped with a steel-tipped four-blade broadhead arrow—is perched on the dash between us. It looks like you could shoot through a goddamn mountain with it. 车上配有安全带,但似乎从来没人用过。Phil没系。我也没系,因为我可不想让Phil看扁。(然而太迟了……)手弩就趴在我俩之间的仪表板上。那是只巴内特弩,装备有一根箭头钢制、四向开刃的阔首箭。它看上去会让你觉得拿着它就可以他妈的射穿一座山。 "That'll bury up in you and kill you dead," Phil says. “这东西能把你射穿,彻底干掉你”,Phil说。 The bow is cocked and loaded, just in case a deer stumbles in front of us and we need to do a redneck drive-by on the poor bastard, but the safety is on. SAFETY FIRST. Still, Phil warns me, "You don't want to be bumping that." 弓已装好,扳机已扣上,万一有野鹿突然跑到我们的车子面前,那我们就需要在这倒霉蛋身上玩一场红脖式飞车射击了。但保险栓还是拉上了。安全第一!不过,Phil还是告诫我,“你最好还是不要碰到它。” As we drive out into the woods, past a sign that reads parish maintenance ends, Phil is telling me all about the land around us and how the animals are a glorious gift from God and how blowing their heads off is part of His plan for us. 随着我们驱车驶入丛林,把一个写着“县政府维护界”的牌子甩在后面,Phil一路都在跟我介绍周边的土地,说动物们是上帝赠与的极好礼物,又说把它们爆头是他为我们此行准备的计划之一。 "Look at this," he says, gesturing to the surrounding wilderness. "The Almighty gave us this. Genesis 9 is where the animals went wild, and God gave them wildness. After the flood, that's when he made animals wild. Up until that time, everybody was vegetarian. After the flood, he said, 'I'm giving you everything now. Animals are wild.'" “看看这个”,他说,手指着我们周围的荒野。“上帝把它赐予了我们。动物们走向野生是在《创世纪》第9章,上帝赐予了它们荒野。是在洪水之后,他才让动物们野生的。直到那时以前,所有人都吃素。洪水以后,上帝就说,‘我把一切都赐予你们。动物是野生的。’” There's a fly parked on Phil's long beard. It's been there the whole ride, and I desperately want to pluck it out, but I decide against it. Along with the crossbow, there's a loaded .22-caliber rifle rattling around in the footwell. Phil的长胡子上停着一只苍蝇。整个行驶过程中,它一直都在那儿,我极度想要把它抓走,但最终还是决定不这么干。除了手弩之外,车上还有支已经装上弹药的点22口径步枪在脚坑里一直晃荡。 And yet, much like the 14 million Americans who Nielsen says tune in to Duck Dynasty every week—over 2 million more than the audience for the Breaking Bad finale—I am comfortable here in these woods with Phil and his small cache of deadly weaponry. He is welcoming and gracious. 不过,跟Nielsen所说的每周都收看《鸭子王朝》的1400万美国人(比《绝命毒师》大结局的观众还要多200万)一样,我跟Phil及他的一小批致命武器藏品一起呆在丛林中时,感到非常舒适。他热心好客、和蔼可亲。 He is a man who preaches the gospel of the outdoors and, to my great envy, practices what he preaches. He spends most of his time out here, daydreaming about what he calls a "pristine earth": a world where nothing gets in the way of nature or the hunters who lovingly maintain it. No cities. No buildings. No highways. 他是一个户外运动的布道者,而且令我非常嫉妒的是,他实践了他所传之道。他大部分时候都呆在这里,梦想存在一个他称为“原始地球”的地方:整个世界没有任何东西会妨碍自然,或者妨碍那些细心维护自然的猎人。没有城市。没有建筑。没有高速公路。 Oh, and no sinners, too. So here's where things get a bit uncomfortable. Phil calls himself a Bible-thumper, and holy shit, he thumps that Bible hard enough to ring the bell at a county-fair test of strength. If you watch Duck Dynasty, you can hear plenty of it in the nondenominational supper-table prayer the family recites at the end of every episode, and in the show's no-cussing, no-blaspheming tone. 哦,还得没有罪人。说到这里事情就有点尴尬了。Phil称自己是个圣经狂人,而且我的神啊,他宣扬圣经的力度都可以把县农贸市场的力量测试钟给敲响了。如果你也看《鸭子王朝》,那你就能听到很多,包括他们一家在每集节目结尾时的晚餐桌前都会念诵的无宗派祈祷文,以及整个节目不乱诅咒、不亵渎神明的语气。 But there are more things Phil would like to say—"controversial" things, as he puts it to me—that don't make the cut. (This March, for instance, he told the Christian-oriented Sports Spectrum magazine that he didn't approve of A&E editing out "in Jesus" from a family prayer scene, even though A&E says that the phrase has been uttered in at least seventeen episodes.) 但Phil想要表达的东西更多,用他自己的话说,那都是些“有争议的”事情,而这些就不太符合要求了。(比如,今年三月,Phil就跟具有基督教倾向的《运动光谱》杂志说他并不赞成A&E台将“奉耶稣”一语从家庭祷告镜头中剪辑掉的做法,尽管A&E台宣称这一词汇已经在至少17集节目中被他们提到过。) Out here in these woods, without any cameras around, Phil is free to say what he wants. Maybe a little too free. He's got lots of thoughts on modern immorality, and there's no stopping them from rushing out. Like this one: 在这种丛林之中,周围没有摄像机,Phil拥有了想说啥就说啥的自由。可能还有点过分自由了。他对于现代的道德败坏想法甚多,根本无法阻止它们脱口而出。比如: "It seems like, to me, a vagina—as a man—would be more desirable than a man's anus. That's just me. I'm just thinking: There's more there! She's got more to offer. I mean, come on, dudes! You know what I'm saying? But hey, sin: It's not logical, my man. It's just not logical." “在我看来,作为一个男人,阴道似乎要比男人的后门更可爱。我就是这样。我的想法就是:那可要好多了!她能给我提供更多东西。我的意思是,别这样,男人们!你明白我在说什么吧?但世上就是会有罪恶。这没道理,兄弟。这就是没道理。” Perhaps we'll be needing that seat belt after all. 我想我们终究还是需要把安全带系好。

