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[译文]教养的迷思及其他

‘When life hands you a lemon, just bite in’
“如果生活递给你一个柠檬,那就去咬它吧”

作者:Judith Rich Harris @ 2016-09
译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚)
校对:辉格(@whigzhou)
来源:The Psychologist, http://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-29/september/when-life-hands-you-lemon-just-bite

Judith Rich Harris takes Lance Workman through her extraordinary fightback against entrenched views of child development.
Judith Rich Harris对话Lance Workman,对已被深深认同的儿童发展心理学观点作出了非同寻常的回击。

Judith Rich Harris is a psychologist and author.
Judith Rich Harris是一位心理学家和作家。

译注:粗体字是Workman的提问,常字体是Harris的回答

I first become aware of you when I read The Nurture Assumption in 1998. In it you proposed that a child’s peer group has greater influence on development than her parents. Can we begin by outlining this theory?

我第一次认识你是读到你1998年出版的《教养的迷思》。在书中你提到,同龄人群体对孩子成长的影响大于父母。我们从简要概括这个理论开始,好吗?

Group socialisation theory was my attempt to solve a puzzle I had encountered while writing child development textbooks for college students. My textbooks endorsed the conventional view of child development – that what ma(more...)

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‘When life hands you a lemon, just bite in’ “如果生活递给你一个柠檬,那就去咬它吧” 作者:Judith Rich Harris @ 2016-09 译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚) 校对:辉格(@whigzhou) 来源:The Psychologist, http://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-29/september/when-life-hands-you-lemon-just-bite Judith Rich Harris takes Lance Workman through her extraordinary fightback against entrenched views of child development. Judith Rich Harris对话Lance Workman,对已被深深认同的儿童发展心理学观点作出了非同寻常的回击。 Judith Rich Harris is a psychologist and author. Judith Rich Harris是一位心理学家和作家。 【译注:粗体字是Workman的提问,常字体是Harris的回答I first become aware of you when I read The Nurture Assumption in 1998. In it you proposed that a child’s peer group has greater influence on development than her parents. Can we begin by outlining this theory? 我第一次认识你是读到你1998年出版的《教养的迷思》。在书中你提到,同龄人群体对孩子成长的影响大于父母。我们从简要概括这个理论开始,好吗? Group socialisation theory was my attempt to solve a puzzle I had encountered while writing child development textbooks for college students. My textbooks endorsed the conventional view of child development – that what makes children turn out the way they do is ‘nature’ (their genes) and ‘nurture’ (the way their parents bring them up). But after a while it dawned on me that there just wasn’t enough solid evidence to support that view, and there was a growing pile of evidence against it. 群体社会化理论是我在撰写儿童发展心理学的大学教材时试图解决的难题。我的教材赞同儿童发展心理学的传统观点——是‘先天本性’(基因)和‘后天培养’(父母养育他们的方式)共同使孩子们形成他们的做事方式。但一段时间后我明白了,并没有足够确凿的证据支持这个观点,同时,反对证据却越来越多。 The problem was not with the ‘nature’ part – genes were having their expected effect. But ‘nurture’ wasn’t working the way it was supposed to. In studies that provided some way of controlling for or eliminating the effects of heredity, the environment provided by parents had little or no effect on how the children turned out. 问题不在于‘天性’部分——基因有其预期效果。不过‘培养’并未如大家所认为的方式发生作用。在一些以某种方式控制或消除了遗传作用的研究中,父母提供的环境对孩子如何变成后来的样子很少或者没有影响。 And yet, genes accounted for only about 50 per cent of the variation in personality and social behaviour. The environment must be playing some role. But it wasn’t the home environment. So I proposed that the environment that has lasting effects on personality and social behaviour is the one the child encounters outside the home. 然而,基因改变个性和社会行为的作用大约只占50%。环境肯定发挥着一定的作用。但这不是家庭环境。因此我认为,持久影响孩子个性和社交行为的环境是其面对的家庭之外的环境。 This makes sense if you think about the purpose of childhood. What do children have to accomplish while they’re growing up? They have to learn how to behave in a way that is acceptable to the other members of their society. How do they do this? Not by imitating their parents! Parents are adults, and every society prescribes different behaviours for children and adults. 如果想想童年的目标,你会发现这是有道理的。随着孩子长大他们不得不做什么呢?他们不得不学习他们的社交圈里其他成员可以接受的行为方式。他们如何做到这一点?不是通过模仿父母!父母是成年人,社会给孩子和成人规定了不同的行为。 A child who behaved like his or her parents (in any context other than a game) would be seen as impertinent, unruly or weird. So the first step in becoming socialised must be to figure out what sort of person you are. Are you a child or an adult? A male or a female? In complex societies there are more categories, but age and gender were probably enough for the small groups of hunter-gatherers of our ancestors. 在除游戏之外的任何情境下,孩子若像父母那样行事,会被视为不得体、任性或怪异。因此,社会化的第一步是弄清楚你属于哪类人。是孩子还是成人?男人还是女人?复杂社会分类更多,但年龄和性别对于我们祖先的狩猎采集小团体可能足够了。 Once a child had identified with a particular social category – let’s say, female child – her next job would be to learn how to behave like the others in her category. A social category is an abstract concept, not necessarily an actual group of children. My use of the term ‘peer group’ turned out to be misleading. I should have said ‘social category’ or perhaps ‘reference group’. 一旦一个孩子明确了自己属于某个特定社会类别——比方说,女童——她接下来的工作将是学会如何像她这个类别的其他人一样行事。一个社会类别是一个抽象概念,并非儿童的实际群体。我后来发现使用‘同龄人群体’这个术语是个误导。我应该说‘社会类别’或者‘参照群体’。 Why?  为什么? The problem with ‘peer group’ was that it made people think ‘friends’. Group socialisation theory is not about the influence of friends. Friendships are relationships. Socialisation is not a product of relationships. ‘同龄人群体’这个词的问题在于,它让人想到‘朋友’。群体社会化理论无关朋友的影响。友谊是关系。社会化不是关系的产物。 The expanded theory presented in my second book, No Two Alike, explains why. The theory is based on the idea, put forth by evolutionary psychologists such as Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, that the human mind is modular, a collection of specialised devices which each evolved as a solution to a specific problem or need. 我在第二本书《没有两个人是一样》中提出的扩展理论解释了其中缘由。这个理论基于如进化心理学家Leda Cosmides和John Tooby所提出的思想,即人类大脑是模块化的,是一套随着解决某个特定问题或需要而进化出的专门化元件的集合。 I proposed that there are three such devices involved in social development – the relationship system, the socialisation system and the status system. These systems work more or less independently; sometimes they even issue contradictory commands. They collect different kinds of information from the environment and process it in different ways. Friendships – like parent–child relationships – are in the purview of the relationship system, which collects data on specific individuals and makes fine distinctions among them. The socialisation system, in contrast, doesn’t bother with individuals – it computes means. It forms a prototype for each social category. The child is influenced by the norms of the social category she identifies with, even if she never interacts personally with any of its members. 我提出三种元件参与社会发展——关系系统、社会化系统和身份系统。这些系统或多或少独立工作;有时他们甚至发出相互矛盾的命令。它们从环境中收集不同种类信息并以不同方式进行处理。友谊——如亲子关系——属于关系系统范畴,它收集特定个体的数据,并在它们之间做出精准区别。相反,社会化系统与个体无关,它计算的是平均情况。它构成了每种社会类别的原型范式。孩子是被其身份认同的社会类别的规范所影响,即便她从未亲自与群体其他成员发生互动。 The Nurture Assumption completely split the field. People either said it was a serious step forward in our understanding of child development or they just weren’t having any of it. I’m in the first camp – it changed my view of child development. But why do you think there was so much hostility? 《教养的迷思》彻底分裂了这个研究领域。要么有人说这是我们理解儿童发展心理向前迈进的重要一步,要么就说它什么也不是。我是前者,它改变了我关于儿童发展心理学的看法。但是,为什么对它有这么多敌意呢? Part of the problem was the media coverage, which was often headlined ‘Do parents matter?’. Parents were understandably irked by the question. (My answer, by the way, is: Of course parents matter!) 部分问题出在媒体报道,它们常用‘父母重要吗?’这样的标题。可以理解家长们被这样的问题搞得苦恼不已。(顺便说一句,我的回答是:当然,父母重要!) But the real opposition to my work came from the academic world – from professors of developmental psychology. Some of these people had spent their entire careers doing studies designed to support the traditional view of child development. Then some troublemaker pops up – a complete nobody, with no PhD and no academic affiliation – and announces that the professors are wrong and their studies are worthless. You wouldn’t expect them to greet me with open arms, would you? 但是对我工作的真正反对来自学术世界——发展心理学的教授们。他们中的一些人毕其全部职业生涯做研究,旨在支持儿童发展心理学的传统观点。然后一些捣乱者冒了出来——不知何方人士,没有博士学位,没有学术任职——就胆敢声称教授们是错误的,他们的研究毫无价值。你不会指望他们张开双臂欢迎我,对吗? You were particularly critical of their correlational studies of development.  你对于发展心理学相关研究表现的特别有批判性。 I still see those worthless studies all the time – they get a lot of publicity. I see them as a shameful waste of time and research money. I see them as reminders that I failed in my goal of reforming the methodology of developmental psychology. 我总是仍然看到那些毫无价值的研究——他们获得大量宣传。我认为这是时间和研究经费的可耻浪费。我将这些视为对我改革发展心理学之方法论的雄心所受挫折的提醒。 The studies are worthless because the results they produce are ambiguous, so the researchers can interpret them any way they please. Let’s say they find a correlation between how often a family eats dinner together and how well their teenager manages to stay out of trouble. Such results are presented as evidence that eating dinner with their parents has ‘protective’ effects on teenagers. 这些研究毫无价值,因为其结果模棱两可,研究者以他们乐意的任何方式解释之。比方说,他们找到了一家人多久一起共进晚餐和青少年多大程度上努力不出乱子之间的相关性。这个结果作为与父母共进晚餐对青少年有‘保护’作用的证据呈现出来。 But the research method provides no way of controlling for, or estimating, the effects of inherited genes on the teenagers’ behaviour. (Conscientious parents tend to have conscientious children.) No way of controlling for what I call ‘child-to-parent effects.’ (Parents are more likely to enjoy eating dinner with well-behaved teenagers.) No way of controlling for the teenagers’ own willingness to show up at dinnertime. (Teenagers are less likely to enjoy eating dinner with their parents if they are doing things their parents don’t approve of.) The researchers assume that, even though these other factors might play a role, some of the correlation must be due to the beneficial effects of family dinners. That is a logically indefensible assumption, not supported by studies that do provide the necessary controls. 但是研究方法却没有提供任何控制或者估计遗传基因影响青少年行为的方法(有责任心的父母的孩子往往有责任心)。没有控制我所说的‘从孩子到父母的影响’(父母更乐意与举止礼貌的孩子共进晚餐)。没有控制青少年自己乐意露面的晩餐时间(如果青少年正在做父母不认可的事情,他们不大可能喜欢与父母共进晚餐)。研究者认为,尽管其他因素可能有一定作用,但一些相关肯定是由于家庭晚餐的正面作用。这是一个逻辑上站不住脚的假设,并且没有得到那些确实控制了其他因素的研究的支持。 I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to state that The Nurture Assumption pretty much made you famous almost overnight. It’s not only a radical alternative to traditional ideas, but also a real ‘page-turner’. Was it your intention to write in that style? 我不觉得《教养的迷思》几乎让你一夜之间出名是夸张的措词。这本书不仅对传统观点来说是激进的,也是真正的‘新篇章开启者’。用这种风格写作是你的目的吗? Actually, I started out by writing a traditional article and publishing it in a traditional journal, the Psychological Review. No one called it a page-turner. In fact, though it did get some favourable responses from people in other areas of psychology, it was completely ignored by the audience I was hoping to reach – those professors of developmental psychology. 实际上,我一开始是要写篇传统文章发表在传统期刊《心理学评论》上。没有人把它称为新篇章开启者。事实上,尽管它确实得到了其他心理学领域的积极反响,但却被我希望能看到它的观众——发展心理学领域的教授们——完全忽略了。 So I decided to go over their heads, as it were, and take my message directly to the general public. If you’re writing a book on a complex topic and you want people to read it, you have to make it interesting. It also helps if you can give your readers an occasional laugh. My model for how to write a book for the general public was Steven Pinker’s The Language Instinct. 因此我决定,这么说吧,越过他们,直接把我的研究呈现在广大公众面前。假如你正在写一本复杂话题的书,还希望有人读它,那你就要让它有趣起来。如果读者时而笑出声来,那也有所帮助。我所借鉴的如何为广大公众写书的模本,是Steven Pinker的《语言本能》一书。 Pinker of course went on to write several more books for the public – all page turners, and in many cases game changers. I noticed that he dedicated The Blank Slate to ‘Don, Judy, Leda and John’. I would assume that three of these are Don Symons, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. Would I be right in thinking you are the Judy?  当然,Pinker为大众写了不少书——全都是新篇章开启者,许多情况下还是游戏改变者。我注意到他把《白板论》一书献给‘Don, Judy, Leda and John’。我猜其中三个是Don Symons, Leda Cosmides和John Tooby。你是Judy,对吗? Yes. Steve and I became e-mail friends after I sent him a copy of my Psych Review paper and some comments on The Language Instinct. After we had exchanged a few e-mails, he asked, ‘Have you ever thought of writing a book?’ It wasn’t exactly a new idea to me, but it was nice to have the encouragement. 是的。在我给他寄送了我写的《心理学评论》论文拷贝和对《语言本能》一书的个人见解后,Steve和我成了电邮笔友。后来,我们互通了一些电子邮件,他问我:“你有没有想过写一本书?”这对我实在不是新想法,但它是很好的鼓励。 I think Steve was particularly receptive to my arguments because he’s a psycholinguist. I often use examples from psycholinguistics in explaining my theory, for two reasons. First, the outcome is usually obvious. You don’t need fancy statistical tests to decide whether or not someone has a foreign accent. Second, language and accent are among the very few social behaviours in which genetic differences play no role at all. Whether you speak Japanese or Swahili, whether your accent is Oxbridge or Liverpudlian, has nothing to do with heredity. But it does have a great deal to do with social context. The children of immigrants have the same accent as the other kids in the neighbourhood, even if they use their parents’ native language at home. Around the world, it is quite common for children to use one language at home and a different one outside the home, or one language with Mummy and a different one with Daddy. 我感觉Steve特别能接受我的观点,因为他是心理语言学家。我经常使用心理语言学例子解释我的理论,有两个原因。首先,结果通常显而易见。不需要花哨的统计学计算来确定某人是否有外国口音。其次,语言和口音是极少数遗传基因差异不起作用的社会行为之一。无论你说日语或者斯瓦希里语,无论你操牛津剑桥口音或者利物浦口音,均与遗传无关。而它确实与社会背景有很大关系。即便在家说父母亲的母语,移民孩子的口音与其他邻居孩子也一样。在世界各地,常常可见孩子在家使用一种语言而出门使用另外一种,或者和妈咪说一种语言而和爹地说另一种。 A central tenet of my theory is that social behaviours are tightly linked to the context in which they were acquired. It’s a mistake – one that’s incorporated into all the major theories of child development – to assume that children automatically generalise what they learn, from one context or person to another: Mummy is nice to them so they expect everyone to be nice to them. But discrimination, not generalisation, is the default setting of the baby’s mind. 我的理论的核心要义是,社会性行为与从中习得它的社会情境紧密相连。假设孩子自动将所学内容一般化,从一种情境或一个人推及另外一种或另一个人:就像妈咪善待他们,因此期待人人善待他们——这个假定被植入了儿童发展学的所有重要理论中,但它是错误的。相反,区别对待而非一般化处理,是婴儿心理的默认设置。 Many of the behaviours that children acquire at home would be counterproductive elsewhere. Children who dominate their younger siblings at home would be making a mistake if they tried to treat their schoolmates the same way, especially if they happen to be small for their age. Fortunately, children don’t make that mistake. Firstborns are no more likely than laterborns to try to dominate their peers. 孩子在家习得的许多行为在别处则是有害无益的。在家对弟妹指手划脚的孩子,如果试图以同样方式对待同学,就犯错了,尤其如果他们碰巧在同龄人中个头偏小。幸运的是,孩子不会犯类似错误。排行高的孩子不比排行低的孩子有更多可能性对同龄人指手划脚。 Of course, some of the things children learn at home are useful elsewhere. Those who learn to speak the local language, or to read, or to play a musical instrument, don’t have to acquire these skills all over again when they step outside. But they don’t trot them out automatically. They are tentative at first, until they’re sure that the behaviour or skill they learned at home will also work in the new setting. 当然,也有孩子在家学习的一些事情在别处是有用的。掌握了言说和阅读本地语言或演奏乐器的人,走出家门不必重新学习这些技能。但是,他们不必机械地小跑离家出来。他们先试探,直到确信那些在家里学到的行为或技能在新的环境设定中也管用。 For a young child, it’s safer to discriminate than to generalise. The child’s mind is not short of storage space. A child can store different rules of behaviour for every setting, and different expectations for every individual he or she encounters. 对于小孩子,区别对待比一般化处理更安全。孩子的意识不缺存储空间。可以为不同环境设定存储不同行为规范,以及为他所与之交往的每个人分别存储各自对对方的期望。 Your goal in No Two Alike was to explain why individuals differ so much, even if they grew up in the same family, right? 您写《没有两个人一样》一书是解释为什么每个人如此不同,即使他们在同一家庭长大,对吗? Right. I realised a couple of years after The Nurture Assumption was published that I had done only half the job: I had explained only how children get socialised. Socialisation is a process that causes children to become more similar in behaviour to their same-sex peers. And yet, despite being socialised, children continue to differ from one another in personality and social behaviour. 对。《教养的迷思》出版后过了几年,我发现自己只做了一半工作:我只解释了孩子是如何社会化的。社会化是导致孩子行为处事更像同性同龄人的过程。尽管被社会化,孩子们的个性和社会行为仍然彼此不同。 If anything, the differences widen during childhood and adolescence. I made some ineffectual efforts to deal with that problem in The Nurture Assumption, but I didn’t have a theory to account for it till I wrote the second book. The improved version of the theory presented in No Two Alike explains how children can, at the same time, become more similar to their peers in some ways and more different in other ways. 很可能,个体差异在孩童期和青春期扩大了。在《教养的迷思》中我做了些无效努力面对这个问题,但没有理论可以解释它,直到我写第二本书。《没有两个人一样》提出的改进版理论解释了为什么孩子在一些方面与同伴更相似,与此同时在另一些方面却变得更为不同。 There was a fair bit of replying to arguments put forward by critics of The Nurture Assumption. Was that one of the aims? 之前你针对《教养的迷思》批评者所提出的观点给出了不少直接回应。那是你的写作目的之一吗? It was. I was tired of journalists telling me that my theory must be wrong because some expert at some big university had told them that there were plenty of studies that disproved it. I searched diligently for the studies they cited. In some cases they were nowhere to be found; at any rate, they had never been published in a peer-reviewed journal. In other cases a study had been published but the results didn’t do what the experts claimed – they didn’t disprove my theory. In one case, a study they cited actually did the opposite – it supported my theory! 是的。我厌烦了记者告诉我,我的理论肯定错误,因为某些著名大学的某些专家已经告诉他们,有大量研究反驳我的理论。我努力分析他们引用的研究。有些研究什么也没发现;不管怎么说,它们从未在同行评议的学术期刊上发表。另一些研究,发表的一项实验没获得专家声称的实验结果——并没有反驳我的理论。一个研究援引的一项实验结果实际上恰好相反——它支持我的理论! That 1995 Psychological Review piece you mentioned won the George A. Miller award for an outstanding article in general psychology. There was a certain irony about that? 你提到的1995年那篇《心理学评论》文章荣获了George A. Miller心理学杰出论文奖。这是某种嘲讽吗? In 1960 I was a graduate student in the Department of Psychology at Harvard. One day I got a letter saying that the Department had decided to kick me out of their PhD programme. They doubted I would ever make a worthwhile contribution to psychology, the letter said, due to my lack of ‘originality and independence’. The letter was signed by the acting chairman of the Department, George A. Miller! 1960年,我是哈佛大学心理学系研究生。有一天,我收到一封信,说系里已经决定把我排除在博士项目之外。信中说,由于我缺乏‘原创性和独立性’,他们对我做出有价值的心理学贡献表示怀疑。这封信正是由代理系主席George A. Miller签署的! Sometimes, when life hands you a lemon, you should just bite in. Getting kicked out of Harvard was a devastating blow at the time, but in retrospect, it was the best thing that Harvard ever did for me. It freed me from the influence of ‘experts’. It kept me from being indoctrinated. Many years later, it enabled me to write The Nurture Assumption. 有时,当生活递给你一个柠檬时,你就应该咬它。当时被踢出哈佛是一个毁灭性打击,但现在回想起来,这是哈佛为我所做过的最好的事情。这让我从‘专家’的影响解脱出来。让我不被灌输。许多年以后,让我写出《教养的迷思》。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]伊斯兰改革是否可能?

Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes.
伊斯兰教能够被改革吗?历史和人的本性告诉我们:能。

作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08
译者:Tankman
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed

Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here.
《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上:伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。

Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate?

伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退,激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗?或是能被改革,变得更加温和,现代且与邻为善呢?伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利,并给穆斯林信仰自由,接受现代金融和司法的基本原则,而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗?

A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that “radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution,” the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, “He’s wrong. Sorry about that.” She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point.

越来越多的分析家认为不会,穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情,这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中,成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注:一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物,以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题,温和伊斯兰是解药”时,她说:“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕,追求同一目标,和相同的敌人战斗,但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。

My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge.

我的论述有两部分。第一,很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的;第二,革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。

Arguing Against Essentialism
对本质主义的驳斥

To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion’s core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past.

声称伊斯兰不可被改变,则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解,而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误,因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切,包括对圣典的解读,随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。

Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran’s interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of “no compulsion in religion,” and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi’i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam.

只有不考虑人类本性,无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁,一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变,像圣战,奴隶,高利贷,“宗教的非(more...)

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Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes. 伊斯兰教能够被改革吗?历史和人的本性告诉我们:能。 作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08 译者:Tankman 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here. 《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上:伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。 Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate? 伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退,激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗?或是能被改革,变得更加温和,现代且与邻为善呢?伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利,并给穆斯林信仰自由,接受现代金融和司法的基本原则,而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗? A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that "radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution," the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, "He's wrong. Sorry about that." She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point. 越来越多的分析家认为不会,穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情,这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中,成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注:一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物,以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题,温和伊斯兰是解药”时,她说:“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕,追求同一目标,和相同的敌人战斗,但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。 My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge. 我的论述有两部分。第一,很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的;第二,革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。 Arguing Against Essentialism 对本质主义的驳斥 To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion's core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past. 声称伊斯兰不可被改变,则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解,而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误,因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切,包括对圣典的解读,随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。 Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran's interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of "no compulsion in religion," and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi'i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam. 只有不考虑人类本性,无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁,一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变,像圣战,奴隶,高利贷,“宗教的非强制原则以及妇女的角色。而且,我们容易想到过去的1400年,很多重要的伊斯兰诠释者—— ash-Shafi'i,al-Ghazali,Ibn Taymiya,Rumi,Shah Waliullah和Ruhollah Khomeini彼此对伊斯兰教导的内容有很大分歧。 However central the Koran and Hadith may be, they are not the totality of the Muslim experience; the accumulated experience of Muslim peoples from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond matters no less. To dwell on Islam's scriptures is akin to interpreting the United States solely through the lens of the Constitution; ignoring the country's history would lead to a distorted understanding. 可兰经和圣训也许是中心,而不是穆斯林经验的全部;从摩洛哥到印尼以及其他地方的穆斯林社群积累的经验也很重要。只专注于伊斯兰的文本就像是只从宪法角度解释美国;忽略了这个国家的历史,会导致认知的扭曲。 Put differently, medieval Muslim civilization excelled and today's Muslims lag behind in nearly every index of achievement. But if things can get worse, they can also get better. Likewise, in my own career, I witnessed Islamism rise from minimal beginnings when I entered the field in 1969 to the great powers it enjoys today; if Islamism can thus grow, it can also decline. 换一种说法就是,中世纪穆斯林文明是杰出的,今天的穆斯林在衡量成就的每个指标上几乎都是落后的。但是如果事情能变得更糟,它们也能变得更好。就像我自己的事业,1969年我进入该领域时,我见证了伊斯兰主义从很小的规模兴起,到今天享有着巨大能量;如果伊斯兰主义可以壮大,那么它也可能衰落。 How might that happen? 这种变化可能会如何发生呢? The Medieval Synthesis 中世纪整合 Key to Islam's role in public life is Sharia and the many untenable demands it makes on Muslims. Running a government with the minimal taxes permitted by Sharia has proved to be unsustainable; and how can one run a financial system without charging interest? A penal system that requires four men to view an adulterous act in flagrante delicto is impractical. Sharia's prohibition on warfare against fellow Muslims is impossible for all to live up to; indeed, roughly three-quarters of all warfare waged by Muslims has been directed against other Muslims. Likewise, the insistence on perpetual jihad against non-Muslims demands too much. 伊斯兰作用于公共生活的关键是伊斯兰教法及其加诸于穆斯林身上的不合理要求。用伊斯兰教法允许的最小税负来运作政府被证明是不可持续的;而且怎么能运作一个不要求利息的金融系统呢?一个刑罚体系,要求四个男人在作案现场目睹一起通奸事件是不现实的。沙利亚禁止穆斯林对穆斯林同胞发动战争,遵循这禁令是不可能的;实际上,穆斯林发起的战争中,约四分之三是针对其他穆斯林。类似地,坚持对非穆斯林的永久性圣战也实在要求过分了。 To get around these and other unrealistic demands, premodern Muslims developed certain legal fig leaves that allowed for the relaxation of Islamic provisions without directly violating them. Jurists came up with hiyal (tricks) and other means by which the letter of the law could be fulfilled while negating its spirit. For example, various mechanisms were developed to live in harmony with non-Muslim states. There is also the double sale (bai al-inah) of an item, which permits the purchaser to pay a disguised form of interest. Wars against fellow Muslims were renamed jihad. 为了回避这些或者其他一些不现实的要求,前现代的穆斯林发展了一些合理化的做法,允许放松一些伊斯兰法条,而不直接违背它们。法务人员使用hiyal(花招)和其他方式,遵循法律的形式,同时否定其实质。比如,为了和谐的生活在非穆斯林国家,很多技巧被发展出来。还有重复售卖(bai al-inah)意味着允许购买者支付隐性利息。对穆斯林同胞的战争则被重新命名为吉哈德。 This compromise between Sharia and reality amounted to what I dubbed Islam's "medieval synthesis" in my book In the Path of God (1983). This synthesis translated Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands. Kecia Ali, of Boston University, notes the dramatic contrast between formal and applied law in Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, quoting other specialists: 沙利亚和现实之间的妥协契合了我的著作《在神的道路上》(1983)中的伊斯兰“中世纪整合”的概念。这一整合把伊斯兰从一套抽象,不切实际的要求,翻译成可以被实行的体系。在实际中,它减低了沙利亚的力度,使得法条可以操作。沙利亚现在能够充分被实行,同时穆斯林不会被其更加严苛的要求束缚。波士顿大学的Kecia Ali,在《Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam》一书中指出了正式和实用法律之间鲜明的对照。他引用了其他专家的话: One major way in which studies of law have proceeded has been to "compare doctrine with the actual practice of the court." As one scholar discussing scriptural and legal texts notes, "Social patterns were in great contrast to the 'official' picture presented by these 'formal' sources." Studies often juxtapose flexible and relatively fair court outcomes with an undifferentiated and sometimes harshly patriarchal textual tradition of jurisprudence. We are shown proof of "the flexibility within Islamic law that is often portrayed as stagnant and draconian." 律法研究的一个主要方式是“比较教条和法庭实践”。当学者讨论经文和法律书注记时,“社会上的模式和这些‘正式’来源所呈现的‘官方’图景反差很大。”研究经常把灵活和相对公平的法庭判决和没有变通、有时非常宗法制的传统法律文本并列。这就是“常被描述为顽固专横的伊斯兰法的内在灵活性。” While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists. Indeed, premodern Muslim history featured many such challenges, including the Almohad movement in 12th-century North Africa and the Wahhabi movement in 18th-century Arabia. In each case, purist efforts eventually subsided and the medieval synthesis reasserted itself, only to be challenged anew by purists. This alternation between pragmatism and purism characterizes Muslim history, contributing to its instability. 虽然中世纪整合持续了几个世纪,它并未克服一个基本的弱点:它并没有全面的植根于伊斯兰的有宪法意味的基础文本,或者从其中独立出来。基于妥协和折衷,面对原教旨主义者的挑战,它仍然是脆弱的。实际上,前现代穆斯林历史总是凸显这样的挑战,包括十二世纪北非的穆瓦希德运动和十八世纪阿拉伯的瓦哈比运动。每个例子中,原教旨主义的努力最终被软化,中世纪整合重新回到轨道,而后被新的原教旨主义挑战。实用主义和原教旨主义的更替是穆斯林历史的特色,助长了其不稳定性。 The Challenge of Modernity 现代性的挑战 The de facto solution offered by the medieval synthesis broke down with the arrival of modernity imposed by the Europeans, conventionally dated to Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1798. This challenge pulled most Muslims in opposite directions over the next two centuries, to Westernization or to Islamization. 中世纪整合所提供的实用主义的解决方案被欧洲强加的现代化因素打断,传统观点来看,这可以追溯到拿破仑在1798年对埃及的入侵。这一挑战在接下来的两个世纪中,把大多数穆斯林拉向了两个相反的方向:西方化或是伊斯兰化。 Muslims impressed with Western achievements sought to minimize Sharia and replace it with Western ways in such areas as the nonestablishment of religion and equality of rights for women and non-Muslims. The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), symbolizes this effort. Until about 1970, it appeared to be the inevitable Muslim destiny, with resistance to Westernization looking rearguard and futile. 西方的成就给一些穆斯林留下了深刻印象,他们试图削弱伊斯兰教法,代之以同类领域的西方做法,比如不利用法律确立宗教,妇女和非穆斯林拥有平等权利。现代土耳其的缔造者——凯末尔·阿塔图尔克 (1881-1938)代表了这种努力。在1970年前,这似乎是穆斯林不可避免的命运,对抗西方化的努力看起来被动无力。 But that resistance proved deep and ultimately triumphant. Atatürk had few successors and his Republic of Turkey is moving back toward Sharia. Westernization, it turned out, looked stronger than it really was because it tended to attract visible and vocal elites while the masses generally held back. 但是这种抵抗被证明根基深厚并最终取得了胜利。阿塔图尔克的后继者不多,而他的土耳其共和国现在正退回伊斯兰教法。说到底,西方化表面上看起来强大,实则不然,因为它倾向于吸引曝光度高,有话语权的精英,而广大民众则被压制。 Starting around 1930, the reluctant elements began organizing themselves and developing their own positive program, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and India. Rejecting Westernization and all its works, they argued for the full and robust application of Sharia such as they imagined had been the case in the earliest days of Islam. 从1930年代起,抗拒因素开始组织起来,发展他们自己的力量,尤其是在阿尔及利亚,埃及,伊朗,和印度。他们拒绝西方化及其所有的成果,呼吁要按照他们想象中的早期伊斯兰历史那般,坚决完全的实施伊斯兰教法。 Though rejecting the West, these movements—which are called Islamist—modeled themselves on the surging totalitarian ideologies of their time, Fascism and Communism. Islamists borrowed many assumptions from these ideologies, such as the superiority of the state over the individual, the acceptability of brute force, and the need for a cosmic confrontation with Western civilization. They also quietly borrowed technology, especially military and medical, from the West. 虽然排斥西方,这些被称为伊斯兰主义的运动,依靠同一时期涌现的极权主义意识形态塑造了自身,比如法西斯主义和共产主义。伊斯兰主义者借用很多这些意识形态的假设,比如国家优先于个人,可以接受暴力斗争,和在全世界和西方文明进行斗争的必要性。他们也静静地从西方借用技术,尤其是军事和医疗方面。 Through creative, hard work, Islamist forces quietly gained strength over the next half century, finally bursting into power and prominence with the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 led by the anti-Atatürk, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89). This dramatic event, and its achieved goal of creating an Islamic order, widely inspired Islamists, who in the subsequent 35 years have made great progress, transforming societies and applying Sharia in novel and extreme ways. 通过创造性的努力,伊斯兰主义者的力量在接下来的半个世纪静静增长,最终在1978-79年由阿塔图尔克的反对者,霍梅尼 (1902-89) 领导的伊朗革命中,显出了爆发性的能力和优势。这个戏剧性的事件,和其达到的目标——创造一种伊斯兰的秩序,在伊斯兰主义者中影响广泛。他们在接下来35年中有了巨大进步,用各种创新且极端的方式,变革社会,实行伊斯兰教法。 For example, in Iran, the Shiite regime has hanged homosexuals from cranes and forced Iranians in Western dress to drink from latrine cans, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has torched girls' schools and music stores. The Islamists' influence has reached the West itself, where one finds an increasing number of women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas. 比如,在伊朗,什叶派统治者用起重机吊死同性恋者,并强迫穿西方服饰的伊朗人喝茅厕里的液体。在阿富汗,塔利班统治者烧毁女生学校和音乐店。伊斯兰主义者的影响波及到了西方自身,你在西方可以发现越来越多的妇女穿戴面纱,头巾和罩袍。 Although spawned as a totalitarian model, Islamism has shown much greater tactical adaptability than either Fascism or Communism. The latter two ideologies rarely managed to go beyond violence and coercion. But Islamism, led by figures such as Turkey's Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954-) and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explored nonrevolutionary forms of Islamism. Since it was legitimately voted into office in 2002, the AKP gradually has undermined Turkish secularism with remarkable deftness by working within the country's established democratic structures, practicing good government, and not provoking the wrath of the military, long the guardian of Turkish secularism. 虽然脱胎于一个极权主义模型,相比法西斯和共产主义,伊斯兰主义表现出远为优越的战术灵活性。前两者很少试图超越暴力和强制手段。而伊斯兰运动,被诸如土耳其总理埃尔多安 (1954-) 之类的人物和他的正义发展党(AKP)领导着,已经探索出了伊斯兰主义的非革命形式。自从它在2002年合法地通过选举上台,AKP就用十分纯熟的手腕,借助该国已经建立的民主制度,和良好的施政表现,逐渐削弱土耳其的世俗化力量,而且没有激起土耳其世俗主义的长期守护者——军队的强力反弹。 The Islamists are on the march today, but their ascendance is recent and offers no guarantees of longevity. Indeed, like other radical utopian ideologies, Islamism will lose its appeal and decline in power. Certainly the 2009 and 2013 revolts against Islamist regimes in Iran and Egypt, respectively, point in that direction. 伊斯兰主义者如今风头正健,但是它们的势头并不是由来已久,也并不保证能持续下去。实际上,像其他激进乌托邦意识形态一样,伊斯兰主义将会失去它的吸引力,其力量也会衰减。伊朗和埃及分别在2009年和2013年对伊斯兰主义统治的反抗,明确体现了这点。 Toward a Modern Synthesis 通向一个现代的整合 If Islamism is to be defeated, anti-Islamist Muslims must develop an alternative vision of Islam and explanation for what it means to be a Muslim. In doing so, they can draw on the past, especially the reform efforts from the span of 1850 to 1950, to develop a "modern synthesis" comparable to the medieval model. This synthesis would choose among Shari precepts and render Islam compatible with modern values. It would accept gender equality, coexist peacefully with unbelievers, and reject the aspiration of a universal caliphate, among other steps. 若要打败伊斯兰主义,反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林必须发展出一套替代性的伊斯兰图景,来解释成为一个穆斯林意味着什么。要做到这点,他们可以回溯历史,尤其是在1850年到1950年间的改革努力,对照“中世纪整合”,来发展出一套“现代整合”。这种整合将会在伊斯兰教法戒律中做出选择并使伊斯兰与现代观念兼容。它将可能接受性别平等,和不信伊斯兰者和平共存,并在各步骤中排斥建立普世哈里发国的冲动。 Here, Islam can profitably be compared with the two other major monotheistic religions. A half millennium ago, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all broadly agreed that enforced labor was acceptable and that paying interest on borrowed money was not. Eventually, after bitter and protracted debates, Jews and Christians changed their minds on these two issues; today, no Jewish or Christian voices endorse slavery or condemn the payment of reasonable interest on loans. 在此,把伊斯兰教和其他两大一神教相比较,不无益处。五个世纪前,犹太教徒,基督教徒和穆斯林全部大致同意奴隶是可以被接受的,借贷收利息则不被允许。最终,经过了苦涩和反复的辩论,犹太教徒和基督徒改变了他们在这两件事情上的观点;今天,没有犹太教或是基督教人士会支持蓄奴或是谴责给贷款支付利息。 Among Muslims, however, these debates have only begun. Even if formally banned in Qatar in 1952, Saudi Arabia in 1962, and Mauritania in 1980, slavery still exists in these and other majority-Muslim countries (especially Sudan and Pakistan). Some Islamic authorities even claim that a pious Muslim must endorse slavery. Vast financial institutions worth possibly as much as $1 trillion have developed over the past 40 years to enable observant Muslims to pretend to avoid either paying or receiving interest on money, ("pretend" because the Islamic banks merely disguise interest with subterfuges such as service fees.) 然而在穆斯林当中,这些辩论才刚刚开始。即使卡塔尔在1952年,沙特阿拉伯在1962年,毛里塔尼亚在1980年,官方禁止了蓄奴,奴隶制仍然在这些地方和其他以穆斯林为多数人口的国家存在(尤其是苏丹和巴基斯坦)。一些伊斯兰权威甚至声称一个敬虔的穆斯林必须支持奴隶制。很多金融机构可能市值达一万亿美元,并已经发展了四十年来让穆斯林可以假装避免支付或接受货币利息,(“假装”因为穆斯林银行们仅仅用服务费等术语来遮掩利息这一名目。) Reformist Muslims must do better than their medieval predecessors and ground their interpretation in both scripture and the sensibilities of the age. For Muslims to modernize their religion they must emulate their fellow monotheists and adapt their religion with regard to slavery and interest, the treatment of women, the right to leave Islam, legal procedure, and much else. 穆斯林改革主义者必须比他们中世纪的前辈做得更好,并把他们的表述植根在文本和时代潮流当中。当穆斯林试图现代化他们的宗教,他们必须模仿其他一神教,改变自己宗教在蓄奴,利息,妇女权益,背教自由,司法程序和很多其他方面的立场。 When a reformed, modern Islam emerges it will no longer endorse unequal female rights, the dhimmi status, jihad, or suicide terrorism, nor will it require the death penalty for adultery, breaches of family honor, blasphemy, and apostasy. 当一个改革的,现代的伊斯兰涌现,它将不会再支持不平等的妇女权益,统治异教徒的观念,圣战,或者自杀性恐怖主义,它也不会要求对通奸,危害家族荣誉,渎神和背教者处以死刑。 Already in this young century, a few positive signs in this direction can be discerned. Note some developments concerning women: 在这一新的世纪,一些积极的苗头已初露端倪。有关妇女的一些进步如下:
  • Saudi Arabia's Shura Council has responded to rising public outrage over child marriagesby setting the age of majority at 18. Though this doesn't end child marriages, it moves toward abolishing the practice.
  • 沙特阿拉伯的协商会议回应了公众对童婚的愤怒,把成年的年龄定为18岁。虽然这没有终结童婚,但向着禁止这一行为迈进了一步。
  • Turkish clerics have agreed to let menstruating women attend mosque and pray next to men.
  • 土耳其神职人员已经同意,让经期的妇女参加清真寺礼拜,并且和男人一起祷告。
  • The Iranian government has nearly banned the stoning of convicted adulterers.
  • 伊朗政府已接近于禁止对通奸罪施以石刑。
  • Women in Iran have won broader rights to sue their husbands for divorce.
  • 伊朗妇女在诉讼离婚方面赢得了更广泛的权利。
  • A conference of Muslim scholars in Egypt deemed clitoridectomies contrary to Islam and, in fact, punishable.
  • 穆斯林学者在埃及召开了一个会议,认为阴蒂割除违背伊斯兰,事实上应该被惩罚。
  • A key Indian Muslim institution, Darul Uloom Deoband, issued a fatwa against polygamy.
  • 一个著名的印度穆斯林机构 Darul Uloom Deoband发表了一项伊斯兰释法,反对多妻制。
Other notable developments, not specifically about women, include: 其他显著进步,不一定局限于妇女权益方面,包括:
  • The Saudi government abolished jizya (the practice of enforcing a poll tax on non-Muslims).
  • 沙特政府终止了Jizya(向非穆斯林征收人头税)。
  • An Iranian court ordered the family of a murdered Christian to receive the same compensation as that of a Muslim victim.
  • 一个伊朗法庭,判决被谋杀的基督徒的亲属得到和穆斯林受害者一样多的赔偿。
  • Scholars meeting at the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Sharjah have started to debate and challenge the call for apostates to be executed.
  • 学者们在位于沙迦的国际伊斯兰教律学院开会,开始就处决背教者展开辩论。
All the while, individual reformers churn out ideas, if not yet for adoption then to stimulate thought. For example, Nadin al-Badir, a Saudi female journalist, provocatively suggested that Muslim women have the same right as men to marry up to four spouses. She prompted a thunderstorm, including threats of lawsuits and angry denunciations, but she spurred a needed debate, one unimaginable in prior times. 同时,倾向于改革的人士不断推出新的想法,如果不是着眼于改进,那就是从模仿着手。比如Nadine al-Badir,一个沙特女记者,大胆建议穆斯林妇女和男人拥有相同的权利,和四个配偶结婚。她引发了一场风暴,包括诉讼威胁和愤怒谴责,但她的确引发了一场亟需的辩论,在以前时代这是无法想象的。 Like its medieval precursor, the modern synthesis will remain vulnerable to attack by purists, who can point to Muhammad's example and insist on no deviation from it. But, having witnessed what Islamism, whether violent or not, has wrought, there is reason to hope that Muslims will reject the dream of reestablishing a medieval order and be open to compromise with modern ways. Islam need not be a fossilized medieval mentality; it is what today's Muslims make of it. 和其中世纪的先行者一样,面对原教旨人士的攻击,现代整合将仍然是脆弱的。原教旨人士可以拿默罕默德做例子,然后坚持不能偏离他的做法。但是,已经见证了暴力或是非暴力的伊斯兰主义所产生的恶果,有理由相信穆斯林会拒绝重建一种中世纪秩序的梦想,并对向现代化妥协持开放态度。伊斯兰不一定是一成不变的中世纪观念;它也取决于当下穆斯林的实践。 Policy Implications 政策含义 What can those, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who oppose Sharia, the caliphate, and the horrors of jihad, do to advance their aims? 反对伊斯兰教法,哈里发国,和可怕的圣战的穆斯林和非穆斯林该做什么来推进他们的目标呢? For anti-Islamist Muslims, the great burden is to develop not just an alternative vision to the Islamist one but an alternative movement to Islamism. The Islamists reached their position of power and influence through dedication and hard work, through generosity and selflessness. Anti-Islamists must also labor, probably for decades, to develop an ideology as coherent and compelling as that of the Islamists, and then spread it. Scholars interpreting sacred scriptures and leaders mobilizing followers have central roles in this process. 对反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林,最大的责任是不光要发展出一套图景来代替伊斯兰主义,而且要发展出一个运动来取代它。伊斯兰主义者通过献身和努力,通过慷慨和无私,达到了目前的能量和影响力。反伊斯兰主义者,必须也经过可能是数十年的努力,发展出一套和伊斯兰主义一样自洽并有吸引力的意识形态,然后推广它。在这个过程中,解释经文的学者和鼓动群众的领袖有着中心的位置。 Non-Muslims can help a modern Islam move forward in two ways: first, by resisting all forms of Islamism—not just the brutal extremism of an Osama bin Laden, but also the stealthy, lawful, political movements such as Turkey's AKP. Erdoğan is less ferocious than Bin Laden, but he is more effective and no less dangerous. Whoever values free speech, equality before the law, and other human rights denied or diminished by Sharia must consistently oppose any hint of Islamism. 非穆斯林可以通过两种方式帮助现代化的伊斯兰:第一,坚持反对所有形式的伊斯兰主义——不仅仅是残暴的极端主义者奥萨马·本·拉登,也可以是隐秘鬼祟,表面合法的政治性运动,如土耳其的AKP。埃尔多安也许不如本·拉登残忍,但他却更有效,危险性也就一点不比后者小。伊斯兰教法否认或削弱了言论自由,法律面前人人平等和其他人权,珍视它们的人必须不懈地反抗伊斯兰主义的各种苗头。 Second, non-Muslims should support moderate and Westernizing anti-Islamists. Such figures are weak and fractured today and face a daunting task, but they do exist, and they represent the only hope for defeating the menace of global jihad and Islamic supremacism, then replacing it with an Islam that does not threaten civilization. 第二,非穆斯林应该支持温和和西方化的反伊斯兰主义穆斯林。今天,这些人物弱小零散,且面对着艰巨的任务,但是他们确实存在,他们代表了击败全球性圣战和伊斯兰霸权,代之以一种不威胁文明的伊斯兰的唯一希望。 Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum. Daniel Pipes是中东论坛的总裁。 July 7, 2013 update: Jeff Jacoby does an excellent job of summarizing this article in his Boston Globe column today under the title "What Is Islam?" 2013年7月7日更新: Jeff Jacoby在他的《波士顿环球》专栏上很好的总结了这篇文章,标题为“什么是伊斯兰”。 Oct. 1, 2013 update: Six Commentary readers reply to this article and I then respond to them at "Islam's Future." 2013年10月1日更新:六位《评论》杂志读者回复了这篇文章,我回应以“伊斯兰的未来”。 Apr. 10, 2014 update: Despite her 2007 statement quoted in the 2nd paragraph above, about the impossibility of a moderate Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali today wrote that "Both Christianity and Judaism have had their eras of reform. I would argue that the time has come for a Muslim Reformation." So, perhaps she is coming around to agree with me after all. 2014年4月10日更新:虽然她在2007年的评论中引用了上述文章的第二段,并说温和伊斯兰是不可能的。但是Ayaan Hirsi Ali 今天写道,“基督教和犹太教也有它们的改革时代。我能够说伊斯兰教宗教改革的年代已经到来。”所以,她也许开始接受我的观点了。 Feb, 4, 2016 update: I tweeted today that "When it comes to #Islam, amateurs talk texts, pros talk history." 2016年2月4日更新:我发了推文“当谈到伊斯兰,门外汉讨论文本,内行讨论历史。” Feb. 24, 2016 update: Perhaps symbolic of Islamic banking's illusory promise, here is the reality of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's headquarters (as photographed by me). It's a pale and desultory version of the plans shown above. 2016年2月24日更新:这是我拍摄的阿布扎比伊斯兰银行的现实中的照片,也许这象征了伊斯兰银行业的宏伟计划的不切实际。相对于文章中的计划,这版本似乎并不让人激动。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]色情内容如何毒害少年?