……

The Duck Dynasty origin story is the mighty river from which all other Robertson-family stories flow. And it is an awesome story, one that improves the more it is told, so here is my stab at it: 《鸭子王朝》的起源故事是一条滔滔大河,Robertson家族此后所有的故事都发源于此。这是一个精彩的故事,而且每讲一次就会愈加完美一次,所以让我来试着叙述一下: Phil Robertson grew up bone poor in the northwest corner of this state—a place where Cajun redneck culture and Ozark redneck culture intersect—to a manic-depressive mother and a roughneck father. Phil Robertson成长于该州西北角一个极度贫困的家庭,当地乃是卡真人红脖文化【译注:卡真人是路易斯安那州的法国后裔。】与欧扎卡红脖文化【译注:欧扎卡山区位于密苏里南部与阿肯色和俄克拉荷马交界处。】的交汇之处。他的母亲患有狂躁抑郁症,父亲则是一个大老粗。 He was a star quarterback in high school and earned a scholarship to play at Louisiana Tech, but quit after one season because football interfered with duck-hunting season. The guy who took his roster spot at Tech was Terry Bradshaw, because that's how these kinds of stories go. 高中时代,他是个明星四分卫,后来获得奖学金在路易斯安那理工大学校队打球。但一个赛季以后他就退学了,因为橄榄球赛季和猎鸭季节相互冲突。在理工大学校队球员名册上顶替他位置的是Terry Bradshaw【译注:著名四分卫】,因为所有这类故事都有这种情节走向。 Phil On Growing Up in Pre-Civil-Rights-Era Louisiana Phil谈民权时代以前的路易斯安那成长经历 "I never, with my eyes, saw the mistreatment of any black person. Not once. Where we lived was all farmers. The blacks worked for the farmers. I hoed cotton with them. I'm with the blacks, because we're white trash. We're going across the field.... They're singing and happy. “我从未亲眼看过对任何黑人的虐待。一次都没有。我们住的地方全是农民。黑人们都为农民工作。我跟他们一起锄棉花。我跟黑人是一边的,因为我们都是穷苦白人。我们横穿田野……他们兴高采烈地歌唱。 "I never heard one of them, one black person, say, I tell you what: These doggone white people—not a word!... Pre-entitlement, pre-welfare, you say: Were they happy? They were godly; they were happy; no one was singing the blues." “我从未听他们,从未听任何一个黑人说过,嘿,我跟你说,这些他妈的白人——我从未听过此类说辞……这是在补贴以前,在福利制度以前。你要问:他们开心吗?他们是虔诚的、开心的;根本没人丧气埋怨。” According to Phil's autobiography—a ghostwritten book he says he has never read—he spent his days after Tech doing odd jobs and his evenings getting drunk, chasing tail, and swallowing diet pills and black mollies, a form of medicinal speed. In his midtwenties, already married with three sons, a piss-drunk Robertson kicked his family out of the house. 根据Phil的自传——该书由影子写手完成,Phil称自己从未读过——他从理工大学退学后,白天做零工,晚上则喝个大醉、拈花惹草、吞服减肥药和“黑玛丽鱼”(一种药物兴奋剂)。20多岁时,他已经结婚,并生有3个孩子,某次酩酊大醉后将家人全部赶出了自己的房子。 "I'm sick of you," he told his wife, Kay. But Robertson soon realized the error of his ways, begged Kay to come back, and turned over his life to Jesus Christ. “我看见你就烦”,他这么跟他老婆Kay说。但Robertson很快就意识到这种生活方式的错误,求Kay回家,并将自己的生命托付给了耶稣基督。 In 1972, with Jesus at the wheel, Robertson founded the Duck Commander company, which sold a line of custom-made duck-hunting calls that quickly became popular among avid hunters for their uncanny accuracy in replicating the sound of a real duck. 1972年,在耶稣的指引下,Robertson创办了“鸭司令”公司,出售一种定制的猎鸭哨子。这种哨子很快就在贪婪的猎人中流行开来,因为它能出奇精准地再现真鸭子的声音。最终,他将公司的一半卖给了自己现年41岁的儿子Willie。 He eventually sold half the company to his son Willie, now 41, and together they made a DVD series about the family's duck hunts, which led to a show on the Outdoor Channel, which led to Duck Dynasty on A&E, which led to everything blowing right the fuck up. 他们还一起录制了一个DVD系列,内容是全家的猎鸭活动,此举促使他们后来在“户外频道”上过一期节目,又催生了A&E台的《鸭子王朝》,而后者则促成了此后所有名声大噪的一切。 The show—a reality sitcom showcasing the semiscripted high jinks of Phil, his brother "Uncle Si," his four sons, Alan, Willie, Jase, and Jep, and the perpetually exasperated but always perfectly accessorized Robertson-family ladies—has become the biggest reality-TV hit in the history of cable television, reportedly earning the family a holy shit worthy $200,000-an-episode paycheck. 《鸭子王朝》是个真人秀情景剧,剧中展现的是Phil,他的兄弟“Uncle Si”和他4个儿子Alan、Willie、Jase和Jep之间半编排半自发的嬉笑怒骂,以及永远怒气冲冲但又总是穿戴整齐完美的Robertson家族的女士们。该剧已经成为有线电视史上最为成功的真人秀热播节目。据报道,这一家子收获了每集20万美元的天价报酬。 It's a funny, family-friendly show, with "skits that we come up with," as Phil describes the writing process. They plunder beehives. They blow up beaver dams. And when the Robertson-family ladies go up to a rooftop in a hydraulic lift, you just know that lift will "accidentally" get stuck and strand them. 这个节目既逗乐又适合家庭观看,据Phil介绍其写作过程,其中“有些搞笑是我们想出来的”。他们偷蜂巢。他们炸河狸坝。如果Robertson家族的女士们想要通过液压升降机爬到屋顶上去,你就知道升降机肯定会“突然”卡住,把她们困在里面。 But the show, whose fifth season premieres on January 15, is just one part of the family's pop-cultural dominance. In 2013 four books written (kind of!) by Robertson family members made the top ten on the New York Times nonfiction best-seller list. 该剧第5季将在1月15日首播,但它还只是Robertson家族在流行文化界统治地位的一个侧面。2013年,Robertson家族成员写作(请自行加上引号!)的4本书进入了《纽约时报》畅销书非虚构类前十榜单。 Another book—penned by Jase Robertson and detailing his Christian rebirth at age 14, his struggle to forgive his father's past behavior, and his young daughter's struggle through five facial-reconstruction surgeries to overcome a severe cleft lip and palate—is forthcoming and destined to make it five best-sellers. 还有一本马上要出的书——由Jase Robertson写作,详述他本人14岁时经历的基督教新生、他如何努力原谅其父过去的所作所为、他的小女儿为了治疗严重的唇腭裂如何挣扎着经历5次面部修复手术——也注定要成为第5本畅销书。 There's also a book of devotionals somewhere in there, along with Duck Dynasty themed birthday cards, bobblehead dolls, camo apparel (pink camo for the ladies), Cajun-spice seasoning, car fresheners, iPhone games (from the press release: "As players successfully complete the challenges, their beards grow to epic proportions and they start to transform from a yuppie into a full-blown redneck!"), and presumably some sort of camouflage home-pregnancy test. 这家人的作品清单里还有一本关于宗教仪式的书,此外还有《鸭子王朝》主题生日卡片、大头塑像、迷彩服(女士还有粉红迷彩)、卡真香料调味品、车用空气清新剂、iPhone游戏(游戏的新闻稿称,“如果玩家成功完成挑战,他们的胡子就会长到极为浓密,于是他们就会开始从雅皮转变为一个货真价实的红脖!”),可能还有某种具有伪装性的居家验孕办法。 It's easy to see the appeal. The Robertsons are immensely likable. They're funny. They look cool. They're "smarter than they look," says sportswriter Mark Schlabach, who co-writes the family's books. 他们的吸引力显而易见。Robertson一家子极为可爱。他们很搞笑。他们看起来很酷。他们“比看上去要聪明得多”,体育作家Mark Schlabach说道,他参与了写作该家族的书籍。 And they are remarkably honest both with one another and with the viewing audience: Phil's old hell-raising, Si's traumatic stint in Vietnam, the intervention that the family staged for Jep when he was boozing and doing drugs in college (Phil placed him under house arrest for three months)—all of it is out in the open. The more they reveal, the more people feel connected to them. 而且,他们对于彼此以及对于收看节目的观众也极为诚实。Phil曾经的捣蛋胡闹、Si在越南的痛苦岁月、Jep大学期间嗜酒嗜毒时全家为他而安排的干预矫治(Phil把他软禁在家中长达3个月)等等,所有这些都公之于众。他们展示给人的越多,人们就越是觉得自己与他们有共鸣。 And then, of course, there is their faith, which plays no small role here. During the family's initial negotiations about the show with A&E, Jase told me, "the three no-compromises were faith, betrayal of family members, and duck season." 当然,此外还有就是他们的信仰,这也发挥了不小的作用。Jase告诉我,在家族与A&E台最初就节目进行交涉时,“我们绝不让步的有三样,那就是信仰、背叛家族成员和猎鸭季节。” That refusal to betray their faith or one another has been a staple of every media article about the Robertson family. It's their elevator pitch, and it has made them into ideal Christian icons: beloved for staking out a bit of holy ground within the mostly secular, often downright sinful, pop culture of America. 拒绝背叛信仰、拒绝背叛彼此,已经成为了所有关于Robertson家族的媒体文章的共同主题。这就是他们的“电梯演讲”【译注:指推销自己的简短自我介绍】,使他们成为了完美的基督徒典范:因为在通常都很世俗、经常纯属邪恶的美国流行文化界圈出了一小块圣洁土壤而受到人们钟爱。

……

Phil Robertson's house is located in the sticks about twenty miles outside the city of Monroe (pronounce it mun-roe). It's a rather small house—the kind of place its owner would proudly call "humble." The kitchen table is covered with big plastic tubs of cinnamon rolls and mini muffins. There are candy dishes filled to the brim, bricks of softening butter, and packages of jerky made from unknown animals, sent by unnamed fans. (I tried some, and it was awesome.) Phil Robertson的家安在距门罗市大约20英里的边远地区。房子相对较小——主人很可以骄傲地称这种住所为“寒舍”。厨房餐桌上摆满了大塑料盆装的肉桂饼和迷你松糕。还有满到冒尖的糖果盘子、快要融化的黄油块以及一包包由不知名粉丝送来的不知何种动物的肉干(我试吃了一些,味道棒极了)。 