Sex on TV: Less impact on teens than you might think
电视上的色情内容: 对青少年的影响比你想象的少

作者:Christopher Ferguson @ 2016-08-02
译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅)
来源:https://theconversation.com/sex-on-tv-less-impact-on-teens-than-you-might-think-61957

Few people would doubt that sex is ubiquitous in media – whether movies, television, music or books – and that teens today have unprecedented access to all of it. It’s often taken for granted that this easy access to “sexy media” has an influence on teenage sexuality.

性在媒体上无处不在,这个论断少有人质疑。无论电影、电视、音乐或书籍,对当今的青少年而言,有关性的一切信息触手可及,这种便捷史无前例。人们经常理所当然的认为,随处可见的“色情媒体”会对青少年性行为产生影响。

Specifically, the worry is that teens may have sex earlier or engage in higher-risk sexual activities such as having multiple partners or exposing themselves to potential pregnancies or STDs. In 2010 the American Academy of Pediatrics even published a position paper claiming that sexually explicit media could promote risky teen sexual behavior.

具体来说,人们担心的是青少年可能更早发生性行为,或者参与高风险性行为。比如与多位同伴有性行为,或者暴露于怀孕或染上性病的风险中。2010年美国儿科协会甚至发表了一篇意见书,声称色情媒体可能诱发青少年危险性行为。

But government data find that teens are actually waiting longer than in the past to have sex. And teen pregnancy rates are at historic lows. How is it possible that sexy media has such a pernicious effect even as teen sexuality is becoming healthier?

然而政府数据显示,事实上青少年发生性行为前的等待时间比过去更长。且现时未成年人怀孕率处于历史最低点。色情媒体如此有害,而青少年性行为反而比以往健康,这怎么可能呢?

I’ve spent more than a decade researching how media – like video games or advertising – influences youth behavior. What fascinates m(more...)

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Sex on TV: Less impact on teens than you might think 电视上的色情内容: 对青少年的影响比你想象的少 作者:Christopher Ferguson @ 2016-08-02 译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 来源:https://theconversation.com/sex-on-tv-less-impact-on-teens-than-you-might-think-61957 Few people would doubt that sex is ubiquitous in media – whether movies, television, music or books – and that teens today have unprecedented access to all of it. It’s often taken for granted that this easy access to “sexy media” has an influence on teenage sexuality. 性在媒体上无处不在,这个论断少有人质疑。无论电影、电视、音乐或书籍,对当今的青少年而言,有关性的一切信息触手可及,这种便捷史无前例。人们经常理所当然的认为,随处可见的“色情媒体”会对青少年性行为产生影响。 Specifically, the worry is that teens may have sex earlier or engage in higher-risk sexual activities such as having multiple partners or exposing themselves to potential pregnancies or STDs. In 2010 the American Academy of Pediatrics even published a position paper claiming that sexually explicit media could promote risky teen sexual behavior. 具体来说,人们担心的是青少年可能更早发生性行为,或者参与高风险性行为。比如与多位同伴有性行为,或者暴露于怀孕或染上性病的风险中。2010年美国儿科协会甚至发表了一篇意见书,声称色情媒体可能诱发青少年危险性行为。 But government data find that teens are actually waiting longer than in the past to have sex. And teen pregnancy rates are at historic lows. How is it possible that sexy media has such a pernicious effect even as teen sexuality is becoming healthier? 然而政府数据显示,事实上青少年发生性行为前的等待时间比过去更长。且现时未成年人怀孕率处于历史最低点。色情媒体如此有害,而青少年性行为反而比以往健康,这怎么可能呢? I’ve spent more than a decade researching how media – like video games or advertising – influences youth behavior. What fascinates me is how society interacts with media, often embracing salacious content while simultaneously blaming it for societal problems, whether real or imagined. 我花了超过十年的时间研究视频游戏和广告之类的媒体如何影响青少年行为。让我着迷的是,社会如何与媒体相互作用。媒体经常热衷于色情内容,同时却将之归咎于真实或假想中的社会问题。 So my colleagues and I decided to look at the research on sexy media and teenage sexual behavior to see how the strong the link between the two is. 于是我和我的同事们决定研究色情媒体和青少年性行为的关系,看看这两者之间的相关性有多高。 Sexy media doesn’t predict sexual behavior 色情媒体不是性行为的有效预测变量 Despite the common assumptions about sex in the media and its alleged effects on teens, the evidence behind the link is weak. Some studies find evidence for a small effect (perhaps in some circumstances but not others), while others find no evidence for any effect. 尽管人们声称媒体上的性信息会影响青少年,这个受到普遍认同的假设前提并未得到多少证据支持。有些研究发现了微弱效应存在的证据(可能在某些情形下有相关性,其它情形下没有),然而另一些研究没有发现存在任何影响的证据。 One reason the evidence may not be conclusive is that there are practical and ethical limitations to conducting research. We can’t run experiments where teens watch different TV shows and we wait around to see who has sex. This means research often relies on self-reported data. What we do is ask teens to report on their sexual behavior and their media preferences, as well as other variables we might like to control for (such as personality or family environment) and see if correlations exist. 证据可能不够有说服力的原因之一是,开展此类研究有操作上的和伦理上的限制。我们不能在青少年观看不同电视节目的地方进行实验,并且在周围等待,看谁发生了性行为。这意味着研究经常依赖自我报告的数据。我们所做的是,让青少年报告他们的性行为和偏好的媒体,以及我们可能想控制的其它变量(比如性格和家庭环境),来看是否存在相关性。 With this in mind, my colleagues Patrick Markey at Villanova and Danish researcher Rune Nielsen and I conducted a meta-analysis of 22 studies with over 22,000 participants that examine the correlation between sexy media and teenage sexual behavior. A meta-analysis lets us look for commonalities in the results, and is something that had not been done previously with this pool of research. 出于这种考虑,我和在维拉诺瓦的同事Patrick Markey,还有丹麦研究员Rune Nielsen进行了一项对22个研究,包含超过2.2万参与者的荟萃分析,来检验色情媒体和青少年性行为之间的相关性。这个荟萃分析让我们寻找已有研究结果中的共性,这批研究此前未做过荟萃分析。 All of the studies in the meta-analysis looked at depictions of sexual situations, nudity, partial nudity or explicit discussions of sex in television shows or movies easily accessible to minors (and thus excluded pornography). 这次荟萃分析里的研究都着眼于电视节目上对行为情景的描述、裸露、部分裸露或者公开讨论的性内容, 或者容易被未成年人接触到的电影 (因此排除了色情文学)。 In particular, we were curious to see whether sexy media predicted teen sexual behavior once other variables had been controlled. For instance, maybe boys tend to watch sexier media and also are more sexually risk-taking. Or perhaps youth who are more liberal in terms of personality are more open both to sexy media and earlier sexual initiation. Perhaps a difficult family background is the underlying key to understanding any correlation between media use habits and actual sexual behavior. 我们特别好奇的是,一旦其它变量受到控制,色情媒体接触行为能否预测青少年性行为。例如,可能男孩更倾向于观看更色情的媒体内容,并且愿意承担更多的性风险。或者有更自由人格的青少年更易于接受色情媒体和早期性启蒙。也许一个复杂的家庭背景是理解媒体使用习惯和实际性行为相关性背后的关键。 Ultimately, this is what we found. Once other factors such as family environment, personality or even gender were controlled, sexy media exposure did not meaningfully correlate with teen sexual behavior. 最后,这是我们的发现。一旦其它因素,比如家庭环境、性格甚至性别都受到控制,色情媒体的曝光与青少年性行为没有显著的相关。 Contrary to common fears, sexy media doesn’t seem to have any practical significance for when teens first have sex or start other sexual behaviors. This lack of correlation is a warning sign we might be on the wrong track in trying to blame media for teen sexual risk-taking. 与常见的恐惧相反,色情媒体内容似乎对青少年首次性行为或者进行其它性接触的时间没有任何实际影响。缺乏相关性是一个警告信号,我们将青少年冒险的性行为归咎于媒体的观点可能是错误的。 Why doesn’t media influence teens? 为什么媒体内容影响不了青少年? There are numerous theories that discuss how individuals and media interact. However, many older media effects theories didn’t consider why people were drawn to media, how they processed it, or what they hoped to get from it. Such theories assumed viewers simply irrationally and purposelessly imitated what they saw. Most of the papers we examined in our meta-analysis were tests of these basic, automatic, media effects theories. 有很多理论讨论个人和媒体如何相互影响。然而,许多早期媒体效应理论没有考虑为什么人们被媒体内容吸引,他们如何处理媒体内容,或者他们想从媒体内容中得到什么。这些理论假设观众只是简单非理性和无目的地模仿他们观看的内容。我们荟萃分析里的大多数论文就是这些基本、自动的媒体效应理论的实验测试。 In the past few years, some scholars (myself included) have specifically called for the retirement of these older media effects theories. This is because the evidence increasingly suggests that fictional media such as feature movies or sitcoms media is too remote to have a clear impact on consumers' behavior, especially compared to families and peers. 过去几年,一些学者(包括我自己)号召淘汰这些早期媒体效应理论。越来越多的证据表明,像故事电影和情景喜剧这样的虚构媒体内容太遥不可及,不足以对消费者的行为产生清晰明确的影响,尤其是与家庭和同龄人这两个因素相比。 In addition, emerging evidence suggests that young children process fictional media differently from real events. If small children are able to process a difference between fictional events and real events, we can assume that teens don’t really expect media to reflect reality. 此外,新出现的证据表明,年轻的孩子处理虚构媒体的方式不同于真实事件。如果小孩子都能够辨别虚构事件和真实事件之间的差异,我们可以假设青少年从来没有真正想过媒体反映了现实。 Our results regarding the limited impact of media also fit with the observations from societal data. Despite a plethora of sexual media available to teens, a crisis of risky teen sexual behavior has not emerged. 我们关于媒体有限影响的研究结果也符合来自社会数据的观察。尽管青少年接触到种类繁多的色情媒体,高风险青少年性行为的危机并没有出现。 We watch what we’re interested in watching 我们观看我们感兴趣的 Newer models of media use suggest that it is the individuals who consume media, not the media itself, who are the driving agents of behavior. Evidence suggests that users seek out and interpret media according to what they want to get from it, rather than passively imitating it. 较新的媒体使用模型表明,是消费媒体内容的个人而不是媒体本身,驱动了行为。有证据表明,用户根据他们想要从中得到什么来寻找和解读媒体,而不是被动的模仿。 People don’t generally accidentally watch media, sexual or otherwise, but are motivated to do so because of preexisting desires. 人们通常不是偶然地观看媒体、性或者其它,而是被先前存在的欲望驱动。 For instance, some recent studies have indicated that youth seek out media that fit with preexisting motives, called a selection effect, but that media don’t necessarily lead to further problem behaviors. For example, research suggests that some teens who are already aggressive might be interested in violent video games, but playing such games doesn’t make kids more aggressive. 例如,最近的一些研究显示青年人寻求适合先前已经存在的动机的媒体,这被称为“选择效应”。但是媒体并不一定导致进一步的问题行为。比如,研究表明一些本来就已经好斗的青年人可能对暴力视频游戏感兴趣,但玩这样的游戏并没有让孩子更好斗。 That’s a point that sometimes seems ignored when we talk about teens and sex. Interest in sex is a largely biologically motivated process; fictional media really isn’t required. Teens will become interested in sex all on their own. 这就是当我们谈论青少年与性时,有时候会忽略的一点。对性的兴趣很大程度上是生物性驱动的过程,虚构媒体并非必需。青少年自发的对性产生兴趣。 Parents have more influence than the media 父母比媒体影响更大 Parents can rest a bit easier since the evidence suggests that media isn’t a primary driver of teen sexuality. 父母们可以松口气了,因为证据表明媒体不是一个青少年性行为的主要驱动力。 To the extent media has any impact at all, it is likely only in a vacuum left by adults reluctant to talk to kids about sex, especially the stuff kids really want to know. 即便媒体能施加影响,也只是在一个由成人所留下的真空内起作用,有些成人不愿意跟孩子谈论与性有关的话题,尤其是孩子真正想知道的事情,由此便产生了真空。 How do you ask someone out on a date and how do you handle it if they say no? What does sex feel like? When is it OK to have sex? What are the risks and how do you avoid them? In the face of patient, empathic and informative discussions about sex by adults kids trust, the media likely has little influence. 你怎么邀请别人出去约会?如果他们拒绝了,你怎么处理?性爱是怎么样的?什么时候可以发生性行为?性行为有什么风险,你怎么避免这些风险?在成人与孩子之间互相信任、耐心、有同理心和有理有据的讨论面前,媒体可能几乎没有影响。 Ultimately, whether media have salacious or more conscientious portrayals of sexuality, we should not expect media to replace conversations with youth by parents, guardians and educators. 最后,无论媒体是否有露骨或更谨慎的性描写,我们都不应期待媒体取代父母、监护人和教育工作者与青少年的谈话。 I’m not suggesting everyone run out and buy “50 Shades of Grey” for their teen, but if teens happen to come across it (and they will), it’s not the end of the world. 我不是建议每个人都跑出去买《五十度灰》给他们的小孩,但是如果青少年无意中发现这本书(他们肯定会),这不是世界末日。 The important thing for parents is to talk to their kids. 作为父母,重要的是和他们的孩子谈一谈。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]劳动法的仇女渊源

The Misogynist Origins of American Labor Law
美国劳动法的仇女起源

作者:Jeffrey Tucker @ 2016-02-17
译者:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅)
来源:FEE,https://fee.org/articles/government-s-war-on-women-1900-1920/

Many now credit government for past progress in gender equality, mostly because of late 20th-century legislation that appeared to benefit women in the workplace. This is a distorted view. Few know that government at all levels actually sought to prevent that progress.

如今许多人把过去在性别平等上的进步归功于政府,主要是因为二十世纪后期的立法看似让职业女性受益。然而这个观点与现实不符。鲜为人知的是,各个层级的政府都曾企图阻挠这种进步。

A century ago, just as markets were attracting women to professional life, government regulation in the United States specifically targeted women to restrict their professional choices. The regulations were designed to drive them out of offices and factories and back into their homes — for their own good and the good of their families, their communities, and the future of the race.

一个世纪前,正当市场吸引女性进入职场之际,美国的政府管制刻意将女性作为目标人群,限制她们的职业选择。这些管制措施的目的是把女性从办公室和工厂驱赶回家中——为了女性和她们家庭、社区,以及民族的未来。

The new controls — the first round of a century of interventions in the free labor market — were designed to curb the sweeping changes in economics and demographics that were taking place due to material advances in the last quarter of the 19th century. The regulations limited women’s choices so they would stop making what elites considered the wrong decisions.

这些新的控制措施——是整整一个世纪对自由劳动力市场的干涉浪潮的第一波——意在阻止由于十九世纪最后二十五年物质进步所带来的经济和人口统计上的巨大变化。管制措施限制了女性的选择,这样她们就无法做出当时社会精英眼中的“错误”决定。

The real story, which is only beginning to emerge within the academic literature, is striking. It upends prevailing narratives about the relationship between government and women’s rights. Many cornerstones of the early welfare and regulatory state were designed to hobble women’s personal liberty and economic advancement. They were not progressive but reactionary, an attempt to turn back the clock.

Women’s Work Is Not New
女性工作不是什么新鲜事

It was the freedom and opportunity realized in the latter period of the 19th century that changed everything for women workers, opening up new lines of employment.

The growth of industrial capitalism meant that women could leave the farm and move to the city. They could choose to leave home without having married — and even stay in the workforce as married women. They enjoyed more choice in education and professional life than ever before.

New clerical jobs, unknown a century earlier, were everywhere to be had. Women’s wages were rising quickly, by an impressive 16 percent from 1890 through 1920. Nor were women working at “exploitative” wages. A Rand corporation 标签: | | | | | |

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The Misogynist Origins of American Labor Law 美国劳动法的仇女起源 作者:Jeffrey Tucker @ 2016-02-17 译者:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 校对:鳗鱼禅(@鳗鱼禅) 来源:FEE,https://fee.org/articles/government-s-war-on-women-1900-1920/ Many now credit government for past progress in gender equality, mostly because of late 20th-century legislation that appeared to benefit women in the workplace. This is a distorted view. Few know that government at all levels actually sought to prevent that progress. 如今许多人把过去在性别平等上的进步归功于政府,主要是因为二十世纪后期的立法看似让职业女性受益。然而这个观点与现实不符。鲜为人知的是,各个层级的政府都曾企图阻挠这种进步。 A century ago, just as markets were attracting women to professional life, government regulation in the United States specifically targeted women to restrict their professional choices. The regulations were designed to drive them out of offices and factories and back into their homes — for their own good and the good of their families, their communities, and the future of the race. 一个世纪前,正当市场吸引女性进入职场之际,美国的政府管制刻意将女性作为目标人群,限制她们的职业选择。这些管制措施的目的是把女性从办公室和工厂驱赶回家中——为了女性和她们家庭、社区,以及民族的未来。 The new controls — the first round of a century of interventions in the free labor market — were designed to curb the sweeping changes in economics and demographics that were taking place due to material advances in the last quarter of the 19th century. The regulations limited women’s choices so they would stop making what elites considered the wrong decisions. 这些新的控制措施——是整整一个世纪对自由劳动力市场的干涉浪潮的第一波——意在阻止由于十九世纪最后二十五年物质进步所带来的经济和人口统计上的巨大变化。管制措施限制了女性的选择,这样她们就无法做出当时社会精英眼中的“错误”决定。 The real story, which is only beginning to emerge within the academic literature, is striking. It upends prevailing narratives about the relationship between government and women’s rights. Many cornerstones of the early welfare and regulatory state were designed to hobble women’s personal liberty and economic advancement. They were not progressive but reactionary, an attempt to turn back the clock. Women’s Work Is Not New 女性工作不是什么新鲜事 It was the freedom and opportunity realized in the latter period of the 19th century that changed everything for women workers, opening up new lines of employment. The growth of industrial capitalism meant that women could leave the farm and move to the city. They could choose to leave home without having married — and even stay in the workforce as married women. They enjoyed more choice in education and professional life than ever before. New clerical jobs, unknown a century earlier, were everywhere to be had. Women’s wages were rising quickly, by an impressive 16 percent from 1890 through 1920. Nor were women working at “exploitative” wages. A Rand corporation study of wage differentials discovered an interesting fact: women’s wages relative to men’s were higher in 1920 than they were in 1980. 新的文书类工作在那之前一个世纪还不存在,而此时已经到处都是。从1890年至1920年女性的工资快速上升,涨幅高达16%。女性的工资并非是“剥削性”的。兰德公司一项关于工资差异的研究揭示了一个有趣的事实:1920年女性工资相对于男性工资的比率要高于1980年。 The Law Intervenes 法律介入 And yet, these were also the years in which we first saw government intervention in the labor market, much of it specifically targeting women. As historian Thomas Leonard argues in his spectacular book Illiberal Reformers (2016), an entire generation of intellectuals and politicians panicked about what this could mean for the future of humanity. 然而,在那些年政府首次开始介入劳动力市场,明确针对的目标主要是女性。正如历史学家Thomas Leonard在其力作《非自由的改革者(Illiberal Reformers)》中指出的,整整一代的知识分子和政治家恐慌于女性工资上升会给人类未来带来的影响。 Society must control reproduction and therefore what women do with their lives. So said the prevailing ideology of the age. We couldn’t have a situation in which markets enticed women to leave the control of their families and move to the city. 社会必须控制生育,因而也就必须控制女性的人生。那个时代盛行的意识形态如是说。市场引诱女性离开家庭的控制搬迁到城市,这种情况让人无法接受。 Though they are called Progressives, the reformers’ rhetoric had more in common with the “family values” movement of the 1970s and ‘80s — with pseudoscientific race paranoia playing the role that religion would later play. In many ways, they were the ultimate conservatives, attempting to roll back the tide of history made possible by the advance of the capitalist economy. 尽管他们被称为进步主义者,这些改革者的话语倒跟1970和80年代的“家庭价值观”运动有更多共同点——也包括日后宗教也运用的伪科学种族妄想狂那一套。在许多方面,这些人是终极的保守主义者,他们企图使资本经济的进步带来的历史浪潮倒流。 They were incredibly successful. Over a 10-year period between 1909 and 1919, 40 states restricted the number of hours that women employees could work. Fifteen states passed new minimum wage laws to limit entry-level jobs. Most states created stipends for single-parent families, specifically to incentivize women to reject commercial life, return to protected domesticity, and stop competing with men for wages. 他们大获全胜。1909年至1919年的十年间,40个州限制了女性雇员可以工作的小时数。15个州通过了新的最低工资法来限制初级工作职位。大多数州制定了对单职工家庭的津贴,特意激励女性抵制商业生活回归被保护的家庭生活,同时不再与男人在职场上竞争。 Such laws were completely new in American history (and in almost all of modern history) because they intervened so fundamentally in the right of workers and employers to make any sort of contract. The Progressive agenda involved government deeply in issues that directly affected people’s ability to provide for themselves. It also created unprecedented impositions on both employees and their employers. Such laws would have been inconceivable even 50 years earlier. 这些法律在美国历史上(同时也在几乎整个现代历史上)没有先例。原因在于它们如此根本性地介入了工人和雇主订立任意契约的权利。在一些直接影响人们自给自足能力的议题上,进步主义的议程和政府关联极深。同时进步主义创立了前所未有的税项,同时向雇主和雇员征收。这样的法律即使在五十年前也是不可想象的。 How did all this happen so fast, and why? 政府的干预如何迅速实施?为何能得逞? The Inferiority of Women 女性的劣势 Richard T. Ely, the hugely influential founder of the American Economic Association and the godfather of progressive economics, explained the issue clearly, laying the groundwork for the laws that followed. His 1894 book Socialism and Social Reform expressed a panic about women’s entry into the workforce: Richard T. Ely 是美国经济协会极具影响力的创建者,也是进步主义经济学的教父。他曾清楚地阐述了这个问题,为之后产生的法律打下了基石。他在1894年发表的著作《社会主义与社会改革》中对女性加入劳动力大军表达了恐慌:
Restrictions should be thrown about the employment of married women, and their employment for a considerable period before and after child-birth should be prohibited under any circumstances. There should also be a restriction of the work-day, as in England, for children and young persons under eighteen, and for women. Such a limitation having beneficial effect upon the health of the community…. Night work should be prohibited for women and persons under eighteen years of age and, in particular, all work injurious to the female organism should be forbidden to women. 应该限制雇用已婚女性,在任何情形下,都应该禁止雇用处于分娩期前后的女性,禁止雇用期应该相当长。我们应该仿效英格兰,限制儿童、十八岁以下的年轻人和女性的工作时长。这种限制利于社会健康发展。……应该禁止女性和不满十八岁者上夜班,尤其应该禁止女性从事那些损害女性生理机体的工作。
If the reference to the “female organism” sounds strange, remember that this generation of intellectuals believed in eugenics — using state force to plan the emergence of the model race — and hence saw women mainly as propagators of the race, not human individuals with the right to choose. 如果书中所谓的“女性生理机体”听着别扭,请记住那一代知识分子相信优生学——即使用国家的力量来制定生产模范种族的计划,因此他们将女性主要看成生育者,而非拥有选择权利的个人。 For anyone who believed that government had a responsibility to plan human production (and most intellectuals at the time did believe this), the role of women was critical. They couldn’t be allowed to do what they wanted, go where they wanted, or make lives for themselves. This was the normal thought pattern for the generation that gave the United States unprecedented legal restrictions on the labor market. 对于任何相信政府有责任对人类生育做规划的人(当时大多数知识分子确实相信)来说,女性的角色至关重要。女性不能被允许做自己想做的事,去她们想去的地方,或过她们自己想要的生活。这就是当时一代人通常的思维模式,而正是这种思维模式让美国政府对劳动力市场进行前所未有的法律限制。 The Supreme Court Weighs In 最高法院的介入 Consider the Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon, which considered state legislation on maximum working hours and decided in favor of the state. Oregon was hardly unusual; it was typical of the 20 states that had already passed such laws directed at women’s freedom to choose employment. From the text of Colorado’s law passed in 1903: “No woman” shall “work or labor for a greater number than eight hours in the twenty-four hour day … where such labor, work, or occupation by its nature, requires the woman to stand or be upon her feet.” 看一下Muller诉俄勒冈州这个最高法院案例,最高法院认可对最大工作小时数的州立法,并做了对州政府有利的判决。俄勒冈州并非特别,它只是已经通过此类针对女性选择工作自由的法律的二十个州的典型。在1903年通过的科罗拉多州的法律这样写道:“没有女性”应该“在一天的24小时中进行8小时以上的工作或劳动……这里指的是需要女性站立完成的工作、劳动或职业。” The decision in Muller v. Oregon, then, ratified such laws all over the country. Today, this case is widely considered the foundation of progressive labor law. What’s not well known is that the brief that settled the case was a remarkable piece of pseudoscience that argued for the inferiority of women and hence their need for special protections from the demands of commercial enterprise. That brief was filed by future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis. 于是,最高法院对Muller诉俄勒冈州案的判决正式批准了全国范围内此类法律。今天,该诉讼被普遍认为是进步主义劳动法的基础。而不为人所周知的是,终结该诉讼的那份简报是一篇令人称奇的伪科学文章,该简报论述了女性的劣势,认为女性需要特殊的保护使她们免受商业公司侵害。这份简报正是后来成为最高法院法官的Louis Brandeis提交的。 The Weird and Awful “Brandeis Brief” 奇怪又糟糕的“Brandeis简报” The “Brandeis Brief” argued that the law had to stop the massive influx of women into the workplace because women have “special susceptibility to fatigue and disease,” because female blood has more water in it than men’s blood. Their blood composition also accounts for why women have less focus, energy, and strength generally, according to the brief. “Brandeis简报”认为法律必须制止大量女性流入劳动力大军,因为女性“特别容易疲劳和生病”,原因是与男性相比,女性血液中含有更高比例的水分。按照这份简报的说法,女性的血液成分比例也解释了为何女性通常在注意力、精力和体力上逊于男性。。 “Physicians are agreed that women are fundamentally weaker than men in all that makes for endurance: in muscular strength, in nervous energy, in the powers of persistent attention and application.” “医生们认同女性在一切和耐力有关的方面从根本上弱于男性的观点:这些方面包括肌肉力量,神经系统的能量,持续保持注意力和坚持的能力。” Moreover, “In strength as well as in rapidity and precision of movement women are inferior to men. This is not a conclusion that has ever been contested.” 此外,“不仅在力量上,在速度和动作的精确度上,女性都劣于男性。这一结论从未受到过质疑。” Long hours are “more disastrous to the health of women than to men,” the brief explained. Government therefore needed to regulate work hours for the “health, safety, morals, and general welfare of women.” 长时间工作“对女性健康的损害要大于对男性,”该简报这样解释道。因此政府需要为了“女性的健康、安全、道德,以及生活幸福”对工作时长进行管制。 Restrictions on work hours were therefore essential. “It is of great hygienic importance on account of the more delicate physical organization of woman,” the brief said, “and will contribute much toward the better care of children and the maintenance of a regular family life.” 因此限制工作时间就至关重要。“考虑到女性生理组织更脆弱,(限制工作时间长度)在卫生上具有重大意义”,该简报这样写道,“这对关爱儿童和维持正常家庭生活都非常有益。” This brief is also notable for being the first to combine science, however bogus, and public policy in an appeal to the Supreme Court. 这份简报另一个闻名于世的原因,是它首次在向最高法院的上诉中将科学——尽管是冒牌货——与公共政策结合在一起。 Florence Kelley’s Dream of Nonworking Women Florence Kelley的女性不工作梦想 One might suspect that the entire effort was a male-driven one to stop female progress, but that’s not the case. A leader in the campaign for such labor interventions was writer and activist Florence Kelley. Modern progressives celebrate her activism for maximum work hours, the 10-hour workday, minimum wages, and children’s rights. Indeed, she is considered a great hero by the sanitized version of history that progressives tell each other. 现在可能有人会怀疑这整个事情都是男性驱使的,意在阻止女性进步,但事实并非如此。支持政府介入劳动力市场的运动的一位领导者Florence Kelley是一名作家兼激进分子。现代进步主义者颂扬了她在最大工作时长、十小时工作制、最低工资和儿童权益上的激进主义。没错,在进步主义者相互传颂的历史洁本中,她是一位伟大的英雄。 Before we cheer her accomplishments, however, we should look at Kelley’s driving motivation. Writing in the American Journal of Sociology, she explained that she wanted a minimum wage as a wage floor to stop manufacturing plants and retail outlets from employing women for less than they could otherwise employ men. 但在为她的成就欢呼之前,我们应该看看Kelley的动机。在发表于《美国社会学杂志》的文章上,她解释道,她支持最低工资标准是因为最低工资相当于工资门槛,可以不让工厂和零售商店以低于男性工资的标准雇佣女性。 Retail stores, she wrote, tend to “minimize the employment of men, substituting them for women, girls, and boys, employed largely at less than living wages.” It was precisely such competition from women and children that Kelley intended to stop, so that men could earn higher wages and women could return to traditional roles. 她写道,零售商店倾向于“将雇佣的男性数量最小化,取而代之的是以低于基本生活工资的薪酬雇佣女性,女孩和男孩。”Kelley希望制止的正是这些来自于女性和儿童的就业竞争,这样男性就可以赚更多工资,而女性则可以回归她们的传统角色。 In her book Some Ethical Gains through Legislation (1905), Kelley said that long working hours had to be ended for women because commercial life was introducing “vice” into communities (“vice” for this generation was the preferred euphemism for every manner of sexual sin). Worse, women were choosing commercial life over home “on their own initiative.” 在出版于1905年的《一些通过立法获得的伦理好处》一书中,Kelley认为女性长时间工作必须被阻止,因为商业化生活正在将“恶习”带入社区(那一代人更喜欢用“恶习”这一委婉说法来指代任何与性相关的罪孽 )。而更糟的是,女性在商业化生活和家庭二者间选择了前者,完全是“自己主动的”。 Kelley considered it necessary to restrict women’s rights for their own “health and morality,” she said, and also to boost men’s wages so women would stay home under the care of their mothers, fathers, suitors, and husbands. Kelley认为有必要为了女性的“健康和道德”限制女性权利。在书中她写道,限制女性权利也是为了推动男性工资的增长,从而使得女性可以留在家中受她们的父母、求婚者和丈夫们的照顾。 Moreover, to make such work illegal would make “righteous living” more practical for women. If they stopped being rewarded in wages, they would return to domestic life. Kelley even regretted the invention of electricity because it allowed women to work late at factories, when they should be at home reading to children by firelight. 此外,将女性长时间工作定为非法会使得“正直的生活”对女性来说更为实际可行。如果女性不再受工资回报的奖励,她们就会回归家庭生活。Kelley甚至还为电的发明感到遗憾,因为是电让女性可以夜晚在工厂工作,而此时她们本应在家中的炉火旁给孩子们讲故事。 In Kelley’s view, the ideal role of women with children is not to enter commercial life at all: “Family life in the home is sapped in its foundation when mothers of young children work for wages.” It’s an opinion with which some may still sympathize, but should such an opinion be imposed on working families by coercive legislation? For this paragon of progressive social reform, it was clear that lawmakers had to force women back into the home. 在Kelley看来,女性面对孩子的理想角色是完全不进入商业化生活:“当小孩的母亲们为工资工作时,家庭生活的基础被削弱了。”现在有些人依然支持这样的观点,但这样的观点应该通过强制性立法被强加于双职工家庭吗?按照这种进步主义社会改革的范式,立法者必须强迫女性回家。 Florence Kelley and the movement she represented sought to disemploy women and get everyone back to a premodern form of domestic living. She wanted not more rights for women but fewer. The workplace was properly for men, who were to get paid high wages sufficient for the whole family. That was the basis for her support of a range of legislation to drive women out of the workforce and put an end to the new range of options available to them, options that many women were happy to choose. Florence Kelley与她代表的运动,追求的是女性不被雇佣以及所有人都回归现代之前的家庭生活。她要的不是女性拥有更多权利,而是更少。工作场所适合男性,因为他们在那里能获得高薪酬,足够养活全家人。就是基于这样的理念,她支持通过广泛的立法将女性从工作场所驱逐出去,使女性不再有一系列新的选项——很多女性乐于选择的选项。 Fear the Women of East Prussia 对东普鲁士女性的恐惧 All this scholarship and activism is one thing, but what about the popular press? 这些学术研究和激进主义是一回事,那大众传媒又怎么样呢? Professor Edward A. Ross, author of Sin and Society, spoke out in the New York Times on May 3, 1908. In an article titled “The Price Woman Pays to Industrial Progress,” Ross warned that America’s “fine feminine form” was endangered by commercial society. Edward A. Ross教授是《罪与社会》一书的作者。他在1908年3月3日纽约时报上一篇题为《女性为产业进步所付出的代价》文章中警告了“精致的女性气质”正在被商业化社会所危害。 If women were permitted to work, an evolutionary selection process would govern their reproduction to the detriment of the human race. The graceful women who would otherwise bear beautiful children would be pushed out of the gene pool and replaced by “squat, splay-footed, wide-backed, flat-breasted, broad-faced, short-necked — a type that lacks every grace that we associate with women.” 如果允许女性工作,进化选择过程会主宰她们的生育,危害人类。本来会生养漂亮孩子的优雅女性会被挤出基因池,取而代之的将是“矮胖、八字脚、宽背、平胸、脸蛋平庸、脖子短的女性——这种类型的女性在任何方面都不能让我们把女性优雅与之相联系。” Ross’s example: “the women of East Prussia,” who “bear a child in the morning” and “are out in the field in the afternoon.” Ross举的例子是“东普鲁士女人”,她们“在早晨刚生完孩子”,“下午就下地”。 The professor explained that women who had worked in factories would not make suitable bearers of children. “Think of the discouraging situation of the young man who after he has been married two or three years finds he has a wife who at the age of 28 or 30 has collapsed, become a miserable invalid, suffering aches and pains all the time.” Why, she might find herself “unable to keep the home attractive.” And all of this “because of just a few extra dollars added to the profits of the employer or a few extra dollars saved to the consumer.” 该教授解释说,在工厂工作的女性不会是合适的生养者。“试想一下这样令人沮丧的情况:一个年轻男人在和他妻子结婚两三年后发现她在28或30岁的年纪垮掉了,终日一身病痛。”这样的妻子可能会发现自己“无法把家里弄得漂亮”。而这一切“仅仅是为了让雇主多赚几美元,或是让消费者多省几美元”。 Because of the dangerous combination of employment and natural selection, Ross contended, the government had to extend a hand to help these women by limiting working hours and establishing a high bar to enter the workforce: minimum wages. 由于雇佣劳动和自然选择的危险结合,Ross主张政府必须通过限制工作时长,并对进入劳动力市场设置高门槛——即最低工资——向女性伸出援手。 Only through such enlightened interventions could government save women from the workplace, so that they could return to the maternal duties of rearing “girls who have the qualities of fineness — grace and charm.” 政府只有通过这样高明的干预才能将女性从工作场所中拯救出来,这样女性才能回归母亲的角色,抚养“具有优雅和美丽这些优秀特质的女孩”。 Is This Satire? 讽刺否? If this reads like satire, sadly it is not. Nor were such views unusual in a generation of ruling-class intellectuals, politicians, and activists that embraced eugenics and rejected capitalism as too random, too chaotic, too liberating. Their plan was to reestablish and entrench by law the family and marital structure they believed in, which absolutely precluded a generation of women making individual choices over their own lives. Every trend panicked the eugenic generation. They fretted about the falling birth rate among those who should be reproducing and the rising birth rate among those who shouldn’t be. They worried about morals, about competition, about health, about culture. Most of all, they regretted the change that a dynamic economy was bringing about. 所有的时代趋向都让相信优生学的一代人恐慌。他们担心本应生养的群体的生育率在下降,而那些本不应生育的群体的生育率却在上升。他们忧虑于道德、竞争、健康和文化。所有问题中他们最担心的是充满活力的经济即将带来的改变。 Thus, from 1900 through 1920, a period that set the stage for a century of interventions in the labor market, hundreds of laws stifling women were passed in every state and at the federal level, too. None dared call it misogyny, but this is real history, however rarely it is told. 因此,1900至1920年间,政府为干预劳动力市场打好了舞台,这种干预持续了一个世纪。数以百计窒息女性的法律在所有州以及联邦层面上通过。没人敢称之为厌女,但这是真实的历史,尽管很少被说起。 Feminists against Regulation 对抗管控的女权主义 Laws that disemployed thousands of women nationwide led to vast protests. The Equal Opportunity League, an early feminist organization in New York, lobbied the state legislature to repeal the bans on work. And it received quite the press coverage. 使全国范围内成千上万的女性失去工作的法律导致了大范围的抗议。机会平等联盟是一个位于纽约的早期女权组织,它游说州立法机构废除对女性工作的禁令,得到了相当多的媒体报道。 “So-called ‘welfare’ legislation is not asked for or wanted by real working women,” the league said. “These ‘welfare’ bills are drafted by self-styled social uplifters who assert that working women do not know enough to protect themselves.” “所谓的“福利”立法不是真正在工作的女性要求或内心想要的,”该联盟如是说。“这些“福利”法案由自封的社会提升者起草,他们认为工作的女性不知如何保护自己。” “Are women people? Women are no longer the wards of the State and a law that is unconstitutional for a man voter is equally unconstitutional for a woman voter.” “女性也是人吧?女性不再是州政府的被监护人,对男性投票人来说违宪的法律对女性投票人来说一样违宪。” “Working at night is not more injurious than working in the daytime,” the league argued. “Many women prefer to work at night because the wage is higher, opportunities for advancement greater, and women with children can enjoy being with their child after school hours in the day time.” “在晚上工作不比在白天工作更有害”,该联盟这样认为。“许多女性喜欢在晚上工作是因为工资更高,升职的机会更大,而且有孩子的女性可以在白天孩子放学后和孩子在一起。” In fact, the phrase “equal pay for equal work” was not created to mandate higher wages for women. It was a league slogan invoked to argue against laws that made it “a crime to employ women even five minutes after the eight-hour day.” The phrase emerged as a preferred slogan to protest in favor of free markets, not against them. 事实上,“同工同酬”这一警句的出现并非为了强制提高女性工资。它是联盟的一句口号,用来反对那些认定“8小时工作时间之外即使多雇佣女性5分钟也是犯罪”的法律。这一广受欢迎警句的是作为亲市场而非反对自由市场的口号而提出的。 The Equal Opportunity League also passionately opposed the minimum wage law. Such laws, it argued, “while purporting to be for [women’s] benefit, would really be a serious handicap to them in competing with men workers for desirable positions.” 平等机会联盟也积极地反对最低工资法。联盟认为这样的法律“尽管本意是为了照顾(女性)利益,实质上却让女性在与男性工人竞争好职位时受到严重妨碍”。 In short, the conclusion of the League is that these proposed bills and laws, ostensibly intended to protect and shield the woman worker, will, if permitted to stand, unquestionably work her industrial ruin and throw her back into the slough of drudgery out of which she is just emerging after centuries of painful, laborious effort to better her condition. ("Women’s Work Limited by Law," New York Times, January 18, 1920) 简单来说,联盟的结论是这些提议中的法案和法律表面上意在保护女性工人,实际上一旦通过则毫无疑问会毁坏女性的职业生涯,将女性赶回家务重活的泥沼。而女性在经历数个世纪痛苦艰难的努力后才刚刚脱离这一泥沼而改善了自己的状况。(《女性的工作被法律所限》,《纽约时报》1920年1月18日。) Restriction Becomes Liberation? 限制变成了解放? The fairy tale version of history says that during the 20th century, government freed women to become newly empowered in the workplace. The reality is exactly the opposite. Just as the market was granting women more choices, government swept in to limit them in the name of health, purity, family values, and social uplift. Such laws and regulations are still around today, though they have been recharacterized in a completely different way. As Orwell might say, somewhere along the way, restriction became liberation. 历史的童话版本说,在20世纪政府给予了女性自由,让女性在工作场所拥有了权利。真相恰好相反。市场给予女性更多的选择,而政府却插手进来以健康、纯洁、家庭价值观和社会地位提升等名义限制女性的选择。这类法律和法规在今天仍然存在,虽然它们以完全不同的方式被重新描绘。正如奥威尔所说,在通往动物庄园路途中,不知从何处起,限制变成了解放。 (Author’s note: I’m grateful to Thomas Leonard’s Illiberal Reformers for providing the footnotes I followed to write this piece. Also, much more rethinking of Progressive Era politics and its impact on the family is discussed in Steven Horwitz’s Hayek’s Modern Family, newly published by Palgrave.) (作者附言:非常感激Thomas Leonard的《非自由的改革者》,循着该书提供的脚注,我写下了此文。另外,对进步时代的政治及其对家庭之影响的更多再思考,在Steven Horwitz所著的由Palgrave最新出版的《哈耶克的现代家庭》一书中有更多讨论。) (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]美国文化的四颗种子

BOOK REVIEW: ALBION’S SEED
书评:《阿尔比恩的的种子》

作者:SCOTT ALEXANDER @ 2016-04-27
译者:Tankman
校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen)
来源:http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/04/27/book-review-albions-seed/

I.

Albion’s Seed by David Fischer is a history professor’s nine-hundred-page treatise on patterns of early immigration to the Eastern United States. It’s not light reading and not the sort of thing I would normally pick up. I read it anyway on the advice of people who kept telling me it explains everything about America. And it sort of does.

《阿尔比恩的种子》是历史学教授David Fischer 所作的九百页专著【校注:阿尔比恩,英国旧称,据说典出海神之子阿尔比恩在岛上立国的神话】。该书讨论了美国东部地区的早期移民的模式。阅读此书并不轻松,而且一般我也不会挑选这种书来读。但不管如何,我读完了。这是因为有人向我推荐此书,他们不断告诉我它能解释关于美国的一切。而某种程度上,此书做到了这点。

In school, we tend to think of the original American colonists as “Englishmen”, a maximally non-diverse group who form the background for all of the diversity and ethnic conflict to come later. Fischer’s thesis is the opposite. Different parts of the country were settled by very different groups of Englishmen with different regional backgrounds, religions, social classes, and philosophies. The colonization process essentially extracted a single stratum of English society, isolated it from all the others, and then plunked it down on its own somewhere in the Eastern US.

在学校,我们倾向于把初代北美殖民者看作是“英国人”,这是一个最不多元化的群体,并且构成了后来所有的多元性和种族冲突的背景。Fischer的论述则与此相反。这个国家的不同地区被非常不同的英国人群体开拓。这些群体有着不同的地区背景,宗教,社会阶级和哲学。殖民化过程其实是提取了英国社会的某个单一阶层,令其与其他阶层隔绝,而后在美国东部的某个地方打上该群体深深的烙印。

I used to play Alpha Centauri, a computer game about the colonization of its namesake star system. One of the dynamics that made it so interesting was its backstory, where a Puerto Rican survivalist, an African plutocrat, and other colorful characters organized their own colonial expeditions and competed to seize territory and resources. You got to explore not only the settlement of a new world, but the settlement of a new world by societies dominated by extreme founder effects.

我曾玩过电脑游戏《南门二》。这游戏是关于与游戏同名的星系的殖民活动的。游戏如此有趣的一个因素是其故事背景:一个波多黎各生存狂,一个非洲财阀,以及其他有色人种角色组织了他们自己的殖民探险,相互竞争,来占领领土和资源。你能探索的,不单单只是对新世界拓殖,而且是那种受极端奠基者效应支配的社会对新世界的拓殖。

What kind of weird pathologies and wonderful innovations do you get when a group of overly romantic Scottish environmentalists is allowed to develop on its own trajectory free of all non-overly-romantic-Scottish-environmentalist influences? Albion’s Seed argues that this is basically the process that formed several early US states.

当一群过度浪漫的苏格兰环保主义者被允许自由发展,不受其他群体影响时,你能得到什么样怪异的社会失序或是伟大创新呢?《阿尔比恩的种子》认为这基本上是早期美国的某几个州形成的过程。

Fischer describes four of these migrations: the Puritans to New England in the 1620s, the Cavaliers to Virginia in the 1640s, the Quakers to Pennsylvania in the 1670s, and the Borderers to Appalachia in the 1700s.

Fischer描述了这些移民中的四种:在1620年代来到新英格兰地区的清教徒,在1640年代来到弗吉尼亚的“骑士党”,在1670年代来到宾夕法尼亚的贵格会,以及1700年代来到阿巴拉契亚山地的边民【校注:指英格兰和苏格兰交界地区的人】。

II.

A: The Puritans
A:清教徒

I hear about these people every Thanksgiving, then never think about them again for the next 364 days. They were a Calvinist sect that dissented against the Church of England and followed their own brand of dour, industrious, fun-hating Christianity.

我在每个感恩节都听说过这群人,而后在接下来的364天,就再也没有想起过他们。他们是一个加尔文宗派,对英国国教会持异议,而且遵从他们特有的严厉,勤奋,厌恶享乐的基督教伦理。

Most of them were from East Anglia, the part of England just northeast of London. They came to America partly because they felt persecuted, but mostly because they thought England was full of sin and they were at risk of absorbing the sin by osmosis if they didn’t get away quick and build something better. They really liked “city on a hill” metaphors.

他们中的大多数,来自东英吉利,是位于伦敦东北方向的一个地区。他们来到美国,部分是因为他们感到被迫害,但是大部分原因是他们觉得英国充满了罪恶,如果不尽快离开并且构建更好的生活,他们就面临被罪恶渗透的风险。他们真是非常喜爱“山巅之城”这个比喻。

I knew about the Mayflower, I knew about the black hats and silly shoes, I even knew about the time Squanto threatened to release a bioweapon buried under Plymouth Rock that would bring about the apocalypse. But I didn’t know that the Puritan migration to America was basically a eugenicist’s wet dream.

我知道五月花,我知道清教徒的黑帽和有些滑稽的皮鞋,我甚至知道印第安领袖Squanto曾威胁释放普利茅斯岩石之下那能够带来末日灾难的生物武器。但是我不知道清教徒移民美国基本上是个优生学的春梦。

Much like eg Unitarians today, the Puritans were a religious group that drew disproportionately from the most educated and education-obsessed parts of the English populace. Literacy among immigrants to Massachusetts was twice as high as the English average, and in an age when the vast majority of Europeans were farmers most immigrants to Massachusetts were skilled craftsmen or scholars. And the Puritan “homeland” of East Anglia was a an unusually intellectual place, with strong influences from Dutch and Continental trade; historian Havelock Ellis finds that it “accounts for a much larger proportion of literary, scientific, and intellectual achievement than any other part of England.”

清教徒这个宗教团体很像今天的唯一神教派,其成员中很多是受过最好教育、最痴迷于教育的英国民众。来到马萨诸塞的移民,其拥有读写能力的比例,是英国平均水平的两倍;在一个大部分欧洲人还是农夫的时代,大部分马萨诸塞的移民是熟练技工或学者。而清教徒在东英吉利的“故土”则是个文教很发达的地方,受到荷兰和大陆贸易的强烈影响;历史学家Havelock Ellis发现,“相比英国的其他任何地区,该地很大程度上以文艺,科学和知识成就著称。”

Furthermore, only the best Puritans were allowed to go to Massachusetts; Fischer writes that “it may have been the only English colony that required some of its immigrants to submit letters of recommendation” and that “those who did not fit in were banished to other colonies and sent back to England”. Puritan “headhunters” went back to England to recruit “godly men” and “honest men” who “must not be of the poorer sort”.

而且,只有最好的清教徒,才能被允许来到马萨诸塞;Fischer写道,“这也许是唯一要求部分移民出具推荐信的英国殖民地”,而且“不适合该地的移民,则被放逐到其他殖民地,或是送回英国。”清教徒“猎头”回到英国去招募“虔敬的人”和“诚实的人”,这些人“绝对不能是阶层较低的那一类”。

INTERESTING PURITAN FACTS:
关于清教徒的一些有趣事实:

1. Sir Harry Vane, who was “briefly governor of Massachusetts at the age of 24”, “was so rigorous in his Puritanism that he believed only the thrice-born to be truly saved”.

Harry Vane先生“在24岁时曾短期担任马萨诸塞殖民地的长官”。“他践行清教徒伦理十分严格,以至于相信只有第三次重生的人才能够得救”。

2. The great seal of the Massachusetts Bay Company “featured an Indian with arms beckoning, and five English words flowing from his mouth: ‘Come over and help us’”

马萨诸塞湾公司的大印上刻着“一个印第安人在招手,从他嘴里喊出五个词:‘来帮助我们’”。

3. Northern New Jersey was settled by Puritans who named their town after the “New Ark Of The Covenant” – modern Newark.

新泽西北部的清教徒开拓者把他们的镇起名为“新约柜”————即如今的纽瓦克

4. Massachusetts clergy were very powerful; Fischer records the story of a traveller asking a man “Are you the parson who serves here?” only to be corrected “I am, sir, the parson who ruleshere.”

马萨诸塞的牧师有很大权力;Fischer记录了一个故事:一个旅行者问一个男人“您(more...)