Just inside the front door, a giant flat-screen TV shows Fox News on mute at all times, and a bunch of big squishy sofas are arranged in a rectangle around it. 一进前门,就可以看到一个巨大的平面屏幕电视机,不间断地静音播放Fox News。好几个松垮垮的沙发就呈矩形摆放在电视机周围。 Si Robertson is sitting on the couch facing the TV. Jep Robertson, age 35, the youngest son, curls up in a recliner in the corner with a pistol strapped to his waist. He barely speaks, like a countrified Silent Bob. Si Robertson坐在正对电视机的沙发上。35岁的Jep Robertson是最小的儿子,蜷缩在角落里的一条躺椅上,腰上别支手枪。他很少说话,就像是个乡村版的“沉默的鲍勃”【译注:美国制片人Kevin Smith创造的虚拟人物,沉默寡言】。 Jase, 44, and Willie share a love seat while Phil lounges barefoot on a camo-patterned recliner in the far corner of the room. Two dogs share the recliner's footrest with Phil's heavily callused bare feet. He has severe bunions, so his big toes jut in at forty-five-degree angles. 44岁的Jase和Willie一起坐在一张双人沙发上,而Phil则赤脚躺在房间最远处角落里的一张涂着迷彩图案的躺椅上。两只狗跟Phil那长满老茧的赤脚一同靠着脚垫。他患有严重的拇囊炎,所以大脚趾根呈45度角突出【编注:据某些医生认为,拇囊炎和长期穿不合脚的鞋有关,比如特别窄的尖头皮靴。】。 The main TV room is cluttered with mismatched furniture and photos hung haphazardly on the walls. And Phil looks like part of the clutter himself, as if he'd been wedged into that recliner a while back by some absentminded homeowner who didn't know where else to put him. 放电视机的主客厅里胡乱摆放着互不搭配的家具,墙上随意挂着些照片。Phil本人看起来似乎就是杂物之一,就好像是之前某个心不在焉的房主不知道要把他摆哪里,所以就塞进了那个躺椅中。 When I walk into the TV area, no one makes a move to get up—the Robertson men greet you as they would a friend who just came back from a beer run. Not only are the Robertsons among the most famous people in the country, they also happen to be among the most recognizable. 我走进电视房时,没人做出什么要起来的动作。Robertson家的男人欢迎你的方式,就像他们对待一个刚买啤酒回来的朋友一样。Robertson一家不但是全县最出名的人物之一,他们也是最好认的人之一。凭着那些大胡子,你在一英里以外都能认出他们。 You can spot them from a mile away with those beards. Imagine Johnny Depp walking around every day in his Jack Sparrow costume and you begin to get an idea of how much they stand out. It's gotten to the point that they say they can't fly commercial anymore. 想象一下约翰·尼德普天天顶着杰克船长的那套装扮四处晃悠,你就能大体理解他们有多么突兀显眼。这事已经发展到了他们说他们再也不能乘坐普通民航的程度。 "You been hunting yet this year?" Phil asks me, by way of introduction. “今年你打过猎?”Phil这么问我,算是引见。 I have not. In fact, I confess to Phil, I've never been hunting before. But I have fired a gun! NOT A TOTAL LIGHTWEIGHT, GANG! 没有。事实上,我跟Phil坦白说,我还从未打过猎。但是开过枪!绝不是完全的废材,酷! "Si went this morning and killed three squirrels," says Phil. "They're delicious. One of the best meats there is in the woods, I'll tell you that. Very clean animal." He nods toward Uncle Si, who, with his mangy ponytail, looks very much like the squirrels he hunts. “Si今天早上去了,杀了三只松鼠”,Phil说。“太美味了。我跟你说,这可是丛林中最美的肉食之一。非常干净的动物。”他朝Uncle Si点点头,后者顶着一条脏兮兮的马尾辫,看起来倒是蛮像他猎杀的松鼠。 Phil On Why He Voted Romney in 2012 Phil谈他2012年为什么给罗姆尼投票 "If I'm lost at three o'clock in a major metropolitan area...I ask myself: Where would I rather be trying to walk with my wife and children? One of the guys who's running for president is out of Chicago, Illinois, and the other one is from Salt Lake City, Utah. [Editor's note: Romney is from Boston, not Salt Lake City.] Where would I rather be turned around at three o'clock in the morning? I opted for Salt Lake City. I think it would be safer." “如果我早上三点在一个大都市区迷路了……我会问我自己:我更想带着我的妻子和孩子朝哪个方向走?竞选总统的人中有一个来自伊利诺斯的芝加哥,另一个来自犹他的盐湖城[原文编辑注:罗姆尼来自波士顿,而不是盐湖城]【译注:罗姆尼虽不是来自盐湖城,但确实是摩门教徒。】。凌晨3点钟,我应该朝哪个方向走?我选择盐湖城。我觉得这样安全些。” Even though he's in the far corner of the room, Phil dominates the house. There are times when he doesn't look you in the eye while he's speaking—he looks just off to the side of you, as if Jesus were standing nearby, holding a stack of cue cards. Everyone else in the room just stares at his phone, or at the TV, or holds side conversations as Phil preaches. 尽管他只是远远地坐在房间的角落里,但Phil仍俯视着整个屋子。有时候,他在跟你说话时并不会和你对视,他的视线会朝向你的左右两边,就好像耶稣正手拿一堆提示卡站在旁边一样。Phil布道时,屋子里的其他人要么就盯着自己的手机,要么就盯着电视机,要么就继续和其他人单独说话。 "We're Bible-thumpers who just happened to end up on television," he tells me. "You put in your article that the Robertson family really believes strongly that if the human race loved each other and they loved God, we would just be better off. We ought to just be repentant, turn to God, and let's get on with it, and everything will turn around." “我们都是些圣经狂人,只是碰巧跑到电视上去了而已”,他跟我说。