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BOOK REVIEW: ALBION’S SEED 书评:《阿尔比恩的的种子》 作者:SCOTT ALEXANDER @ 2016-04-27 译者:Tankman 校对:沈沉(@沈沉-Henrysheen) 来源:http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/04/27/book-review-albions-seed/ I. Albion’s Seed by David Fischer is a history professor’s nine-hundred-page treatise on patterns of early immigration to the Eastern United States. It’s not light reading and not the sort of thing I would normally pick up. I read it anyway on the advice of people who kept telling me it explains everything about America. And it sort of does. 《阿尔比恩的种子》是历史学教授David Fischer 所作的九百页专著【校注:阿尔比恩,英国旧称,据说典出海神之子阿尔比恩在岛上立国的神话】。该书讨论了美国东部地区的早期移民的模式。阅读此书并不轻松,而且一般我也不会挑选这种书来读。但不管如何,我读完了。这是因为有人向我推荐此书,他们不断告诉我它能解释关于美国的一切。而某种程度上,此书做到了这点。 In school, we tend to think of the original American colonists as “Englishmen”, a maximally non-diverse group who form the background for all of the diversity and ethnic conflict to come later. Fischer’s thesis is the opposite. Different parts of the country were settled by very different groups of Englishmen with different regional backgrounds, religions, social classes, and philosophies. The colonization process essentially extracted a single stratum of English society, isolated it from all the others, and then plunked it down on its own somewhere in the Eastern US. 在学校,我们倾向于把初代北美殖民者看作是“英国人”,这是一个最不多元化的群体,并且构成了后来所有的多元性和种族冲突的背景。Fischer的论述则与此相反。这个国家的不同地区被非常不同的英国人群体开拓。这些群体有着不同的地区背景,宗教,社会阶级和哲学。殖民化过程其实是提取了英国社会的某个单一阶层,令其与其他阶层隔绝,而后在美国东部的某个地方打上该群体深深的烙印。 I used to play Alpha Centauri, a computer game about the colonization of its namesake star system. One of the dynamics that made it so interesting was its backstory, where a Puerto Rican survivalist, an African plutocrat, and other colorful characters organized their own colonial expeditions and competed to seize territory and resources. You got to explore not only the settlement of a new world, but the settlement of a new world by societies dominated by extreme founder effects. 我曾玩过电脑游戏《南门二》。这游戏是关于与游戏同名的星系的殖民活动的。游戏如此有趣的一个因素是其故事背景:一个波多黎各生存狂,一个非洲财阀,以及其他有色人种角色组织了他们自己的殖民探险,相互竞争,来占领领土和资源。你能探索的,不单单只是对新世界拓殖,而且是那种受极端奠基者效应支配的社会对新世界的拓殖。 What kind of weird pathologies and wonderful innovations do you get when a group of overly romantic Scottish environmentalists is allowed to develop on its own trajectory free of all non-overly-romantic-Scottish-environmentalist influences? Albion’s Seed argues that this is basically the process that formed several early US states. 当一群过度浪漫的苏格兰环保主义者被允许自由发展,不受其他群体影响时,你能得到什么样怪异的社会失序或是伟大创新呢?《阿尔比恩的种子》认为这基本上是早期美国的某几个州形成的过程。 Fischer describes four of these migrations: the Puritans to New England in the 1620s, the Cavaliers to Virginia in the 1640s, the Quakers to Pennsylvania in the 1670s, and the Borderers to Appalachia in the 1700s. Fischer描述了这些移民中的四种:在1620年代来到新英格兰地区的清教徒,在1640年代来到弗吉尼亚的“骑士党”,在1670年代来到宾夕法尼亚的贵格会,以及1700年代来到阿巴拉契亚山地的边民【校注:指英格兰和苏格兰交界地区的人】。 II. A: The Puritans A:清教徒 I hear about these people every Thanksgiving, then never think about them again for the next 364 days. They were a Calvinist sect that dissented against the Church of England and followed their own brand of dour, industrious, fun-hating Christianity. 我在每个感恩节都听说过这群人,而后在接下来的364天,就再也没有想起过他们。他们是一个加尔文宗派,对英国国教会持异议,而且遵从他们特有的严厉,勤奋,厌恶享乐的基督教伦理。 Most of them were from East Anglia, the part of England just northeast of London. They came to America partly because they felt persecuted, but mostly because they thought England was full of sin and they were at risk of absorbing the sin by osmosis if they didn’t get away quick and build something better. They really liked “city on a hill” metaphors. 他们中的大多数,来自东英吉利,是位于伦敦东北方向的一个地区。他们来到美国,部分是因为他们感到被迫害,但是大部分原因是他们觉得英国充满了罪恶,如果不尽快离开并且构建更好的生活,他们就面临被罪恶渗透的风险。他们真是非常喜爱“山巅之城”这个比喻。 I knew about the Mayflower, I knew about the black hats and silly shoes, I even knew about the time Squanto threatened to release a bioweapon buried under Plymouth Rock that would bring about the apocalypse. But I didn’t know that the Puritan migration to America was basically a eugenicist’s wet dream. 我知道五月花,我知道清教徒的黑帽和有些滑稽的皮鞋,我甚至知道印第安领袖Squanto曾威胁释放普利茅斯岩石之下那能够带来末日灾难的生物武器。但是我不知道清教徒移民美国基本上是个优生学的春梦。 Much like eg Unitarians today, the Puritans were a religious group that drew disproportionately from the most educated and education-obsessed parts of the English populace. Literacy among immigrants to Massachusetts was twice as high as the English average, and in an age when the vast majority of Europeans were farmers most immigrants to Massachusetts were skilled craftsmen or scholars. And the Puritan “homeland” of East Anglia was a an unusually intellectual place, with strong influences from Dutch and Continental trade; historian Havelock Ellis finds that it “accounts for a much larger proportion of literary, scientific, and intellectual achievement than any other part of England.” 清教徒这个宗教团体很像今天的唯一神教派,其成员中很多是受过最好教育、最痴迷于教育的英国民众。来到马萨诸塞的移民,其拥有读写能力的比例,是英国平均水平的两倍;在一个大部分欧洲人还是农夫的时代,大部分马萨诸塞的移民是熟练技工或学者。而清教徒在东英吉利的“故土”则是个文教很发达的地方,受到荷兰和大陆贸易的强烈影响;历史学家Havelock Ellis发现,“相比英国的其他任何地区,该地很大程度上以文艺,科学和知识成就著称。” Furthermore, only the best Puritans were allowed to go to Massachusetts; Fischer writes that “it may have been the only English colony that required some of its immigrants to submit letters of recommendation” and that “those who did not fit in were banished to other colonies and sent back to England”. Puritan “headhunters” went back to England to recruit “godly men” and “honest men” who “must not be of the poorer sort”. 而且,只有最好的清教徒,才能被允许来到马萨诸塞;Fischer写道,“这也许是唯一要求部分移民出具推荐信的英国殖民地”,而且“不适合该地的移民,则被放逐到其他殖民地,或是送回英国。”清教徒“猎头”回到英国去招募“虔敬的人”和“诚实的人”,这些人“绝对不能是阶层较低的那一类”。 INTERESTING PURITAN FACTS: 关于清教徒的一些有趣事实: 1. Sir Harry Vane, who was “briefly governor of Massachusetts at the age of 24”, “was so rigorous in his Puritanism that he believed only the thrice-born to be truly saved”. Harry Vane先生“在24岁时曾短期担任马萨诸塞殖民地的长官”。“他践行清教徒伦理十分严格,以至于相信只有第三次重生的人才能够得救”。 2. The great seal of the Massachusetts Bay Company “featured an Indian with arms beckoning, and five English words flowing from his mouth: ‘Come over and help us'” 马萨诸塞湾公司的大印上刻着“一个印第安人在招手,从他嘴里喊出五个词:‘来帮助我们’”。 3. Northern New Jersey was settled by Puritans who named their town after the “New Ark Of The Covenant” – modern Newark. 新泽西北部的清教徒开拓者把他们的镇起名为“新约柜”————即如今的纽瓦克 4. Massachusetts clergy were very powerful; Fischer records the story of a traveller asking a man “Are you the parson who serves here?” only to be corrected “I am, sir, the parson who ruleshere.” 马萨诸塞的牧师有很大权力;Fischer记录了一个故事:一个旅行者问一个男人“您是在此地服侍的牧师吗?”被问者纠正了他的问题,“先生,我是统治此地的牧师。” 5. The Puritans tried to import African slaves, but they all died of the cold. 清教徒试图进口黑奴,但是黑奴全部死于严寒。 6. In 1639, Massachusetts declared a “Day Of Humiliation” to condemn “novelties, oppression, atheism, excesse, superfluity, idleness, contempt of authority, and trouble in other parts to be remembered”. 1639年,马萨诸塞发起了“羞辱日”,以谴责“新潮,压迫,无神论,纵欲,奢侈,懒散,轻视权威以及其他引人注目的麻烦”。 7. The average family size in Waltham, Massachusetts in the 1730s was 9.7 children. 1730年代,在马萨诸塞的Waltham,平均家庭规模是9.7个孩子。 8. Everyone was compelled by law to live in families. Town officials would search the town for single people and, if found, order them to join a family; if they refused, they were sent to jail. 按照法律,每个人都必须生活在家庭中。城镇官员会搜查镇中的单身者,如果发现,则会命令其加入一个家庭;如果单身者拒绝,则会被投入监狱。 9. 98% of adult Puritan men were married, compared to only 73% of adult Englishmen in general. Women were under special pressure to marry, and a Puritan proverb said that “women dying maids lead apes in Hell”. 98%的清教徒成年男子都结了婚,而英国成年男子总体的结婚率为73%。要求妇女结婚的压力特别大,一句清教徒格言说“没结婚的女人死后在地狱里带领着猿猴”。【译注:这一格言大意是谴责独身主义,但字面意思难考,一说是因为猿猴在当时人看来是没有价值的动物,肉不可吃,也不能做驼兽或者看家。10. 90% of Puritan names were taken from the Bible. Some Puritans took pride in their learning by giving their children obscure Biblical names they would expect nobody else to have heard of, like Mahershalalhasbaz. Others chose random Biblical terms that might not have technically been intended as names; “the son of Bostonian Samuel Pond was named Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”. Still others chose Biblical words completely at random and named their children things like Maybe or Notwithstanding. 90%清教徒的名字都取自圣经。一些清教徒引以为豪的是:用他们料想没人听过的圣经中的生僻词给孩子取名,并以此夸耀自己的学问,以至于他们可以预期人们从来没听过这个名字,比如 Mahershalalhasbaz【译者注:掳掠速临,抢夺快到。见圣经以赛亚书第八章1节】。另一些则随机取用圣经中的词,有些词技术上说本不是用来做名字的;“Bostonian Samuel Pond的孩子被起名为 Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin Pond”【译者注:前四个单词作为孩子的名,引自圣经但以理书第五章25节。四个单词都是亚兰文的度量单位,表示神已经数算过巴比伦的岁月,神已称量了巴比伦的道德】。也有些人,完全随机取用圣经中的词,给他们的孩子取名为Maybe或者是Notwithstanding。 11. Puritan parents traditionally would send children away to be raised with other families, and raise those families’ children in turn, in the hopes that the lack of familiarity would make the child behave better. 传统上,清教徒父母把孩子送给别的家庭寄养,作为交换,他们也寄养别人家的孩子,他们希望家中缺失亲情可以让孩子们被管教得更好。 12. In 1692, 25% of women over age 45 in Essex County were accused of witchcraft. 在1692年,Essex郡25%的45岁以上妇女被控为女巫。 13. Massachusetts passed the first law mandating universal public education, which was called The Old Deluder Law in honor of its preamble, which began “It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the scriptures…” 马萨诸塞通过了第一部强制普及公共教育的法律,被称为“老说谎者法案”,因为其前言的开头写道:“老牌说谎者撒旦的一个主要活动,就是阻止人们接触到经文的知识……” 14. Massachusetts cuisine was based around “meat and vegetables submerged in plain water and boiled relentlessly without seasonings of any kind”. 马萨诸塞的饮食基本上是“白水炖煮肉和蔬菜,不加任何调料”。 15. Along with the famous scarlet A for adultery, Puritans could be forced to wear a B for blasphemy, C for counterfeiting, D for drunkenness, and so on. 除了著名的表示通奸的红字A,清教徒还因为渎神被强制穿上B(blasphemy),因为造假被穿上C( counterfeiting ),因为醉酒被穿上D( drunkenness ),如此种种。 16. Wasting time in Massachusetts was literally a criminal offense, listed in the law code, and several people were in fact prosecuted for it. 在马萨诸塞,浪费时间是一种犯罪行为,列在法条上,并有几人的确因此被起诉。 17. This wasn’t even the nadir of weird hard-to-enforce Massachusetts laws. Another law just said “If any man shall exceed the bounds of moderation, we shall punish him severely”. 这还不是难以被执行的马萨诸塞法律的极点。另一条法律说:“如果任何人超越了适度的界限,我们将对其进行严惩。” Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote of Massachusetts Puritanism: “The underlying foundation of life in New England was one of profound, unutterable, and therefore unuttered mehalncholy, which regarded human existence itself as a ghastly risk, and, in the case of the vast majority of human beings, an inconceivable misfortune.” Harriet Beecher Stowe就马萨诸塞的清教主义写道:“新英格兰生活的基础是一种深刻微妙,无法言说,因此也就未被说破的惆怅,即人类的存在本身就是一种可怖的风险,绝大多数人,其存在是一种不可思议的不幸。” And indeed, everything was dour, strict, oppressive, and very religious. A typical Massachusetts week would begin in the church, which doubled as the town meeting hall. There were no decorations except a giant staring eye on the pulpit to remind churchgoers that God was watching them. 而且的确,一切都是严厉,严格,压抑并且非常宗教化的。马萨诸塞典型的一周生活开始于教堂,其规模是镇议事厅的两倍。教堂里没有别的装饰,除了牧师讲道台上的一个巨大眼睛,提醒来教堂的人们上帝在看着他们。 Townspeople would stand up before their and declare their shame and misdeeds, sometimes being forced to literally crawl before the other worshippers begging for forgiveness. THen the minister would give two two-hour sermons back to back. The entire affair would take up to six hours, and the church was unheated (for some reason they stored all their gunpowder there, so no one was allowed to light a fire), and this was Massachusetts, and it was colder in those days than it is now, so that during winter some people would literally lose fingers to frostbite (Fischer: “It was a point of honor for the minister never to shorten a sermon merely because his audience was frozen”). Everyone would stand there with their guns (they were legally required to bring guns, in case Indians attacked during the sermon) and hear about how they were going to Hell, all while the giant staring eye looked at them. 在讲道开始前,镇上的人坦白自己的羞耻和劣迹,有时真的是被强迫匍匐在其他敬拜者前,乞求饶恕。然后布道者会开始连续两场两小时长的证道。整个过程可以花掉六小时,而且教堂里没有取暖设施(出于一些原因,人们把所有的火药储存在教堂,所以那里禁止生火),而且这可是马萨诸塞,那时候天气比今天更冷,所以在冬季,有人真的会因为冻疮失去手指。(Fischer:“对布道者来说,从不因听众冻僵而缩短证道是一种荣耀。”)每个人站在那里,带着他们的枪(法律上,他们被要求携带武器,以防印第安人在其听讲道时袭击),听着他们将会怎样下地狱,整个过程,那巨大的眼睛一直盯着他们。 So life as a Puritan was pretty terrible. On the other hand, their society was impressively well-ordered. Teenage pregnancy rates were the lowest in the Western world and in some areas literally zero. Murder rates were half those in other American colonies. 所以一个清教徒的生活是非常恐怖的。另一方面,他们的社会有着令人印象深刻的良好秩序。未成年人怀孕率曾是西方世界中最低的,在某些地方则实际上为零。谋杀率则只有其他北美殖民地的一半。 There was remarkably low income inequality – “the top 10% of wealthholders held only 20%-30% of taxable property”, compared to 75% today and similar numbers in other 17th-century civilizations. The poor (at least the poor native to a given town) were treated with charity and respect – “in Salem, one man was ordered to be set by the heels in the stocks for being uncharitable to a poor man in distress”. 收入差距很低——“10%最富者只占有可税财产的20%-30%”,对比而言,今天这个比例是75%,17世纪时的其他文明也近似这个数字。穷人(至少是在镇上的本地穷人)受到尊重和接济——“在Salem,一个男人因为不肯接济一位在苦难中的穷人,被罚上脚枷示众”。 Government was conducted through town meetings in which everyone had a say. Women had more equality than in most parts of the world, and domestic abuse was punished brutally. The educational system was top-notch – “by most empirical tests of intellectual eminence, New England led all other parts of British America from the 17th to the early 20th century”. 政府通过镇上的议事会议得以运作,每个人在会上都有发言权。比世界其他地方,妇女享有更多平等,而家庭暴力则会遭到严酷惩罚。教育系统是顶尖的——“从十七世纪到二十世纪早期,在大多数有关智识能力的经验测试中,新英格兰领先所有其他北美的英国殖民地”。 In some ways the Puritans seem to have taken the classic dystopian bargain – give up all freedom and individuality and art, and you can have a perfect society without crime or violence or inequality. Fischer ends each of his chapters with a discussion of how the society thought of liberty, and the Puritans unsurprisingly thought of liberty as “ordered liberty” – the freedom of everything to tend to its correct place and stay there. 某种程度上,清教徒似乎选择了经典的敌托邦方案——放弃一切自由、个体性和艺术,得到一个没有犯罪、暴力和不平等的完美社会。Fischer在每一章的结尾部分都会探讨该社会如何看待自由,而清教徒毫不奇怪地认为自由是“有秩序的自由”——在这种自由下,万物都处于正确的位置,并且保持这种状态。 They thought of it as a freedom from disruption – apparently FDR stole some of his “freedom from fear” stuff from early Puritan documents. They were extremely not in favor of the sort of liberty that meant that, for example, there wouldn’t be laws against wasting time. That was going too far. 他们认为这是一种免于被扰乱的自由——显然富兰克林·罗斯福从早期清教徒的文档中,偷取了一些创意,用于他的“免于恐惧的自由”的理念。他们非常不喜欢某些类型的自由,比如,没有禁止浪费时间的法律。这种自由实在是过度了。 B: The Cavaliers B:骑士党 The Massachusetts Puritans fled England in the 1620s partly because the king and nobles were oppressing them. In the 1640s, English Puritans under Oliver Cromwell rebelled, took over the government, and killed the king. The nobles not unreasonably started looking to get the heck out. 马萨诸塞清教徒在1620年代逃离英格兰,部分是因为国王和贵族压迫他们。在1640年代,英国清教徒在奥利弗·克伦威尔的领导下反叛,夺取了政权,处死了国王。贵族在此时开始想要尽快逃离并不是没有原因的。 Virginia had been kind of a wreck ever since most of the original Jamestown settlers had mostly died of disease. Governor William Berkeley, a noble himself, decided the colony could reinvent itself as a destination for refugee nobles, and told them it would do everything possible to help them maintain the position of oppressive supremacy to which they were accustomed. The British nobility was sold. The Cavaliers – the nobles who had fought and lost the English Civil War – fled to Virginia. 自从詹姆斯敦最初一批殖民者中的大部分死于疾病,弗吉尼亚一度沦落得像一片废墟。殖民地长官 William Berkeley自己就是个贵族。他决定殖民地应该转型为一个避难贵族的目的地。他告诉避难的贵族,殖民地将会竭尽全力,帮他们维持其久已习惯的压迫性支配地位。不列颠的贵族地位标价出售。骑士党——在英国内战中顽抗继而失败的贵族——逃至弗吉尼亚。 Historians who cross-checking Virginian immigrant lists against English records find that of Virginians whose opinions on the War were known, 98% were royalists. They were overwhelming Anglican, mostly from agrarian southern England, and all related to each other in the incestuous way of nobility everywhere: “it is difficult to think of any ruling elite that has been more closely interrelated since the Ptolemies”. There were twelve members of Virginia’s royal council; in 1724 “all without exception were related to one another by blood or marriage…as late as 1775, every member of that august body was descended from a councilor who had served in 1660”. 历史学家交叉对比了弗吉尼亚移民的名单和英国的记录,他们发现,对于英国内战,立场可知的弗吉尼亚人当中,98%是保皇党。他们绝大多数都是国教徒,大部分来自英国南部的农业区,互相之间都有贵族间内婚的血缘关系:“很难想到自托勒密王朝以来,统治精英还有比这更近的亲缘关系”。弗吉尼亚皇家议会有十二名成员;在1724年“无一例外的彼此有着血缘或姻亲关系……迟至1775年,这一庄严机构的每个成员都是其1660年委员的后代”。 These aristocrats didn’t want to do their own work, so they brought with them tens of thousands of indentured servants; more than 75% of all Virginian immigrants arrived in this position. Some of these people came willingly on a system where their master paid their passage over and they would be free after a certain number of years; others were sent by the courts as punishments; still others were just plain kidnapped. The gender ratio was 4:1 in favor of men, and there were entire English gangs dedicated to kidnapping women and sending them to Virginia, where they fetched a high price. Needless to say, these people came from a very different stratum than their masters or the Puritans. 这些贵族不想自己做工,所以他们带来上万的契约仆佣;超过75%的弗吉尼亚移民以这个身份【编注:即契约仆佣】到来。一些人是自愿而来,主人支付了他们的旅费,他们在服务一些年份后会获得自由;另一些人则被法庭判罚来到这里;还有些人明显是被拐骗的。男女性别比是4:1,存在专门贩卖妇女到弗吉尼亚的英国黑帮,他们从中赚取高价。无需多言,相比于他们的贵族主人或清教徒,这些人来自一个非常不同的阶层。 People who came to Virginia mostly died. They died of malaria, typhoid fever, amoebiasis, and dysentery. Unlike in New England, where Europeans were better adapted to the cold climate than Africans, in Virginia it was Europeans who had the higher disease-related mortality rate. The whites who survived tended to become “sluggish and indolent”, according to the universal report of travellers and chroniclers, although I might be sluggish and indolent too if I had been kidnapped to go work on some rich person’s farm and sluggishness/indolence was an option. 来到弗吉尼亚的人多数都死了。他们死于疟疾,伤寒,阿米巴病,和痢疾。不像在新英格兰,在那里欧洲人比非洲人更好的适应了寒冷气候,在弗吉尼亚,欧洲人有着更高的疾病死亡率。参考旅行者的报告和编年史,幸存下来的白人倾向于变得“低迷和懒惰”,当然,我也许也会变得低迷和懒惰,如果我被诱拐到某个富人的农场做工而且可以选择低迷/懒惰的话。 The Virginians tried their best to oppress white people. Really, they did. The depths to which they sank in trying to oppress white people almost boggle the imagination. There was a rule that if a female indentured servant became pregnant, a few extra years were added on to their indenture, supposedly because they would be working less hard during their pregnancy and child-rearing so it wasn’t fair to the master. Virginian aristocrats would rape their own female servants, then add a penalty term on to their indenture for becoming pregnant. 弗吉尼亚人竭尽全力的压迫白人。确实,他们干过这种事。他们试图压迫白人的深度,超乎想象。有一条规矩:如果女性契约仆人怀了孕,她们的服务期会被延长几年,大概是因为她们的产出在孕期和抚育期会下降,这就对主人不公平。弗吉尼亚贵族们会强奸自己的女性仆人,而后给她们的服务期加上基于怀孕的惩罚期限。 That is an impressive level of chutzpah. But despite these efforts, eventually all the white people either died, or became too sluggish to be useful, or worst of all just finished up their indentures and became legally free. The aristocrats started importing black slaves as per the model that had sprung up in the Caribbean, and so the stage was set for the antebellum South we read about in history classes. 这种无耻妄为令人印象深刻。但是虽然有这些努力,最终所有白人不是死了,就是变得太低迷以至于无用,或者最糟糕的是他们结束了服务期限,在法律上变得自由了。贵族开始按照加勒比地区涌现的那种模式引进黑奴,于是我们在历史课上读到的内战前南方的一幕幕已经预备好上演。 INTERESTING CAVALIER FACTS: 关于骑士党的有趣事实: 1. Virginian cavalier speech patterns sound a lot like modern African-American dialects. It doesn’t take much imagination to figure out why, but it’s strange to think of a 17th century British lord speaking what a modern ear would clearly recognize as Ebonics. 弗吉尼亚骑士党的说话腔调听来更像是现代非裔美国人。不用多想就能推测出原因,不过想到17世纪的不列颠贵族讲一口现在听来是黑人英语的腔调,的确很奇怪。 2. Three-quarters of 17th-century Virginian children lost at least one parent before turning 18. 四分之三的17世纪弗吉尼亚孩子在十八岁之前至少丧失父母之一。 3. Cousin marriage was an important custom that helped cement bonds among the Virginian elite, “and many an Anglican lady changed her condition but not her name”. 堂亲结婚是弗吉尼亚精英加固联盟的重要习俗,“很多国教徒女士改变了她们的境遇,但不改变其姓氏”。 4. In Virginia, women were sometimes unironically called “breeders”; English women were sometimes referred to as “She-Britons”. 在弗吉尼亚,并非出于讽刺,妇女有时被称作“育仔员”;英国妇女有时被称作“女不列颠人”。 5. Virginia didn’t really have towns; the Chesapeake Bay was such a giant maze of rivers and estuaries and waterways that there wasn’t much need for land transport hubs. Instead, the unit of settlement was the plantation, which consisted of an aristocratic planter, his wife and family, his servants, his slaves, and a bunch of guests who hung around and mooched off him in accordance with the ancient custom of hospitality. 弗吉尼亚没有真正的城镇;切萨皮克湾是众多河流、河口和水路组成的迷宫,并不需要陆路运输的集散地。相反,殖民的基本单位是种植园,由一位贵族种植园主,他的妻子和家庭,他的仆人,他的奴隶,以及一群借着古已有之的好客传统依附寄生于主人的宾客们组成。 6. Virginian society considered everyone who lived in a plantation home to be a kind of “family”, with the aristocrat both as the literal father and as a sort of abstracted patriarch with complete control over his domain. 弗吉尼亚社会认为每个生活在种植园中的人多少都算是“家庭成员”,而贵族既是真正的父亲,也是控制自己地域的抽象家主。 7. Virginia governor William Berkeley probably would not be described by moderns as ‘strong on education’. He said in a speech that “I thank God there are no free schools nor printing [in Virginia], and I hope we shall not have these for a hundred years, for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divuldged them, and libels against the best government. God keep us from both!” 按现代观点,弗吉尼亚殖民地长官William Berkeley很可能算不上“重视教育”。他在一次演说中说“我感谢上帝,(在弗吉尼亚)没有免费学校和印刷术,而且我希望我们一百年也不要有这些东西,因为学习给世界带来不服从、异端、和结党,印刷术则传播上述这些,以及对最佳政府的诽谤。上帝让我们远离学校和印刷术。” 8. Virginian recreation mostly revolved around hunting and bloodsports. Great lords hunted deer, lesser gentry hunted foxes, indentured servants had a weird game in which they essentially draw-and-quartered geese, young children “killed and tortured songbirds”, and “at the bottom of this hierarchy of bloody games were male infants who prepared themselves for the larger pleasures of maturity by torturing snakes, maiming frogs, and pulling the wings off butterflies. Thus, every red-blooded male in Virginia was permitted to slaughter some animal or other, and the size of his victim was proportioned to his social rank.” 弗吉尼亚的休闲活动大多涉及打猎和血腥运动。大领主猎鹿,小绅士猎狐,契约仆人玩着奇怪的游戏来肢解鹅,年幼的孩子“杀死和折磨鸣禽”,而“在这一血腥游戏等级体系底部的则是男性幼童,为了长大后享受更大的猎杀愉悦,他们折磨蛇、残害青蛙、扯掉蝴蝶的翅膀。因此,每个热血的弗吉尼亚男性都被允许屠杀这样或那样一些动物,其受害者的尺寸则和他的社会等级成比例。” 9. “In 1747, an Anglican minister named William Kay infuriated the great planter Landon Carter by preaching a sermon against pride. The planter took it personally and sent his [relations] and ordered them to nail up the doors and windows of all the churches in which Kay preached.” “在1747年,一个叫William Kay的国教会牧师因为一篇反对骄傲的讲道,激怒了大种植园主Landon Carter。种植园主认为这是对其个人的冒犯,派出了他的亲属,命其钉死所有Kay牧师曾讲过道的教堂的门窗。 10. Our word “condescension” comes from a ritual attitude that leading Virginians were supposed to display to their inferiors. Originally condescension was supposed to be a polite way of showing respect those who were socially inferior to you; our modern use of the term probably says a lot about what Virginians actually did with it. 我们的“屈尊”一词来自于,弗吉尼亚的领袖应该对自己的下级表示的一种礼仪性态度。最初屈尊应该是一种礼貌的方式,对社会等级比自己低的人表示尊敬;我们现在对这个词的用法,很可能反映了当时弗吉尼亚人是怎么使用它的。 In a lot of ways, Virginia was the opposite of Massachusetts. Their homicide rate was sky-high, and people were actively encouraged to respond to slights against their honor with duels (for the rich) and violence (for the poor). They were obsessed with gambling, and “made bets not merely on horses, cards, cockfights, and backgammon, but also on crops, prices, women, and the weather”. 在很多方面,弗吉尼亚是马萨诸塞的反面。他们的谋杀率非常高,而人们实际上被鼓励用决斗(富人)和暴力(穷人)来回应对他们荣誉的轻慢。他们沉迷于赌博,“不仅仅在马,扑克,斗鸡,和十五子棋上打赌,而且还在庄稼,价格,妇女和天气上下注”。 Their cuisine focused on gigantic sumptuous feasts of animals killed in horrible ways. There were no witchcraft trials, but there were people who were fined for disrupting the peace by accusing their neighbors of witchcraft. Their church sermons were twenty minutes long on the dot. 他们的饮食注重巨大奢靡的欢宴,充斥着用各种可怕方法杀死的动物。这里没有女巫审判,倒是有人因为指控其邻居是女巫而犯了寻衅滋事被罚款的。他们的教会布道只有20分钟那么长。 The Puritans naturally thought of the Virginians as completely lawless reprobate sinners, but this is not entirelytrue. Virginian church sermons might have been twenty minutes long, but Virginian ballroom dance lessons could last nine hours. It wasn’t that the Virginians weren’t bound by codes, just that those codes were social rather than moral. 清教徒自然认为弗吉尼亚人是完全不遵法纪的邪恶罪人,但是这并不是完全正确的。弗吉尼亚教会的讲道也许只有20分钟,但其舞池中的交谊舞教学课可以长达九小时。并不是弗吉尼亚人不受法规约束,只是这些法规是社交上的,而不是道德上的。 And Virginian nobles weren’t just random jerks, they were carefully cultivated jerks. Planters spared no expense to train their sons to be strong, forceful, and not take nothin’ from nobody. They would encourage and reward children for being loud and temperamental, on the grounds that this indicated a strong personality and having a strong personality was fitting of a noble. 而且弗吉尼亚贵族并不仅仅是混蛋,他们是被精心教化过的混蛋。种植园主不惜代价训练他们的儿子,令其强壮、坚决,不受任何人摆弄。他们会因孩子们声音洪亮、感情激烈而加以鼓励和奖励,因为这意味着强烈的个性,而有强烈个性和做一个贵族是相符的。 When this worked, it worked really well – witness natural leaders and self-driven polymaths like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. More often it failed catastrophically – the rate of sex predation and rape in Virginia was at least as high as anywhere else in North America. 当这种做法奏效时,它确实有很好的效果——天然的领袖和自我激励的博学者例如乔治·华盛顿和托马斯·杰弗逊即是明证。更多的时候,这做法导致了灾难性的失败,弗吉尼亚的性侵犯和强奸率至少和北美其他地方一样高。 The Virginian Cavaliers had an obsession with liberty, but needless to say it was not exactly a sort of liberty of which the ACLU would approve. I once heard someone argue against libertarians like so: even if the government did not infringe on liberties, we would still be unfree for other reasons. If we had to work, we would be subject to the whim of bosses. If we were poor, we would not be “free” to purchase most of the things we want. In any case, we are “oppressed” by disease, famine, and many other things besides government that prevent us from implementing our ideal existence. 弗吉尼亚骑士党着迷于自由,但是不用说,这自由不完全等同于美国民权自由联盟(ACLU)所支持的那种自由。我曾听某人和自由意志主义者做如此争辩:即使政府不侵犯我们的自由,我们仍然会因为其他原因不自由。如果我们必须工作,我们就会被老板的兴之所至所限制。如果我们贫穷,我们就不可能“自由的”购买我们所需的大部分物品。在任何时候,我们都会被疾病、饥饿和其他很多政府之外的事情“压迫”,来阻止我们达到理想的状态。 The Virginians took this idea and ran with it – in the wrong direction. No, they said, we wouldn’t be free if we had to work, therefore we insist upon not working. No, we wouldn’t be free if we were limited by poverty, therefore we insist upon being extremely rich. Needless to say, this conception of freedom required first indentured servitude and later slavery to make it work, but the Virginians never claimed that the servants or slaves were free. 弗吉尼亚人采纳了这个主意,并且践行了它——在错误的方向上。不,他们说,如果我们必须工作,我们不可能自由,所以我们坚持不工作。不,如果我们被贫穷限制,我们不可能自由,所以我们坚持要极度的富有。无需多言,要实行这种自由观念,起先要求契约仆人的服侍,而后要求奴隶的劳动,但弗吉尼亚人从来没有宣称仆人或奴隶是自由的。 That wasn’t the point. Freedom, like wealth, was properly distributed according to rank; nobles had as much as they wanted, the middle-class enough to get by on, and everyone else none at all. And a Virginian noble would have gone to his grave insisting that a civilization without slavery could never have citizens who were truly free. 问题不在这里。自由,像财富一样,按照等级进行恰当分配;贵族想要多少就要多少,中间阶层也得到了足够的,而其他人则什么也没有。一个弗吉尼亚贵族可能至死都会坚持:没有奴隶制的文明,不可能有真正自由的公民。 C: The Quakers C:贵格会 Fischer warns against the temptation to think of the Quakers as normal modern people, but he has to warn us precisely because it’s so tempting. Where the Puritans seem like a dystopian caricature of virtue and the Cavaliers like a dystopian caricature of vice, the Quakers just seem ordinary. Yes, they’re kind of a religious cult, but they’re the kind of religious cult any of us might found if we were thrown back to the seventeenth century. Fischer警告我们小心那种想要把贵格会看作正常现代人的倾向,但是他之所以不得不警告我们,恰好就是因为这种想法是如此诱人。清教徒看上去像关于德行的敌托邦讽刺画,骑士党看起来像关于邪恶的敌托邦讽刺画,而贵格会则看起来刚好正常。是的,他们是一种教派,但是他们是那种我们中任何人如果穿越回17世纪都会成立的教派。 Instead they were founded by a weaver’s son named George Fox. He believed people were basically good and had an Inner Light that connected them directly to God without a need for priesthood, ritual, Bible study, or self-denial; mostly people just needed to listen to their consciences and be nice. Since everyone was equal before God, there was no point in holding up distinctions between lords and commoners: Quakers would just address everybody as “Friend”. 其实贵格会是被一个纺织工的儿子George Fox创立的。他相信,人基本上是善的,而且人心有内在的光亮,可以把人和上帝直接联系起来,不需要牧师、仪式、解经或者自我否定;大部分时候,人只需要听从他们良心的召唤,为人友善。因为每个人在神面前都是平等的,所以没有任何理由坚持领主和平民之间的分别:贵格会对每个人都以“朋友”称呼。 And since the Quakers were among the most persecuted sects at the time, they developed an insistence on tolerance and freedom of religion which (unlike the Puritans) they stuck to even when shifting fortunes put them on top. They believed in pacificism, equality of the sexes, racial harmony, and a bunch of other things which seem pretty hippy-ish even today let alone in 1650. 而且因为贵格会在当时是最受迫害的宗派,他们发展出了对宗教宽容和信仰自由的坚持,这点不像清教徒。他们甚至在自身有幸掌权时,仍然坚持这点。他们信仰和平主义、性别平等、种族和谐,以及其他很多即使在今天看来都很嬉皮士的观念,更遑论在1650年。 England’s top Quaker in the late 1600s was William Penn. Penn is universally known to Americans as “that guy Pennsylvania is named after” but actually was a larger-than-life 17th century superman. Born to the nobility, Penn distinguished himself early on as a military officer; he was known for beating legendary duelists in single combat and then sparing their lives with sermons about how murder was wrong. 17世纪晚期,英国最重要的贵格会信徒是William Penn。对大多数美国人而言,他只是因“宾夕法尼亚以其得名”而广为人知。但其实,他是17世纪的超凡人物。生于贵族之家,Penn早年担任军官,崭露头角;他因以下事迹而著名:在一对一决斗中击败传奇般的对手们,而后饶过其性命,并发表讲道,指出谋杀是错误的。 He gradually started having mystical visions, quit the military, and converted to Quakerism. Like many Quakers he was arrested for blasphemy; unlike many Quakers, they couldn’t make the conviction stick; in his trial he “conducted his defense so brilliantly that the jurors refused to convict him even when threatened with prison themselves, [and] the case became a landmark in the history of trial by jury.” 渐渐的,他开始经历神秘的异象,退出军旅,改宗成为贵格会信徒。就像很多贵格会信徒一样,他因渎神被逮捕;和许多贵格会信徒不同,审判者没能给他定罪;在审判中,他“如此精彩的辩护,以至于陪审团成员甚至在面对牢狱之灾威胁时,都不肯定他的罪,而且该案成为了陪审团审判历史上的里程碑。” When the state finally found a pretext on which to throw him in prison, he spent his incarceration composing “one of the noblest defenses of religious liberty ever written”, conducting a successful mail-based courtship with England’s most eligible noblewoman, and somehow gaining the personal friendship and admiration of King Charles II. 当政府终于找到借口将其投入监狱时,他在狱中创作了“有史以来,对宗教自由的最高贵辩护之一的文章”,以信件形式向英国最有贵族资格的女士成功求爱,而且不知何故得到了查理二世的个人友谊和敬佩。 Upon his release the King liked him so much that he gave him a large chunk of the Eastern United States on a flimsy pretext of repaying a family debt. Penn didn’t want to name his new territory Pennsylvania – he recommended just “Sylvania” – but everybody else overruled him and Pennyslvania it was. 获释之后,国王如此喜爱他,以至于把美国东部的一大片以偿还家庭债务的单薄借口划给了他。Penn不想把他的新领地命名为宾夕法尼亚——他推荐的命名仅仅是“夕法尼亚”——但是其他所有人否决了他的意见,宾夕法尼亚就这样得名。 The grant wasn’t quite the same as the modern state, but a chunk of land around the Delaware River Valley – what today we would call eastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware, southern New Jersey, and bits of Maryland – centered on the obviously-named-by-Quakers city of Philadelphia. 授予Penn的这份领地和现在宾州的疆域并不完全一样,而是德拉维尔河谷周围的一大片土地——今天我们称为宾夕法尼亚东部、德拉维尔北部、新泽西南部,以及很小一部分马里兰州的地区——该地区的中心的费城,显然是由贵格会命名的【编注:Philadelphia一词希腊文本意为“兄弟情谊”】。 Penn decided his new territory would be a Quaker refuge – his exact wording was “a colony of Heaven [for] the children of the Light”. He mandated universal religious toleration, a total ban on military activity, and a government based on checks and balances that would “leave myself and successors no power of doing mischief, that the will of one man may not hinder the good of a whole country”. Penn决定把他的新领土变成贵格会的避难地——他的原话是“一个面向圣光之子们的天国殖民地”。他强制实施普遍的宗教宽容,完全禁止军事活动,基于分权和制衡的政府将“不会给我自己和继任者留下作恶的权力,个人的意志不会妨害整个国家的益处”。 His recruits – about 20,000 people in total – were Quakers from the north of England, many of them minor merchants and traders. They disproportionately included the Britons of Norse descent common in that region, who formed a separate stratum and had never really gotten along with the rest of the British population. They were joined by several German sects close enough to Quakers that they felt at home there; these became the ancestors of (among other groups) the Pennsylvania Dutch, Amish, and Mennonites. 他招募了总共大约两万人——他们是英格兰北部的贵格会信徒,很多是小商小贩。不成比例地,他们中很多是那个区域很常见的具有北欧血统的英国人,构成了不列颠的一个特殊阶层,并且从未和其他不列颠人真正融合在一起。几个和贵格会近似的德国宗派加入了他们,教义相似使得这些人在那里能找到家的感觉;这些人和其他一些团体成为了德裔宾州人、阿米绪人和门诺派的祖先。 INTERESTING QUAKER FACTS: 关于贵格会的有趣事实: 1. In 1690 a gang of pirates stole a ship in Philadelphia and went up and down the Delaware River stealing and plundering. The Quakers got in a heated (but brotherly) debate about whether it was morally permissible to use violence to stop them. When the government finally decided to take action, contrarian minister George Keith dissented and caused a major schism in the faith. 在1690年,一帮海盗在费城偷了一艘船,在德拉维尔河上四处偷盗劫掠。贵格会信徒们展开了一场激烈(但是兄弟般的)辩论,讨论用暴力阻止这帮海盗在道德上是否合理。当政府最终决定采取行动,持反对意见的牧师George Keith表示不同意,并引发了信仰上的一次重大分裂。 2. Fischer argues that the Quaker ban on military activity within their territory would have doomed them in most other American regions, but by extreme good luck the Indians in the Delaware Valley were almost as peaceful as the Quakers. As usual, at least some credit goes to William Penn, who taught himself Algonquin so he could negotiate with the Indians in their own language. Fischer认为贵格会在他们的领土上禁止军事活动,在全美大部分别的地区可能都会给他们带来悲惨的命运。然而非常幸运的是,德拉维尔谷地的印第安人几乎和贵格会会众一样和平。和通常一样,这至少部分功绩归于William Penn,他自学了Algonquin语,所以他可以用印第安人的母语与其谈判。 3. The Quakers’ marriage customs combined a surprisingly modern ideas of romance, with extreme bureaucracy. The wedding process itself had sixteen stages, including “ask parents”, “ask community women”, “ask community men”, “community women ask parents”, and “obtain a certificate of cleanliness”. William Penn’s marriage apparently had forty-six witnesses to testify to the good conduct and non-relatedness of both parties. 贵格会信徒的婚姻习俗结合了令人惊讶的现代浪漫创意和极端的官僚化。婚姻过程本身有十六个阶段,包括“问询父母”,“问询社区里的妇人”,“问询社区里的男人”,“社区里的妇人问询父母”,以及“获得一个清白认证”。William Penn的婚姻显然有46位证人,见证夫妻双方都德行良好,没有亲属关系。 4. Possibly related: 16% of Quaker women were unmarried by age 50, compared to only about 2% of Puritans. 可能相关的事实:16%的贵格会妇女到50岁时都没有结婚,清教徒中这一数字仅为2%。 5. Quakers promoted gender equality, including the (at the time scandalous) custom of allowing women to preach (condemned by the Puritans as the crime of “she-preaching”). 贵格会推行性别平等,包括允许妇女讲道(在那时算是丑闻,被清教徒谴责为“妇女讲道”罪) 6. But they were such prudes about sex that even the Puritansthought they went too far. Pennsylvania doctors had problems treating Quakers because they would “delicately describe everything from neck to waist as their ‘stomachs’, and anything from waist to feet as their ‘ankles'”. 但是他们对性十分的正经,甚至清教徒都认为他们在这方面走得太远。宾州医生在治疗贵格会会众时会遇到麻烦,因为他们“故意把所有从颈到腰的部位都称为‘肚子’,而任何从腰到脚的地方都称为‘脚踝’”。 7. Quaker parents Richard and Abigail Lippincott named their eight children, in order, “Remember”, “John”, “Restore”, “Freedom”, “Increase”, “Jacob”, “Preserve”, and “Israel”, so that their names combined formed a simple prayer. 贵格会的一对父母Richard和Abigail Lippincott把他们的八个孩子按顺序起名叫做,“记得”,“约翰”,“恢复”,“自由”,“增加”,“雅各”,“存留”,“以色列”,他们的名字合起来构成一个简单的祷词。 8. Quakers had surprisingly modern ideas about parenting, basically sheltering and spoiling their children at a time when everyone else was trying whip the Devil out of them. 贵格会在教养孩童方面有着令人惊讶的现代观点,在那个其他人都试图从孩子身上赶出魔鬼的时代,他们基本上是保护和宠爱孩子的。 9. “A Quaker preacher, traveling in the more complaisant colony of Maryland, came upon a party of young people who were dancing merrily together. He broke in upon them like an avenging angel, stopped the dance, and demanded to know if they considered Martin Luther to be a good man. The astonished youngsters answered in the affirmative. The Quaker evangelist then quoted Luther on the subject of dancing: ‘as many paces as the man takes in his dance, so many steps he takes toward Hell. This, the Quaker missionary gloated with a gleam of sadistic satisfaction, ‘spoiled their sport’.” “一个贵格会的传道人,在更殷勤有礼的马里兰殖民地旅行时,遇到了一群年轻人在欢快的跳舞。他如复仇天使般闯入其中,停止了舞会,要求众人考虑马丁·路德是否是个好人。被惊呆的年轻人给出了肯定的答案。这位贵格会传道人接着引用了路德关于跳舞的评论:‘一个人在舞蹈中跳多少步,就朝地狱走了多少步。’这个贵格会传道人带着一种施虐的快感吹嘘,‘毁掉了他们的活动’。” 10. William Penn wrote about thirty books defending liberty of conscience throughout his life. The Quaker obsession with the individual conscience as the work of God helped invent the modern idea of conscientious objection. 终其一生,William Penn写下了约三十本书,为良心自由辩护。贵格会着迷于把个人良心看作是上帝的造物,这促进了因良心拒绝服兵役这一现代观念的产生。 11. Quakers were heavily (and uniquely for their period) opposed to animal cruelty. When foreigners introduced bullbaiting into Philadelphia during the 1700s, the mayor bought a ticket supposedly as a spectator. When the event was about to begin, he leapt into the ring, personally set the bull free, and threatened to arrest anybody who stopped him. 贵格会会众十分强力的反对虐待动物(在他们的时代,这是很独特的)。当外地人在18世纪把猎犬咬牛游戏引入费城时,市长买了一张票,本应作为观众呆在现场。当活动快开始时,他跃入场地,自己把牛放走,并威胁逮捕任何阻止他的人。 12. On the other hand, they were also opposed to other sports for what seem like kind of random reasons. The town of Morley declared an anathema against foot races, saying that they were “unfruitful works of darkness”. 在另一方面,他们借着各种任意的理由,反对各种其他运动。Morley镇宣布取缔长跑,因为长跑是“黑暗徒劳的工作”。 13. The Pennsylvania Quakers became very prosperous merchants and traders. They also had a policy of loaning money at low- or zero- interest to other Quakers, which let them outcompete other, less religious businesspeople. 宾夕法尼亚的贵格会信徒成了非常兴旺的商人。他们也有着一项以低利率或零利率贷款给其他贵格会成员的政策,这使得贵格会会众比其他更少宗教化的人更有竞争优势。 14. They were among the first to replace the set of bows, grovels, nods, meaningful looks, and other British customs of acknowledging rank upon greeting with a single rank-neutral equivalent – the handshake. 把英国的等级化问候动作,如鞠躬、下拜、点头、注目礼等等,更换为不具有等级意味的握手礼,贵格会是首先实施这种变革的群体之一。 15. Pennsylvania was one of the first polities in the western world to abolish the death penalty. 宾夕法尼亚是在西方世界首先废除死刑的政治体之一。 16. The Quakers were lukewarm on education, believing that too much schooling obscured the natural Inner Light. Fischer declares it “typical of William Penn” that he wrote a book arguing against reading too much. 贵格会会众对教育有些冷淡,认为太多学校教育会掩蔽人内心自然的灵性之光。Fischer宣称这是“William Penn的典型做法”,他写了一本书来反对过多的阅读。 17. The Quakers not only instituted religious freedom, but made laws against mocking another person’s religion. 贵格会会众不仅仅制定了宗教自由制度,还颁布法律,禁止嘲笑他人的宗教。 18. In the late 1600s as many as 70% of upper-class Quakers owned slaves, but Pennsylvania essentially invented modern abolitionism. Although their colonial masters in England forbade them from banning slavery outright, they applied immense social pressure and by the mid 1700s less than 10% of the wealthy had African slaves. As soon as the American Revolution started, forbidding slavery was one of independent Pennsylvania’s first actions. 在17世纪晚期,多达70%的上层贵格会人士拥有奴隶,但是宾夕法尼亚的确发明了现代废奴主义。虽然他们在英国的殖民地宗主们不准他们公然废除奴隶制,但是他们施加了巨大的社会压力,到18世纪中叶,少于10%的富裕阶层拥有黑奴。美国革命一开始,废奴就成为了宾州独立后的第一批举措之一。 Pennsylvania was very successful for a while; it had some of the richest farmland in the colonies, and the Quakers were exceptional merchants and traders; so much so that they were forgiven their military non-intervention during the Revolution because of their role keeping the American economy afloat in the face of British sanctions. 宾夕法尼亚曾非常成功;它拥有殖民地当中最肥沃的农地,贵格会会众是出色的商人;这些优势如此之大,以至于独立战争期间,他们的军事不干涉态度得到了原谅,因为面临英国的制裁,他们起到了支撑美国经济的作用。 But by 1750, the Quakers were kind of on their way out; by 1750, they were a demographic minority in Pennsylvania, and by 1773 they were a minority in its legislature as well. In 1750 Quakerism was the third-largest religion in the US; by 1820 it was the ninth-largest, and by 1981 it was the sixty-sixth largest. 但是到1750年代,贵格会信徒日渐式微;到1750年,他们变成了宾州人口上的少数派,到1773年,他们又变成了宾州立法机构中的少数。在1750年,贵格主义是美国的第三大宗教;到1820年,变成了第九大,到1981年,变成了第六十六大。 What happened? The Quakers basically tolerated themselves out of existence. They were so welcoming to religious minorities and immigrants that all these groups took up shop in Pennsylvania and ended its status as a uniquely Quaker society. At the same time, the Quakers themselves became more “fanatical” and many dropped out of politics believing it to be too worldly a concern for them; this was obviously fatal to their political domination. 发生了什么呢?贵格会信徒基本上是因宽容而使得他们自己逐步消逝。他们如此欢迎少数教派和移民,这些人占据了宾州,结束了宾州贵格会一统天下的状态。同时,贵格会自身变得更具属灵热忱,许多人从政治领域退出,他们认为该领域对于他们而言属于过于世俗的关怀;这对于他们的政治影响力显然是致命的。 The most famous Pennsylvanian statesman of the Revolutionary era, Benjamin Franklin, was not a Quaker at all but a first-generation immigrant from New England. Finally, Quakerism was naturally extra-susceptible to that thing where Christian denominations become indistinguishable from liberal modernity and fade into the secular background. 独立战争时期最著名的宾州政治家是本杰明·富兰克林。他完全不是贵格会信徒,而是来自新英格兰的第一代移民。最后,贵格主义自然而然地特别易于受这一趋势影响:即基督教派日渐变得和自由主义现代性难以区分,从而渐渐融于世俗背景中去。 But Fischer argues that Quakerism continued to shape Pennsylvania long after it had stopped being officially in charge, in much the same way that Englishmen themselves have contributed disproportionately to American institutions even though they are now a numerical minority. The Pennsylvanian leadership on abolitionism, penal reform, the death penalty, and so on all happened after the colony was officially no longer Quaker-dominated. 但是Fischer争辩说,在退出官方主导地位后,贵格主义的影响在宾州持续了很长一段时间,正如英国裔本身对美国的制度有着不成比例的巨大贡献那样,即使他们现在是数量上的少数派。宾州在废奴、刑罚改革、死刑等等方面的领袖地位全部出现在该殖民地官方不再被贵格会掌控之后。 And it’s hard not to see Quaker influence on the ideas of the modern US – which was after all founded in Philadelphia. In the middle of the Puritans demanding strict obedience to their dystopian hive society and the Cavaliers demanding everybody bow down to a transplanted nobility, the Pennsylvanians – who became the thought leaders of the Mid-Atlantic region including to a limited degree New York City – were pretty normal and had a good opportunity to serve as power-brokers and middlemen between the North and South. Although there are seeds of traditionally American ideas in every region, the Quakers really stand out in terms of freedom of religion, freedom of thought, checks and balances, and the idea of universal equality. 而且,很难忽略贵格会对现代美国理念上的影响——不管如何,现代美国创建于费城。清教徒严格要求服从他们的敌托邦集体主义社会,骑士党人要求每个人都在移植的贵族制度中鞠躬,介于两者之间,宾夕法尼亚人——作为中大西洋地区,一定程度上也包括纽约市的思想领袖——则相当正常,并且有很好的机会作为南方和北方的中间人和权力经纪人。虽然在每个区域都有美国传统观念的种子,贵格会在宗教自由、思想自由、分权制衡和普世平等理念上真的表现很突出。 It occurs to me that William Penn might be literally the single most successful person in history. He started out as a minor noble following a religious sect that everybody despised and managed to export its principles to Pennsylvania where they flourished and multiplied. Pennsylvania then managed to export its principles to the United States, and the United States exported them to the world. I’m not sure how much of the suspiciously Quaker character of modern society is a direct result of William Penn, but he was in one heck of a right place at one heck of a right time 我突然想到,William Penn也许真的是史上最成功的个人。一开始,作为一个小贵族,他皈依了一个人人蔑视的宗派,他尽力把该宗派的原则输出到了宾夕法尼亚,让其发扬光大。宾夕法尼亚则尽力把它的原则输出到美国,而美国则将之输出到全世界。我不确定现代社会的贵格会特征有多大可能是William Penn的直接成果,但他的确是一个在非常正确的时间,出现在非常正确的地点的人。 D: The Borderers D: 边民们 The Borderers are usually called “the Scots-Irish”, but Fischer dislikes the term because they are neither Scots (as we usually think of Scots) nor Irish (as we usually think of Irish). Instead, they’re a bunch of people who lived on (both sides of) the Scottish-English border in the late 1600s. 边民们经常被叫做“苏格兰-爱尔兰人”,但是Fischer不喜欢这个称谓,因为他们既不是如我们通常想象的苏格兰人,也不是如我们通常想象的爱尔兰人。相反,他们是一群17世纪晚期生活在苏格兰-英格兰边界两侧的人。 None of this makes sense without realizing that the Scottish-English border was terrible. Every couple of years the King of England would invade Scotland or vice versa; “from the year 1040 to 1745, every English monarch but three suffered a Scottish invasion, or became an invader in his turn”. These “invasions” generally involved burning down all the border towns and killing a bunch of people there. 如果没有意识到苏格兰-英格兰边境曾极其可怕,事情就说不通。每隔几年,英格兰的国王就会侵略苏格兰,或者反之;“从1040年到1745年,除了三个君主之外,每个英格兰君主都遭遇过苏格兰的入侵,或者反之变成了入侵者”;这些“入侵”总的来说,就是烧毁所有边境城镇,杀死那地区的一大批人。 Eventually the two sides started getting pissed with each other and would also torture-murder all of the enemy’s citizens they could get their hands on, ie any who were close enough to the border to reach before the enemy could send in their armies. As if this weren’t bad enough, outlaws quickly learned they could plunder one side of the border, then escape to the other before anyone brought them to justice, so the whole area basically became one giant cesspool of robbery and murder. 最终,双方都被激怒了,开始虐杀所有落入手中的对方平民,也就是任何住的离边境足够近、在敌方军队赶来前就能实施侵害的人。好像嫌这还不够糟,法外匪徒很快学到他们可以在边境一侧抢掠,而后在被绳之以法前,逃到另一边去。所以整个地区基本上是充满抢劫谋杀的血腥地狱。 In response to these pressures, the border people militarized and stayed feudal long past the point where the rest of the island had started modernizing. Life consisted of farming the lands of whichever brutal warlord had the top hand today, followed by being called to fight for him on short notice, followed by a grisly death. The border people dealt with it as best they could, and developed a culture marked by extreme levels of clannishness, xenophobia, drunkenness, stubbornness, and violence. 面对这些压力,边民武装了起来,在大不列颠岛的其他地方已经开始现代化之后很久,他们还保持着封建制度。生活由以下部分构成:耕种土地,这些土地属于当时军阀混战的胜利者,服从突然而至的上战场的征召,面对悲惨的死亡。边民在此条件下,竭力挣扎求活,发展出一种以极端小集团、排外、酗酒、倔强和暴力为特征的文化。 By the end of the 1600s, the Scottish and English royal bloodlines had intermingled and the two countries were drifting closer and closer to Union. The English kings finally got some breathing room and noticed – holy frick, everything about the border is terrible. 到1600年代末,苏格兰和英格兰的皇族变得血脉相连,两个国家开始接近并组成联邦【编注:1603年苏格兰国王詹姆斯六世继承英格兰王位,成为英格兰的詹姆斯一世】。此后的英格兰国王们终于缓过气来,并且发现——天哪,边境的一切都很可怕。 They decided to make the region economically productive, which meant “squeeze every cent out of the poor Borderers, in the hopes of either getting lots of money from them or else forcing them to go elsewhere and become somebody else’s problem”. Sometimes absentee landlords would just evict everyone who lived in an entire region, en masse, replacing them with people they expected to be easier to control. 他们决定让这个地区在经济产出上有效,这意味着“从贫穷边民身上榨出每一分钱,目的是要么从边民那里得到很多收入,要么强迫他们搬到别处,变成他人的麻烦。”有时候,外居的领主会直接把整个区域的居民驱逐,代之以他们预期会更好控制的人。 Many of the Borderers fled to Ulster in Ireland, which England was working on colonizing as a Protestant bulwark against the Irish Catholics, and where the Crown welcomed violent warlike people as a useful addition to their Irish-Catholic-fighting project. But Ulster had some of the same problems as the Border, and also the Ulsterites started worrying that the Borderer cure was worse than the Irish Catholic disease. So the Borderers started getting kicked out of Ulster too, one thing led to another, and eventually 250,000 of these people ended up in America. 许多边民逃到爱尔兰的阿尔斯特,英国人当时正要在此地殖民,将之变成新教针对爱尔兰天主教的堡垒。所以皇室欢迎暴力好战的人,用于补充他们和爱尔兰天主教的斗争工程。但是阿尔斯特也有一些和边境地区相同的麻烦,而阿尔斯特人也开始担忧,边民作为一种解药,也许比爱尔兰天主教这一疾病更糟。所以边民又开始被驱逐出阿尔斯特,事情接踵而至,最终边民中有25万人移居美国。 250,000 people is a lot of Borderers. By contrast, the great Puritan emigration wave was only 20,000 or so people; even the mighty colony of Virginia only had about 50,000 original settlers. So these people showed up on the door of the American colonies, and the American colonies collectively took one look at them and said “nope”. 25万人可是很大一批。对比之下,清教徒移民大潮只有2万人左右;即使是弗吉尼亚巨大的殖民地,也只有5万初始殖民者。所以当这些人出现在北美殖民地的大门口,各个殖民地一齐打量了他们一下,然后说“不”。 Except, of course, the Quakers. The Quakers talked among themselves and decided that these people were also Children Of God, and so they should demonstrate Brotherly Love by taking them in. They tried that for a couple of years, and then they questioned their life choices and also said “nope”, and they told the Borderers that Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley were actually kind of full right now but there was lots of unoccupied land in WesternPennsylvania, and the Appalachian Mountains were very pretty at this time of year, so why didn’t they head out that way as fast as it was physically possible to go? 当然,贵格会会众例外。贵格会内部进行了讨论,认定这些人也是上帝的孩子,所以他们应该彰显兄弟之爱,接纳边民们。他们尝试了几年,然后他们对自己的选择产生了疑问,也转向了说“不”。他们告诉边民,费城和德拉威尔河谷现在其实已经很满了,但是西宾夕法尼亚有很多无主之地,而阿巴拉契亚山脉在这个季节也很好,为什么不向那些方向尽快开拓,趁着自然条件还允许? At the time, the Appalachians were kind of the booby prize of American colonization: hard to farm, hard to travel through, and exposed to hostile Indians. The Borderers fell in love with them. They came from a pretty marginal and unproductive territory themselves, and the Appalachians were far away from everybody and full of fun Indians to fight. 在那时,阿巴拉契亚的群山对北美殖民者来说,是分给最后一名的奖品:很难耕种,很难通行,暴露于充满敌意的印第安人面前。边民却爱上了它们。他们本就来自贫瘠的边缘化的故土,而阿巴拉契亚群山远离所有人,充满了与印第安人战斗的乐趣。 Soon the Appalachian strategy became the accepted response to Borderer immigration and was taken up from Pennsylvania in the north to the Carolinas in the South (a few New Englanders hit on a similar idea and sent their own Borderers to colonize the mountains of New Hampshire). 很快,阿巴拉契亚策略成为了对移入边民的既定策略,北到宾夕法尼亚,南到卡罗莱纳的殖民地都加以采纳(几个新英格兰殖民地也想出了相似的办法,把他们自己的边民打发到新罕布什尔的群山去殖民)。 So the Borderers all went to Appalachia and established their own little rural clans there and nothing at all went wrong except for the entire rest of American history. 所以边民们都去了阿巴拉契亚,建立了他们自己的小群农村宗族,一切都相安无事,除了整个美国历史被大大影响。 INTERESTING BORDERER FACTS: 关于边民的有趣事实: 1. Colonial opinion on the Borderers differed within a very narrow range: one Pennsylvanian writer called them “the scum of two nations”, another Anglican clergyman called them “the scum of the universe”. 对边民,殖民地人们的看法相去不远:一个宾夕法尼亚作家把他们叫做“两个国家之间的渣滓”,另一个国教会牧师把他们叫做“宇宙的渣滓”。 2. Some Borderers tried to come to America as indentured servants, but after Virginian planters got some experience with Borderers they refused to accept any more. 一些边民试图以契约仆人身份来美国,但是在弗吉尼亚种植园主得到了一些关于边民的教训后,他们不再接收边民。 3. The Borderers were mostly Presbyterians, and their arrival en massestarted a race among the established American denominations to convert them. This was mostly unsuccessful; Anglican preacher Charles Woodmason, an important source for information about the early Borderers, said that during his missionary activity the Borderers “disrupted his service, rioted while he preached, started a pack of dogs fighting outside the church, loosed his horse, stole his church key, refused him food and shelter, and gave two barrels of whiskey to his congregation before a service of communion”. 边民们大部分是长老会信徒,他们的成群到达开启了一场其他既有美国宗派转化他们的竞赛。基本上,这是不成功的;国教会传道人 Charles Woodmason是研究早期边民的重要资料来源。他说在他的传道活动期间,边民“打断他的侍奉,在其讲道时作乱,在教会外面斗狗,放了他的马,偷了他的教堂钥匙,拒绝给他食物和住宿,在一次擘饼聚会时,给他的会众两桶威士忌。 4. Borderer town-naming policy was very different from the Biblical names of the Puritans or the Ye Olde English names of the Virginians. Early Borderer settlements include – just to stick to the creek-related ones – Lousy Creek, Naked Creek, Shitbritches Creek, Cuckold’s Creek, Bloodrun Creek, Pinchgut Creek, Whipping Creek, and Hangover Creek. There were also Whiskey Springs, Hell’s Half Acre, Scream Ridge, Scuffle town, and Grab town. The overall aesthetic honestly sounds a bit Orcish. 边民的集镇命名规则非常不同于清教徒的圣经命名法,或者弗吉尼亚人的仿古英文命名法。早期边民殖民点中和溪流有关的名字有——糟糕溪,裸露溪,烂裤衩溪,戴绿帽溪,流血溪,吃不饱溪,鞭打溪,以及宿醉溪。当然,也有威士忌泉,地狱半英亩,尖叫岭,混战镇,揪住镇。总体审美的确听来有些野蛮。 5. One of the first Borderer leaders was John Houston. On the ship over to America, the crew tried to steal some of his possessions; Houston retaliated by leading a mutiny of the passengers, stealing the ship, and sailing it to America himself. He settled in West Virginia; one of his descendants was famous Texan Sam Houston. 第一代边民的领袖之一是约翰·休斯顿。在来美国的船上,船员试图偷窃他的财产;作为报复,他领导乘客发动事变,劫持了船,自己航行到美国。他在西弗吉尼亚安顿下来,后代之一,就是著名的德州佬山姆·休斯顿。 6. Traditional Borderer prayer: “Lord, grant that I may always be right, for thou knowest I am hard to turn.” 传统的边民祷词:“上帝,让我一直都走对路吧,因为你最清楚,我是难以回转的。” 7. “The back country folk bragged that one interior county of North Carolina had so little ‘larnin’ that the only literate inhabitant was elected ‘county reader'” “荒野的乡民吹嘘北卡的一个内陆郡是如此的缺乏‘蚊化’,以至于唯一识字的定居者被选为“‘郡阅读员’”。 8. The Borderer accent contained English, Scottish, and Irish elements, and is (uncoincidentally) very similar to the typical “country western singer” accent of today. 边民的口音包括了英格兰、苏格兰和爱尔兰元素,而且并非巧合,它和今天的“乡村西部歌手”腔调十分相似。 9. The Borderers were famous for family feuds in England, including the Johnson clan’s habit of “adorning their houses with the flayed skins of their enemies the Maxwells in a blood feud that continued for many generations”. The great family feuds of the United States, like the Hatfield-McCoy feud, are a direct descendent of this tradition. 边民在英格兰以家族世仇闻名,包括Johnson宗族的习惯:“在持续多代的血腥世仇中,用他们的敌人,Maxwells家族身上剥下来的皮装饰自己的房子”。在美国,大型的家族世仇,比如Hatfield家族与McCoy家族的世仇,则直接继承自这种传统。 10. Within-clan marriage was a popular Borderer tradition both in England and Appalachia; “in the Cumbrian parish of Hawkshead, for example, both the bride and the groom bore the same last names in 25 percent of all marriages from 1568 to 1704”. This led to the modern stereotype of Appalachians as inbred and incestuous. 在英格兰和阿巴拉契亚,宗族内婚都是边民流行的传统;“例如在Hawkshead的Cumbrian教区,从1568年到1704年,25%的新郎和新娘都有着相同的姓。”这导致了现代对阿巴拉契亚山民的刻板印象:近亲繁殖和内婚盛行。 11. The Borderers were extremely patriarchal and anti-women’s-rights to a degree that appalled even the people of the 1700s. 边民极端家长制,反对女权,其极端程度甚至吓坏了十八世纪的人们。 12. “In the year 1767, [Anglican priest] Charles Woodmason calculated that 94 percent of backcountry brides whom he had married in the past year were pregnant on their wedding day” “在1767年,国教会牧师Charles Woodmason统计,上一年度他主持结婚的乡下新娘中有94%在婚礼之日已经怀孕了。” 13. Although the Borderers started off Presbyterian, they were in constant religious churn and their territories were full of revivals, camp meetings, born-again evangelicalism, and itinerant preachers. Eventually most of them ended up as what we now call Southern Baptist. 虽然边民本来信长老会,但他们持续处于信仰流失中,而他们的领地上则充满了复兴、营会、重生福音主义和巡回布道者。最终,他们中大部分变成了我们现在所称的南方浸信会信徒。 14. Borderer folk beliefs: “If an old woman has only one tooth, she is a witch”, “If you are awake at eleven, you will see witches”, “The howling of dogs shows the presence of witches”, “If your shoestring comes untied, witches are after you”, “If a warm current of air is felt, witches are passing”. Also, “wet a rag in your enemy’s blood, put it behind a rock in the chimney, and when it rots your enemy will die”; apparently it was not a coincidence they were thinking about witches so much. 边民相信:“如果一个老妇人只有一颗牙,她就是个女巫”,“如果你在11点醒来,你会看到女巫”,“嚎叫的狗显示了女巫的存在”,“如果你的鞋带松了,女巫在跟着你”,“如果空气中有一股暖流,女巫正在经过”。而且,“用抹布沾湿敌人的血,把它放在烟囱里的一块石头后面,当它烂掉,你的敌人就会死了”;显然,他们如此多的考虑女巫,不是巧合。 15. Borderer medical beliefs: “A cure for homesickness is to sew a good charge of gunpowder on the inside of ths shirt near the neck”. That’ll cure homesickness, all right. 边民的医疗观念:“治疗思乡的方子是在衬衫靠近脖子的部位缝上大量火药”。好吧,这会治好乡愁。 16. More Borderer medical beliefs: “For fever, cut a black chicken open while alive and bind it to the bottom of your foot”, “Eating the brain of a screech owl is the only dependable remedy for headache”, “For rheumatism, apply split frogs to the feet”, “To reduce a swollen leg, split a live cat and apply while still warm”, “Bite the head off the first butterfly you see and you will get a new dress”, “Open the cow’s mouth and throw a live toad-frog down her throat. This will cure her of hollow-horn”. Also, blacksmiths protected themselves from witches by occasionally throwing live puppies into their furnaces. 边民的其他医疗观念:“如果发烧,活活剖开一只黑鸡,把它绑在你的脚底”,“吃掉尖叫猫头鹰的脑子是唯一可靠的治头痛药方”,“对风湿病,在脚上绑上撕开的青蛙”,“为了给腿消肿,劈开一只活猫,趁还温热敷上”,“把你见到的第一只蝴蝶的头拽掉,你会得到一件新裙子”,“把奶牛的嘴打开,扔一只活的癞蛤蟆到它喉咙里。这会治好它的空角病”。而且,铁匠们为了避免女巫的危害,会时不时把活着的小狗扔进他们的炉子里。 17. Rates of public schooling in the backcountry settled by the Borderers were “the lowest in British North America” and sometimes involved rituals like “barring out”, where the children would physically keep the teacher out of the school until he gave in and granted the students the day off. 边民乡村的公共学校入学率是“北美英国殖民地”中最低的,而且有些时候会发生“封门”的仪式,即孩子们会用身体阻挡教师进入学校,除非他让步并给学生们当天放假。 18. “Appalachia’s idea of a moderate drinker was the mountain man who limited himself to a single quart [of whiskey] at a sitting, explaining that more ‘might fly to my head’. Other beverages were regarded with contempt.” “阿巴拉契亚关于适度饮酒的理念是,一个山民会克制自己一次只喝一夸脱以下的威士忌,解释是喝更多‘也许会让我的脑袋发晕’。其他饮品则是被轻视的。” 19. A traditional backcountry sport was “rough and tumble”, a no-holds-barred form of wrestling where gouging out your opponent’s eyes was considered perfectly acceptable and in fact sound strategy. In 1772 Virginia had to pass a law against “gouging, plucking, or putting out an eye”, but this was the Cavalier-dominated legislature all the way on the east coast and nobody in the backcountry paid them any attention. Other traditional backcountry sports were sharpshooting and hunting. 一项传统的乡下运动是“混战”,一种无规则限制的摔角,在运动中挖掉对手的眼睛被认为是完全可以接受,且实际上非常有效的策略。在1772年弗吉尼亚被迫通过一项法律反对“抠,挖,挤出眼球”,但这是骑士党主导的法律,只在东海岸有效,在阿巴拉契亚的山民根本不理会。另一项传统的乡下运动则是射击和打猎。 20. The American custom of shooting guns into the air to celebrate holidays is 100% Borderer in origin. 美国向天鸣枪庆祝节日的传统100%来自于山民。 21. The justice system of the backcountry was heavy on lynching, originally a race-neutral practice and named after western Virginian settler William Lynch. 山民地区的法律体系非常依赖于私刑审判,这种做法(原本并无种族倾向)即以西弗吉尼亚殖民者William Lynch得名。【编注:lynch一词在内战后常常特指美国南方白人种族主义者针对黑人的私刑。22. Scottish Presbyterians used to wear red cloth around their neck to symbolize their religion; other Englishmen nicknamed them “rednecks”. This maybe the origin of the popular slur against Americans of Borderer descent, although many other etiologies have been proposed. “Cracker” as a slur is attested as early as 1766 by a colonist who says the term describes backcountry men who are great boasters; other proposed etymologies like slaves talking about “whip-crackers” seem to be spurious. 苏格兰长老会教徒曾在脖子周遭围上红布来象征他们的宗教;其他英国人昵称其为“红脖”。这也许是这一对美国边民后裔的流行贬称的起源,虽然有很多其他的语源学解释也被提出过。“大话精”则是另一个贬称,验证发现,早在1766年一个殖民者曾以该词表示边民们中的吹牛者;其他语源学解释包括奴隶们谈到的“挥鞭子的人”,看来是谬误的。 This is not to paint the Borderers as universally poor and dumb – like every group, they had an elite, and some of their elite went on to become some of America’s most important historical figures. Andrew Jackson became the first Borderer president, behaving exactly as you would expect the first Borderer president to behave, and he was followed by almost a dozen others. Borderers have also been overrepresented in America’s great military leaders, from Ulysses Grant through Teddy Roosevelt (3/4 Borderer despite his Dutch surname) to George Patton to John McCain. 并不是说边民普遍贫穷愚笨——如同每个群体一样,他们也有精英,有些精英成了美国史上最重要的历史人物之一。Andrew Jackson成为第一任边民总统,其作为和你预期的第一任边民总统会做的一样,他之后又有十多个边民总统。边民在美国伟大军事领袖中的比例也高得过分,从尤利西斯·格兰特到泰迪·罗斯福(3/4的边民血统,虽然他有个荷兰裔姓氏),再到乔治·巴顿,再到约翰·麦凯恩。 The Borderers really liked America – unsurprising given where they came from – and started identifying as American earlier and more fiercely than any of the other settlers who had come before. Unsurprisingly, they strongly supported the Revolution – Patrick Henry (“Give me liberty or give me death!”) was a Borderer. They also also played a disproportionate role in westward expansion. 边民真的很爱美国——考虑到他们来自何处,这不奇怪——而且他们产生美国人的自我认同比其他在他们之前到的殖民者更早,程度更强烈。并不奇怪的是,他们强烈支持独立革命——Patrick Henry(“不自由,宁毋死!”)是个边民。他们也在西进运动中发挥了不成比例的重要作用。 After the Revolution, America made an almost literal 180 degree turn and the “backcountry” became the “frontier”. It was the Borderers who were happiest going off into the wilderness and fighting Indians, and most of the famous frontiersmen like Davy Crockett were of their number. This was a big part of the reason the Wild West was so wild compared to, say, Minnesota (also a frontier inhabited by lots of Indians, but settled by Northerners and Germans) and why it inherited seemingly Gaelic traditions like cattle rustling. 革命后,美国实际上是180度转向,“内地”变成了“边疆”。对于深入荒野,和印第安人战斗,边民是最开心的,大部分著名的边疆拓荒者如Davy Crockett即是其中一员。很大程度上,这就是为什么狂野西部是如此狂野,相比于比如说明尼苏达(也是个有很多印第安人定居的边疆地带,但是由北方人和德国裔开拓殖民),这也解释了为何西部有套小牛的传统,这疑似是苏格兰盖尔人的传统。 Their conception of liberty has also survived and shaped modern American politics: it seems essentially to be the modern libertarian/Republican version of freedom from government interference, especially if phrased as “get the hell off my land”, and especially especially if phrased that way through clenched teeth while pointing a shotgun at the offending party. 他们的自由观念也存留下来并塑造了美国的政治:它看起来基本上是现代自由意志主义者/共和党版本的免于政府干涉的自由,特别是“滚出我的土地”这句话,尤其是这话以咬牙切齿的腔调说出,伴着指向入侵者的霰弹枪的时候。 III. This is all interesting as history and doubly interesting as anthropology, but what relevance does it have for later American history and the present day? 这些从历史学上来说,很有意思,从人类学角度来说,更有意思。但是这些和美国之后的历史以及今天又什么关系吗? One of my reasons reading this book was to see whether the link between Americans’ political opinions and a bunch of their other cultural/religious/social traits (a “Blue Tribe” and “Red Tribe”) was related to the immigration patterns it describes. I’m leaning towards “probably”, but there’s a lot of work to be done in explaining how the split among these four cultures led to a split among two cultures in the modern day, and with little help from the book itself I am going to have to resort to total unfounded speculation. 我读这本书的理由之一,是想看看美国政治观点和一系列文化/宗教/社会特质(“红部落”和“蓝部落”)是否和该书描述的移民模式相关。我倾向“很可能”这一结论,但是还需要大量的工作来解释这四种文化之分裂是如何导致今日的两种文化之分裂,而且接下来我将要不依赖这本书的帮助,诉诸未经验证的大胆猜想。 But the simplest explanation – that the Puritans and Quakers merged into one group (“progressives”, “Blue Tribe”, “educated coastal elites”) and the Virginians and Borderers into another (“conservatives”, “Red Tribe”, “rednecks”) – has a lot going for it. 然而最简单的解释有很大的说服力——清教徒和贵格会融合成了一个团体(“进步派”,“蓝部落”,“受过教育的东西岸精英”),而弗吉尼亚人和边民则汇聚成另一个(“保守派”,“红部落”,“红脖子”)。 Many conservatives I read like to push the theory that modern progressivism is descended from the utopian Protestant experiments of early America – Puritanism and Quakerism – and that the civil war represents “Massachusetts’ conquest of America”. I always found this lacking in rigor: Puritanism and Quakerism are sufficiently different that positing a combination of them probably needs more intellectual work than just gesturing at “you know, that Puritan/Quaker thing”. 我所读到的很多保守派喜欢这一理论:现代进步主义来自于早期乌托邦式的新教实验——清教主义和贵格主义——而内战则代表“‘马萨诸塞’”征服了美国”。我总是发现这个说法缺乏严谨:清教主义和贵格主义有很大的不同,把他们合并起来很可能需要更多的智力工作,而不是仅仅陈述“你知道的,清教徒/贵格会的那套”。 But the idea of a Puritan New England and a Quaker-(ish) Pennsylvania gradually blending together into a generic “North” seems plausible, especially given the high levels of interbreeding between the two (some of our more progressive Presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, were literally half-Puritan and half-Quaker). 但是一个清教徒的新英格兰和一个贵格会的宾夕法尼亚逐渐融合在一起,被统称为“北方”,这一说法似乎有道理,尤其是考虑到两个群体之间很高的通婚率(我们一些更偏进步派的总统,包括亚伯拉罕·林肯,实际上是半清教徒半贵格会血统)。 Such a merge would combine the Puritan emphasis on moral reform, education, and a well-ordered society with the Quaker doctrine of niceness, tolerance, religious pluralism, individual conscience, and the Inner Light. It seems kind of unfair to just mix-and-match the most modern elements of each and declare that this proves they caused modernity, but there’s no reason that couldn’t have happened. 这种融合把清教徒对道德改革、教育和有序社会的强调,以及贵格会友善、容忍、宗教多元、个人良心和内在灵性之光的教义结合了起来。把两个宗派最现代化的元素混合对应起来,然后宣称这证明了他们导致了现代性,这似乎有点不公平,但是没有理由否定,这可能发生。 The idea of Cavaliers and Borderers combining to form modern conservativism is buoyed by modern conservativism’s obvious Border influences, but complicated by its lack of much that is recognizably Cavalier – the Republican Party is hardly marked by its support for a hereditary aristocracy of gentlemen. 骑士党和边民结合形成了现代保守主义这一看法,被现代保守主义明显受边民影响所支持。但更复杂的是,它缺乏可以被辨认为骑士党文化的成分——共和党在支持绅士们的世袭贵族政治方面并不突出。 Here I have to admit that I don’t know as much about Southern history as I’d like. In particular, how were places like Alabama, Mississippi, et cetera settled? Most sources I can find suggest they were set up along the Virginia model of plantation-owning aristocrats, but if that’s true how did the modern populations come to so embody Fischer’s description of Borderers? In particular, why are they so Southern Baptist and not very Anglican? 这里我不得不承认,我所知的南方历史,并不如我渴望的那么多。特别是,像阿拉巴马,密西西比这些地方是如何被开发的?我所找到的大部分资料都暗示,他们是按照弗吉尼亚那种拥有种植园的贵族模式发展,但是如果这是真的,为何现代这片土地上的人口和Fischer描述的边民如此相似?特别是,为什么他们如此倾向于南方浸信会,而不是国教会? And what happened to all of those indentured servants the Cavaliers brought over after slavery put them out of business? What happened to that whole culture after the Civil War destroyed the plantation system? My guess is going to be that the indentured servants and the Borderer population mixed pretty thoroughly, and that this stratum was hanging around providing a majority of the white bodies in the South while the plantation owners were hogging the limelight – but I just don’t know. 而所有那些骑士党带来的契约仆人在被奴隶取代而不再做仆人后,又经历了什么?在内战毁灭了南方种植园系统后,整个文化经历了什么?我的猜想是契约仆人和边民人口深度融合,而这个阶层蔓延开来,构成了南方白人的主体,而与此同时种植园主们则吸引了太多关注——但是我就是不知道。 A quick argument that I’m not totally making all of this up: 以下的简易论证并非纯属编造: This is a map of voting patterns by county in the 2012 Presidential election. The blue areas in the South carefully track the so-called “black belt” of majority African-American areas. The ones in the Midwest are mostly big cities. Aside from those, the only people who vote Democrat are New England (very solidly!) and the Delaware Valley region of Pennsylvania. albion1 这是2012年总统大选在郡层面的投票模式的地图。蓝色区域在南方精确地分布在大量非裔美国人聚居的所谓“黑带”上。在中西部的蓝色基本上是大城市。除了这些,选民主党的人只有新英格兰人(支持度很高!)和宾州德拉威尔河谷地区。 In fact, you can easily see the distinction between the Delaware Valley settled by Quakers in the east, and the backcountry area settled by Borderers in the west. Even the book’s footnote about how a few Borderers settled in the mountains of New Hampshire is associated with a few spots of red in the mountains of New Hampshire ruining an otherwise near-perfect Democratic sweep of the north. 事实上,你能一眼看出,贵格会开拓的东部德拉威尔河谷和边民开拓的西部区域之间的区别。即便是书中脚注提到的少量边民移居新罕布尔州群山也能对应图中新罕布尔州群山中的几个红点,如果不是这几个红点,民主党在北方就拥有了完美的全胜。 One anomaly in this story is a kind of linear distribution of blue across southern Michigan, too big to be explained solely by the blacks of Detroit. But a quick look at Wikipedia’s History of Michigan finds: 这个故事中的一个异常就是在南密歇根存在一种线性分布的蓝色,面积太大,不能仅用底特律的黑人来解释。但是快速浏览维基百科上密歇根的历史条目就会发现: In the 1820s and 1830s migrants from New England began moving to what is now Michigan in large numbers (though there was a trickle of New England settlers who arrived before this date). These were “Yankee” settlers, that is to say they were descended from the English Puritans who settled New England during the colonial era….Due to the prevalence of New Englanders and New England transplants from upstate New York, Michigan was very culturally contiguous with early New England culture for much of its early history…The amount with which the New England Yankee population predominated made Michigan unique among frontier states in the antebellum period. Due to this heritage Michigan was on the forefront of the antislavery crusade and reforms during the 1840s and 1850s. 在1820年代到1830年代,来自新英格兰的移民大量移居到今日的密歇根(虽然有少量新英格兰开拓者在之前就移居此地)。这些是“扬基”开拓者,这意味着他们是在殖民地时期住在新英格兰的英国清教徒的后裔……因为新英格兰人众多,以及从纽约上州移入的新英格兰人,在它早期历史的相当长时间,密歇根在文化上和早期新英格兰文化很相近……新英格兰扬基人口的庞大数量使得密歇根在内战前时期边疆州当中与众不同。因为这种传统,密歇根站在1840年代和1850年代的废奴十字军和改革的前列。 Alhough I can’t find proof of this specifically, I know that Michigan was settled from the south up, and I suspect that these New England settlers concentrated in the southern regions and that the north was settled by a more diverse group of whites who lacked the New England connection. 虽然我不能发现专门的证据,我知道密歇根是从南方被开拓的,我怀疑新英格兰开拓者集中于南部区域,而北部则被更多元的白人群体开拓,这些人缺乏和新英格兰地区的联系。 Here’s something else cool. We can’t track Borderers directly because there’s no “Borderer” or “Scots-Irish” option on the US census. But Albion’s Seed points out that the Borderers were uniquely likely to identify as just “American” and deliberately forgot their past ancestry as fast as they could. 还有更有趣的发现。我们不能直接跟踪边民,因为在美国人口普查中没有“边民”或者“苏格兰人-爱尔兰人”的选项。但是《阿尔比安的种子》一书指出,边民特别倾向于自我认同为“美国人”,并故意尽快忘记自己过去的先祖。 Meanwhile, when the census asks an ethnicity question about where your ancestors came from, every year some people will stubbornly ignore the point of the question and put down “America” (no, this does not track the distribution of Native American population). Here’s a map of so-called “unhyphenated Americans”, taken from this site: 同时,当普查问及关于你先祖来自何处的族裔问题时,每年都有一些人顽固的忽略这一问题的目的,而填上“美国”(不,这并不能代表印第安人的分布)。下面是所谓的“纯粹的美国人”的地图,来自这个网站。 albion2 We see a strong focus on the Appalachian Mountains, especially West Virginia, Tennesee, and Kentucky, bleeding into the rest of the South. Aside from west Pennsylvania, this is very close to where we would expect to find the Borderers. Could these be the same groups? 我们看到了该人群在阿巴拉契亚山脉区域有很高的密度,尤其是西弗吉尼亚,田纳西,和肯塔基,延伸到南方其他地区。除了西宾夕法尼亚之外,这和我们预期能发现边民的地区非常接近。这些可能是相同的人群吗? Meanwhile, here is a map of where Obama underperformed the usual Democratic vote worst in 2008: 同时,这里还有奥巴马在08年民主党选举中表现最差的地区的一张地图: albion3 These maps are small and lossy, and surely unhyphenatedness is not an exact proxy for Border ancestry – but they are nevertheless intriguing. You may also be interested in the Washington Post’s correlation between distribution of unhyphenated Americans and Trump voters, or the Atlantic’s article on Trump and Borderers. 这些地图也许小且模糊,而且纯种美国人认同也不是边民先祖的精确表征——但是它们仍然十分吸引人。你也许会对《华盛顿邮报》在纯种美国人分布和川普支持者之间相关性的报道感兴趣,还有《大西洋月刊》关于川普和边民的文章。 If I’m going to map these cultural affiliations to ancestry, do I have to walk back on my previous theory that they are related to class? Maybe I should. But I also think we can posit complicated interactions between these ideas. Consider for example the interaction between race and class; a black person with a white-sounding name, who speaks with a white-sounding accent, and who adopts white culture (eg listens to classical music, wears business suits) is far more likely to seem upper-class than a black person with a black-sounding name, a black accent, and black cultural preferences; a white person who seems black in some way (listens to hip-hop, wears baggy clothes) is more likely to seem lower-class. This doesn’t mean race and class are exactly the same thing, but it does mean that some races get stereotyped as upper-class and others as lower-class, and that people’s racial identifiers may change based on where they are in the class structure. 如果我把这些文化偏好对应到祖先谱系,我是否也不得不回到我之前的理论上,即这些和阶层有关?也许我应该这么做。但是我也认为我们应该注意这些看法之间的交互作用。比如考虑一下种族和阶层的交互关系;一个黑人带着一个白人式的名字,带白人口音,适应了白人文化(比如听古典音乐,穿西装),则比取黑人名、带黑人口音、偏好黑人文化的黑人更可能是上等阶级;一个某方面像黑人的白人(听嘻哈,穿松垮的衣服)则更可能属于底层。这并不是说种族和阶层完全是一码事,但是这说明一些族群给人的固定印象是上层,另一些是底层,而基于人们在阶层结构中位置,人们的和种族相关的特征可能会变化。 I think something similar is probably going on with these forms of ancestry. The education system is probably dominated by descendents of New Englanders and Pennsylvanians; they had an opportunity to influence the culture of academia and the educated classes more generally, they took it, and now anybody of any background who makes it into that world is going to be socialized according to their rules. Likewise, people in poorer and more rural environments will be surrounded by people of Borderer ancestry and acculturated by Borderer cultural products and end up a little more like that group. As a result, ethnic markers have turned into and merged with class markers in complicated ways. 我认为族裔血统的构成中,很可能发生了相似的事情。教育系统很可能被新英格兰人和宾夕法尼亚人把持,他们更有机会普遍地影响学术界的文化和受教育阶层,他们把握了这个机会,现在任何背景的人,要进入他们的世界,都会按照他们的规则被社会化。相似的,更穷和更乡村化的人,被边民的先祖和边民文化的产物包围,最终变得有点像这个群体。结果,族裔标志以种种复杂的方式转化成了阶层标志并与之融合。 Indeed, some kind of acculturation process has to have been going on, since most of the people in these areas today are not the descendents of the original settlers. But such a process seems very likely. Just to take an example, most of the Jews I know (including my own family) came into the country via New York, live somewhere on the coast, and have very Blue Tribe values. But Southern Jews believed in the Confederacy as strongly as any Virginian – see for example Judah Benjamin. And Barry Goldwater, a half-Jew raised in Arizona, invented the modern version of conservativism that seems closest to some Borderer beliefs. 的确,某种同化过程一定发生过,因为这些地区今天的大部分人并不是初代开拓者的后代。但是这样一个过程很可能发生。仅举一个例子,大部分我所认识的犹太人(包括我自己的家庭),从纽约来到这个国家,生活在靠海岸的某处,拥有蓝色的价值观。但是南方犹太人曾和任何弗吉尼亚人一样,相信南部邦联——可以参考Judah Benjamin的例子。而且Barry Goldwater,一个长在亚利桑那的半血犹太人,发明了现代版本的保守主义,其观点看起来最接近一些边民信仰。 All of this is very speculative, with some obvious flaws. What do we make of other countries like Britain or Germany with superficially similar splits but very different histories? Why should Puritans lose their religion and sexual prudery, but keep their interest in moralistic reform? There are whole heaps of questions like these. 所有这些都是很大胆的假设,带有一些明显的缺陷。对于英国或者德国,这些国家表面上有类似的分裂,但是有很不同的历史,我们如何来解释呢?为什么清教徒失去了他们的宗教和在性上的规矩,但是仍然在道德改革上保持兴趣?还有一大堆类似的问题。 But look. Before I had any idea about any of this, I wrote that American society seems divided into two strata, one of which is marked by emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, academic/financial jobs, and Democratic party affiliation, and furthermore that this group was centered in the North. 但是看看,在我有这些想法之前,我就曾写道美国社会看来被分裂成两层,其中之一有以下特征:重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容,很低的未成年怀孕率,学术和财经工作,以及支持民主党,而且这个群体以北方为中心。 Meanwhile, now I learn that the North was settled by two groups that when combined have emphasis on education, interest in moral reforms, racial tolerance, low teenage pregnancy, an academic and mercantile history, and were the heartland of the historical Whigs and Republicans who preceded the modern Democratic Party. 同时,我现在知道了北方曾被两个团体所开拓,两个群体结合起来,拥有以下特征:重视教育、道德变革、种族宽容,很低的未成年怀孕率 ,具有学术和商业历史,而且是历史上辉格党和共和党(后来的地位被现代的民主党取代)的核心地域。 And I wrote about another stratum centered in the South marked by poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high teenage pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, country western music, and support for the Republican Party. And now I learn that the South was settled by a group noted even in the 1700s for its poor education, gun culture, culture of violence, xenophobia, high premarital pregnancy, militarism, patriotism, accent exactly like the modern country western accent, and support for the Democratic-Republicans who preceded the modern Republican Party. 我还写到过另一个集中于南方的阶层,它以教育贫乏,枪文化,暴力文化,排外,高未成年人怀孕率,军国主义,爱国主义,西部乡村音乐,和支持共和党为特征。现在我知道,开拓南方的群体,在18世纪就以教育的贫乏, 枪文化,暴力文化,排外,高未成年人怀孕率,尚武精神,爱国主义,接近现代西部乡村的口音,以及支持民主-共和党为特征(后来地位被现代的共和党取代)。 If this is true, I think it paints a very pessimistic world-view. The “iceberg model” of culture argues that apart from the surface cultural features we all recognize like language, clothing, and food, there are deeper levels of culture that determine the features and institutions of a people: whether they are progressive or traditional, peaceful or warlike, mercantile or self-contained. 如果这是真的,我认为这给出了一个非常悲观的世界图景。文化的“冰山模型”认为,撇开我们都能识别的文化表面特征,例如语言、衣着、和食物,存在更深层次的文化,它们决定了上述特征和人们的制度:决定他们是进步的还是传统的,和平的还是好战的,爱经商的还是自给自足的。 We grudgingly acknowledge these features when we admit that maybe making the Middle East exactly like America in every way is more of a long-term project than something that will happen as soon as we kick out the latest dictator and get treated as liberators. Part of us may still want to believe that pure reason is the universal solvent, that those Afghans will come around once they realize that being a secular liberal democracy is obviously great. 当我们承认也许让中东在每一方面都变成和美国一样是一个长期过程,而不是如我们把最近的独裁者赶下台,像解放者般被接待那么快,我们就是在勉强承认这些文化特征的存在。我们中的部分人还想相信纯粹理性是普遍适用的答案,只要阿富汗人意识到一个世俗化的自由主义的民主制度明显很棒,他们就会觉醒。 But we keep having deep culture shoved in our face again and again, and we don’t know how to get rid of it. This has led to reasonable speculation that some aspects of it might even be genetic – something which would explain a lot, though not its ability to acculturate recent arrivals. 但是我们已经一而再地被深层文化打脸,我们不知道如何摆脱它。这导致了合理的猜想,深层文化的某方面可能是遗传性的——这可以解释很多事情,虽然这个因素不能解释其同化最近的新来者的能力。 This is a hard pill to swallow even when we’re talking about Afghanistan. But it becomes doubly unpleasant when we think about it in the sense of our neighbors and fellow citizens in a modern democracy. What, after all, is the point? A democracy made up of 49% extremely liberal Americans and 51% fundamentalist Taliban Afghans would be something very different from the democratic ideal; even if occasionally a super-charismatic American candidate could win over enough marginal Afghans to take power, there’s none of the give-and-take, none of the competition within the marketplace of ideas, that makes democracy so attractive. Just two groups competing to dominate one another, with the fact that the competition is peaceful being at best a consolation prize. 即便我们讨论的是阿富汗,这也是一枚难以下咽的药丸。但如果我们从现代民主制中我们的邻舍和公民同胞的角度来考虑这个问题时,难受程度又要翻倍。这到底有什么意义?一个由49%的极端自由派的美国人和51%的基本教义派的阿富汗塔利班组成的民主制恐怕和民主典范非常不同;即使有时,一个很有人格魅力的美国候选人能赢得足够的阿富汗人摇摆票,获得权力,这里也没有讨价还价,没有思想市场的竞争,而正是这些因素才使得民主制如此有吸引力。只剩两个团体相互竞争来统治对方,事实上,如果竞争是和平的,就已经是谢天谢地了。 If America is best explained as a Puritan-Quaker culture locked in a death-match with a Cavalier-Borderer culture, with all of the appeals to freedom and equality and order and justice being just so many epiphenomena – well, I’m not sure what to do with that information. 如果美国可以很好地被解释成一种清教徒-贵格会文化,和一种骑士党-边民文化锁在一起的拼死对决,并且所有对自由,平等,秩序,正义的呼求仅是众多附带现象——那么我不确定该如何处理这个信息。 Push it under the rug? Say “Well, my culture is better, so I intend to do as good a job dominating yours as possible?” Agree that We Are Very Different Yet In The End All The Same And So Must Seek Common Ground? Start researching genetic engineering? Maybe secede? 把它藏在桌布下?说“好,我的文化更好,所以我打算竭尽全力做做好事,来统治你?”同意我们是非常不同的,但最终我们会变得一样,所以我们必须寻求共同立场?开始研究基因工程?也许独立分裂? I’m not a Trump fan much more than I’m an Osama bin Laden fan; if somehow Osama ended up being elected President, should I start thinking “Maybe that time we made a country that was 49% people like me and 51% members of the Taliban –maybe that was a bad idea“. 我不是个川普粉,就像我不是奥萨马·本·拉登粉丝一样;如果不知何故,本·拉登当选了总统,我应该开始思考“也许那时候我们由49%的像我这样的人和51%的塔利班组成了一个国家——也许这是一个坏主意”。 I don’t know. But I highly recommend Albion’s Seed as an entertaining and enlightening work of historical scholarship which will be absolutely delightful if you don’t fret too much over all of the existential questions it raises. 我不知道。但是我高度推荐《阿尔比安的种子》这本富有娱乐性和启发性的历史学著作。如果你没有过多地被它引起的实在性问题吓到,读它绝对会是非常愉悦的。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]文化与生物性如何协同进化

HOW CULTURE DROVE HUMAN EVOLUTION
A Conversation with Joseph Henrich 
文化如何推动人类进化:与Joseph Henrich对话

时间:@ 2012-09-04
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说)
来源:https://www.edge.org/conversation/joseph_henrich-how-culture-drove-human-evolution

Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution. 

导言:我的研究课题之一就是要让人们相信,我们应该停止以常见的方式在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们应该将整件事情当作生物进化过程来看待。

JOSEPH HENRICH is an anthropologist and Professor of Psychology and Economics. He is the Canada Research Chair in Culture, Cognition and Coevolution at University of British Columbia.

约瑟夫·亨里奇是一名人类学家,同时还担任心理学与经济学教授。他还是英属哥伦比亚大学(UBC)文化、认知和协同进化“加拿大首席研究员”。

[JOSEPH HENRICH:] The main questions I’ve been asking myself over the last couple years are broadly about how culture drove human evolution. Think back to when humans first got the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution—and by this I mean the ability for ideas to accumulate over generations, to get an increasingly complex tool starting from something simple. One generation adds a few things to it, the next generation adds a few more things, and the next generation, until it’s so complex that no one in the first generation could have invented it.

约瑟夫·亨里奇:过去几年,我反复追问自己的一个主要问题,大体上就是文化如何推动人类进化。我会回溯至人类刚刚获得累积性的文化进化能力的时候。我说的这种能力是指,观念在代际间不断积累,从很简单的东西发展出日益复杂的工具的能力。一代人添加一点点东西,下一代人又添加一点点东西,如此接力,直到最后得出的工具无比复杂,以至第一代人无论如何不可能发明出来。

This was a really important line in human evolution, and we’ve begun to pursue this idea called the cultural brain hypothesis—this is the idea that the real driver in the expansion of human brains was this growing cumulative body of cultural information, so that what our brains increasingly got good at was the ability to acquire information, store, process and retransmit this non genetic body of information.

这在人类进化中确实是非常重要的一条线索,我们现在已经开始探究一种叫做文化大脑假说的观点,这种观点认为,人脑增大的真正动力就是,文化信息以这种方式不断累积,由此导致我们的大脑越来越善于获取信息,存储、处理和传递这种非基因信息体。

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The two systems begin interacting over time, and the most important selection pressures over the course of human evolution are the t(more...)

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HOW CULTURE DROVE HUMAN EVOLUTION A Conversation with Joseph Henrich  文化如何推动人类进化:与Joseph Henrich对话 时间:@ 2012-09-04 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:慕白(@李凤阳他说) 来源:https://www.edge.org/conversation/joseph_henrich-how-culture-drove-human-evolution Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution.  导言:我的研究课题之一就是要让人们相信,我们应该停止以常见的方式在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们应该将整件事情当作生物进化过程来看待。 JOSEPH HENRICH is an anthropologist and Professor of Psychology and Economics. He is the Canada Research Chair in Culture, Cognition and Coevolution at University of British Columbia. 约瑟夫·亨里奇是一名人类学家,同时还担任心理学与经济学教授。他还是英属哥伦比亚大学(UBC)文化、认知和协同进化“加拿大首席研究员”。 [JOSEPH HENRICH:] The main questions I've been asking myself over the last couple years are broadly about how culture drove human evolution. Think back to when humans first got the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution—and by this I mean the ability for ideas to accumulate over generations, to get an increasingly complex tool starting from something simple. One generation adds a few things to it, the next generation adds a few more things, and the next generation, until it's so complex that no one in the first generation could have invented it. 约瑟夫·亨里奇:过去几年,我反复追问自己的一个主要问题,大体上就是文化如何推动人类进化。我会回溯至人类刚刚获得累积性的文化进化能力的时候。我说的这种能力是指,观念在代际间不断积累,从很简单的东西发展出日益复杂的工具的能力。一代人添加一点点东西,下一代人又添加一点点东西,如此接力,直到最后得出的工具无比复杂,以至第一代人无论如何不可能发明出来。 This was a really important line in human evolution, and we've begun to pursue this idea called the cultural brain hypothesis—this is the idea that the real driver in the expansion of human brains was this growing cumulative body of cultural information, so that what our brains increasingly got good at was the ability to acquire information, store, process and retransmit this non genetic body of information. 这在人类进化中确实是非常重要的一条线索,我们现在已经开始探究一种叫做文化大脑假说的观点,这种观点认为,人脑增大的真正动力就是,文化信息以这种方式不断累积,由此导致我们的大脑越来越善于获取信息,存储、处理和传递这种非基因信息体。

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The two systems begin interacting over time, and the most important selection pressures over the course of human evolution are the things that culture creates—like tools. Compared to chimpanzees, we have high levels of manual dexterity. We're good at throwing objects. We can thread a needle. There are  aspects of our brain that seem to be consistent with that as being an innate ability, but tools and artifacts (the kinds of things that one finds useful to throw or finds useful to manipulate) are themselves products of cultural evolution. 随着时间推移,两个系统开始相互作用。在人类进化的过程中,最重要的选择压力正是文化所生成的事物,比如工具。与黑猩猩相比,我们的手要灵巧得多,比如我们善于抛掷东西,我们能够穿针引线。我们大脑的某些方面与此高度协调,使得这种能力看上去似乎与生俱来,但工具和人工制品——那种我们觉得扔出去有用或操作起来有用的东西——本身则是文化进化的产物。 Another example here is fire and cooking. Richard Wrangham, for example, has argued that fire and cooking have been important selection pressures, but what often gets overlooked in understanding fire and cooking is that they're culturally transmitted—we're terrible at making fires actually. We have no innate fire-making ability. But once you got this idea for cooking and making fires to be culturally transmitted, then it created a whole new selection pressure that made our stomachs smaller, our teeth smaller, our gapes or holdings of our mouth smaller, it altered the length of our intestines. It had a whole bunch of downstream effects. 另外一个例子就是用火和烹饪。Richard Wrangham就提出,用火和烹饪一直都是非常重要的选择压力。但在看待用火和烹饪的问题上,经常容易忽略的一点是,它们实际是通过文化进行传递的——人类原本是不怎么会生火的。我们不具备生火的先天能力。但一旦烹饪和生火的观念通过文化得以传递,就创造出一种全新的选择压力,使我们的胃容量变小、牙齿变小、嘴能张开的幅度变小,一口能吃下的东西也变少,而且我们肠道的长度也发生改变。这就带来了一系列的下游效应。 Another area that we've worked on is social status. Early work on human status just took humans to have a kind of status that stems from non-human status. Chimps, other primates, have dominant status. The assumption for a long time was that status in humans was just a kind of human version of this dominant status, but if you apply this gene-culture co-evolutionary thinking, the idea that culture is one of the major selection pressures in human evolution, you come up with this idea that there might be a second kind of status. We call this status prestige. 我们研究的另一个领域是社会地位。有关人类社会地位的早期研究只是简单地假定,人类的地位有其非人类时期的根源。黑猩猩和其他灵长类社群中都有拥有宰制地位的个体。长期以来,人们假定,人类的地位属性只不过是动物群体中的宰制地位的人类版本。但如果运用这种“基因和文化协同进化”的观念,也就是说把文化作为人类进化中的一种主要选择压力,你就会意识到或许存在另外一种类型的地位。我们称其为“威望地位”。 This is the kind of status you get from being particularly knowledgeable or skilled in an area, and the reason it's a kind of status is because once animals, humans in this case, can learn from each other, they can possess resources. 当你在某个领域的知识特别丰富或技能特别熟练时,你就能得到这种地位。这之所以能成为一种地位,是因为一旦动物(此处就是人)能够彼此学习,它们自身便可拥有资源【编注:此句较绕口,意思是相互学习的可能性,使得个体所拥有的知识成为一种对他人也有价值的人力资源】。 You have information resources that can be tapped, and then you want to isolate the members of your group who are most likely to have a lot of this resources, meaning a lot of the knowledge or information that could be useful to you in the future. This causes you to focus on those individuals, differentially attend to them, preferentially listen to them and give them deference in exchange for knowledge that you get back, for copying opportunities in the future. 如果存在可资利用的信息资源,那你就会想把你所属团体之中最有可能拥有大量此类资源的人单独区分出来,这是一大堆你将来有可能用得上的知识或信息。这会促使你关注这些人,特别地留意他们,更乐于倾听他们的意见,敬重他们,以此作为从他们那里获得知识、在未来运用这些知识的回报。

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From this we've argued that humans have two separate kinds of status, dominance and prestige, and these have quite different ethologies. Dominance [ethology] is about physical posture, of size (large expanded chest the way you'd see in apes). Subordinates in dominance hierarchies are afraid. They back away. They look away, where as prestige hierarchies are quite the opposite. 基于此,我们认为人类存在两种不同类型的地位,分别是宰制和威望,分别对应着不同的动物行为学。宰制(行为学)核心在于身体块头的展示(你能在猿类身上看到的那种大块胸肌)。在宰制等级中,处于从属地位的个体会感到害怕。他们会退缩。他们不会正视上级,而在威望等级中情况则正好相反。 You're attracted to prestigious individuals. You want to be near them. You want to look at them, watch them, listen to them, and interact with them. We've done a bunch of experimental work here at UBC and shown that that pattern is consistent, and it leads to more imitation. There may be even specific hormonal profiles with the two kinds of status. 你会被有威望的个体所吸引。你渴望亲近他们。你渴望看着他们,观察他们,倾听他们,与他们交往。在UBC(不列颠哥伦比亚大学),我们已经就此做过一连串实验,证明了这种模式总是存在,而且会引发更多的模仿。这两种不同的地位可能还对应着各自不同的激素配置。 I've also been trying to think broadly, and some of the big questions are, exactly when did this body of cumulative cultural evolution get started? Lately I've been pursuing the idea that it may have started early: at the origins of the genus, 1.8 million years ago when Homo habilis or Homo erectus first begins to emerge in Africa. 此外,我也一直在试图思考一些更为宏大的问题,比如,这一累积性的文化进化体到底是从什么时候开始的?最近,我一直致力于澄清一个想法,那就是它可能开始得很早:很可能在人属出现时就开始了,也就是180万年前能人或直立人最早出现于非洲的时候。 Typically, people thinking about human evolution have approached this as a two-part puzzle, as if there was a long period of genetic evolution until either 10,000 years ago or 40,000 years ago, depending on who you're reading, and then only after that did culture matter, and often little or no consideration given to a long period of interaction between genes and culture. 通常,研究人类进化的人在处理这一问题时,会把它看作是一个“两部分谜题”,就好像从一开始直到距今1万或4万年以前(具体时间取决于你正在阅读谁的研究),曾经存在过一个长时段的基因进化,自此以后,文化才开始发挥作用。他们很少或根本不会考虑基因和文化之间曾长期相互作用这种情形。 Of course, the evidence available in the Paleolithic record is pretty sparse, so another possibility is that it emerged about 800,000 years ago. One theoretical reason to think that that might be an important time to emerge is that there's theoretical models that show that culture, our ability to learn from others, is an adaptation to fluctuating environments. If you look at the paleo-climatic record, you can see that the environment starts to fluctuate a lot starting about 900,000 years ago and going to about six or five hundred thousand years ago. 当然,我们能得到的旧石器时代证据相当少。因此,另一种可能性是,这一文化进化体开始于大约80万年前。这个时间点之所以成为一个重要的起源时间选项,一个理论依据在于,已经有理论模型表明,文化——即我们从他人身上学习的能力——是我们对持续的环境变动的一种适应。翻一翻古气候记录就会发现,环境大概在距今90万年前的时候开始剧烈变动,直到距今60或50万年前才消停。 This would have created a selection pressure for lots of cultural learning for lots of focusing on other members of your group, and taking advantage of that cumulative body of non-genetic knowledge. 这有可能创造出一种选择压力,催生了更多的文化学习,促使人更多关注团体中的其他成员,也促使人们更多地利用那种累积性的非基因的知识体。

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Another signature of cultural learning is regional differentiation and material culture, and you see that by about 400,000 years ago. So, you could have a kind of late emergence at 400,000 years ago. A middle guess would be 800,000 years ago based on the climate, and then the early guess would be, say, the origin of genus, 1.8 million years ago. 文化学习的另外一个鲜明特征是地区分化和物质文化,这一点在大约40万年前可以看到。所以还有一种说法,认为这一文化进化体始于40万年前。这一时间比较晚,持中的猜测则是基于气候的80万年前起源说,更早的猜测则是人属出现的时候,即180万年前。 Along these same lines, I've been trying to figure out what the ancestral ape would have looked like. We know that humans share a common ancestry with chimpanzees about five or six million years ago with chimpanzees and bonobos, and the question is, what kind of ape was that? 沿着同样的思考线索,我还一直试图弄清祖猿长成什么样子。我们知道,大概500万或600万年前,人类和黑猩猩、倭黑猩猩拥有共同的祖先,问题是,这是种什么样的猿? One possibility, and the typical assumption, is that the ape was more like a chimpanzee or a bonobo. But there's another possibility that it was a different kind of ape that we don't have in the modern world: a communal breeding ape that lives in family units rather than the kind of fission fusion you might see in chimpanzees, and that actually chimpanzees and bonobos took a separate turn, and that lineage eventually went to humans spurred off a whole bunch of different kinds of apes. In the Pliocene, we see lots of different kinds of apes in terms of different species of Australopithecus. 其中一种可能是,这种祖猿更像黑猩猩或倭黑猩猩,这也是通常的假设。但还有另外一种可能性,它们可能是一种当今世界已经不存在的完全不同的猿:一种以家庭为单位、合作繁殖的猿,而不是黑猩猩那种裂变融合群体【译注:指群体的规模和成员不断变动】,而且黑猩猩和倭黑猩猩实际上是往另外一个不同方向上演变了,而最终进化出人类的那一谱系则进化成为一系列不同种类的猿。在上新世,我们可以看到大量不同种类的猿,他们都是南猿的不同种。 I'm just beginning to get into that, and I haven't gotten very far, but I do have this strong sense that we now have evidence to suggest that humans were communal breeders, so that we lived in family groups maybe somewhat similar to the way gorillas live in family groups, and that this is a much better environment for the evolution of capacities for culture than typical in the chimpanzee model, because for cultural learning to really take off, you need more than one model. 我才刚刚开始研究这一问题,成果还不多,但我强烈地感觉到,我们现在已经有证据说人类曾是合作繁殖的,因此我们是生活于家庭群体之中的,某种程度上就像大猩猩现在的那种家庭群体生活一样。相比黑猩猩的那种模式,这一模式为文化能力进化提供的环境要好得多,因为文化学习要真正实现飞跃,必须得有多种模式。 You want a number of individuals in your social environment to be trying out different techniques—say different techniques for getting nuts or for finding food or for tracking animals. Then you need to pay attention to them so you can take advantage of the variation between them. If there's one member of your group who's doing it a little bit better, you preferentially learn from them, and then the next generation gets the best technique from the previous generation. 这需要你所在的社会环境中拥有许多个体去尝试各不相同的技术,比如说取出果仁或找到食物或追踪猎物的不同技术。然后你就需要细心关注他们,以便能充分利用他们彼此之间的差异变化。如果群体之中有一个成员比其他成员做得稍微好一点点,你就更乐于向他们学习,于是下一代就能从上一代学到最好的技术。 Other things I've been thinking about along these lines are just trying to think through all the different adaptations that would have resulted from this gene culture interaction. One thing that's been noted by a number of people is that humans are strangely good at long distance running. We seem to have long distance running adaptations. 沿着这条线索,我还在考虑其他一些问题,那就是基于这种基因与文化的相互作用,到底我们会出现哪些不同的适应性变化。其中许多人已经注意到的一点是,人类特别善于长距离奔跑,这一点相当令人诧异。我们身上似乎出现了长距离奔跑的适应性变化。 Our feet have a particular anatomy. We have sweat glands and we can run really far. Hunter-gatherers can chase down game by just running the antelope down until it collapses. We run marathons. We seem generally attracted to running, and the question is, how did we become such long distance runners? 我们的脚具有一种独特的生理构造。我们拥有汗腺,可以跑得很远。狩猎采集者要追捕羚羊的话,只需要追着它跑,直到猎物筋疲力尽自己倒下。我们能跑马拉松。我们似乎全都对跑步感兴趣。问题是,我们是如何变得这样善于长跑的呢? We don't see this in other kinds of animals. We think if it was an obvious adaptation, we'd see it recurring through nature, but only humans have it. The secret is that humans who don't know how to track animals, can't run them down, so you need to have a large body of tracking knowledge that allows you to interpret spoors and identify individual animals and track animals over long distances when you can't see the animal, and without that body of knowledge, we're not very good at running game down. 在其他动物身上,我们看不到这一点。我们认为,如果这是一种简单的适应,那我们就应该能在自然界中看到它重复出现,但这一现象只有人类身上有。这里的隐秘在于,如果有的人类不知道如何追踪猎物,那他就不可能尾随追捕,所以你需要拥有一大套的追踪知识,以便你能在看不到猎物的时候分析足迹,能正确辨识猎物个体并能长距离追踪到它。如果没有这一知识体系,我们是不善于把猎物追倒的。 There's an interaction between genes and culture. First you have to get the culturally transmitted knowledge about animal behavior and tracking and spoor knowledge and the ability to identify individuals, which is something you need to practice, and only after that can you begin to take advantage of long distance running techniques and being able to run animals down. 在基因与文化之间存在着相互作用。首先你需要拥有那套关于动物行为和追踪的知识、足迹知识和辨识猎物个体的能力,而这是通过文化传递的,是一种需要练习的东西,只有这样,你才能用上长跑技巧,才能把猎物追倒。 That's a potential source for figuring out the origins of capacities for culture, because to the degree that we have information about the anatomy of feet, we can use that to figure out when it started. The same idea follows from cooking and fire. Since we know that those are culturally transmitted now, when we begin to see evidence that that affected our anatomy, that gives us clues to the origins of our capacities for culture. 要弄清人类文化能力的起源,这是一个可以思考的方向,因为凭借对人类足部构造的了解,我们可以弄清文化进化开始的时间。同样的思路也可以用在烹饪和用火问题上。因为我们现已知道烹饪和用火都是通过文化传递的,因此,如果我们能够找到它们影响身体构造的证据,就有了探究我们的文化能力之起源的线索。

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Most recently I've been also thinking about the evolution of societal complexity. This is the emergence of complex societies that happens after the origins of agriculture, when societies begin to get big and complex and you have lots of interactions among strangers, large-scale cooperation, market exchange, militaries, division of labor, substantial division of labor. We have a sense of the sequence of events, but we don't have good process descriptions of how it was. What are the causal processes that bring these things about? 最近,我还在思考社会复杂性的进化问题。这里说的是农业起源之后复杂社会的出现,社会开始变大、变复杂,在其中你能看到陌生人之间的大量互动、大范围的合作、市场交换、军队、劳动分工、深度劳动分工。我们对这些事件的发生次序有所了解,但对于它们到底是如何发生的,我们还没能形成一个很好的过程描叙。引发这些事件的因果过程到底是什么样的? One of the ideas I've been pursuing is that after the origins of agriculture, there was an intense period that continues today of intergroup competition, which favors groups who have social norms and institutions that can more effectively expand the group while maintaining internal harmony, leading to the benefits of exchange, of the ability to maintain markets, of division of labor and of higher levels of cooperation. Then you get intense competition amongst the early farming groups, and this is going to favor those groups who have the abilities to expand. 我一直在思考的一个想法是,在农业出现之后,曾有过一个群体之间激烈竞争的时期,一直持续到现在。这种竞争使得拥有社会规范和制度、从而能够更有效地在扩张的同时维持内部和谐的一类群体脱颖而出,进而凸显出了交易、维持市场的能力、劳动分工和更高水平的合作所能带来的好处。早期农耕群体之间存在激烈竞争,那些拥有扩张能力的群体在这种竞争中更占优势。 You need to be precise about what you mean by these cultural traits and norms. I've worked in a couple of different areas on this, and one is religion. We just got a big grant to study the cultural evolution of religion with the idea being that the religions of modern societies are quite different than the religions we see in hunter gatherers and small scale societies, because they've been shaped by this process over millennia, and specifically they've been shaped in ways that galvanize cooperation in larger groups and sustained cooperation amongst non relatives. 在谈及文化特征和规范时,需要精确界定它们表达的意思。我在许多不同领域中都研究过这一问题,其中一个领域就是宗教。我们刚刚拿到一大笔资金,来研究宗教的文化进化,主要的观点就是,现代社会的宗教与狩猎采集群体和小规模社会中的宗教大不相同,因为它们已经被这一进程不断塑造了几千年,特别是,它们已经被塑造得能够有助于大规模群体中的合作,以及非亲属之间的持续合作。 The emergence of high-moralizing gods is an important example of this. In small-scale hunter-gatherer religions, the gods are typically whimsical. They're amoral. They're not concerned with your sexual behavior or your social behavior. Often you'll make bargains with them, but as we begin to move to the religions in more complex societies, we find that the gods are increasingly moralizing. They're concerned about exactly the kinds of things that are going to be a problem for running a large-scale society, like how you treat other members of your religious group or your ethnic group. 这方面的一个重要例子就是具有高度道德教化意义的神的出现。在小规模狩猎采集群体的宗教中,神通常都是反复无常的。它们是非道德的。它们并不关心你的性行为或社会行为。通常你会跟它们讨价还价。但在更为复杂的社会中,我们发现神会变得越来越具有道德教化意义。它们所关注的,恰好就是会对大规模社会运行构成麻烦的那一类事情,比如你如何对待同一宗教团体或本种族中的其他成员。 Experiments run at UBC and elsewhere have shown that when you remind atheists, it doesn't matter, but if you remind believers of their god, believers cheat less, and they're more pro social or fair in exchange tasks, and the kinds of exchange tasks that they're more pro social in are the ones with anonymous others, or strangers. UBC和其他一些地方所做的实验都表明,如果你提醒无神论者注意自己的言行,基本没有什么效果,但如果你提醒有神论者,并抬出他们的神,他们就会更少说谎,在参与交易时也会表现得更亲社会或更公平,而且他们在其中表现得更亲社会的这类交易,其对象都是匿名人士或陌生人。 These are the kinds of things you need to make a market run to have a successful division of labor. We've been pursuing that hypothesis and, in fact, we've just sent a number of psychologists and anthropologists to the field, and we'll be doing more of that in the coming years to do these kinds of experiments in a diverse range of societies, seeing if the moralizing gods of a variety of religions create these same kinds of effects. 这恰好是维持市场运转、成功维系劳动分工所需要的特征。我们近来一直在研究这个假说,事实上,我们不久前刚派出了一批心理学家和人类学家就此去做田野研究,未来几年还会加大力度,在大量不同社会群体中去做这类实验,以检验不同宗教中的教化性神是否都能造成以上同样的效果。

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We also think that ritual plays a role in this in that rituals seem to be sets of practices engineered by cultural evolution to be effective at transmitting belief and transmitting faith. By attending a ritual, you elevate the degree of belief in the high-moralizing gods or the priests of the religion by the ritual practice. If you break down rituals common in many religions, they put the words in the mouths of a prestigious member of the group, someone everyone respects. That makes it more likely to transmit and be believed. 我们还认为,仪式在文化进化中发挥了作用。仪式似乎是文化进化所创造出来的一整套行为,有助于信念和信仰的传递。通过参与仪式,你就能通过仪式行为提高对高度教化性的神或传教者的信仰程度。如果你分析一下在许多宗教中都能找到的仪式行为就会发现,它们会借群体中某个威望很高、大家都尊重的人物之口来宣之于众。这会令其更易传播、更可能被相信。 People also engage in what we call credibility-enhancing displays [during rituals]. These are costly things. It might be an animal sacrifice or the giving of a large sum of money or some kind of painful initiation rite like circumcision, which one would only engage in if one actually believed in it. It's a demonstration of true belief, which then makes the observers more likely to acquire the belief. (在仪式过程中,)人们也会参与我们称为“提升可信度”的行为。这是一种代价颇高的事情。可能是以动物献祭,或者捐出大笔钱财,或者是某种痛苦的加入仪式,比如割礼,这些事都是只有真正的信徒才会参与的,是真信仰的展示,并能增加旁观者接受这些信仰的可能性。 Speaking in unison, large congregations saying the same thing, this all taps our capacity for conformist transmission; the fact that we weight what everybody believes in deciding in what we believe. 齐声说话,大规模集会倾诉同样的内容,这些都是在利用人们实现从众传递的潜力——也就是说我们在选择自己要相信什么的时候会考虑其他人都相信些什么。 These seem to want to tap our cultural transmission abilities to deepen the faith, and one of the interesting kind of ways that this has developed is that high-moralizing gods will often require rituals of this kind, and then by forcing people to routinely do the rituals, they then guarantee that the next generation acquires a deepened faith in the god, and then the whole thing perpetuates itself. It creates a self-perpetuating cycle. 这就像是要利用文化传递能力来加深信仰,它发展出来的有趣方式之一是,高度教化性的神通常都要求执行这类仪式,通过强迫人们经常性地履行仪式,就能保证下一代人对神能够拥有更深一层的信仰,然后整套体系就能实现永续。它创造出了一个自我存续的循环。 We think religions are just one element, one way in which culture has figured out ways to expand the sphere of cooperation and allow markets to form and people to exchange and to maintain the substantial division of labor. 我们认为,文化已经发展出了许多方式来扩大合作领域、允许市场形成、促进人们之间的交易,并维持明确的劳动分工,而宗教只是其中之一。 One of the interesting things about the division of labor is that you're not going to specialize in a particular trade—maybe you make steel plows—unless you know that there are other people who are specializing in other kinds of trades which you need—say food or say materials for making housing, and you have to be confident that you can trade with them or exchange with them and get the other things you need. 关于劳动分工,有一点非常有趣:你要选择专门从事某一特定行业,比如打造铁犁具,这需要一个前提,那就是你得知道有人专门从事你对之有需求的其他一些行业,比如食品或建材,而且你需要确信,自己能与他们进行贸易或交换,能够得到你需要的其他东西。 There's a lot of risk in developing specialization because you have to be confident that there's a market there that you can engage with. Whereas if you're a generalist and you do a little bit of farming, a little bit of manufacturing, then you're much less reliant on the market. 发展专业分工有很大的风险,因为你必须确信存在一个你能够利用的市场。如果你是个多面手,能做一点农活,再从事一些制造,那么你对这个市场的依赖度就大幅降低。 Markets require a great deal of trust and a great deal of cooperation to work. Sometimes you get the impression from economics that markets are for self-interested individuals. They're actually the opposite. Self-interested individuals don't specialize, and they don't take it [to market], because there's all this trust and fairness that are required to make markets run with impersonal others. 市场的运转需要很高的信任和大量的合作。你会从经济学得知,市场是由自利的个体组成的。实际上正好相反。自利的个体没法专业化,不能形成市场,因为要使市场在素昧平生的陌路人之间运作,那需要非常高的信任和公平。