“你写的文章要说一说,Robertson一家人确实非常相信,如果人类能够爱彼此同时爱上帝,我们就会过得更加好。我们就是应该悔改、应该皈依上帝。只要我们努力如此,一切都会好转。” What does repentance entail? Well, in Robertson's worldview, America was a country founded upon Christian values (Thou shalt not kill, etc.), and he believes that the gradual removal of Christian symbolism from public spaces has diluted those founding principles. (He and Si take turns going on about why the Ten Commandments ought to be displayed outside courthouses.) He sees the popularity of Duck Dynasty as a small corrective to all that we have lost. 悔改意味着什么?关于这事,在Robertson的世界观里,美国的建国基础是基督教价值观(“不可杀人”等等)。而且他认为,将基督教符号从公共空间中逐步清除的做法已经冲淡了这些建国原则。(他和Si轮流喋喋不休地谈论为什么应该将十诫摆在法院外边。)他将《鸭子王朝》的风靡视作对我们所丢弃之物的一点点矫正。 "Everything is blurred on what's right and what's wrong," he says. "Sin becomes fine." “何为是?何为非?一切都模糊了”,他说。“罪恶通行无阻。” What, in your mind, is sinful? 在你心目中,什么是有罪? "Start with homosexual behavior and just morph out from there. Bestiality, sleeping around with this woman and that woman and that woman and those men," he says. Then he paraphrases Corinthians: "Don't be deceived. Neither the adulterers, the idolaters, the male prostitutes, the homosexual offenders, the greedy, the drunkards, the slanderers, the swindlers—they won't inherit the kingdom of God. Don't deceive yourself. It's not right." 他说,“首先是同性恋,然后就从那开始分化。兽交,跟这个女的那个女的厮混,然后又跟那个女的这群男的厮混。”然后他改述《哥林多前书》:“不要自欺。无论是奸淫的、拜偶像的、做男妓的、行同性恋的冒犯者、贪婪的、醉酒的、造谣的、行骗的,他们都不能承受神的国。不要自欺。这是不对的。” During Phil's darkest days, in the early 1970s, he had to flee the state of Arkansas after he badly beat up a bar owner and the guy's wife. Kay Robertson persuaded the bar owner not to press charges in exchange for most of the Robertsons' life savings. ("A hefty price," he notes in his memoir.) I ask Phil if he ever repented for that, as he wants America to repent—if he ever tracked down the bar owner and his wife to apologize for the assault. He shakes his head. 在他过往的黑暗日子里,1970年代早期,Phil曾将一个酒吧店主及其妻子打成重伤,自己不得不逃离阿肯色。Kay Robertson说服酒吧店主不起诉,代价是付出了Robertson一辈子攒下的大部分积蓄。(“沉重的代价”,他在自传中说。)我问他,如果他要美国悔改,那他是否曾为此悔改过,是否曾追寻那个店主及其妻子的下落并为其袭击行为致歉。他摇了摇头。 "I didn't dredge anything back up. I just put it behind me." “我不会在任何旧事上徘徊。我会径直将它们丢在脑后。” As far as Phil is concerned, he was literally born again. Old Phil—the guy with the booze and the pills—died a long time ago, and New Phil sees no need to apologize for him: 在Phil看来,他已经真真切切地重生了一次。旧的Phil,那个饮酒嗑药的Phil,很久以前就已死去,新的Phil不觉得有必要帮他道歉。 "We never, ever judge someone on who's going to heaven, hell. That's the Almighty's job. We just love 'em, give 'em the good news about Jesus—whether they're homosexuals, drunks, terrorists. We let God sort 'em out later, you see what I'm saying?" “谁会上天堂,谁会下地狱,在这个问题上我们从不、绝不对人加以评判。这是上帝的事务。我们只需爱他们,向他们传递关于耶稣的好消息,不管他们是同性恋、酒鬼还是恐怖分子。我们让上帝以后来挑选他们,你知道我什么意思吗?” Okay, so perhaps it's not exactly shocking that a deeply religious 67-year-old hunter from rural Louisiana would have, shall we say, enthusiastic ideas about what constitutes good Christian morality. That's the unspoken red-state appeal of Duck Dynasty. They're godly folk. "Real" folk. 好吧。所以,一个信仰极为真诚的67岁路易斯安那乡下猎人会对什么是好的基督教伦理这一问题抱有(也许可以说)极为狂热的想法,这也许并不是特别令人震惊。这是《鸭子王朝》对于红州不言而喻的感染力。他们是一帮虔诚的老百姓。“真正的”老百姓。 It helps explain why people flock to Monroe in droves to visit the Duck Commander store (which, shockingly, does not sell firearms). It's why Willie Robertson can walk out of work on a regular Thursday afternoon and be greeted by a cheering crowd that seemingly stretches back to the horizon. He shows me a video of the crowd on his phone. 它可以解释,为什么人们会成群结队地涌入门罗市,只为参观“鸭司令”的门店(令人惊讶的是,店里并不出售武器)。这也是为何当Willie Robertson在某个平常的周四下午歇工后会受到一大群人欢呼致意,拥挤的人群似乎要延伸到天边去。他用手机向我展示了人群的视频。 "This was one day just in the summer," he says. "I was just going in my car to go home. " “这就只是夏日的一天”,他说。“我只是朝我的车子走去,准备回家。” Does it ever wear you down? 