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In developing this line of thought, one of the things you need to be clear about is what you mean by culture and culture evolution. Culture is one of those terms that has lots of different meanings, and people have used it lots of different ways. In the intellectual tradition that I'm building on, culture is information stored in people's heads that gets there by some kind of social learning—so imitation, teaching, any kind of observational learning. 沿着这条思路想问题时,你需要清晰界定的事物之一就是文化和文化进化的含义。文化是那种带有很多不同含义的词汇,人们已经在用不同方式使用它。在我所背靠的智识传统中,文化指的是人们通过某种形式的社会化学习——如模仿、教育或任何形式的观察学习——而获得并储存在自己头脑中的信息。 We tend to think of cultural transmission, or at least many people think of cultural transmission as relying on language, but that's in part because in our culture, especially among academics, there tends to be a lot of talking, but in lots of small-scale societies, it's quite clear that there is a ton of cultural transmission that is just strictly by observational learning. 我们,或至少很多人,都倾向于认为文化传递是依赖语言的,但造成这种理解的部分原因在于,在我们的文化里,特别是在学术界,人们倾向于进行大量的语言交流,但是在众多小型社群中,很明显大量的文化传递纯粹是依靠观察学习来实现的。 If you're trying to make a tool, you're mostly watching the physical movements of the hands and the strategies taken. You might get tips that are transmitted verbally as you go along. In building a house, you're looking at how the house is built together, again with verbal comments as supplements to getting a sense for how the house goes together. 如果你想学习制造工具,就得主要观察手部的物理运动,以及其中的技巧。在这个过程中你可能会获得一些口头传达的指点。如果要学建房子,你要观察房子到底是怎么建造起来的,当然也会得到一些口头评论,帮助你理解房子到底如何拼起来。 If you're copying how to shoot an arrow, you're watching body position and bow position and aiming, and you're not listening to a lot of exposition on it, although clearly the verbal part of the transmission helps. We think and there's experimental evidence that show you can transmit lots of stuff without using any words. 如果你是在学习射箭,你观察的是身体的姿势、弓箭的位置及如何瞄准,你不会去听一大堆阐释,虽然很明显这种传达的口头部分也是有帮助的。我们认为,而且也有很多实验证据表明,无需使用任何词语,也能传达很多信息。 This is information stored in people's brains, and when we look at other animals, we find that the evolutionary models of culture make really good predictions about culture in fish. Fish will learn food foraging preferences from each other, and non-human primates can learn from each other, but what we don't see amongst other animals is cumulative cultural evolution. The case in which the cultural transmission is high enough fidelity that you can learn one thing from one generation, and that begins to accumulate in subsequent generations. 这是储存在人脑中的信息,当我们观察其他动物的时候,我们发现文化的进化模型能够很好地预测鱼类的文化。鱼类能够相互学习觅食偏好,人类之外的灵长类也能相互学习,但我们在其他动物身上看不到累积性的文化进化。也就是那种能从一代人身上学会某样事物,然后在接下来的数代人中间开始逐步累积的足够准确的文化传递。 One possible exception to that is bird song. Bird songs accumulate in such that birds from large continents have more complex songs than birds from islands. It turns out humans from smaller islands have less complex material culture than humans from larger islands, at least until recently, until communication was opened up. One of the interesting lines of research that's come out of this recognition is the importance of population size and the interconnectedness for technology. 此处有一个可能的例外,那就是鸟鸣。鸟类的鸣叫方式能够累积,以至于大陆鸟类的鸣叫方式要比海岛鸟类的更复杂。我们还发现,直到不久之前,也就是直到交流开放之前,在物质文化的复杂程度方面,来自小型海岛的人群不如来自更大型海岛的人群。源于这一认知的有趣研究领域之一,就是人口规模和互联程度对科技的重要影响。

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I began this investigation by looking at a case study in Tasmania. Tasmania's an island off the coast of Southern Victoria in Australia and the archeological record is really interesting in Tasmania. Up until about 10,000 years ago, 12,000 years ago, the archeology of Tasmania looks the same as Australia. It seems to be moving along together. It's getting a bit more complex over time, and then suddenly after 10,000 years ago, it takes a downturn. It becomes less complex. 调查开始之初,我回顾了一个关于塔斯马尼亚岛的案例研究。塔斯马尼亚岛是澳大利亚的维多利亚州南部海洋上的一个岛屿,这里的考古记录非常有趣。直到约1万年前,和1.2万年前,塔斯马尼亚岛的考古记录看起来都跟澳洲大陆是一样的。两者似乎是齐头并进的,随着时间推移而变得日渐复杂。但在距今1万年以后,突然它就衰退了,变得没有澳洲大陆复杂了。 The ability to make fire is probably lost. Bone tools are lost. Fishing is lost. Boats are probably lost. Meanwhile, things move along just fine back on the continent, so there's this kind of divergence, and one thing nice about this experiment is that there's good reason to believe that peoples were genetically the same. 生火的能力可能丢失了。骨制工具丢失了。不会打渔了。船可能也没有了。与此同时,大陆上的事物则照常发展,所以就出现了这种分化。这一案例特别好的一点在于,我们有很好的理由相信两地的人群原本拥有相同的基因。 You start out with two genetically well-intermixed peoples. Tasmania's actually connected to mainland Australia so it's just a peninsula. Then about 10,000 years ago, the environment changes, it gets warmer and the Bass Strait floods, so this cuts off Tasmania from the rest of Australia, and it's at that point that they begin to have this technological downturn. 最开始两个群体在基因方面是相互混杂的。塔斯马尼亚最早是跟澳大利亚本土连在一起的,因此只是个半岛。大约在距今1万年前,气候发生了变化,越来越暖,于是巴斯海峡形成了,把塔斯马尼亚岛和澳大利亚其余部分分隔开来。也就是在这时,他们开始出现这种技术上的倒退。 You can show that this is the kind of thing you'd expect if societies are like brains in the sense that they store information as a group and that when someone learns, they're learning from the most successful member, and that information is being passed from different communities, and the larger the population, the more different minds you have working on the problem. 假如把各个社会群体比作不同人的大脑,就可以说发生上述这种事情毫不奇怪。因为社会群体以集体的方式储存信息,如果某人要学习,他就会向最成功的成员学习,而且这种信息会在不同社群之间传播,人口规模越大,你在处理问题时所能依靠的不同头脑就更多。 If your number of minds working on the problem gets small enough, you can actually begin to lose information. There's a steady state level of information that depends on the size of your population and the interconnectedness. It also depends on the innovativeness of your individuals, but that has a relatively small effect compared to the effect of being well interconnected and having a large population. 如果处理问题时能够依靠的头脑数目少到一定程度,你实际上会开始丢失信息。信息的稳态水平依赖于人口规模和互联程度。它也依赖于个体的创造性,但后一方面的影响相对而言比较小,良好的互联水平和大量的人口更加重要。 There have been a number of tests of this recently, the best of which is this study by Rob Boyd and Michelle Kline in which they took the fishing technologies of different Oceanic islands from the time when Europeans first arrived, and they looked at how the population size of the island relates to the tool complexity, and larger islands had much bigger and more complex fishing technologies, and you can even show an effective contact. Some of the islands were in more or less contact with each other, and when you include that, you get the size effect, but you also get a contact effect, and the prediction is that if you're more in contact, you have fancier tools, and that seems to hold up. 在这方面,最近已经有了很多测试,其中最好的当属Rob Boyd和Michelle Kline所做的研究。他们研究了自欧洲人初次抵达以后大洋洲不同岛屿上的捕鱼技术,考察了岛上人口规模如何影响渔具的复杂度,结果发现更大的岛屿拥有更大型、更复杂的捕鱼技术。有效接触也会发挥作用。其中某些岛屿跟其他岛屿之间存在或多或少的接触,如果把这个考虑在内,就既能发现规模效应,又能发现接触效应,理论上的预测是,更多的接触就意味着更好的渔具,这似乎也得到了验证。 If you follow this idea a little bit further, then it does give you a sense that rates of innovation should continue to increase, especially with the emergence of communication technologies, because these allow ideas to flow very rapidly from place to place. 如果你顺着这一想法再进一小步,它就会促使你产生一种想法,那就是创新的速度应该还会继续提高,特别是在通信技术出现以后,因为这使得观念从一地到另一地的流动速度变得非常快。 An important thing to remember is that there's always an incentive to hide your information. As an individual inventor or company, you're best off if everybody else shares their ideas but you don't share your ideas because then you get to keep your good ideas, and nobody else gets exposed to them, and you get to use their good ideas, so you get to do more recombination. 这里要记住的重要一点是,对于你自己知道的信息,你总是有动力进行隐瞒。对于个体发明家或单个公司而言,如果其他所有人都分享他们的想法,而你不分享你的想法,那你就是最受益的。因为这种情况下你能保守自己的好想法,别人没法知道,而你却能使用他们的好想法,这样你就能尝试更多的组合。 Embedded in this whole information-sharing thing is a constant cooperative dilemma in which individuals have to be willing to share for the good of the group. They don't have to explicitly know it's for the good of the group, but the idea that a norm of information sharing is a really good norm to have because it helps everybody do better because we share more ideas, get more recombination of ideas. 信息分享本身就存在合作困境,这种情形是一致存在的。为了集体的利益,个体要有分享的意愿。他们不需要明确地知道这是为了集体的利益,但他们需要建立一个观念,即认为有一个信息分享的规范是件好事,因为这能帮助所有人过得更好,因为我们分享的观念越多,我们得到的观念组合就越多。

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I've done a lot of work on marriage systems with the evolution of monogamy. We have a sort of human nature that pushes us towards polygyny whenever there are sufficient resources. Eighty-five percent of human societies have allowed men to have more than one wife, and very few societies have adopted polyandry which would be the flip side of this, and then there's actually a number of societies that allowed both, but they tended to be polygynous because, assuming you have enough resources, the men are going to be more interested in having more wives than the wives are interested in having more husbands, and the husbands aren't inclined to be second husbands as much as the women are willing to be second wives. 我在婚姻体制方面下了很多功夫,研究过一夫一妻制的进化。我们有某种天性,促使我们在资源充分的前提下追求一夫多妻。85%的人类社会曾允许男人拥有一个以上妻子,极少有社会采用过这一制度的对立面,即一妻多夫制。有些社会实际上两者都允许,但最终更可能出现一夫多妻,因为假定有充足的资源,男人会对拥有更多妻子更感兴趣,女人对于拥有更多丈夫就没那么感兴趣,而且丈夫们并不太愿意成为别人的二号丈夫,而女人在做别人的二号妻子方面意愿相对更强。 But in the modern world, of course, monogamy is normative, and people who have too many wives are thought poorly of by the larger society. The question is, how did this ever get in place? And of course, it traces back through Europe. 但是在现代社会,当然一夫一妻制是规范性的,而且那些拥有很多妻子的人会被更大社群当中的人瞧不起。问题是,到底怎么会变成这样的?当然,这要从欧洲往上追溯。 One of the things that distinguished Europe from the rest of the world was something called the European Marriage Pattern, and part of that was normative monogamy, the idea that taking a second wife was wrong as long as you still had the first wife, and this actually traces back to Rome and eventually to Athens. Athens legislates the first rules about monogamous marriage just before the Classical period. 欧洲区别于世界其他地方的一个要点就是欧洲婚姻模式,规范性一夫一妻制就是其中之一。认为只要你的第一个妻子还在,娶第二个妻子就是错误的,这种观念实际上可以追溯到古罗马,甚至古雅典。在古典时代开始之前,雅典人就正式奠定了一夫一妻制的最初规则。 This was an example of a case where people are ready to moralize it, and I like to view it as the evolution of this marriage system of monogamy. It's peculiar. It doesn't fit with what we know about human nature, but it does seem to have societal level benefits. It reduces male-male competition. 人们会把一些东西道德化,婚姻制度就是例证之一,而且我倾向于从一夫一妻制婚姻体制的进化这个角度来考虑。这是很特别的。它跟我们对人性的认知相左,但确实具有社会层面的好处。它能减少男性之间的竞争。 We think there's evidence to say it reduces crime, reduces substance abuse, and it also engages males in ways that cause them to discount the future less and engage in productive activities rather than taking a lot of risks which include crime and other things. Depending on what your value systems are, if you think freedom is really important, then you might be for polygyny, but if you want to trade freedom off against other social ills like high crime, then you might favor the laws that prohibit polygamy. 我们认为,有证据表明这一制度可以减少犯罪,减少毒品滥用,而且它还能吸引男性更多地重视未来,更多地参与生产性活动,而不是到处冒险,制造犯罪及其他事端。这取决于你的价值观体系,如果你认为自由非常重要,那么你可能会支持一夫多妻,但如果你愿意为了减少社会麻烦(如高犯罪率)而牺牲一些自由,那么你可能就会支持立法禁止多偶制。 When I talk about success and un-success, I don't mean anything moralizing. I'm talking about the cultural evolutionary processes that favor the spread of one idea over another. If I talk about normative monogamy as being successful, I mean that it spread, and in this case the idea is that it spread despite the fact that it's contrary to some aspects of human nature. It does harness our pair bonding in some aspects, so it's a complex story there, but it creates societal level benefits. 我所说的成功或不成功,并不具有任何道德意味。我要表达的只是,在文化进化的过程中,某个理念的传播压倒了另外一个理念。当我说规范性一夫一妻制成功了的时候,我的意思只是它传播开了,而且在这个例子中,尽管它与人性某些方面相抵触,但仍然得以传播开来。它确实在某些方面约束了我们的结成配偶的行为,所以这个故事很复杂,但它带来了社会层面的好处。 Societies that have this are better able to maintain a harmonious population, increase trade and exchange, and have economic growth more than societies that allow polygamy, especially if you have a society with widely varying amounts of wealth, especially among males. Then you're going to have a situation that would normally promote high levels of polygyny. 实行一夫一妻制的社会更能维持人与人之间的和谐,增加贸易和交易,实现更快的经济增长,而允许多偶制的社会在这些方面就要差一些,特别是如果这一社会里财富差异非常大时(尤其是在男性之间)。如果存在上述情形,通常都会加剧一夫多妻的程度。 The absolute levels of wealth difference of, say, between Bill Gates and Donald Trump and the billionaires of the world, and the men at the bottom end of the spectrum is much larger than it's ever been in human history, and that includes kings and emperors and things like that in terms of total control of absolute wealth. 比如说,一边是比尔·盖茨、唐纳德·特朗普以及世上的亿万富翁,另一边则是处于财富分配末端的众多人口,财富差异绝对水平远远超过人类历史上的任何时候,而且这还把历史上那些国王、帝王等人物都考虑了在内,他们可是绝对财富的全权控制者。 Males will be males in the sense that they'll try to obtain extra matings, but the billionaires are completely curbed in terms of what they would do if they could do what emperors have done throughout the ages. They have harems and stuff like that. Norms of modern society prevent that. 男性作为男性,就会力图拥有更多的配偶,但现在的亿万富翁在这一点上却受到了完全的约束;本来如果他们可以这么做,他们会这么做的,历史上的所有帝王都不例外。他们会形成后宫体制,或类似的体制,但现代社会的道德规范阻止了他们。 Otherwise, there would be massive male-male competition, and even to get into the mating and marriage market you would have to have a high level of wealth if we were to let nature take it's course as it did in the earliest empires. It depends on what your views are about freedom versus societal level benefits. 否则的话,如果我们像早期帝国那样,让天性不加阻碍地发展,那将会出现大规模的男性竞争,甚至是仅仅想进入配偶和婚姻市场,你就得拥有很多的财富。这取决于你如何看待自由和社会层面利益之间的取舍。

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Part of my program of research is to convince people that they should stop distinguishing cultural and biological evolution as separate in that way. We want to think of it all as biological evolution. 我的研究课题之一就是要说服人们相信,人们应该停止在文化进化和生物进化之间做出截然区分。我们希望将所有这些事情整个当作生物进化看待。 We want to distinguish genetic evolution and cultural evolution, and then at some point we may have epigenetic evolution, and there are other kinds of inheritance systems. 我们要区分基因进化和文化进化,在某些情况下我们可能还发生了表观进化,此外还有其他种类的继承机制。 It's going to be a little bit more of a complex story. Culture is part of our biology. We now have the neuroscience to say that culture's in our brain, so if you compare people from different societies, they have different brains. Culture is deep in our biology. 接下来的故事更加复杂一点。文化是我们生物属性的一部分。现在,神经科学告诉我们,文化存在于我们的大脑中,所以如果你把来自不同社会的人进行比较,会发现他们拥有不同的大脑。文化深嵌于我们的生物属性之中。 We have people with different cultural backgrounds that have different hormonal reactions as well as having different brains on the MRI scan. So culture is just part of our biology, and we shouldn't take this dualistic view that there's this realm of ideas that somehow are separate from this realm of biology, and you're either talking about the realm of ideas or the realm of biology. 我们看到,来自不同文化背景的人会有不同的激素反应,而且在核磁共振扫描上显示的大脑也不一样。所以文化只是我们生物属性的一部分,我们不应该采取一种二元区分的观点,认为存在一个观念领域,和一个生物领域,两者截然分开,只能分别谈论。 Cognition and our ability to think are all interwoven, and we're a cultural species, which means one of our genetic programs is to be able to acquire ideas, beliefs and values and weave them into our brain such that they then affect our biology. A good example of this is the placebos. 认知和思考能力是相互交织的,我们就是一个文化物种,这就是说我们的基因程序之一就是使我们获得观念、信念和价值观并将它们编入我们的大脑,我们的生物属性也因而受到影响。 Placebos are something that depend on your cultural beliefs. If you believe that something will work, then when you take it, like you take an aspirin or you take a placebo for an aspirin, it initiates the same pathways as the chemically active substance. 这方面的一个恰当例子就是安慰剂。安慰剂的作用取决于你的文化信念。如果你相信某物会起作用,那在你服用它之后,比如把安慰剂当作阿司匹林来服用,那么安慰剂就会像阿司匹林那样开启同样的路径。 Placebos are chemically inert but biologically active, and it's completely dependent on your cultural beliefs. If you don't believe that cures come in pills, then taking a placebo aspirin does not have any effect on you. That's a case where it shows the ability of a cultural belief to activate biological processes, and then it's something we know a little bit about. 从化学角度来说,安慰剂是不会起效的,但从生物学上来说,它能起到跟阿司匹林一样的作用,这完全取决于你的文化信念。如果你不相信药能治病,那么服用阿司匹林安慰剂就不会对你产生任何效果。这是表明文化信念能够激发生物过程的一个案例,我们对此稍微有所了解。

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One of the large research projects that I run in an effort to understand human sociality is called The Root of Human Sociality Project. In the mid '90s I was working in the Peruvian Amazon and I was working with a group called the Machiguenga. Traditionally, the Machiguenga lived in single-family units scattered throughout the forest. I had been exposed through my advisor, Rob Boyd, at the time to something called the Ultimatum Game, and the Ultimatum Game seemed to provide evidence that humans were innately inclined to punish unfairness. 为了理解人类社会,我正在做的大型研究项目中包括一个“人类社会性探源项目”。上世纪90年代中期我在秘鲁的亚马逊地区工作,跟一个叫做Machiguenga的群体一起。传统上,该群体的人们以独户家庭为单位分散居住在森林里。通过我的导师Rob Boyd,我那时知道了一个叫做“最后通牒博弈”的东西,而这个博弈似乎能够证明人类天性倾向于对不公加以惩罚。 In the Ultimatum Game, two players are allotted a sum of money, say $100, and the first player can offer a portion of this $100 to the second player who can either accept or reject. If the second player accepts, they get the amount of the money, and the first player gets the remainder. If they reject, both players get zero. 在“最后通牒博弈”中,两个参与者会拿到一笔钱,比如100块。参与者A可以开价,将100块中的一部分给予参与者B,后者既可以接受,也可以拒绝。如果参与者B接受,他就能拿走提议数目的钱,剩下的归参与者A。如果他拒绝,那两个参与者都拿不到钱。 Just to give you an example, suppose the money is $100, and the first player offers $10 out of the $100 to the second player. If the second player accepts, he gets the $10 and the first player gets $90. If he rejects, both players go home with zero. If you place yourself in the shoes of the second player, then you should be inclined to accept any amount of money if you just care about making money. 举个例子,假设总数为100块,参与者A开价将100块中的10块给参与者B。如果B接受,他就得10块,而A得90块。如果他拒绝,两人都只能空手而归。如果你站在参与者B的角度想问题,如果你只关心赚钱与否,那你就应该接受任何开价。 Now, if he offers you zero, you have the choice between zero and zero, so it's ambiguous what you should do. But assuming it's a positive amount, so $10, you should accept the $10, go home with $10 and let the other guy go home with $90. 如果A提出不给你钱,那无论如何选择,你都只能空手而归,在这种情况下你应该如何选择就是不确定的。但是,假定A提议分给你一个正数,比如10块,那你就应该接受这10块钱,拿着10块钱回家,让另外那个家伙拿90块回家。 But in experiments with undergraduates, Western undergraduates, going back to 1982, behavioral economists find that students give about half, sometimes a little bit less than half, and people are inclined to reject offers below about 30 percent. 但在实验中,在1982年针对大学生——西方大学生——的实验中,行为经济学家发现,学生们会开价给一半,有时候是略少于一半,一旦开价低于30%,人们就倾向于拒绝接受了。 Subsequent work with non-student adults in the West show that it's an even a stronger result. The older you get, even if you have more wealth and more income, you're especially inclined to only offer half, and you'll reject offers below 40 percent. 针对非学生的西方成人的后续研究显示出了比这更强的结果。随着年龄增长,不管你多么有钱收入多高,你都会特别倾向于只拿出一半钱来分享,而且你会拒绝任何低于40%的开价。 In 1995, it had been done in a number of different countries, and it seemed to be robust. I was thinking that the Machiguenga would be a good test of this, because if they also showed this willingness to reject and to make equal offers, it would really demonstrate the innateness of this finding, because they don't have any higher level institutions, and it would be hard to make a kind of cultural argument that they were bringing something into the experiment that was causing this behavior. 到1995年,研究者已在许多不同国家做过同一实验,这一关系都很明显。我当时想,拿Machiguenga人做个测试会相当好,因为如果他们也显示出拒绝的意愿和平等分享的意愿,那就真的能证明这一发现确属天性,因为这个群体中并没有任何高层次的制度,因此我们很难提出一种文化论证,说他们在参加实验时带入了某些(文化方面的)东西,影响了他们的行为。 I went and I did it in 1995 and 1996 there, and what I found amongst the Machiguenga was that they were completely unwilling to reject, and they thought it was silly. Why would anyone ever reject? They would almost explain the subgame perfect equilibrium, the solution that the economists use, back to me by saying, "Well, why would anybody ever reject? You lose money then." And they made low offers, the modal offer was 15 percent instead of 50, and the mean comes out to be about 25 percent. 我1995年和1996年去那里做了实验,而我从Machiguenga人那里得到的结论是,他们绝不愿意拒绝,而且他们觉得拒绝是愚蠢的做法。为什么有人会拒绝?而且他们几乎都能跟我解释经济学家使用的那个解,即子博弈完美均衡:“为什么会有人拒绝呢?拒绝了你就会损失钱啊。”而且他们还会给出很低额度的开价,开价的众数是15%而非50%,而平均值则是大约25%。 Rob Boyd then was my advisor, and we went to the MacArthur Foundation for some funding, and they funded us, and we were able to put together a team of anthropologists. We brought them to UCLA. We had some economists there, including Ernst Fehr, Sam Bowles, and Herb Gintis, and we taught them some game theory. Rob Boyd那时候是我导师,我们跑去麦克阿瑟基金会要资助,他们资助了我们。我们由此得以组建了一个人类学家团队,把他们带到加州大学洛杉矶分校。我们在那还有一批经济学家,包括Ernst Fehr, Sam Bowles和Herb Gintis,我们就教了他们一些博弈论。 There was large discussion about methods, about whether we could actually pull this off, and then over the next two summers these field anthropologists went to the field and conducted the ultimatum game as well as a few other games—not systemically across the societies— but it gave us insight that we would then later use, and what we found is that societies vary dramatically, from societies that would never reject, to societies that would even reject offers above 50 percent, and we found that mean offers ranged across societies from about 25 percent to even over 50 percent. We had some of what we called hyper fair societies. The highest was 57 percent in Lamalera, Indonesia. 当时就方法论有很多争论,还争论到了我们到底能否做成这事。但接下来的两个夏季,我们的田野人类学家就到了实地,实施了“最后通牒博弈”和其他一些博弈(并没有在不同社群中系统性实施),这给我们提供了一些见解,后来都能够用上。我们发现的是,社群与社群之间差别极大,有些社群绝不会选择拒绝任何开价,而有些社群甚至连高于50%的开价都会拒绝。而且我们发现,不同社群的平均开价从25%到高于50%不等。有些社群我们称为“极度公平”社会。其中最高的是印度尼西亚的Lamalera人,(开价)高达57%。 We found we were able to explain a lot of the variation in these offers with two variables. One was the degree of market integration. More market-integrated societies offered more, and less market integrated societies offered less. But also, there seemed to be other institutions, institutions of cooperative hunting seemed to influence offers. Societies with more cooperative institutions offered more, and these were independent effects. 我们发现,我们可以用两个变量解释开价方面的很大一部分差异。其中一个变量是市场整合的程度。市场整合度越高的社群开价越高,整合度越低的社群开价越低。不过似乎也还有其他的机制,比如合作狩猎的机制似乎也会影响开价。合作机制越多的社群开价越高,而且两者是独立发挥作用的。 This then led to a subsequent project where we measured market integration much more carefully along with a large number of other variables, including wealth, income, education, community size, and also religion. We did the Ultimatum Game along with two other experiments. The two other experiments were the Dictator Game (the Dictator Game is like the Ultimatum Game except the second player doesn't have the option to reject) and the Third Party Punishment Game. 这又引出了我们后来的项目,我们更加细致地测量了市场整合度,以及很多其他变量,包括财富、收入、教育、社区规模,还有宗教。除“最后通牒博弈”之外,我们还一同做了另外两个实验。一个是“独裁者博弈”(跟“最后通牒博弈”类似,只是参与者B没有拒绝的选项),另一个是“第三方惩罚博弈”。 In the Third Party Punishment Game, there are three players and the first two players play a Dictator Game. They're allotted a sum of money, say $100, and the first player can offer any portion of the $100 to the second player, player B. Now, player B in this game can't do anything, and they just get whatever they're offered. But there is a third player, player C, and player C is given half the amount that A and B are dividing up, and he can use some of his money (20 percent of it actually) to pay to take money away from A at three times the rate. If he's given $50, he can use $10 of it to take $30 away from player A. Suppose player A gives only $10 to player B and keeps $90 for himself, then player B will go home with $10. Now, player C can pay $10, so he goes home with $40 instead of $50 in order to take $30 away from player A. Player A would go home with $60 instead of $90, because he got punished. Player B goes home with $10, and player C goes home with $40 instead of $50 because he chose to punish. 在“第三方惩罚博弈”中有三个参与者,头两个进行“独裁者博弈”。他们会得到一笔钱,比方说100块。然后参与者A可以提议将100块中的任意数目分给第二个参与者,参与者B。在这个游戏中,参与者B不能做任何事,A给他多少,他就只能得到多少。但是还有第三个参与者,参与者C。参与者C手里有相当于A和B所分数额一半的钱,他可以拿出其中的一部分(20%)去抵消掉参与者A手中的一部分钱,而且能1抵3。比如,C手里有50块,他就能花掉其中的10块去抵消掉参与者A手中的30块。假设参与者A只分了10块给B参与者,自己留下了90块,那么参与者B就得10块。但因为参与者C拿出了10块钱,那他拿回家的就是40块而非50块,又因为参与者A手中钱被抵消掉了30块。A拿回家的就是60块而非90块,因为他遭到了惩罚。参与者B拿回家10块,参与者C拿回家40块而非50块,因为他选择进行惩罚。 This gives us two different measures of willingness to punish strangers, ephemeral interactions—people that you don't know and won't see again. In the experiment, one is rejection in the Ultimatum Game, and then this Third Party Punishment measure, and it gives us three measures of fairness in this kind of transaction. 对于我们惩罚陌生人和一次性交往(那些你不认识并且以后也不会再见到的人)的意愿,这就提供了两种测量办法。在试验中,一种测量是看“最终通牒博弈”中的拒绝选项,另一个则是看“第三方惩罚”。并且,它还给我们提供了此类交易中关于公平的三种测量方式。 It gives us offers in all three games and what we found there is that market integration again predicts higher offers in all three games, and size of the community predicts willingness to punish and this fits with a lot of theoretical work, suggesting that if you have small communities, you don't need punishment. You don't need costly punishment. You need some kind of sanctioning system to keep people in line, but you're probably not going to do it with single individuals punishing. You have some other mechanism. It could be some kind of reputational mechanism like if they don't cooperate in this situation, then you won't interact with them in some other situation. It's a withdrawal of interaction rather than direct punishment. There's a number of different ways to create norm systems that operate like that. 在三种博弈中都有出价,而且我们再次发现,在三种博弈中,市场整合度能够预测出价的高低,社区的规模能够预测惩罚的意愿,而且这跟许多理论研究成果相吻合;这意味着,如果社区规模足够小,根本不需要惩罚。根本不需要代价高昂的惩罚。你需要建立某种处罚机制,以便人人都能守规矩,但你可能无需对个体施加单独的惩罚。你还有其他一些机制。可能是某种声誉机制,比方说如果他们在这种情况下不能够合作,那碰到其他情况你就不会与他们互动。这是取消交往,而不是直接惩罚。有许多办法可以创造出按照这个模式运行的规范制度。 In a big society punishment can be most effective because reputational mechanisms can be weak. If you're in a big society and you encounter somebody, you probably don't have friends in common through which you could pass reputational information for which punishment could be generated. You might want to punish them right on the spot or someone who observes the interaction might want to punish them right on the spot or call the authorities or whatever, which is also costly. 在大型社群中,惩罚可能是最有效的,因为声誉机制的效力可能很微弱。如果你在一个大型社群中与某人打交道,你和他之间可能并没有共同的朋友,那你就没法传递声誉信息,也就无从构成惩罚。你可能希望当场惩罚他,或者你们打交道时的某个旁观者可能想要当场惩罚他,或者诉诸权威,这样的代价都是很高的。

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This creates a puzzle because typically people think of small-scale kinds of societies, where you study hunter-gatherers and horticultural scattered across the globe (ranging from New Guinea to Siberia to Africa) as being very pro social and cooperative. This is true, but the thing is those are based on local norms for cooperation with kin and local interactions in certain kinds of circumstances. 这就给我们制造了一个谜题。因为通常人们认为,小规模的社区——比如当你研究的是散布全球各地的狩猎采集者群体(从新几内亚到西伯利亚到非洲)——都是非常亲社会的、非常具有合作精神的。事实的确如此,但问题是这只是基于地方性的与亲族合作的的规范,以及在特定情形下的地方性交往规范。 Hunter-gatherers are famous for being great at food sharing, but these norms don't extend beyond food sharing. They certainly don't extend to ephemeral or strangers, and to make a large-scale society run you have to shift from investing in your local kin groups and your enduring relationships to being willing to pay to be fair to a stranger. 狩猎采集者在食物分享上的慷慨是出了名的,但这些规范并不会延伸到食物分享以外。它们绝对不会延伸到一次性交往或陌生人身上。要维持一个大型社会运转,你必须要转型,从投资于你的本地亲族群体和长久关系,转变为愿意为了公平对待陌生人而付出代价。 This is something that is subtle, and what people have trouble grasping is that if you're going to be fair to a stranger, then you're taking money away from your family. In the case of these dictator games, in order to give 50 percent to this other unknown person, it meant you were going home with less money, and that meant your family was going to have less money, and your kids would have less money. To observe modern institutions, to not hire your brother-in-law when you get a fancy job or you get elected to an office is to hurt your family. Your brother-in-law doesn't have a job now. He has to have whatever other job he has, a less good job. 这种情形非常微妙。人们不容易理解的是,如果你想要公平对待陌生人,那就会让你家里的钱变少。在上述独裁者博弈中,如果你要拿出50%的钱给另外一个陌生人,那就意味着你拿回家里的钱会变少,也就是你家的钱会变少,你孩子的钱会变少。要遵守现代的制度,比如在你得到一个好工作或被选为官员以后不要雇佣自己的小舅子,这就会对自己家庭造成伤害。你的小舅子现在没有工作。他必须自己去找其他工作,一个没那么好的工作。 A commitment to something like anti-nepotism norms is something that runs against our evolutionary inclinations and our inclinations to help kin and to invest in long-term close relationships, but it's crucial for making a large-scale society run. Corruption, things like hiring your brother-in-law and feathering the nest of your close friends and relatives is what really tears down and makes complex societies not work very well. In this sense, the norms of modern societies that make modern societies run now are at odds with at least some of our evolved instincts. 服膺于像反裙带关系这种规范,这是与我们的进化偏好相悖的,与我们帮助亲族、投资于长期亲密关系的偏好相悖,但它对大型社群的运转则至关重要。腐败,比如雇佣自己的小舅子、为自己的好友和亲属谋私利这种事,才真正会撕裂复杂社会,并令其不能良好运转。在这个意义上,令现代社会得以运转的现代社会规范是与我们进化形成的至少一部分本能相违背的。 Lately we've been focused on the effects of religion. One of the things I didn't mention from the experimental games project is that in addition to market integration in the second project, we found independently that adherence to a world religion matters. People from world religions were willing to give more to the other person in the experiment, the anonymous stranger. 近来我们研究的焦点是宗教的作用。关于我们的博弈实验项目,有一件事我还没有提到,那就是在第二个项目中,除了市场整合度之外,我们还独立地发现,人们对世界宗教的信仰也有关系。在实验中,信仰世界宗教的人会愿意分更多钱给另外一个人,另外一个匿名的陌生人。 We've been using these experiments in the context of behavioral games. There's since been a number of additional papers coming out of economics showing the relationship between market integrations using measures like distance from market and people's willingness to build impartial institutions. Part of this is your willingness to acquire a norm of impartial roles; that we have a set of rules that governs this system. 我们还将这些实验应用到了行为博弈的情境中去。自那以后至今,经济学领域已经又发表了很多论文,证明市场整合度(用与市场的距离之类方式测量)与人们建构公平制度之意愿之间的关系。内容之一包括,你习得一套关于公平角色的规范的意愿,也就是我们有一套规则来管理这个体系。 Sometimes historians or political scientists call it the rule of law. We have an impartial set of rules that we're going to follow, and those rules apply independently of the identities and our emotional reactions towards the participants. 有时候,历史学家或政治科学家会把它叫做法治。我们有一套需要遵守的公平规则,而且不管我们的身份如何,不管我们对其他参与者的感情态度如何,这套规则都适用。 One of the things we find with the relationship between norms and these risk-managing institutions is that when you have risk managing institutions these impartial norms can spread. Otherwise, people are strongly biased towards maintaining these local relationships. If you want the rule of law to spread or to be maintained, you need conditions in which you're managing risk. 关于规范和这类风险管理机制之间的关系,我们有一个发现是,如果你拥有风险管理机制,那么这种公平规范就能得以传播。否则,人们会强烈偏向于固守他们的地方性关系。如果你希望法治得到传播或维持,那就需要一个有风险管控的环境。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]科学病得不轻?

科学的退化
Scientific Regress

作者:William A. Wilson @ 2016-05
译者:小聂(@PuppetMaster)
校对:龙泉
来源:First Things,https://www.firstthings.com/article/2016/05/scientific-regress

The problem with science is that so much of it simply isn’t. Last summer, the Open Science Collaboration announced that it had tried to replicate one hundred published psychology experiments sampled from three of the most prestigious journals in the field. Scientific claims rest on the idea that experiments repeated under nearly identical conditions ought to yield approximately the same results, but until very recently, very few had bothered to check in a systematic way whether this was actually the case.

学研究的问题在于,它们中的很大一部分其实根本不科学。去年夏天,开放科学合作组织(OSC)宣布他们曾试图重复100个选自三本行业权威杂志上的心理学实验。科学论断建基于这样一个观念:在几乎相同的条件下重复实验,其结果也应该相同。但是直到最近为止,此前几乎没有人系统性地验证是不是真的如此。

The OSC was the biggest attempt yet to check a field’s results, and the most shocking. In many cases, they had used original experimental materials, and sometimes even performed the experiments under the guidance of the original researchers. Of the studies that had originally reported positive results, an astonishing 65 perce(more...)

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科学的退化 Scientific Regress 作者:William A. Wilson @ 2016-05 译者:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 校对:龙泉 来源:First Things,https://www.firstthings.com/article/2016/05/scientific-regress The problem with science is that so much of it simply isn’t. Last summer, the Open Science Collaboration announced that it had tried to replicate one hundred published psychology experiments sampled from three of the most prestigious journals in the field. Scientific claims rest on the idea that experiments repeated under nearly identical conditions ought to yield approximately the same results, but until very recently, very few had bothered to check in a systematic way whether this was actually the case. 学研究的问题在于,它们中的很大一部分其实根本不科学。去年夏天,开放科学合作组织(OSC)宣布他们曾试图重复100个选自三本行业权威杂志上的心理学实验。科学论断建基于这样一个观念:在几乎相同的条件下重复实验,其结果也应该相同。但是直到最近为止,此前几乎没有人系统性地验证是不是真的如此。 The OSC was the biggest attempt yet to check a field’s results, and the most shocking. In many cases, they had used original experimental materials, and sometimes even performed the experiments under the guidance of the original researchers. Of the studies that had originally reported positive results, an astonishing 65 percent failed to show statistical significance on replication, and many of the remainder showed greatly reduced effect sizes. OSC小组的工作是迄今最大规模的对于心理学的验证,结果非常惊人。小组几乎采用了原初的实验材料,有些甚至在原来研究者的指导下进行实验。在所有结果阳性的研究中,竟然有65%在统计上不显著,剩下中也有很多的重复结果不如原先的显著。 Their findings made the news, and quickly became a club with which to bash the social sciences. But the problem isn’t just with psychology. There’s an unspoken rule in the pharmaceutical industry that half of all academic biomedical research will ultimately prove false, and in 2011 a group of researchers at Bayer decided to test it. Looking at sixty-seven recent drug discovery projects based on preclinical cancer biology research, they found that in more than 75 percent of cases the published data did not match up with their in-house attempts to replicate. 他们的发现上了新闻,并且很快成了用来攻击社会科学的大棒。但是问题不只是出在心理学领域。医药产业心照不宣的法则是,半数生物医学研究最终会被证明为假,而在2011年拜耳的一组研究者们决定试验一下。在研究了最近的67个基于临床前癌症生物学研究的新药计划之后,他们发现其中75%以上的实验发表的数据和他们内部重复实验的数据对不上。 These were not studies published in fly-by-night oncology journals, but blockbuster research featured in Science, Nature, Cell, and the like. The Bayer researchers were drowning in bad studies, and it was to this, in part, that they attributed the mysteriously declining yields of drug pipelines. Perhaps so many of these new drugs fail to have an effect because the basic research on which their development was based isn’t valid. 这些研究都不是那些发表在无足轻重的肿瘤学期刊上的研究,而是发表在《科学》、《自然》、《细胞》之类期刊上的大手笔。他们发现人们被垃圾研究淹没了,认为这就是临床药物试验离奇衰落的原因。或许如此多的新药研制失败是因为它们所基于的科学研究不靠谱。 When a study fails to replicate, there are two possible interpretations. The first is that, unbeknownst to the investigators, there was a real difference in experimental setup between the original investigation and the failed replication. These are colloquially referred to as “wallpaper effects,” the joke being that the experiment was affected by the color of the wallpaper in the room. This is the happiest possible explanation for failure to reproduce: It means that both experiments have revealed facts about the universe, and we now have the opportunity to learn what the difference was between them and to incorporate a new and subtler distinction into our theories. 当研究结果无法被重复时,有两种可能性。一种是,确实有某项研究者不知道的实验装置区别存在。这种情况俗称“墙纸效应”,戏谑的认为实验会被墙纸的颜色所影响。这是一个皆大欢喜的解释,表明这两个实验揭示了一些事实,现在我们有机会研究这些差异并将这个更微妙的新发现融入理论中。 The other interpretation is that the original finding was false. Unfortunately, an ingenious statistical argument shows that this second interpretation is far more likely. First articulated by John Ioannidis, a professor at Stanford University’s School of Medicine, this argument proceeds by a simple application of Bayesian statistics. Suppose that there are a hundred and one stones in a certain field. One of them has a diamond inside it, and, luckily, you have a diamond-detecting device that advertises 99 percent accuracy. After an hour or so of moving the device around, examining each stone in turn, suddenly alarms flash and sirens wail while the device is pointed at a promising-looking stone. What is the probability that the stone contains a diamond? 而另一种可能是,原实验的结果为假。很不幸的是,一项设计巧妙的统计学论证显示出第二种解读更有可能。该论证最早由斯坦福医学院John Ioannidis教授提出,现在被一个简单的贝叶斯统计应用所取代。假设一块田里有101块石头,其中的一块里面有钻石,并且,你正好有个号称准确率99%的钻石探测器。在经过了近一个小时的来回,一个一个的检查石头之后,突然警报响起,探测器指向一个有可能的石头。该石头含钻石的可能性是多少? Most would say that if the device advertises 99 percent accuracy, then there is a 99 percent chance that the device is correctly discerning a diamond, and a 1 percent chance that it has given a false positive reading. But consider: Of the one hundred and one stones in the field, only one is truly a diamond. Granted, our machine has a very high probability of correctly declaring it to be a diamond. But there are many more diamond-free stones, and while the machine only has a 1 percent chance of falsely declaring each of them to be a diamond, there are a hundred of them. So if we were to wave the detector over every stone in the field, it would, on average, sound twice—once for the real diamond, and once when a false reading was triggered by a stone. If we know only that the alarm has sounded, these two possibilities are roughly equally probable, giving us an approximately 50 percent chance that the stone really contains a diamond. 大多数人会说既然探测器的准确率是99%,那么就有99%的可能性该探测器正确的判断出了钻石的所在,和1%的可能性探测器给出了误报。但是请考虑这一点:101块石头中,只有一块有钻石。毋庸置疑,我们的探测器可以以很高的可能性正确判断一块石头里面是否有钻石。但是大多数石头里面是没有钻石的,所以尽管探测器仅有1%的可能性错误的判断出它们中的某一个有钻石,但是这样的石头有100个。于是如果我们在每一块石头上挥舞探测器,则它会报警的期望值是两次,一次为真正的钻石,一次为误报。如果我们仅仅只是听到报警而已,那么这两个情况出现的可能性是相等的,得出的结论就是石头里面有钻石的可能性是大约50%。 This is a simplified version of the argument that Ioannidis applies to the process of science itself. The stones in the field are the set of all possible testable hypotheses, the diamond is a hypothesized connection or effect that happens to be true, and the diamond-detecting device is the scientific method. A tremendous amount depends on the proportion of possible hypotheses which turn out to be true, and on the accuracy with which an experiment can discern truth from falsehood. Ioannidis shows that for a wide variety of scientific settings and fields, the values of these two parameters are not at all favorable. 这是Ioannidis教授关于科学研究过程的统计学论证的一个简化版本。田里的石头就是所有可验证的理论假设的集合,钻石就是那个恰好为真的假设,而探测器就是科学的方法。至关重要的两个参数是真假设占所有可行假设的比例,以及用实验来判断真假的准确性。Ioannidis教授向我们说明了在大部分科研情景和领域里面,这两个参数的值都不容乐观。 For instance, consider a team of molecular biologists investigating whether a mutation in one of the countless thousands of human genes is linked to an increased risk of Alzheimer’s. The probability of a randomly selected mutation in a randomly selected gene having precisely that effect is quite low, so just as with the stones in the field, a positive finding is more likely than not to be spurious—unless the experiment is unbelievably successful at sorting the wheat from the chaff. Indeed, Ioannidis finds that in many cases, approaching even 50 percent true positives requires unimaginable accuracy. Hence the eye-catching title of his paper: “Why Most Published Research Findings Are False.” 比如说,设想一个分子生物学研究小组想要决定人类无数基因中的某一个基因变异是否会增加阿尔兹海默症的风险。一个随机选择的基因里面产生的随机变异,正好产生一个给定的效果,这个可能性是很低的。所以就像田里的石头一样,阳性结果在大多数情况下都很有可能是假的,除非该实验有着令人难以置信的准确率。确实,Ioannidis教授发现在很多情况下,即使是接近50%的真阳性结果也需要惊人的准确率。正是因为这样,他才给他的论文起了个吸引眼球的标题:“为什么被发表的多数研究结论都是假的?” What about accuracy? Here, too, the news is not good. First, it is a de facto standard in many fields to use one in twenty as an acceptable cutoff for the rate of false positives. To the naive ear, that may sound promising: Surely it means that just 5 percent of scientific studies report a false positive? But this is precisely the same mistake as thinking that a stone has a 99 percent chance of containing a diamond just because the detector has sounded. What it really means is that for each of the countless false hypotheses that are contemplated by researchers, we accept a 5 percent chance that it will be falsely counted as true—a decision with a considerably more deleterious effect on the proportion of correct studies. 准确率又如何呢?也不是太令人乐观。首先,许多研究领域实际上能接受的上限是20个结果里面有一个假阳性。对普通人来说,这个听起来很不错:这想必表明仅仅只有5%的科学研究结果是假阳性的吧?但这和那些认为诱发探测器报警的石头会有99%的可能性藏有钻石的人正好犯了同一个错误。这个数字真正的意义在于,对于研究者们考虑的无数种可行假设中的每一个错误理论,我们接受有5%的可能性它们会被当成是正确理论。这是一个可以显著减少结果正确科学研究的做法。 Paradoxically, the situation is actually made worse by the fact that a promising connection is often studied by several independent teams. To see why, suppose that three groups of researchers are studying a phenomenon, and when all the data are analyzed, one group announces that it has discovered a connection, but the other two find nothing of note. Assuming that all the tests involved have a high statistical power, the lone positive finding is almost certainly the spurious one. However, when it comes time to report these findings, what happens? The teams that found a negative result may not even bother to write up their non-discovery. After all, a report that a fanciful connection probably isn’t true is not the stuff of which scientific prizes, grant money, and tenure decisions are made. 吊诡的是,当数个独立研究小组对同一理论假设做研究的时候,情况反而更糟了。这里用一个例子来说明为什么。设想有三个小组在研究同一现象,在分析完了所有数据之后,一个小组宣布他们发现了现象之间的联系,但是其它两个小组没有发现任何值得一提的东西。假如所有的实验都具有很强的统计学判断力,那么这个孤立的阳性结果几乎一定是可疑的。尽管如此,当要对实验结果做报告发表的时候,会发生什么呢?得出阴性结论的小组甚至都不会去把他们的毫无建树的实验写成论文。毕竟,科研奖项、经费、或是终身教授是不会给一个对有前景的理论假说持否定结论的。 And even if they did write it up, it probably wouldn’t be accepted for publication. Journals are in competition with one another for attention and “impact factor,” and are always more eager to report a new, exciting finding than a killjoy failure to find an association. In fact, both of these effects can be quantified. Since the majority of all investigated hypotheses are false, if positive and negative evidence were written up and accepted for publication in equal proportions, then the majority of articles in scientific journals should report no findings. When tallies are actually made, though, the precise opposite turns out to be true: Nearly every published scientific article reports the presence of an association. There must be massive bias at work. 而且就算他们写成了论文,也很可能不会被发表。期刊之间会争夺学术界的注意力和“影响因子”,因此更乐意发表激动人心的新发现,而不是那些煞风景的阴性结果。事实上,这两个效应是可以被量化的。既然大多数被研究的理论假设应该为假,则如果阴性结果和阳性结果一样被写成论文发表的话,那么大多数期刊论文都应该报告说没有任何发现才对。可是事实上却恰好相反,几乎所有得以发表的论文都认为现象之间存在关联。这个过程中必有大量的偏差。 Ioannidis’s argument would be potent even if all scientists were angels motivated by the best of intentions, but when the human element is considered, the picture becomes truly dismal. Scientists have long been aware of something euphemistically called the “experimenter effect”: the curious fact that when a phenomenon is investigated by a researcher who happens to believe in the phenomenon, it is far more likely to be detected. 即便科学家都如同天使一般,不受任何恶意驱使,Ioannidis教授的论证也一样成立。但是在考虑到人为因素之后,情况就真的差到难以想象了。科学家很久以来都熟悉所谓“观察者期望效应”的委婉说法,即当研究者相信某些现象存在的时候,他们就更有可能在实验中发现这些现象。 Much of the effect can likely be explained by researchers unconsciously giving hints or suggestions to their human or animal subjects, perhaps in something as subtle as body language or tone of voice. Even those with the best of intentions have been caught fudging measurements, or making small errors in rounding or in statistical analysis that happen to give a more favorable result. Very often, this is just the result of an honest statistical error that leads to a desirable outcome, and therefore it isn’t checked as deliberately as it might have been had it pointed in the opposite direction. 这种效应很多源自于:研究者无意识的给他们的人类或动物被试的一些暗示建议,这些暗示可以微妙到肢体语言或是声调变化。就算是最自律的研究者也曾被发现捏造测量,或是在取整的时候犯些小错误,抑或是偏向于统计分析给出的好结果等。经常是一个无心的统计偏差造成了研究者想要的结果,因而就不会被刻意的复查。如果结果指向相反的结论,恐怕就不会被这么轻易的放过了。 But, and there is no putting it nicely, deliberate fraud is far more widespread than the scientific establishment is generally willing to admit. One way we know that there’s a great deal of fraud occurring is that if you phrase your question the right way, scientists will confess to it. In a survey of two thousand research psychologists conducted in 2011, over half of those surveyed admitted outright to selectively reporting those experiments which gave the result they were after. Then the investigators asked respondents anonymously to estimate how many of their fellow scientists had engaged in fraudulent behavior, and promised them that the more accurate their guesses, the larger a contribution would be made to the charity of their choice. 但难以粉饰的事实是,学术圈内造假的广泛程度已经远超学界主流共识所愿意承认的那些。有一种方式可以让我们知道大批的造假行为正在发生,那就是巧妙的使用问卷调查来让科学家们坦白。在2011年的一次涉及两千多位心理学家的问卷调查里,半数以上直接承认了自己有选择性的报告了想要的实验结果。调查者之后让他们匿名估算同事中有多少人从事学术不诚信行为,并许诺向他们指定的慈善机构捐款,额度和估算的准确程度正相关。 Through several rounds of anonymous guessing, refined using the number of scientists who would admit their own fraud and other indirect measurements, the investigators concluded that around 10 percent of research psychologists have engaged in outright falsification of data, and more than half have engaged in less brazen but still fraudulent behavior such as reporting that a result was statistically significant when it was not, or deciding between two different data analysis techniques after looking at the results of each and choosing the more favorable. 经过数轮匿名估算,辅以自我报告的学术不诚信行为数字以及其它的间接测量,调查者得出的结论是:大约有10%的心理学家曾经直接伪造数据,并且半数以上曾经有过相对不那么无耻的学术不端行为,例如将非统计显著的结果报告为统计显著,或是在比较了两种数据分析结果之后再选择对自己有利的分析方法等。 Many forms of statistical falsification are devilishly difficult to catch, or close enough to a genuine judgment call to provide plausible deniability. Data analysis is very much an art, and one that affords even its most scrupulous practitioners a wide degree of latitude. Which of these two statistical tests, both applicable to this situation, should be used? Should a subpopulation of the research sample with some common criterion be picked out and reanalyzed as if it were the totality? Which of the hundreds of coincident factors measured should be controlled for, and how? The same freedom that empowers a statistician to pick a true signal out of the noise also enables a dishonest scientist to manufacture nearly any result he or she wishes. 许多形式的统计造假极难被抓住,或是太过于接近真实的分析决断,从而可以充分拒绝造假的指控。数据分析更像是一门艺术,即使是最严谨的数据分析者也有相当多的自由度可供发挥。两个同样适用的统计检验方法,该用哪个?是否应该将样本中的符合公共准则的子样本挑出来代表整体重新分析?数百个里面,我应该控制哪个?如何控制?使统计学家可以从噪音中挑出信号的那种自由度,同时让不诚实的科学家可以炮制出他/她想要的任何结果。 Cajoling statistical significance where in reality there is none, a practice commonly known as “p-hacking,” is particularly easy to accomplish and difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis. And since the vast majority of studies still do not report their raw data along with their findings, there is often nothing to re-analyze and check even if there were volunteers with the time and inclination to do so. 通过不断诱导数据从而得出不存在的显著统计,是一种通常被称作“p值操纵”的作弊法。做起来很容易,但是要检验出其是否被使用,却是极难。【译注:p值操纵指研究者轮番使用不同的统计方法和数据,直到结果显著为止。与正常的数据分析所采用的提出假设之后用数据验证假设的流程相反,p值操纵旨在找到具有显著性的关联,并在此基础上建立假设,因此导致假阳性。】并且大部分研究结果的原始数据还是不公开的,就算有人肯花时间来检查,也没有资源。 One creative attempt to estimate how widespread such dishonesty really is involves comparisons between fields of varying “hardness.” The author, Daniele Fanelli, theorized that the farther from physics one gets, the more freedom creeps into one’s experimental methodology, and the fewer constraints there are on a scientist’s conscious and unconscious biases. If all scientists were constantly attempting to influence the results of their analyses, but had more opportunities to do so the “softer” the science, then we might expect that the social sciences have more papers that confirm a sought-after hypothesis than do the physical sciences, with medicine and biology somewhere in the middle. 在估算这种学术不端的广泛性方面,有一个有创意的尝试,涉及到比较各学科的“硬”度。始作俑者Daniele Fanelli认为,一个学科离(最硬的)物理学越远,在实验方法上就更具有自由度,对于科学家们有意无意的错误的约束也越少。假如所有的科学家都试图影响实验分析的结果,而较“软”的学科里这么做更加容易,结果就是我们可能会发现,相比于物理学,社会科学发表的文章中更多的证实了那些倍受青睐的假说,而医学和生物学处于这两个学科之间的某个位置。 This is exactly what the study discovered: A paper in psychology or psychiatry is about five times as likely to report a positive result as one in astrophysics. This is not necessarily evidence that psychologists are all consciously or unconsciously manipulating their data—it could also be evidence of massive publication bias—but either way, the result is disturbing. 这正是研究发现的结果:心理学或是精神病学研究论文报告阳性结果的可能性是天体力学的五倍左右。这并不必然表明心理学家们在有意无意的篡改数据,也可能是论文发表系统的大规模选择性偏见,但是无论如何,令人担忧。 Speaking of physics, how do things go with this hardest of all hard sciences? Better than elsewhere, it would appear, and it’s unsurprising that those who claim all is well in the world of science reach so reliably and so insistently for examples from physics, preferably of the most theoretical sort. Folk histories of physics combine borrowed mathematical luster and Whiggish triumphalism in a way that journalists seem powerless to resist. The outcomes of physics experiments and astronomical observations seem so matter-of-fact, so concretely and immediately connected to underlying reality, that they might let us gingerly sidestep all of these issues concerning motivated or sloppy analysis and interpretation. 到物理学,对于这个最硬的学科,结果又如何呢?至少看起来比别的强。因而,不出意料的是,几乎所有认为科学世界安然无恙的那些人会放心的坚持从物理学里寻找例证,最好还是偏理论方向。民间物理学的历史以一种让记者们无法抵御的方式将数学的光泽和辉格式凯旋主义相结合。物理实验和天文观测的结果看上去如此注重事实,如此具体而又直接关联到其表象之下的现实世界,以至于可以让我们小心翼翼的绕开那些别有用心的或是不合格的分析和解读。 “E pur si muove,” Galileo is said to have remarked, and one can almost hear in his sigh the hopes of a hundred science journalists for whom it would be all too convenient if Nature were always willing to tell us whose theory is more correct. “不管你怎么想,它(地球)就是在动的”,这据说是伽利略的名言,而从他的这句感叹中我们几乎能听到一百个科学报道者的祈祷,因为对他们来说,大自然若是肯轻易透露谁的理论更正确,那简直就是太方便了。 And yet the flight to physics rather gives the game away, since measured any way you like—volume of papers, number of working researchers, total amount of funding—deductive, theory-building physics in the mold of Newton and Lagrange, Maxwell and Einstein, is a tiny fraction of modern science as a whole. In fact, it also makes up a tiny fraction of modern physics. Far more common is the delicate and subtle art of scouring inconceivably vast volumes of noise with advanced software and mathematical tools in search of the faintest signal of some hypothesized but never before observed phenomenon, whether an astrophysical event or the decay of a subatomic particle. 即使如此,向物理学寻求庇护也多少泄露一些信息。因为无论怎么看,不论是从发表文章数、研究员数量、还是研究经费方面来看,被牛顿、拉格朗日、麦克斯韦和爱因斯坦所铸造的基于演绎和理论构建的物理学,在整个现代科学界里面也仅仅只是一小撮。实际上,就算是在现代物理学里也是少数。更为普遍的情况则是那些精细微妙的艺术,能够使用先进的软件和数学工具,从难以想象的大规模数据中分离噪音,去找某种极其微弱的从未被观测到的理论信号。 This sort of work is difficult and beautiful in its own way, but it is not at all self-evident in the manner of a falling apple or an elliptical planetary orbit, and it is very sensitive to the same sorts of accidental contamination, deliberate fraud, and unconscious bias as the medical and social-scientific studies we have discussed. Two of the most vaunted physics results of the past few years—the announced discovery of both cosmic inflation and gravitational waves at the BICEP2 experiment in Antarctica, and the supposed discovery of superluminal neutrinos at the Swiss-Italian border—have now been retracted, with far less fanfare than when they were first published. 这类工作自有其难点和引人之处,但是绝不像落下的苹果或是椭圆的行星轨道那样不证自明,且和我们所讨论过的医学以及社会科学一样,非常容易受到意外污染、刻意造假和下意识的偏见所影响。过去几年里最饱受赞誉的两项物理学科研成果——北极BICEP2实验发现的宇宙暴涨和引力波,以及在瑞士-意大利边境发现的超光速中微子——现在已经被撤回,相应关注也比它们刚发表时少了许多。 Many defenders of the scientific establishment will admit to this problem, then offer hymns to the self-correcting nature of the scientific method. Yes, the path is rocky, they say, but peer review, competition between researchers, and the comforting fact that there is an objective reality out there whose test every theory must withstand or fail, all conspire to mean that sloppiness, bad luck, and even fraud are exposed and swept away by the advances of the field. 许多现有科研领域的辩护者承认这些问题,又称赞科学方法自有纠错能力。是的,道路是曲折的,他们说,但是同行评议、研究者之间的竞争、以及存在客观现实以检验理论这些令人舒心的事实,都会随着科学的进展潜移默化的将懒惰、倒霉、甚至欺诈等因素暴露并且驱逐出科研领域。 So the dogma goes. But these claims are rarely treated like hypotheses to be tested. Partisans of the new scientism are fond of recounting the “Sokal hoax”—physicist Alan Sokal submitted a paper heavy on jargon but full of false and meaningless statements to the postmodern cultural studies journal Social Text, which accepted and published it without quibble—but are unlikely to mention a similar experiment conducted on reviewers of the prestigious British Medical Journal. 教条就是这样口口相传。但是这些声明几乎从未被像科学假设那样检验过。新科学至上主义的支持者们乐于重复“Sokal恶作剧”(指物理学家Alan Sokal向后现代文化研究期刊《社会文本》递交了一篇充满着行话但却全是错误和无稽表述的论文,却被接受并且毫无异议的发表了),却不太可能提到一个类似的实验,对象是具有很高声望的英国医学期刊的评审者们。 The experimenters deliberately modified a paper to include eight different major errors in study design, methodology, data analysis, and interpretation of results, and not a single one of the 221 reviewers who participated caught all of the errors. On average, they caught fewer than two—and, unbelievably, these results held up even in the subset of reviewers who had been specifically warned that they were participating in a study and that there might be something a little odd in the paper that they were reviewing. In all, only 30 percent of reviewers recommended that the intentionally flawed paper be rejected. 实验者有意更改了一篇论文,使之包含八个不同的重大错误,分散于实验设计、方法论、数据分析、和结果解读方面。在221个评审者中,没有一个人挑出全部错误。他们平均抓到少于两个错误。并且,令人难以置信的是,当告诉一个分组的评审者们他们面对的论文有问题时,该结论也成立。总而言之,只有30%的评审者认为这篇有意制造的问题论文应该被拒绝发表。 If peer review is good at anything, it appears to be keeping unpopular ideas from being published. Consider the finding of another (yes, another) of these replicability studies, this time from a group of cancer researchers. In addition to reaching the now unsurprising conclusion that only a dismal 11 percent of the preclinical cancer research they examined could be validated after the fact, the authors identified another horrifying pattern: The “bad” papers that failed to replicate were, on average, cited far more often than the papers that did! As the authors put it, “some non-reproducible preclinical papers had spawned an entire field, with hundreds of secondary publications that expanded on elements of the original observation, but did not actually seek to confirm or falsify its fundamental basis.” 如果有一件事情是同行评议机制所擅长的,那就是让不受欢迎的想法不被发表。来看看另一个可重复性研究吧(对,另一个),这次是来自于一些癌症研究人员的。在得出只有11%的癌症临床前研究可被事后验证的令人毫不惊讶的结论之外,研究者们发现了另一个恐怖的现象:那些结果难以被重复的“坏”的论文,平均引用次数大于结果能被重复的那些!正如研究者们所提到的那样:“一些不可重复的临床前实验论文创造了一整个研究领域,和基于原初观察结论所衍生出的数百篇论文,但却没有认真确证或是证伪其研究基础。” What they do not mention is that once an entire field has been created—with careers, funding, appointments, and prestige all premised upon an experimental result which was utterly false due either to fraud or to plain bad luck—pointing this fact out is not likely to be very popular. Peer review switches from merely useless to actively harmful. It may be ineffective at keeping papers with analytic or methodological flaws from being published, but it can be deadly effective at suppressing criticism of a dominant research paradigm. Even if a critic is able to get his work published, pointing out that the house you’ve built together is situated over a chasm will not endear him to his colleagues or, more importantly, to his mentors and patrons. 可他们没有提到的是,当整个研究领域被创造出来,当事业、经费、职务和声望都和一个实验结论所绑定,这个结果是假造的,无论是出于有意欺骗还是仅仅只是运气不好,将事实捅出去看来不是很受欢迎的做法。由此,同行评审从纯粹无用变成了积极为害,它在为论文排除分析上的或方法论上的缺陷方面很没用,但是在压制对主流研究范式的批评方面却非常有效。就算批评者最终可以将他的作品发表,指出整个研究领域是空中楼阁这种行为也不会受到同事、甚至导师和赞助方的青睐。 Older scientists contribute to the propagation of scientific fields in ways that go beyond educating and mentoring a new generation. In many fields, it’s common for an established and respected researcher to serve as “senior author” on a bright young star’s first few publications, lending his prestige and credibility to the result, and signaling to reviewers that he stands behind it. In the natural sciences and medicine, senior scientists are frequently the controllers of laboratory resources—which these days include not just scientific instruments, but dedicated staffs of grant proposal writers and regulatory compliance experts—without which a young scientist has no hope of accomplishing significant research. Older scientists control access to scientific prestige by serving on the editorial boards of major journals and on university tenure-review committees. Finally, the government bodies that award the vast majority of scientific funding are either staffed or advised by distinguished practitioners in the field. 在科学领地的开拓上,有资历的科学家除了对新一代传道授业之外,还可以在其它方面施加很大影响。在很多学科领域,卓有建树且受人尊敬的老学者以论文通讯作者的方式为年轻有为的新学者站台,用自己的名声和信誉向论文评审者对实验结果做出担保,这是很常见的。在自然科学和医学领域,有资历的科学家往往也掌握重要的研究资源,这些资源如今已不仅仅是科学仪器,还包括专门的研究基金申请书写作小组和合规问题专家等。没有这些资源,资历浅的研究员很难做出有影响力的研究。前辈们还掌控着重要的学术声誉,他们往往在重要期刊和终身教职的评审委员会列席。最后,许多主要的科研经费来自于政府机构,而政府的研究理事会要么由行内卓越人士担任,要么向他们寻求建议。 All of which makes it rather more bothersome that older scientists are the most likely to be invested in the regnant research paradigm, whatever it is, even if it’s based on an old experiment that has never successfully been replicated. The quantum physicist Max Planck famously quipped: “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.” 这一切都会使情况变的更麻烦,因为有资历的科学家更有可能站在主流的研究范式一边,无论该范式是什么,就算是建立在一个从未被成功重复的年代久远的实验结果之上。量子物理学家马克思·普朗克有句至理名言:“新的科学理论战胜旧理论,并非是论敌被说服了,而是论敌们最终都死掉了,新的一代成长起来并逐渐适应了新理论。” Planck may have been too optimistic. A recent paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research studied what happens to scientific subfields when star researchers die suddenly and at the peak of their abilities, and finds that while there is considerable evidence that young researchers are reluctant to challenge scientific superstars, a sudden and unexpected death does not significantly improve the situation, particularly when “key collaborators of the star are in a position to channel resources (such as editorial goodwill or funding) to insiders.” 普朗克可能有些过于乐观了。最近一篇来自于国家经济研究办公室的报告,研究了当明星学者在他们最为高产的时候突然死亡所带来的影响,发现虽然有大量的证据表明年轻学者不愿意去挑战明星学者,但是明星学者的突然意外死亡并不能显著改变这个情境,特别是当“明星学者的重要合作者依然掌控着学科内资源(如论文评审时的青睐或是研究经费)的分配渠道”时。 In the idealized Popperian view of scientific progress, new theories are proposed to explain new evidence that contradicts the predictions of old theories. The heretical philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend, on the other hand, claimed that new theories frequently contradict the best available evidence—at least at first. Often, the old observations were inaccurate or irrelevant, and it was the invention of a new theory that stimulated experimentalists to go hunting for new observational techniques to test it. 在理想化的波普尔式科学进步图景中,新理论应该能够解释新的证据,而这些证据是和旧理论所做出的预测是相悖的。与之相反,离经叛道的科学哲学家Paul Feyerabend认为,新理论常常和能够获得的最好证据相悖,至少在一开始是这样的。旧的观察方式往往不够精确或不是非常有关联,而正是新理论的发明促使实验者们去寻找新的观察技术来验证它们。 But the success of this “unofficial” process depends on a blithe disregard for evidence while the vulnerable young theory weathers an initial storm of skepticism. Yet if Feyerabend is correct, and an unpopular new theory can ignore or reject experimental data long enough to get its footing, how much longer can an old and creaky theory, buttressed by the reputations and influence and political power of hundreds of established practitioners, continue to hang in the air even when the results upon which it is premised are exposed as false? 但是这种“非正式”的过程能够成功的关键,取决于当脆弱的新理论一开始被怀疑的风暴包围时能否以一种天真乐观的方式来无视既有证据。尽管如此,就算Feyerabend是对的,且不受欢迎的新理论能够无视或拒绝实验数据以至于站稳脚跟,那些陈腐古板的旧理论,即便其所基于的实验结论已被证明是错的,背后有着数百名业内人士的名誉、影响力、和政治权力的支持,会继续滞留多久呢? The hagiographies of science are full of paeans to the self-correcting, self-healing nature of the enterprise. But if raw results are so often false, the filtering mechanisms so ineffective, and the self-correcting mechanisms so compromised and slow, then science’s approach to truth may not even be monotonic. That is, past theories, now “refuted” by evidence and replaced with new approaches, may be closer to the truth than what we think now. 科学的圣传中充斥着凸显其自我纠正和自我治愈能力的光辉事迹。但如果原始结果是如此容易出错,筛选过程如此无效,且自我纠正机制如此迟缓且经常不被遵守的话,那么科学发掘事实真相的过程甚至不一定是单调的。即,过去的理论,现在已经被新证据“证伪”且被新方法取代的那些,可能比我们所想的更接近事实。 Such regress has happened before: In the nineteenth century, the (correct) vitamin C deficiency theory of scurvy was replaced by the false belief that scurvy was caused by proximity to spoiled foods. Many ancient astronomers believed the heliocentric model of the solar system before it was supplanted by the geocentric theory of Ptolemy. The Whiggish view of scientific history is so dominant today that this possibility is spoken of only in hushed whispers, but ours is a world in which things once known can be lost and buried. 这种倒退在以前也曾经发生过:在19世纪,对于坏血病的(正确的)维他命C缺乏理论被错误的理论取代,该理论认为是坏掉的食物导致了坏血病。许多古代天文学者相信日心说的太阳系模型,直到它被托勒密的地心说取代。以辉格史观看待科学发展的历程支配着当前主流看法,以至于倒退的可能性仅仅存在于窃窃私语中。但是在我们身处的世界里,知识是可以被掩埋和失传的。 And even if self-correction does occur and theories move strictly along a lifecycle from less to more accurate, what if the unremitting flood of new, mostly false, results pours in faster? Too fast for the sclerotic, compromised truth-discerning mechanisms of science to operate? The result could be a growing body of true theories completely overwhelmed by an ever-larger thicket of baseless theories, such that the proportion of true scientific beliefs shrinks even while the absolute number of them continues to rise. Borges’s Library of Babel contained every true book that could ever be written, but it was useless because it also contained every false book, and both true and false were lost within an ocean of nonsense. 而且就算自我纠正确实发生了,且理论的发展严格遵循从模糊到精确的周期,可是如果那些新的、大部分是错误的结果以更快的速度涌现呢?这速度如果快过让迟钝且不完善的科学真理判定机制来做出反应,情况又会怎样呢?结果可能是增长的正确理论被完全淹没在更快速增长的无稽理论中,以至于正确理论的绝对数量在增加,而同时它们所占的比例却逐渐减小。博尔赫斯的“巴别图书馆”里有每一本可能的包含真正知识书籍,但这毫无用处,因为它也收藏了每一本由错误知识构成的书【译注:“巴别图书馆”的藏书包含了25个书写符号任意排列组合组成的所有可能书籍】,结果就是正确和错误的知识都消散于无意义的海洋里。 Which brings us to the odd moment in which we live. At the same time as an ever more bloated scientific bureaucracy churns out masses of research results, the majority of which are likely outright false, scientists themselves are lauded as heroes and science is upheld as the only legitimate basis for policy-making. There’s reason to believe that these phenomena are linked. When a formerly ascetic discipline suddenly attains a measure of influence, it is bound to be flooded by opportunists and charlatans, whether it’s the National Academy of Science or the monastery of Cluny. 我想起生活中的怪事。一方面科学官僚们产生日渐臃肿的研究结果,其中大部分很可能是错误的,另一方面,科学家受到英雄般的尊崇,而科学被视为制定政策的唯一合理依据。我们有理由认为这些现象之间是有联系的。当一个曾经冷门的领域突然获得了一定的影响力的时候,必然遭到一批投机者和骗子的入侵,无论是国家科学院还是克吕尼修道院,都是一样的情况。【译注:克吕尼修道院,是公元910年在法国克吕尼建立的天主教修道院,以禁欲著称,是天主教改革运动克吕尼改革的发源地。】 This comparison is not as outrageous as it seems: Like monasticism, science is an enterprise with a superhuman aim whose achievement is forever beyond the capacities of the flawed humans who aspire toward it. The best scientists know that they must practice a sort of mortification of the ego and cultivate a dispassion that allows them to report their findings, even when those findings might mean the dashing of hopes, the drying up of financial resources, and the loss of professional prestige. 这个比较并不是那么的荒谬:就像修道主义,科学也拥有一个超人的目标,其成就远非有缺陷的人类能力所及。最好的科学家懂得要忍辱负重并培养出冷静的心境,以便他们能够忠实地公布科学发现,尽管有时候这些发现意味着希望的破灭,财政的干涸,以及职业声誉上的损失。 It should be no surprise that even after outgrowing the monasteries, the practice of science has attracted souls driven to seek the truth regardless of personal cost and despite, for most of its history, a distinct lack of financial or status reward. Now, however, science and especially science bureaucracy is a career, and one amenable to social climbing. Careers attract careerists, in Feyerabend’s words: “devoid of ideas, full of fear, intent on producing some paltry result so that they can add to the flood of inane papers that now constitutes ‘scientific progress’ in many areas.” 不必惊奇,尽管科学的实践超出了修道的范畴,它仍然能吸引到不顾自身利益而追求真理的人们,尽管在历史上的大部分时期,投身科学无财无名。而现在,科学,特别是科技官僚,是一项职业,顺应社会攀爬。它会吸引一心求名求利的人,用Feyerabend的话说,这些人“毫无创见,充满恐惧,只想制造出某些琐碎的结论以便加入构成很多领域里所谓的‘科学进步’的论文大军”。 If science was unprepared for the influx of careerists, it was even less prepared for the blossoming of the Cult of Science. The Cult is related to the phenomenon described as “scientism”; both have a tendency to treat the body of scientific knowledge as a holy book or an a-religious revelation that offers simple and decisive resolutions to deep questions. 如果说科学界对突然涌入的利益分子缺乏准备,那么面对爆发的科学教派就更是措手不及了。这个教派和被称为“科学至上主义”的现象有很大联系。二者都倾向于将科学知识视为圣经或是某种非宗教意义上的启示,认为它对于深刻的问题可以带来简单且具有决定意义的解答。 But it adds to this a pinch of glib frivolity and a dash of unembarrassed ignorance. Its rhetorical tics include a forced enthusiasm (a search on Twitter for the hashtag “#sciencedancing” speaks volumes) and a penchant for profanity. Here in Silicon Valley, one can scarcely go a day without seeing a t-shirt reading “Science: It works, b—es!” The hero of the recent popular movie The Martian boasts that he will “science the sh— out of” a situation. 但是科学教在此之上又多了一点夸夸其谈和一点不知脸红的无知。在修辞上体现为一种强迫症式的狂热(在推特上搜一下“sciencedancing”的主题标签就知道了)和对脏话的嗜好。在我们硅谷,走在大街上经常看到有人的T恤上印着诸如“科学:贼好用,婊子们!”最近的热门电影《火星救援》里的主人公面对危机时的豪言壮语则是“用科学把它捅出屎”。 One of the largest groups on Facebook is titled “I f—ing love Science!” (a name which, combined with the group’s penchant for posting scarcely any actual scientific material but a lot of pictures of natural phenomena, has prompted more than one actual scientist of my acquaintance to mutter under her breath, “What you truly love is pictures”). Some of the Cult’s leaders like to play dress-up as scientists—Bill Nye and Neil deGrasse Tyson are two particularly prominent examples— but hardly any of them have contributed any research results of note. Rather, Cult leadership trends heavily in the direction of educators, popularizers, and journalists. 脸书上最大的团体之一的名字是“我真他妈的爱科学!”(这个名字,加上该团体对于发表大量自然现象的图片而不是科学内容的爱好,已经让不止一个我认识的真正的科学家嘀咕“你们爱的其实是图片吧”)。某些科学教的领袖们喜欢装扮成科学家的样子——Bill Nye和Neil deGrasse Tyson是其中的两个典型——但他们几乎没有任何值得一提的研究贡献。与之相对的是,这些领袖们在教育者、科普者、和媒体从业者中非常受欢迎。 At its best, science is a human enterprise with a superhuman aim: the discovery of regularities in the order of nature, and the discerning of the consequences of those regularities. We’ve seen example after example of how the human element of this enterprise harms and damages its progress, through incompetence, fraud, selfishness, prejudice, or the simple combination of an honest oversight or slip with plain bad luck. These failings need not hobble the scientific enterprise broadly conceived, but only if scientists are hyper-aware of and endlessly vigilant about the errors of their colleagues . . . and of themselves. When cultural trends attempt to render science a sort of religion-less clericalism, scientists are apt to forget that they are made of the same crooked timber as the rest of humanity and will necessarily imperil the work that they do. The greatest friends of the Cult of Science are the worst enemies of science’s actual practice. 总之,科学在最好的时候,是具有非凡目标的人类事业:在自然的秩序中发现常理,并且用这些常理来推断事情的后果。我们看到了这项事业里的人类因素一个又一个危害进步的例子,有些出于无能、欺瞒、自私、偏见,有些只是出于某种诚实的忽视和一点坏运气。这些失败不能成为科学事业的羁绊,但这需要科学家对于同事们和自己的错误非常了解,并且保持高度警惕。当文化潮流试图将科学表述成某种区别于宗教的圣职专权时,科学家们非容易忘记他们是和其他人一样易于腐蚀的朽木,随时有可能危害从事的行业。最狂热的科学教徒是科学实践最大的敌人。 William A. Wilson is a software engineer in the San Francisco Bay Area. 本文作者William A. Wilson 是旧金山湾区的一名软件工程师。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]捅刀起义的历史背景

The Paranoid, Supremacist Roots of the Stabbing Intifada
捅刀起义的种族优越论根源,一种妄想症

作者:Jeffrey Goldbery @ 2015-10-16
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
一校:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha)
来源:The Atlantic,www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/the-roots-of-the-palestinian-uprising-against-israel/410944/

Knife attacks on Jews in Jerusalem and elsewhere are not based on Palestinian frustration over settlements, but on something deeper.
耶路撒冷及其他地区发生的针对犹太人的持刀攻击,并非出于巴勒斯坦人因以色列定居活动而产生的挫败感,而是存在某些更深层次的原因。

In September of 1928, a group of Jewish residents of Jerusalem placed a bench in front of the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, for the comfort of elderly worshipers. They also brought with them a wooden partition, to separate the sexes during prayer. Jerusalem’s Muslim leaders treated the introduction of furniture into the alleyway in front of the Wall as a provocation, part of a Jewish conspiracy to slowly take control of the entire Temple Mount.

1928年9月,耶路撒冷的一群犹太居民为了老年礼拜者的舒适着想,在圣殿山的哭墙前安放了一条长凳,还带去了一张木质隔板用来区隔异性祈祷者。耶路撒冷的穆斯林领袖认为,这种在过道安放家具的行为是挑衅,是犹太人缓图全面掌控圣殿山的阴谋的一部分。

Many of the leaders of Palestine’s Muslims believed—or claimed to believe—that Jews had manufactured a set of historical and theological connections to the Western Wall and to the Mount, the site of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in order to advance the Zionist project.

巴勒斯坦的许多穆斯林领袖曾相信——或曾宣称其相信——犹太人捏造了一整套其与哭墙及圣殿山这一阿克萨清真寺和圆顶清真寺所在地之间的历史和神学联系,目的是为了推进犹太复国主义计划。

This belief defied Muslim history—the Dome of the Rock was built by Jerusalem’s Arab conquerors on the site of the Second Jewish Temple in order to venerate its memory (the site had previously been defiled by Jerusalem’s Christian rulers as a kind of rebuke to Judaism, the despised mother religion of Christianity). Jews themselves consider the Mount itself to be the holiest site in their faith. The Western Wall, a large retaining wall from the Second Temple period, is sacred only by proxy.

这一观念完全不顾穆斯林历史——圆顶清真寺是征服耶路撒冷的阿拉伯人为追思先人而在犹太人第二圣殿的旧址上建造的(原址被耶路撒冷的基督教统治者破坏,以谴责犹太教这一遭到鄙视的基督教母宗教)。犹太人自己则视圣殿山为其信仰的至圣之地。哭墙作为第二圣殿时期留存下来的巨大护墙,只是因其象征性才变得神圣。