这是否会让你疲倦? "Oh yeah." “嗯。” Willie has just come back from Washington, D.C., where he accepted an award at the Angels in Adoption Gala. (He and his wife, Korie, adopted a biracial child named Will and are dedicated advocates of the practice.) As we speak, there's a film crew outside the house, prepping for a State Farm ad that the family will be shooting here on the property tomorrow. Willie刚从华盛顿回来,他去“收养天使庆典”上领了一个奖。(Willie和妻子Korie领养了一个混血儿,叫做Will,两人都是领养行为的热情拥护者。)我们交谈的时候,屋子外头还有一个制片组,正在为全家人明天将在这片宅子上拍摄的一个“州立农业保险公司”广告做准备。 The Robertsons receive more than 500 media requests a day, and Willie had to negotiate down to four shooting days a week with A&E just so the family would have a bit of breathing room. Phil knows it won't last. He can already see that the end is near, and he's prepared for it. 每天,Robertson一家都会收到500多份媒体请求,Willie则需要和A&E台商量,将拍摄日减少到每周4天,以便全家能稍微有一些喘息空间。Phil知道事情不会一直如此。他已经预见到,快要到头了,而且正在为之做准备。 "Let's face it," he says. "Three, four, five years, we're out of here. You know what I'm saying? It's a TV show. This thing ain't gonna last forever. No way." “承认吧”,他说。“三年、四年、五年,我们肯定会停的。你知道我什么意思不?这只是个电视节目。这种东西不会永远持续。绝不可能。” When the show runs its course and the production trucks drive off the Robertson property for good, there will be nothing keeping Phil from his greater mission. He could step back if he felt like it, given that he's now a very wealthy man. He could stay in these woods and live out the rest of his days hunting. But he has a flock now. He and the other Robertson men happily tour the country, giving speeches and hosting Bible studies. 如果节目寿终正寝,摄制组的大卡车彻底离Robertson一家人的领地而去,那时候将没有任何事物能够阻止Phil去履行他那更伟大的使命。如果他愿意,他可以退隐,因为他现在已经非常富有。他可以呆在这些林子里,余生全用来打猎。但是他现在有了一批教徒。他和Robertson家的其他男人一起,愉快地在全国巡回,发表演讲,主持圣经研究。 I ask Jep Robertson later on if the second generation of Robertson men shares Phil's views on sin and morality. "We're not quite as outspoken as my dad, but I'm definitely in line," he says. "If somebody asks, I tell 'em what the Bible says." 我后来曾问过Jep Robertson,在罪行和道德问题上,Robertson家的第二代男人是否跟Phil持有一样的观点。“我们并不像爸爸那样坦率直言,但我绝对是跟随着他的”,他说。“如果有人问我什么事,我会告诉他圣经怎么说。” When Uncle Si went to Conway, Arkansas, recently for a paid appearance, 20,000 people showed up. It led the local news that night in Little Rock. The show is merely the platform. The end goal is to save souls. And the Robertson family is more than happy to sacrifice a little privacy out here in the woods—visitors regularly congregate outside Phil's security gate hoping for a glance at the family— to spread the good word. Uncle Si最近参加阿肯色州康威市的一次商业登台时,有20000人出席。该活动在小石城当晚的地方新闻中大放异彩。演出只是一个平台。最终目的是拯救灵魂。而且,为了传播上帝的好消息,Robertson一家非常乐意在这片林子里牺牲一点隐私——参观者经常会聚集在Phil的防盗闸前面,盼望着能窥探一下这个家庭。 "For the sake of the Gospel, it was worth it," Phil tells me. "All you have to do is look at any society where there is no Jesus. I'll give you four: Nazis, no Jesus. Look at their record. Uh, Shintos? They started this thing in Pearl Harbor. Any Jesus among them? None. Communists? None. Islamists? Zero. That's eighty years of ideologies that have popped up where no Jesus was allowed among those four groups. Just look at the records as far as murder goes among those four groups." “为了福音,这么做是值得的”,Phil跟我说。“你只需要看看那些没有耶稣的社会。我给你举4个。纳粹,没有耶稣。看看他们的历史。呃,神道教?他们搞出了珍珠港这档子事。他们有耶稣吗?没有。共产主义者?没有。伊斯兰主义者?零。这4个群体中有80年不允许耶稣出现,结果就冒出了这么些意识形态。只需要看看这4个群体中谋杀蔓延的记录。” Phil On Health Insurance Phil谈医疗保险 "Temporary is all you're going to get with any kind of health care, except the health care I'm telling you about. That's eternal health care, and it's free.... I've opted to go with eternal health care instead of blowing money on these insurance schemes." “你从任何医疗保健上面得到的,都只能是暂时的。除非你采用我跟你说的这种医疗保健,那就是永恒医疗保健,而且它是免费的……我选择采用永恒医疗保健,不会把钱浪费在那些保险计划上头。” For what it's worth—and since I actually looked it up—the violent-crime rate here in America has plummeted since 1990, even as church attendance has stayed the same. And, of course, Phil is conveniently ignoring centuries upon centuries of war, bloodshed, and human enslavement committed in the name of Christ. 或可加以参考的是——我确实查证过——美国的暴力犯罪率自1990年以来已经大幅下降了,尽管去教堂的人数并没有什么变化。而且,Phil显然随手就把历史上数个世纪里以基督的名义犯下的种种战争、杀戮和奴役他人等行为给忽略了。 But I doubt any of that would sway Phil. And anyway, I'm a guest in his house and he is my welcoming host, so I smile politely and nod like the milquetoast suburban WASP that I am. 但是,我怀疑所有这些都不会动摇Phil。而且,不管怎样,我是到他家作客的,他又是个好客的主人,所以我一直礼貌地笑着,恰如其分地像个城郊盎格鲁萨克逊白人新教徒那样温驯地点头。 If you can't reconcile some of the things Phil says with his otherwise friendly demeanor—perhaps because you are gay, or a duck—I don't blame you. And I don't blame Duck Dynasty for keeping the show safely apolitical, ensuring smooth digestion for a mass audience. 如果你没法很好地调和Phil的部分言论与他的另外一些友好举止——也许因为你是同性恋,或者你是只鸭子——我并不会怪你。我也不怪《鸭子王朝》一剧刻意小心地保持其非政治性质的做法,这是为了确保大众受众能够毫无阻碍地接受它。 While Phil proselytizes, I lean over to Willie, who is playing a video game on his phone. 在Phil推销其宗教信仰的时候,我侧身探向Willie,他正在手机上玩电子游戏。 Boy, it's hard to get a word in with him! 哎呀,要在他面前插进一句话可真难啊! Willie nods knowingly, barely looking up. I get the sense he's heard all this before, many, many times. It's taken me a while to figure out that you can cut Phil off and it's not rude. He's like a sidewalk preacher. One look from a stranger is all he needs to delve into the story bank and dole out his sermon. You can stop and listen for a bit, and then move on if you like. So even though he's rolling, I change the subject. Willie会意地点点头,基本没看我。于是我就知道,他之前肯定已经听过这些话了,而且是很多很多次。我费了好一会儿才明白,你可以直接打断Phil的话,他不会觉得你粗鲁。他就像是那些呆在路边的布道者。只要有陌生人看他一眼,就足够让他深入到他自己的故事库里,开始他的讲道。你可以驻足一会,稍微听听,然后想走就走。所以尽管他还在滔滔不绝,我却换了一个话题。 You know what, Phil? Maybe we should just go shoot some stuff. Can we do that? 你知道吗,Phil?也许我们应该直接跑去射点东西。行不? "Oh yeah. You betcha we can." “当然行。这还用问吗?”

……

The Robertson family spread is a 20,000-acre stretch of Louisiana floodplain. At first glance, it looks like an untouched expanse of rural wilderness. It is not. Phil stops the ATV in the middle of the trail, which runs atop a levee that he built himself, to show me a vast field of pink wild flowers. He crumbles one of the wild flowers and shows me the black seeds inside. Robertson家族散居在路易斯安那20000英亩的大片洪泛平原上。乍一看,此地就像是一个未经开发的辽阔荒野。但它不是。Phil半路中停住了他的全地形车,我们行驶的小径就修在他自己建的一条堤坝上。Phil带我去看一大片的粉红色银莲花。他捏碎其中一个,让我看里面的黑色种子。 "See them little black seeds? See that? That's what ducks eat. They love that. It's called Pennsylvania smartweed. So we basically grow either natural vegetation or plants, or augment it, and we flood it." In other words, the Robertsons are a legit farm-to-table family. Real pre-hipster shit. “看到那些小小的黑色种子没有?看到不?鸭子就吃那个。它们很喜欢。这叫做宾夕法尼亚荨麻。所以我们基本上要么就是种天然的植被,要么就是种作物,或者帮助其增长,然后就把它们放水淹起来。”换句话说,Robertson一家可是正统的从农场到餐桌的家庭。真正是颓废派出现之前的做派。 When the waters from the nearby Ouachita River flood, it creates an ideal place to feed ducks. Which means it's also the ideal place to kill ducks, who fly all the way from the Canadian prairies just to find themselves at the wrong end of Phil's shotgun. 当附近的沃希托河洪水泛滥时,这里就成了一个饲养鸭子的理想场所。这也意味着,它同样是猎杀鸭子的理想场所。鸭子们从加拿大的大草原上一路飞过来,却发现自己错误地撞到了Phil的枪口。 "Whack 'em and stack 'em," as he says. And if the river doesn't flood during the sixty-day duck season between November and January, Robertson has a pipeline installed to flood the lowlands anyway so that they don't lose a day of hunting. “啪一下、堆起来”,他是这么说的。如果在11月至1月之间的60天猎鸭季节之内,河里没有涨水,那么Robertson就会装上一根管子,总之要把低洼地带淹没起来,这样他们就不会浪费一天打猎机会。 The ecology here has been so perfectly manipulated that it feels as if two giant hands reached down from the sky and molded the land itself, an effect that I'm sure would please Phil. Whatever you think of Phil's beliefs, it's hard not to gaze upon his cultivations and wonder if you've gotten life all wrong. 这里的生态营造得如此完美,以至于你会觉得好像是有两只巨手从天而降亲自塑造了这片大地。我想这肯定让Phil特别愉悦。无论你怎么看待Phil的信仰, 当你看着他种植的东西时,你几乎总会纳闷自己的生活是不是都错了。 This is life as summer camp. It's gorgeous, in a way that alters you on an elemental level. I feel it when I breathe the air. I feel it when I survey the enormity of the space around me. I shouldn't be sitting around the house and bitching because the new iOS 7 touchscreen icons don't have any fucking drop shadow. I should be out here, dammit! Killing things and growing things and bringing dead things home to cook! There is a life out in this wilderness that I am too chickenshit to lead. 这是一种夏令营似的生活。它无比动人,会从最根本的层面上改变你。我呼吸的时候,有这种体会。我纵览周边的无垠空间时,有这种体会。我不应该在屋子里呆着,为那见鬼的新版iOS 7触屏图标没有阴影效果而满腹牢骚。我应该跑到这儿来,该死的!杀点东西、种点东西,然后带点打死的东西回家煮!这片荒野中有一种生活方式,而我胆小懦弱、无力体验。 As we speed along, a speck of mud gets on my shirt—OMG MUD EWW SO GROSS!—and I flick it away. Meanwhile, Phil sits next to me, and his whole life is caked in mud. He's been out here plunging his hands into the earth and ripping the heads off ducks while I've been in suburbia with my thumb up my ass. I feel both inadequate and ungrateful. There's only one way to absolve myself, I figure, and that is to shoot the fuck out of this crossbow. 疾驰而过的时候,一小块泥巴溅到了我的衬衫上——天啦!泥巴!呃,太恶心啦!——我把它给弹走了。这时,Phil就坐在我旁边,他的整个人生就凝结在泥巴里。当我在郊区呆着没事抠屁眼的时候,他却一直呆在这片荒野中,双手扒进泥土里,撕扯鸭子们的脑袋。我既感到自己人生不够完整,又感到自己不知感恩。我想,只有一种办法能赦免我自己,那就是拿着这只手弩射他妈的几发。 Can I shoot the crossbow? And the rifle, for that matter? 我能不能射射这只手弩?还有那条步枪? "It's ready to go," he says. "Let's see what you can shoot at." “已经弄好了”,他说。“看看你能射到什么。” Since it isn't duck season yet, and since there are no deer around, Phil tosses out a bottle of water from the ATV for me to target. I grab the .22 first, step out of the vehicle, and nail it dead on. first shot. I AM THE HUNTER. 因为现在还没到猎鸭季节,而且周围也没有野鹿,所以Phil从车上往外边扔出一瓶水,让我去瞄准。我先拿起那条点22步枪,爬出车子,十分精准地击中了它。第一枪。我是个猎人! Time for the crossbow. Phil steps in front of the ATV to move the bottle so that I have a clear shot. I jokingly pantomime grabbing at the crossbow to shoot him. 接着是手弩。Phil跑到车子前面去挪动那只瓶子,以便让我能看得更清。我开玩笑地打手势,假装拿着弩要去射他。 Just stay there, Phil! That's perfect! 就呆在那儿,Phil!很好! He laughs and pats his pant leg: "That's why I keep an extra sidearm here." 他笑了,拍拍自己的裤腿。“这就是为啥我要额外在这里再放一支小手枪。” Phil hands me the bow, and I try to get a bead on the bottle through the scope. I close my eyes just as I'm squeezing the trigger. I hear the rush of the arrow and open my eyes in time to see the bottle jump up and start bleeding water down into the swamplands. The arrow is stuck a foot deep in the muck. I feel so very alive. Phil把弩交给我,我试着用瞄准器的准星去对那只瓶子。扣下扳机时,我闭上了眼睛。我听到箭支射出去的声音,睁开眼睛,就看到瓶子飞了起来,正往底下的沼泽地里漏水。箭支没地足有一英尺。我感到活力十足。 Phil nods in approval. "What do they call you where you're from? Deadeye? Let me guess: You were a mischievous boy when you were younger." I was indeed. Perhaps I should have stayed that way. Phil赞赏地点点头。“在你们那边,人们管你叫啥?我猜,是‘神射手’?你小的时候肯定是个淘气的孩子。”我确实是。也许我应该一直保持那样。 "So you and your woman: Are y'all Bible people?" “那么,你和你的女人,信圣经的吗?” Not really, I'm sorry to say. 恐怕不是,很遗憾地说。 "If you simply put your faith in Jesus coming down in flesh, through a human being, God becoming flesh living on the earth, dying on the cross for the sins of the world, being buried, and being raised from the dead—yours and mine and everybody else's problems will be solved. And the next time we see you, we will say: ‘You are now a brother. Our brother.' So then we look at you totally different then. See what I'm saying?" “只要你能相信耶稣通过一个人的形式以肉身降临,相信上帝变成肉身,生活在地球上,为着世上的罪恶而死在了十字架上,被埋进土里又死而复生。那么你的问题、我的问题、所有其他人的问题就都解决了。下次我们再看到你,我们就会说:‘你现在是兄弟。我们的兄弟’。那时候我们看待你就会完全不同了。知道我什么意思不?” I think so? 大概知道? We hop back in the ATV and plow toward the sunset, back to the Robertson home. There will be no family dinner tonight. No cameras in the house. No rowdy squirrel-hunting stories from back in the day. There will be only the realest version of Phil Robertson, hosting a private Bible study with a woman who, according to him, "has been on cocaine for years and is making her decision to repent. I'm going to point her in the right direction." 我们跳回车上,车子朝着夕阳颠簸,往Robertson家开回去。今晚不会有家庭晚餐。家里不会有摄像机。不会有人叽叽喳喳地讲述白天猎松鼠的故事。只会有最真实版本的Phil Robertson,他将举办一个私人的圣经学习会。另外一位参与者是个妇女,据Robertson说,“她多年来一直吸食可卡因,正决定悔改。我会为她指明正确的方向。” It's the direction he would like to point everyone: back to the woods. Back to the pioneer spirit. Back to God. "Why don't we go back to the old days?" he asked me at one point. But now, I'm afraid, I must get out of the ATV and go back to where I belong, back to the godless part of America that Phil is determined to save. 这方向是他愿意为任何人指明的:回归丛林;回归拓荒者的精神;回归上帝。“为什么不能回到老时光呢?”他曾这样问我。但是,我想我现在必须离开他的全地形车,回到属于我的地方、回到Phil下定决心要去拯救的那个不虔诚的美国去了。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

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