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The Paranoid, Supremacist Roots of the Stabbing Intifada 捅刀起义的种族优越论根源,一种妄想症 作者:Jeffrey Goldbery @ 2015-10-16 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 一校:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha) 来源:The Atlantic,www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/the-roots-of-the-palestinian-uprising-against-israel/410944/ Knife attacks on Jews in Jerusalem and elsewhere are not based on Palestinian frustration over settlements, but on something deeper. 耶路撒冷及其他地区发生的针对犹太人的持刀攻击,并非出于巴勒斯坦人因以色列定居活动而产生的挫败感,而是存在某些更深层次的原因。 In September of 1928, a group of Jewish residents of Jerusalem placed a bench in front of the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, for the comfort of elderly worshipers. They also brought with them a wooden partition, to separate the sexes during prayer. Jerusalem’s Muslim leaders treated the introduction of furniture into the alleyway in front of the Wall as a provocation, part of a Jewish conspiracy to slowly take control of the entire Temple Mount. 1928年9月,耶路撒冷的一群犹太居民为了老年礼拜者的舒适着想,在圣殿山的哭墙前安放了一条长凳,还带去了一张木质隔板用来区隔异性祈祷者。耶路撒冷的穆斯林领袖认为,这种在过道安放家具的行为是挑衅,是犹太人缓图全面掌控圣殿山的阴谋的一部分。 Many of the leaders of Palestine’s Muslims believed—or claimed to believe—that Jews had manufactured a set of historical and theological connections to the Western Wall and to the Mount, the site of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in order to advance the Zionist project. 巴勒斯坦的许多穆斯林领袖曾相信——或曾宣称其相信——犹太人捏造了一整套其与哭墙及圣殿山这一阿克萨清真寺和圆顶清真寺所在地之间的历史和神学联系,目的是为了推进犹太复国主义计划。 This belief defied Muslim history—the Dome of the Rock was built by Jerusalem’s Arab conquerors on the site of the Second Jewish Temple in order to venerate its memory (the site had previously been defiled by Jerusalem’s Christian rulers as a kind of rebuke to Judaism, the despised mother religion of Christianity). Jews themselves consider the Mount itself to be the holiest site in their faith. The Western Wall, a large retaining wall from the Second Temple period, is sacred only by proxy. 这一观念完全不顾穆斯林历史——圆顶清真寺是征服耶路撒冷的阿拉伯人为追思先人而在犹太人第二圣殿的旧址上建造的(原址被耶路撒冷的基督教统治者破坏,以谴责犹太教这一遭到鄙视的基督教母宗教)。犹太人自己则视圣殿山为其信仰的至圣之地。哭墙作为第二圣殿时期留存下来的巨大护墙,只是因其象征性才变得神圣。 The spiritual leader of Palestine’s Muslims, the mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, incited Arabs in Palestine against their Jewish neighbors by arguing that Islam itself was under threat. (Husseini would later become one of Hitler’s most important Muslim allies.) Jews in British-occupied Palestine responded to Muslim invective by demanding more access to the Wall, sometimes holding demonstrations at the holy site. 巴勒斯坦穆斯林的精神领袖、耶路撒冷的“穆夫提”【译注:教法说明官】Amin al-Husseini认为是伊斯兰本身受到了威胁,以此来煽动巴勒斯坦的阿拉伯人反对他们的犹太邻居(Husseini后来成为希特勒最重要的穆斯林盟友之一)。英国治下的巴勒斯坦犹太人对穆斯林的谩骂进行了回应,要求提高哭墙对他们的开放程度,有时还会在这一圣地举行示威。 By the next year, violence directed against Jews by their neighbors had become more common: Arab rioters took the lives of 133 Jews that summer; British forces killed 116 Arabs in their attempt to subdue the riots. In Hebron, a devastating pogrom was launched against the city’s ancient Jewish community after Muslim officials distributed fabricated photographs of a damaged Dome of the Rock, and spread the rumor that Jews had attacked the shrine. 次年,由其近邻发动的、针对犹太人的暴力变得愈发常见:当年夏天阿拉伯暴徒就夺走了133条犹太人性命,而英国军队则在镇压暴乱的行动中杀死了116名阿拉伯人。在希布伦市,穆斯林官员四处传播圆顶清真寺遭到破坏的虚假照片,并散布谣言说犹太人攻击了这一神殿,随后该市最为古老的犹太人社区遭到了令人震惊的大屠杀。 The current “stabbing Intifada” now taking place in Israel—a quasi-uprising in which young Palestinians have been trying, and occasionally succeeding, to kill Jews with knives—is prompted in good part by the same set of manipulated emotions that sparked the anti-Jewish riots of the 1920s: a deeply felt desire on the part of Palestinians to “protect” the Temple Mount from Jews. 以色列当下正出现一种“刺杀起义”,巴勒斯坦年轻人试图用刀砍杀犹太人,并且偶尔能够成功。这一具有半暴动性质的行动,很大程度上被同一套人为操纵的情绪所推动,正是这种情绪在1920年代点燃了反犹暴乱——即巴勒斯坦人内心深处的想要“保护”圣殿山不被犹太人染指的强烈情感。 When Israel captured the Old City of Jerusalem in June of 1967 in response to a Jordanian attack, the first impulse of some Israelis was to assert Jewish rights atop the Mount. Between 1948, the year Israel achieved independence, and 1967, Jordan, then the occupying power in Jerusalem, banned Jews not only from the 35-acre Mount—which is known to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif, the noble sanctuary—but also from the Western Wall below. 1967年6月,以色列占领了耶路撒冷古城区域以报复约旦的攻击,部分以色列人的第一反应就是主张犹太人在圣殿山上的权利。在1948年(此年以色列实现独立)至1967年间,耶路撒冷的占领国约旦不但禁止犹太人进入圣殿山周围35英亩范围内——这块区域在穆斯林中以Haram al-Sharif,即“高贵的避难所”著称,而且也禁止他们靠近山下的哭墙。 When paratroopers took the Old City, they raised the Israeli flag atop the Dome of the Rock, but the Israeli defense minister, Moshe Dayan, ordered it taken down, and soon after promised leaders of the Muslim Waqf, the trust that controlled the mosque and the shrine, that Israel would not interfere in its activities. Since then, successive Israeli governments have maintained the status quo established by Dayan. 伞兵控制旧城以后,在圆顶清真寺顶上升起以色列国旗,但以色列国防部长Moshe Dayan命令降旗,随后很快就向穆斯林“瓦克夫”(受托控制清真寺和圣堂的组织)的领袖承诺,以色列不会干涉他们的活动。自此以后,历届以色列政府均对Dayan所立态势萧规曹随。 There is another status quo associated with the Temple Mount, however, that has been showing signs of weakening. This is a religious status quo. The mainstream rabbinical view for many years has been that Jews should not walk atop the Mount for fear of treading on the Holy of Holies, the inner sanctum of the Temple that, according to tradition, housed the Ark of the Covenant. The Holy of Holies is the room in which the Jewish high priest spoke the Tetragrammaton, the ineffable name of God, on Yom Kippur. 但是,与圣殿山相关的另一态势则显现出弱化的迹象。这是种宗教态势。多年来,主流的拉比教义观认为犹太人不应该在圣殿山顶行走,以免踩踏了“至圣所”。这是圣殿中一直用于存放有约柜的内部圣所,是犹太大祭司在赎罪日讲述神圣而需避讳的上帝之名“Tetragrammaton”的地方。 The exact location of the Holy of Holies is not known, and Muslim authorities have prevented archeologists from conducting any excavations on the Mount, in part out of fear that such explorations will uncover further evidence of a pre-Islamic Jewish presence. This mainstream rabbinical view concerning the Mount—that it should be the direction of Jewish prayer, rather than a place of Jewish prayer—has made the lives of Jerusalem’s temporal authorities easier, by keeping Muslim and Jewish worshippers separated. “至圣所”的确切所在并不为人所知,而穆斯林当局一直阻止考古学家对圣殿山实施发掘,一部分也是担心此类勘探有可能会发现更多的证据,证明犹太人先于伊斯兰教存在于此。这种主流的拉比教义观认为圣殿山应是犹太信徒祷告时的朝向而非他们应该出现的地方。这让耶路撒冷的世俗政府由此轻松一些,因为穆斯林礼拜者和犹太礼拜者被泾渭分明的隔开了。 In recent years, however, small groups of radical religious innovators who oppose the mainstream rabbinical view have sought to make the Mount, once again, a site of Jewish prayer. (Here is a New York Times Magazine story I wrote about these radical groups.) These activists have gained sympathizers among some far-right political figures in Israel, though the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not altered the separation-of-religions status quo. 然而,近年来,一些反对主流拉比教义观的激进宗教改革者小团体已在寻求将圣殿山重新确定为犹太祷告之地。(我为《纽约时报》所写的一篇文章所论的正是这些激进团体。)这些积极分子已获得以色列某些极右政治人物的同情,尽管总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡领导下的政府仍未改变两种宗教分离的现状。 One of the tragedies of the settlement movement is that it obscures what might be the actual root cause of the Middle East conflict. 定居行动的悲剧之一是它可能模糊了中东冲突的真正起因。 Convincing Palestinians that the Israeli government is not trying to alter the status quo on the Mount has been difficult because many of today’s Palestinian leaders, in the manner of the Palestinian leadership of the 1920s, actively market rumors that the Israeli government is seeking to establish atop the Mount a permanent Jewish presence. 要让巴勒斯坦人相信以色列政府无意改变圣殿山的现状,这一直很困难。因为巴勒斯坦当今的许多领袖采用了1920年代巴勒斯坦领导层的做法,积极地散布谣言,声称以色列政府想要在圣殿山顶建立永久性的犹太人驻地。 The comments of the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas—by general consensus the most moderate leader in the brief history of the Palestinian national movement—have been particularly harsh. Though Abbas has authorized Palestinian security services to work with their Israeli counterparts to combat extremist violence, his rhetoric has inflamed tensions. 巴勒斯坦民族权力机构(自治政府)总统马哈茂德·阿巴斯的评论尤其尖锐。在巴勒斯坦民族主义运动的简短历史中,他已是公认的最温和的领袖。尽管阿巴斯已下令巴勒斯坦安全部门配合以色列的相关部门打击极端主义暴行,他的说辞却是在火上浇油。 “Every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem is pure, every martyr will reach paradise, and every injured person will be rewarded by God,” he said last month, as rumors about the Temple Mount swirled. He went on to say that Jews “have no right to desecrate the mosque with their dirty feet.” 上个月,关于圣殿山的谣言甚嚣尘上之时,他说:“洒在耶路撒冷的每一滴血都是纯洁的,每一个殉难者都将上天堂,每个受伤的人都将得到上帝的奖赏。”他接着说,犹太人“无权用他们的脏脚玷污清真寺。” Taleb Abu Arrar, an Israeli Arab member of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, argued publicly that Jews “desecrate” the Temple Mount by their presence. (Fourteen years ago, Yasser Arafat, then the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, told me that “Jewish authorities are forging history by saying the Temple stood on the Haram al-Sharif. Their temple was somewhere else.”) 以色列议会中的一位阿拉伯议员,Taleb Abu Arrar,公开发表言论说,犹太人的出现就是对圣殿山的“玷污”。(14年前,巴勒斯坦解放组织时任领导人亚瑟·阿拉法特曾告诉我,“犹太当局说圣殿位于‘高贵的避难所’,这是伪造历史。他们的庙在别的地方。”) These sorts of comments, combined with the violence of the past two weeks—including the sacking and burning of a Jewish shrine outside Nablus—suggest a tragic continuity between the 1920s and today. For those who believe not only in the necessity, but in the practical possibility, of an equitable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and in particular, for those who believe that the post-1967 settlement project is the root cause of the conflict—recent events have been sobering. 诸如此类的言论,再结合过去两周发生的暴力活动——包括洗劫和焚烧纳布卢斯市外的一处犹太圣地——表明在1920年代与今日之间存在一种可悲的持续性。对于那些相信巴以冲突不仅必须、而且实践上也能够通过双方平等建国方案来解决的人来说,尤其是认为1967年后的定居点计划才是冲突根源的人,近期的事态发人深省。 One of the tragedies of the settlement movement is that it obscures what might be the actual root cause of the Middle East conflict: the unwillingness of many Muslim Palestinians to accept the notion that Jews are a people who are indigenous to the land Palestinians believe to be exclusively their own, and that the third-holiest site in Islam is also the holiest site of another religion, one whose adherents reject the notion of Muslim supersessionism. 定居行动的悲剧之一是它可能模糊了中东冲突根本原因:许多巴勒斯坦穆斯林不愿意接受一个观念:犹太人是巴勒斯坦人自信为其所独有的土地上的原住民族,且伊斯兰教的第三大圣地同样也是另外一个宗教的至圣之地,而该宗教的信徒拒斥伊斯兰教的取代论。【译注:又称替换神学,是探讨基督教与犹太教和犹太人民关系的一种基督教神学观点,认为基督教徒已取代以色列人成为上帝的子民、新约已取代旧约。(译自wiki词条)】 The status quo on the Temple Mount is prudent and must remain in place. It saves lives, lives fundamentalist Jewish radicals would risk in order to advance their millennial dreams. But it is the byproduct of the intolerance of Jerusalem’s Muslim leadership. 圣殿山的现状是明智的,且必须继续保持。它确实挽救了人命,那些原教旨主义犹太教激进分子为了推进其千禧年之梦而愿意牺牲的人命。但它也是耶路撒冷的穆斯林领导层不宽容政策的副产品。 When violence against Jews occurs inside Israel, or on the West Bank, a consensus tends to be reached quickly by outside analysts and political leaders, one that holds that such violence represents the inevitable consequence of Israel’s occupation and settlement of Palestinian territory. John Kerry, the U.S. secretary of state, said in an appearance earlier this week at Harvard that, “What’s happening is that unless we get going, a two-state solution could conceivably be stolen from everybody. And there’s been a massive increase in settlements over the course of the last years.” He went on to say, “Now you have this violence because there’s a frustration that is growing, and a frustration among Israelis who don’t see any movement.” 当针对犹太人的暴力发生在以色列内部或约旦河西岸时,外部的分析人士和政治领袖倾向于迅速达成一种共识,认为这些暴力行为是以色列占领并定居于巴勒斯坦领土的必然后果。美国国务卿约翰·克里在本周早些时候出席哈佛的一个公开活动时说:“现状是,除非我们开始采取行动,否则可以预见两国方案将再无可能。而在过去的几年中,定居点已经有了极大的增加。”他接着说:“这些暴力之所以出现是因为挫败感在弥漫,而看不到任何进展的以色列人也很失望。” (On Friday morning, speaking with NPR’s Steve Inskeep, Kerry revised and extended his comments, criticizing Abbas—in a passive way — for the violence: “There's no excuse for the violence. ... And the Palestinians need to understand, and President Abbas has been committed to nonviolence. He needs to be condemning this, loudly and clearly. And he needs to not engage in some of the incitement that his voice has sometimes been heard to encourage.”) (周五早上,参加美国国家公共电台Steve Inskeep的节目时,克里对他的前述评论进行了修正和扩展,就发生的暴力活动(以一种消极方式)批评阿巴斯:“暴力没有任何借口……巴勒斯坦人需要明白,阿巴斯总统也承诺了非暴力,他需要就此高调且清楚地谴责这些暴力行为,并且应当避开使用有时被人当作鼓励的煽动言辞”。) Many Palestinians believe that “this is not a conflict between two national movements, but a conflict between one national movement and a colonial and imperialistic entity.” 许多巴勒斯坦人认为,“这并非两个民族运动之间的冲突,而是一个民族运动和另一个殖民和帝国主义实体之间的冲突。” It is sometimes difficult for policymakers such as Kerry, who has devoted so much time and energy to the search for a solution to the Israeli-Arab impasse, to acknowledge the power of a particular Palestinian narrative, one that obviates the possibility of a solution that allows Jews national and religious equality. 如克里这样的政策制定者,由于他们已经为解决以巴冲突僵局付出了太多时间和精力,有时候难以认识到一种特定的巴勒斯坦叙事的力量,这种叙事排除了允许犹太人获得民族和宗教平等的方案可能性。 Writing in Haaretz, the left-center political scientist Shlomo Avineri describes an important disconnect that often goes unnoticed, even in times like these: Many Palestinians believe that “this is not a conflict between two national movements but a conflict between one national movement (the Palestinian) and a colonial and imperialistic entity (Israel).” 在《国土报》上,中左翼的政治学家Shlomo Avineri描述了一个通常不被注意(即便是当下也是如此)的重要断裂。许多巴勒斯坦人相信,“这并非是两个民族运动之间的冲突,而是一个民族运动(巴勒斯坦)和一个殖民和帝国主义实体(以色列)之间的冲突。” He goes on to write, “According to this view, Israel will end like all colonial phenomena—it will perish and disappear. Moreover, according to the Palestinian view, the Jews are not a nation but a religious community, and as such not entitled to national self-determination which is, after all, a universal imperative.” 他接着写道,“根据这种观点,以色列会跟其他所有殖民现象一样,终将走向灭亡。而且,根据巴勒斯坦人的观点,犹太人不是一个民族,而是一个宗教共同体,因此没有民族自决的权利,毕竟这是一条普遍诫规。” Avineri, like most sensible analysts, understands the many and variegated reasons for the continued failure of the peace process: 跟绝大多数明智的分析家一样,Avineri认识到了和平进程不断失败的原因众多而繁杂:
[M]utual distrust between the two populations, internal pressures from the rejectionists on both sides, Yasser Arafat’s repeated deceptions, the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the electoral victories of Likud in Israeli elections, Palestinian terrorism, continuing Israeli settlement activities in the territories, the bloody rift between Fatah and Hamas, American presidents who did too little (George W. Bush) or too much and in a wrong way (Barack Obama), the political weakness of Mahmoud Abbas, governments headed by Netanyahu that did everything possible to undermine effective negotiations. All this is true, and everyone picks and chooses what fits their views and interests—but beyond all these lies a fundamental difference in the terms in which each side views the conflict, a difference many tend or choose to overlook. “两个群体之间的互不信任,双方抵制派所造成的内部压力,亚瑟·阿拉法特反复无常的欺诈,对伊扎克·拉宾总理的谋杀,利库德集团在以色利选举中的胜利,巴勒斯坦恐怖主义,以色列在该地区持续不断的定居活动,法塔赫和哈马斯之间的血腥纷争,美国总统的无所作为(乔治·W·布什)抑或在错误的方向上做得太多(巴拉克·奥巴马),马哈茂德·阿巴斯的政治软弱,内塔尼亚胡为首的政府干尽了一切有可能破坏有效和谈的事。这些都是对的,每个人都能从中挑选出与合于自身观点和利益的原因——但在此之外,还存在一个易被人忽略的因素,即双方看待这一冲突的角度存在根本性的差别。”
The violence of the past two weeks, encouraged by purveyors of rumors who now have both Israeli and Palestinian blood on their hands, is rooted not in Israeli settlement policy, but in a worldview that dismisses the national and religious rights of Jews. There will not be peace between Israelis and Palestinians so long as parties on both sides of the conflict continue to deny the national and religious rights of the other. 过去两周发生的暴力活动受到了谣言散布者的鼓动,他们的手上现已沾满了以色列人还有巴勒斯坦人的鲜血。这种暴力并非根源于以色列的定居政策,而是源于一种拒绝承认犹太人享有民族和宗教权利的世界观。只要冲突双方继续否定彼此的民族和宗教权利,以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间就不会出现和平。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]丹麦童话 vs 美国梦

The Atlantic: Denmark Isn’t Magic
《大西洋月刊》:丹麦并不神奇

作者:DEREK THOMPSON @ 2016-08-02
译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚)
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/the-american-dream-isnt-alive-in-denmark/494141/

New research suggests that the American dream isn’t alive in Scandinavia—but generous redistribution of wealth isn’t a terrible consolation prize.

新的研究表明,美国梦在斯堪的纳维亚没市场,但慷慨大方的财富再分配并非糟糕的安慰奖。

Danophilia is alive and well in America. Bernie Sanders and other liberals have lauded Denmark’s social democratic dream state, with its free college tuition, nearly universal pre-K, and plentiful child care.

倒是丹麦迷在美国大受欢迎且很滋(more...)

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The Atlantic: Denmark Isn't Magic 《大西洋月刊》:丹麦并不神奇 作者:DEREK THOMPSON @ 2016-08-02 译者:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚) 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/the-american-dream-isnt-alive-in-denmark/494141/ New research suggests that the American dream isn’t alive in Scandinavia—but generous redistribution of wealth isn’t a terrible consolation prize. 新的研究表明,美国梦在斯堪的纳维亚没市场,但慷慨大方的财富再分配并非糟糕的安慰奖。 Danophilia is alive and well in America. Bernie Sanders and other liberals have lauded Denmark’s social democratic dream state, with its free college tuition, nearly universal pre-K, and plentiful child care. 倒是丹麦迷在美国大受欢迎且很滋润。伯尼·桑德斯和其他自由派盛赞丹麦是社会民主主义的梦想国度,因其免费的大学教育,几乎无所不包的学前教育和对孩童的充分关照。 While Republicans and Democrats both praise the virtues of what economists call “intergenerational mobility”—the chance for a poor young child to become at least a middle-class adult—America doesn’t lead the world in the pursuit of the American Dream. 共和党和民主党都赞美经济学家所谓的“代际流动性”——一个贫穷孩子长大至少成为中产阶级的机会——的优点,而在这一点上,美国并未在对美国梦的追求中身先士卒。 The standard social mobility statistic measures how much each generation's income is determined by its parents' income. By that measure, northern Europe and Scandinavia have the highest social mobility in the advanced world, and Denmark tops the list. 标准的社会流动性统计衡量一代人的收入多大程度上由其父母收入所决定。按照这种衡量方式,欧洲北部和斯堪的纳维亚的社会流动性在发达世界排名最高,其中丹麦名列第一。 But this Danish Dream is a “Scandinavian Fantasy,” according to a new paper by Rasmus Landersø at the Rockwool Foundation Research Unit in Copenhagen and James J. Heckman at the University of Chicago. Low-income Danish kids are not much more likely to earn a middle-class wage than their American counterparts. What’s more, the children of non-college graduates in Denmark are about as unlikely to attend college as their American counterparts. 但是,哥本哈根的Rockwool基金会研究部Rasmus Landersø和芝加哥大学James J. Heckman的一项新研究指出,丹麦梦是一个“斯堪的纳维亚空想”。相较于美国的低收入家庭的孩子,丹麦低收入家庭的孩子不会更有可能挣到中产阶级的工资。甚至相较于美国的情况,丹麦无大学文凭者的孩子上大学的希望同样渺茫。 If that’s true, how does Denmark rank number-one among all rich countries in social mobility? It’s all about what happens after wages: The country’s high taxes on the rich and income transfers to the poor “compress” economic inequality within each generation: When the rungs on the economic ladder are closer together, it’s easier to move a little bit up (or down) over the course of a generation. 如果真是这样,为何丹麦的社会流动性在所有富裕国家排名第一?这都源于工资背后的事:国家把从富人和收入里征收的高额税款转移给穷人的做法,“压缩”了代际之间的经济不平等:当社会上升阶梯的横档靠得更近时,代际之间向上(或下)移动就更容易一点。 “The Scandinavian Fantasy” is a rich, complex paper that is already making waves in the newly popular subject of intergenerational mobility. It makes three major points. “斯堪的纳维亚空想”是一篇丰富而复杂的论文,它推波助澜了代际流动性这一新近的流行主题。论文提出三个主要观点。 The first big idea is that Denmark is not a nation of Horatio Algersens. Its high social mobility is not the result of an economy that is uniquely good at helping poor children earn middle-class salaries. Instead, it is a country much like the U.S., where the children of poor parents who don’t go to college are also unlikely to attend college or earn a high wage. Social mobility in Denmark and the U.S. seem to be remarkably similar when looking exclusively at wages—that is, before including taxes and transfers. 第一个是,丹麦不是Horatio Algersens的国家。其高社会流动性并非来自利于贫穷孩子挣到中产薪水的经济。相反它很像美国,在那里没上大学的穷父母的孩子也不大可能上大学或赚取高薪。只看工资——在不考虑税收和财富转移时——丹麦和美国的社会流动性非常相似。【译注:Horatio Alger,1832年1月13日出生,是19世纪一位多产的美国作家,以少年小说而闻名。阿尔杰小说的风格大多一致,均描述一个贫穷少年如何通过其正直、努力、少许运气以及坚持不懈最终取得成功。历史学家认为,阿尔杰的作品绝不仅局限于其有趣的故事本身,小说中描述的通过自身努力获得成功的主人公,给予了大量当时美国穷人力量、信心及动力,更加刻苦工作换取成功。】 It is only after accounting for Denmark’s high taxes on the rich and large transfers to the poor that its social mobility looks so much better than the U.S.’s. America’s (relatively conservative) economic philosophy is that, with low taxes and little regulation, the market is an open savannah where the most talent will win out. But Denmark’s economic philosophy seems to be that the market is an unfortunate socioeconomic lottery system, and so the country compensates the poor with generous transfers paid by high taxes on the rich. 只有平衡了丹麦对富人征高税收和向穷人大量转移财富的因素以后,其社会流动性看上去比美国好很多。美国(相对保守的)的经济哲学是低税收和少管制,市场如同一片开放的大草原,大多数天才自然脱颖而出。而丹麦的经济理念则是,市场是一个不怎么靠谱的社会经济彩票投注系统,所以需要政府通过多征富人税并以慷慨的转移支付补偿穷人。 The second big idea in the paper is that Denmark’s large investment in public education pays off in higher cognitive skills among low-income children, but not in higher-education mobility—i.e., the odds that a child of a non-college grad will go on to finish college. 论文第二个重要观点是,丹麦公共教育的大量投资,在提高低收入家庭孩子的认知技能方面有所斩获,但未增加高等教育的流动性,比如,非大学毕业生子女完成大学学业的几率并未提高。 Overall, Denmark spends much more than the U.S. on all levels of education. In particular, a much higher share of its poor young children is enrolled in daycare and preschool than the United States. This large public investment in kids seems to increase cognitive skills among poor Danish children compared to their American peers. In international math and reading scores, for example, the poorest quartile in Denmark far outperforms their counterparts in the U.S. 总体而言,丹麦在各级教育上的花费比美国多得多。特别是贫困孩子上幼儿园和学前班的比例远高于美国。比起美国的同龄孩子,丹麦对孩子的大量公共投资提高了贫困儿童的认知能力。以国际数学和阅读考试为例,丹麦的最低四分位数的成绩值远优于美国。 But despite this far greater investment in young children and public colleges, Danish children of high-school graduates are still extremely unlikely to go onto college. Put slightly differently, a tiny share of Denmark’s college graduate population comes from homes where neither parent finished high school. The children of college-grads almost always go to college; the children of non-grads often don’t—even in Denmark. 但是,尽管在儿童和公立大学的投资大了很多,丹麦高中毕业生进入大学的可能性仍然非常低。稍有一点不同,极小一部分丹麦大学毕业生来自父母都没读完高中的家庭。大学生的孩子上大学;没上大学的父母,孩子往往也不上大学——即使在丹麦也是这样。 The third big idea is that Denmark’s welfare policies might reduce its citizens’ incentives to go to college. In the early 1990s, when Denmark raised the minimum age of eligibility for social assistance, college enrollment among Danish twenty somethings fell below its trajectory. Based on this finding, the researchers conclude that welfare policies may reduce college enrollment. Denmark makes it more comfortable to be poor and less lucrative to be rich, so many young people decide to end their education after high school. 第三个重要观点是,丹麦的福利政策可能降低了公民上大学的激励。1990年代初,丹麦提高了获得社会援助资格的最低年龄,大学在二十多岁青年人中的招生数随即跌入下行轨迹。基于这项发现,研究人员得出结论,福利政策会减少高校招生。丹麦让穷人更舒适,富人更无利可图,故而很多年轻人决定高中毕业后不再接受教育。 This final idea may be the most controversial. After all, it’s not clear how to frame this finding. Democrats can say: Despite conservative arguments that a welfare state could destroy poor young people’s ambition, Denmark’s educational mobility is no worse than the U.S. But Republicans can say: Despite liberal arguments that Denmark is so much better than the U.S. at social mobility, its poor kids are no more likely to go to college. “There is something here for the Republicans and for the Democrats,” Heckman told me. 最后这个观点可能最具争议。毕竟,目前还不清楚如何解释这个发现。民主党人可以说:尽管保守派观点认为福利国家可能毁掉贫穷年轻人的雄心壮志,可是丹麦的教育流动性并不比美国差。而共和党人可以说:尽管自由派认为丹麦的社会流动性比美国更好,可是其贫穷孩子们同样不太可能进入大学。“这些就是共和党和民主党的说辞”,Heckman告诉我。 The most significant implication of this paper is not a happy one: Equality of opportunity is a fantasy. It does not exist in the U.S., it does not exist in Denmark, and it probably doesn’t exist anywhere. The children of rich college graduates are far more likely to grow up to become rich college graduates, even in the world's social-democratic fantasyland. That is because, everywhere, parents matter. 本文最有意义的推论并不让人开心:机会平等是一种幻想。它在美国不存在,在丹麦不存在,可能在任何地方都不存在。富有的大学毕业生的孩子更有可能成长为富有的大学毕业生,即使在这世界的社会民主乐园——丹麦也是这样。这是因为,任何地方,父母都很重要。 And it’s probably a good thing that parents matter. For the government to make equality of opportunity its singular and absolute policy goal would probably mean breaking up neighborhoods, forcing arranged marriages, enrolling all children in a unified curriculum, and having them all taught by a mass-produced robot; that would eliminate neighborhood effects, assortative mating, peer effects, curricular differences, and the problem of unequal teaching quality. It is unclear that there is a constituency for this policy, even among the most radical of Bernie bros. 当然,父母很重要可能是件好事。对想要实现机会平等的政府来说,其单一而绝对的政策目标,将可能意味着打破邻里关系,强行安排婚姻,统一所有孩子的学习课程,让大批量生产的机器人教授所有孩子;那样将消除邻里影响、选择性的婚配关系【编注:即人们从与自己地位、收入、教育等方面背景相似的人群中选择配偶的倾向】、同侪效应、课程差异和不同教学质量的问题。不知道是否有选区支持这种政策,即使是最激进的桑德斯支持者。 But just as Denmark’s policy may have its own unintended consequences, the American philosophy of opportunity has its own dark side. For example, high income inequality in the U.S. makes a college degree more valuable in America than in similar countries. This may encourage more poor Americans to enroll in college. 但是,正如丹麦政策有自己意想不到的后果,美国式的自我奋斗争取机会的哲学也有自己的暗面。例如,美国显著的收入不平等使美国大学学位比在同类国家更值钱。这会鼓励更多美国穷人上大学。 For many, college pays off. But the recent rise in college attainment in the U.S. has come at a terrible cost for some. Student debt has exploded, particularly at for-profit colleges serving older, poorer students, the majority of whom drop out with student loans that aren’t dischargeable in bankruptcy. 对于很多人来说,上大学是值得的。但是对于一些人,近期大学费用已经上涨到了糟糕的程度。学生债务激增,特别是上营利性院校的年纪较大的穷学生,他们中的大多数辍学时仍带着就算破产也必须偿还的学生贷款。 So the social siren of American inequality—join the rich! go to college!—lures many first-generation students to put tens of thousands of dollars toward a degree that they never get. If they default on their student loans, they won’t be able to get a loan to buy a house. Which means the housing market is constrained by student debt defaults. Which means other industries that rely on a healthy housing market—furniture, cars, plants, kitchen appliances, apparel—are also affected. 因此,美国社会不公平的刺耳警报——成为富人!考上大学!——诱使许多第一代学生花费上万美元以期获得一张他们得不到的文凭。如果他们拖欠学生贷款,将无法获得贷款买房子。这意味着学生债务违约限制了房地产市场发展。也意味着依赖良好运行的房地产市场的其他工业,如家具、汽车、种植、厨房电器和服装都会受到影响。 Denmark doesn’t have all the answers, and apparently its leaders know it—that’s why they have such a strong public assistance system in the first place. But the U.S. mythology of social mobility is also self-defeating, in ways that are exceptionally American. 丹麦没有给出所有的答案,显然其领导人知道这一点,这就是为什么他们首先建立了一套强有力的公共援助制度。但是,美国社会流动性的神话,以非常美国的方式,也打了自己的脸。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]一枚热爱本拉登的鸡蛋

Yuri Kochiyama, today’s Google Doodle, fought for civil rights — and praised Osama bin Laden
今天的谷歌Doodle:为民权作斗争并歌颂本拉登的河内山百合

作者:Dylan Matthews @ 2016-05-19
译者:bear
校对:Tiff
来源:VOX,http://www.vox.com/2016/5/19/11713686/yuri-kochiyama

Thursday, May 19, this year would’ve been the 95th birthday of Yuri Kochiyama, a prominent Japanese-American activist who passed away at 93 two years ago. Google is marking the occasion with one of its trademark doodles.

今年五月十九日的这个周四是河内山百合的95岁诞辰,这位生前著名的日裔美国激进分子,于两年前93岁时去世。谷歌把这一天标记为一个Google doodle。【译注:Google doodle是谷歌为了庆祝节日、纪念伟人以及其它伟大成就的临时主页标志。

Some of Kochiyama’s work was deeply, clearly admirable. As an associate of Malcolm X, she was an important nonblack ally to the more militant end of the civil rights movement. She endured forced internment during World War II, and was an outspoken advocate for reparations to internees, which would eventually be passed in 1988. She was a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War and advocate for inmates she viewed as political prisoners.

河内山的一些工作是值得被深刻地、清晰地赞颂的。作为马尔科姆·艾克斯【译注:马尔科姆·艾克斯与马丁·路德·金并称为20世纪中期美国历史上最著名的两位黑人领导人,但他反对后者的“非暴力”的策略,主张通过以暴力革命的方式获取黑人的权利。】的伙伴,她是民权运动中战斗在第一线的重要的非黑人同盟。她在二战时期被强制收容【译注:由于二战时日本是美国的敌对国,日裔美国人被强制收容】,并且成为“被收容者赔偿”法案的积极倡导者,而这项政策最终在1988年通过。她也为反越战发声,并且支持那些她视为政治犯的囚犯。

But other commitments of hers were more ambiguous. She was an outspoken admirer of Mao Zedong even after the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. She praised Malcolm X for his “admiration for Mao and Ho Chi Minh,” and worked closely with the Revolutionary Action Movement, an “urban guerrilla warfare” organization based on “a synthesis of the thought of Malcolm X, Marx and Lenin, and Mao Zedong.” The activist Robert Williams gifted her with a copy of the Little Red Book, and she later thanked him for “the gift of Mao’s philosophy.”

但是她其他的追求则更为暧昧一些。她是毛的直言不讳的崇拜者,即便是在大跃进和文革之后。她因为马尔科姆·艾克斯对毛和胡志明的赞赏而赞扬他,并且和“革命行动运动”组织亲密合作—这是一个基于马尔科姆·艾克斯思想、马克思列宁思(more...)

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Yuri Kochiyama, today’s Google Doodle, fought for civil rights — and praised Osama bin Laden 今天的谷歌Doodle:为民权作斗争并歌颂本拉登的河内山百合 作者:Dylan Matthews @ 2016-05-19 译者:bear 校对:Tiff 来源:VOX,http://www.vox.com/2016/5/19/11713686/yuri-kochiyama Thursday, May 19, this year would've been the 95th birthday of Yuri Kochiyama, a prominent Japanese-American activist who passed away at 93 two years ago. Google is marking the occasion with one of its trademark doodles. 今年五月十九日的这个周四是河内山百合的95岁诞辰,这位生前著名的日裔美国激进分子,于两年前93岁时去世。谷歌把这一天标记为一个Google doodle。【译注:Google doodle是谷歌为了庆祝节日、纪念伟人以及其它伟大成就的临时主页标志。】 Some of Kochiyama's work was deeply, clearly admirable. As an associate of Malcolm X, she was an important nonblack ally to the more militant end of the civil rights movement. She endured forced internment during World War II, and was an outspoken advocate for reparations to internees, which would eventually be passed in 1988. She was a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War and advocate for inmates she viewed as political prisoners. 河内山的一些工作是值得被深刻地、清晰地赞颂的。作为马尔科姆·艾克斯【译注:马尔科姆·艾克斯与马丁·路德·金并称为20世纪中期美国历史上最著名的两位黑人领导人,但他反对后者的“非暴力”的策略,主张通过以暴力革命的方式获取黑人的权利。】的伙伴,她是民权运动中战斗在第一线的重要的非黑人同盟。她在二战时期被强制收容【译注:由于二战时日本是美国的敌对国,日裔美国人被强制收容】,并且成为“被收容者赔偿”法案的积极倡导者,而这项政策最终在1988年通过。她也为反越战发声,并且支持那些她视为政治犯的囚犯。 But other commitments of hers were more ambiguous. She was an outspoken admirer of Mao Zedong even after the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. She praised Malcolm X for his "admiration for Mao and Ho Chi Minh," and worked closely with the Revolutionary Action Movement, an "urban guerrilla warfare" organization based on "a synthesis of the thought of Malcolm X, Marx and Lenin, and Mao Zedong." The activist Robert Williams gifted her with a copy of the Little Red Book, and she later thanked him for "the gift of Mao's philosophy." 但是她其他的追求则更为暧昧一些。她是毛的直言不讳的崇拜者,即便是在大跃进和文革之后。她因为马尔科姆·艾克斯对毛和胡志明的赞赏而赞扬他,并且和“革命行动运动”组织亲密合作—这是一个基于马尔科姆·艾克斯思想、马克思列宁思想以及毛思综合体的“城市游击战”组织。【译注:Revolutionary Action Movement是马尔科姆·艾克斯的伙伴Max Stanford建立的半秘密组织,制定了用马克思列宁主义建立黑人国家主义的运动纲领】社会活动家罗伯特·威廉姆斯送了她一本红宝书作为礼物,对此她以这是“一份毛思的礼物”为由表示了感谢。 Yuri Kochiyama was a supporter of the terrorist group Shining Path 河内山百合是恐怖组织光明之路的支持者 Two positions of Kochiyama's stand out as particularly alarming. First, she was an enthusiastic supporter of the Peruvian terrorist group Shining Path, a Maoist organization that has conducted a brutal insurgency killing tens of thousands of people since 1980.Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that Shining Path personally killed or disappeared at least 30,000. 河内山有两个立场尤其让人警觉。第一,她是秘鲁恐怖组织光辉道路的狂热拥护者——这是一个毛派组织,从1980年开始发起了一场导致数万人死亡的血腥叛乱。秘鲁真相与和解委员会认为至少三万人遭到了光辉道路的亲自杀害或导致失踪。 "Its tactics include the burning of ballot boxes and the public 'executions' of moderate local leaders and others, including nuns and priests, who are seen as rivals for the allegiance of the poor," according to a 1992 New York Times report. "In wildly exaggerated demonstrations of Maoist precepts, children have been killed for political 'crimes.' Amnesty International says the guerrillas routinely torture, mutilate and murder captives. 纽约时报在1992年的一则报道中提到:“它的策略包括烧毁投票箱和公开处决温和的本地领袖和其他人,包括修女和神父——他们被视为无产阶级的敌人”,“在疯狂的毛派戒律夸张示范中,孩子由于政治犯罪被杀害。大赦国际组织说这个游击队经常折磨,残害和杀害俘虏。” "We reject and condemn human rights because they are reactionary, counter-revolutionary, bourgeois rights," founder Abimael Guzmán declared in one document. "Rather than concentrate its attacks on the armed forces or police, Shining Path has predominantly singled out civilians," Human Rights Watch noted in 1997. "The Shining Path has pragmatically avoided taking captives unless it intends to execute them … Shining Path has been reported to torture captured civilians before executing them." Shining Path also used rape as a weapon of war. 创始人阿维马埃尔·古斯曼在一份文件中声称:“我们拒绝并谴责人权因为它是反动的,反革命的,资产阶级法权的。”“针对军队和警察的攻击还是次要的,光辉道路主要是甄选平民”人权观察组织在1997年写道,“光辉道路实用主义地避免抓俘虏,除非它打算处决他们……有报道称光辉道路在处决被抓的平民前会折磨他们。”光辉道路还把强奸作为一种战争武器。 This did not appear to bother Kochiyama, who joined a delegation to Peru organized by the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party, which defends the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. She read, in her words, "the kind of reading materials that I could become 'educated' on the real situation in Peru; not the slanted reports of corporate America. The more I read, the more I came to completely support the revolution in Peru." In other words, she read, and believed, Maoist propaganda denying Shining Path's war crimes. 这似乎并没有对河内山造成困扰,她曾加入过一个由支持大跃进和文革的毛派共产主义革命党组织的代表团去秘鲁。她读道——她的原话:“这类读物能让我知晓秘鲁真实的现状;有别于美国企业的那些带有偏见的报道。我越读越觉得我在变得更加支持在秘鲁进行的这场革命。”换句话说,她阅读并且相信毛派的宣传,并且否认光辉道路的战争罪行。 After her return from Peru, she declared, "What has been taking place in both Peru and the US is a serious campaign to discredit Guzmán and the Shining Path movement, tainting them as terrorists, undermining their struggle with lies, isolating them, and intimidating anyone who might support them." 在她从秘鲁回来后,她声称:“在秘鲁和美国正在发生的是一场严重的运动——抹黑古斯曼和光辉道路运动,污蔑他们是恐怖分子,用谎言破坏他们的斗争,孤立他们,并且恐吓任何可能支持他们的人。” Yuri Kochiyama declared Osama bin Laden "one of the people that I admire" 河内山百合声明本拉登是“我尊敬的人之一” Kochiyama was a thorough-going opponent of what she viewed as American imperialism, and like some radical anti-imperialists this occasionally led her to admiring truly loathsome figures, because she thought they were effective at combating American empire. Abimael Guzmán was one. Osama bin Laden was another. 河内山是所有被她视作美帝主义事物的死对头,并且,就像一些激进的反帝国主义斗士一样,这偶尔使她仰慕一些真正令人讨厌的人物,因为她认为他们在有效地和美帝战斗。阿维马埃尔·古斯曼是一个,本拉登是另一个。 In a 2003 interview for the Objector: A Magazine of Conscience and Resistance, Kochiyama explained: 2003年,在《反对者:一份良心和抵抗的杂志》的采访中,河内山解释道:
I’m glad that you are curious why I consider Osama bin Laden as one of the people that I admire. To me, he is in the category of Malcolm X, Che Guevara, Patrice Lumumba, Fidel Castro, all leaders that I admire. They had much in common. Besides being strong leaders who brought consciousness to their people, they all had severe dislike for the US government and those who held power in the US. 我非常高兴你对我将本拉登视为我尊敬的人之一的理由感到好奇。对我而言,他在我心中的位置和马尔科姆·艾克斯、切·格瓦拉、帕特里斯·卢蒙巴(译注:刚果民主共和国首任总理)、菲德尔·卡斯特罗,以及所有我尊敬的领袖是一样的。他们有很多共同点。除了以强大的思想领导他们的人民之外,他们都对美国政府和那些在美国掌权的人有着强烈的厌恶。 bin Laden may have come from a very wealthy family, but by the time he was twenty, he came to loathe the eliteness and class conduct of his family… 本拉登可能是来自非常富裕的家庭,但在20岁之时,他开始憎恨精英阶级和他家人所在阶级的做法…… …You asked, "Should freedom fighters support him?" Freedom fighters all over the world, and not just in the Muslim world, don’t just support him; they revere him; they join him in battle. ……你问:“自由斗士应该支持他吗?”全世界的自由斗士,不仅在穆斯林世界,不但支持他;他们尊敬他;他们在战斗中加入他。 …You stated that some freedom fighters responded that bin Laden’s agenda is more reactionary and does not speak to the needs of the masses of people who exist under US dominance. bin Laden has been primarily fighting US dominance even when he received money from the US when he was fighting in Afghanistan. He was fighting for Islam and all people who believe in Islam, against westerners, especially the US--even when he was fighting against the Russians. ……你提到一些自由斗士回应说本拉登的事业是更加反动的,并且没有为生活在美国主导下的人民群众的需求发声。即便是在他接受美国资金在阿富汗战斗的时期,本拉登的主要精力就已经放在和美国主导做斗争上了。他在为伊斯兰和所有信仰伊斯兰的人民和西方势力斗争,特别是美国——即便是在他和俄罗斯战斗的情况下。
To be clear, this is Kochiyama defending bin Laden — who, besides being a mass murderer, was a vicious misogynist and hardly the brave anti-imperial class traitor Kochiyama fancies him as — against other leftists who correctly noted that you can oppose American imperialism without allying or supporting violent jihadism. 需要明确的是,这是河内山为本拉登所作的辩护,而另一些左派人士正确地指出,在不支持暴力圣战主义或不与之结盟的情况下,也可以反对美帝国主义,对此她持反对意见。而本拉登,除了是一个大规模的杀人凶手外,还是一个恶毒的厌恶女性的人,并且他不可能像河内山赞许的那样是一个勇敢的反帝国主义的阶级反叛者。 Kochiyama's praise for Che Guevara and Fidel Castro is also controversial, and, I think wrong, but is at least somewhat common on the left. Sympathy for Shining Path and bin Laden, by contrast, is not a common left position basically anywhere. 河内山对切格瓦拉和卡斯特罗的赞美同样是有争议的。我认为这是错的,但至少在左派中还算常见。相比之下,对光辉道路和本拉登的同情在任何的左派阵营都不寻常。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]一位社会心理学家的自白

RECKONING WITH THE PAST
和过去做个了结

作者:MICHAEL INZLICHT @ 2016-02-29
译者:龟海海(@龟海海)
校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值)
来源:MICHAEL INZLICHT的博客,http://michaelinzlicht.com/getting-better/2016/2/29/reckoning-with-the-past

Sometimes I wonder if I should be fixing myself more to drink.

有时候我辗转反侧,不知是否该借酒消愁。

No, this is not going to be an optimistic post.

没错,这不是一篇鸡汤文。

If you want bubbles and sunshine, please see my friend Simine Vazire’s post on why she is feeling optimistic about things. If you want nuance and balance, see my co-moderator Alison Ledgerwood’s new blog*. Instead, if you will allow me, I want to wallow.

如果你想要泡沫和阳光,我朋友Simine Vazire的文章会告诉你为什么她如此积极乐观。如果你想要情绪间的微妙平衡,看我同僚Alison Ledgerwood的新博客。而我,只想好好吐槽一番。

I have so many feelings about the situation we’re in, and sometimes the weight of it all breaks my heart. I know I’m being intemperate, not thinking clearly, but I feel that it is only when we feel badly, when we acknowledge and, yes, grieve for yesterday, that we can allow for a better tomorrow. I want a better tomorrow, I want social psychology to change. But, the only way we can really change is if we reckon with our past, coming clean that we erred; and erred badly.

我对我们现在的处境有太多的感触,这有时沉重得让我心力交瘁。我知道我失去了自控,头脑不清楚。但我觉得只有当我们直面昨日,为昨日沉痛伤感,才能拥有美好的明天。我渴望美好的明天,我希望社会心理学能改变。但是,唯一能使我们真正改变的是和过去做个了结,坦白过去所犯的严重错误。

To be clear: I am in love with social psychology. I am writing here because I am still in love with social psychology. Yet, I am dismayed that so many of us are dismissing or justifying all those small (and not so small) signs that things are just not right, that things are not what they seem. “Carry-on, folks, nothing to see here,” is what some of us seem to be saying.

首先声明:我热爱社会心理学。我在这儿码字就是因为我依然爱它。然而,让我感到泄气的是,尽管很多微小(其实并非如此微小)的迹象表明情况不妙且另有隐情,我们之中许多人却对所有这些迹象视而不见或想出种种理由开脱。“继续,伙计,这儿没啥好看的,”我们中有些人似乎在这么说着。(more...)

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RECKONING WITH THE PAST 和过去做个了结 作者:MICHAEL INZLICHT @ 2016-02-29 译者:龟海海(@龟海海) 校对:混乱阈值(@混乱阈值) 来源:MICHAEL INZLICHT的博客,http://michaelinzlicht.com/getting-better/2016/2/29/reckoning-with-the-past Sometimes I wonder if I should be fixing myself more to drink. 有时候我辗转反侧,不知是否该借酒消愁。 No, this is not going to be an optimistic post. 没错,这不是一篇鸡汤文。 If you want bubbles and sunshine, please see my friend Simine Vazire’s post on why she is feeling optimistic about things. If you want nuance and balance, see my co-moderator Alison Ledgerwood’s new blog*. Instead, if you will allow me, I want to wallow. 如果你想要泡沫和阳光,我朋友Simine Vazire的文章会告诉你为什么她如此积极乐观。如果你想要情绪间的微妙平衡,看我同僚Alison Ledgerwood的新博客。而我,只想好好吐槽一番。 I have so many feelings about the situation we’re in, and sometimes the weight of it all breaks my heart. I know I’m being intemperate, not thinking clearly, but I feel that it is only when we feel badly, when we acknowledge and, yes, grieve for yesterday, that we can allow for a better tomorrow. I want a better tomorrow, I want social psychology to change. But, the only way we can really change is if we reckon with our past, coming clean that we erred; and erred badly. 我对我们现在的处境有太多的感触,这有时沉重得让我心力交瘁。我知道我失去了自控,头脑不清楚。但我觉得只有当我们直面昨日,为昨日沉痛伤感,才能拥有美好的明天。我渴望美好的明天,我希望社会心理学能改变。但是,唯一能使我们真正改变的是和过去做个了结,坦白过去所犯的严重错误。 To be clear: I am in love with social psychology. I am writing here because I am still in love with social psychology. Yet, I am dismayed that so many of us are dismissing or justifying all those small (and not so small) signs that things are just not right, that things are not what they seem. “Carry-on, folks, nothing to see here,” is what some of us seem to be saying. 首先声明:我热爱社会心理学。我在这儿码字就是因为我依然爱它。然而,让我感到泄气的是,尽管很多微小(其实并非如此微小)的迹象表明情况不妙且另有隐情,我们之中许多人却对所有这些迹象视而不见或想出种种理由开脱。“继续,伙计,这儿没啥好看的,”我们中有些人似乎在这么说着。 Our problems are not small and they will not be remedied by small fixes. Our problems are systemic and they are at the core of how we conduct our science. My eyes were first opened to this possibility when I read Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn’s paper during what seems like a different, more innocent time. 我们的问题不小,想轻易补救谈何容易。我们的问题是系统性的,而且密切关系到我们如何进行科研。我起初发现有可能出了问题是在我读了 Simmons, Nelson, 和Simonsohn合著的论文之后,那时情况看起来和如今还有所不同,还是一个更纯真的年代。【编注:该论文发表于2011年】 This paper details how small, seemingly innocuous, and previously encouraged data-analysis decisions could allow for anything to be presented as statistically significant. That is, flexibility in data collection and analysis could make even impossible effects seem possible and significant. 这篇论文详细阐述了那些之前受鼓励的微小且看似无害的数据分析是如何让事物呈现出统计意义的。那就是,灵活的数据收集和分析可以让那些实际不可能的作用变得可能并且显著。 What is worse, Andrew Gelman made clear that a researcher need not actively p-hack their data to reach erroneous conclusions. It turns out such biases in data analyses might not be conscious, that researchers might not even be aware of how their data-contingent decisions are warping the conclusions they reach. This is flat-out scary: Even honest researchers with the highest of integrity might be reaching erroneous conclusions at an alarming rate. 更糟的是,研究者无需主动挖掘数据就能得到错误的结论,这点被Andrew Gelman解释得很清楚。事实是,研究者在数据分析中的偏见可能不是有意识的,他们甚至没有意识到自己依据数据做出的决定正在歪曲他们最终得到的结论。这可怕至极:即使最诚实,最正直的研究者也有可能以高得吓人的几率得出错误的结论。 Third, is the problem of publication bias. As a field, we tend only to publish significant results. This could be because as authors we choose to focus on these; or, more likely, because reviewers, editors, and journals force us to focus on these and to ignore nulls. 接下来还有发表过程中的偏见。在特定领域中,我们只倾向于发表具有显著意义的结果。这可能是由于作为作者我们选择把注意力放在这些结果上;或者,更可能的是,因为审稿人,编辑和期刊迫使我们把注意力放在具有显著意义的结果上,而忽略那些零结果的研究。 This creates the infamous file drawer that altogether warps the research landscape. Because it is unclear how large the file drawer is for any research literature, it is hard to determine how large or small any effect is, if it exists at all. 这就导致了臭名昭著的"文件抽屉"问题(即发表偏见问题),最终歪曲了整个研究领域的形态。由于对任何研究文献我们无法知道其中的“文件抽屉”有多大,我们很难确定该问题所产生的某种影响有多大,假如该影响确实存在的话。 I think these three ideas—that data flexibility can lead to a raft of false positives, that this process might occur without researchers themselves being aware, and the unknown size of the file drawer—explains why so many of our cherished results can’t replicate. These three ideas suggest we might have been fooling ourselves into thinking we were chasing things that are real and robust, when we were pursuing neither. 我认为以上三点——数据的灵活性可能导致大量错误结论,且这一过程可能在研究人员不经意间发生,以及“文件抽屉”尺寸大小的不明——很好地解释了为什么众多我们所珍视的研究成果无法被重复。这三点表明我们可能一直以来自欺欺人以为自己在探求真实且坚实的结果,而事实上我们所追求的既不真实也不坚实。 As someone who has been doing research for nearly twenty years, I now can’t help but wonder if the topics I chose to study are in fact real and robust. Have I been chasing puffs of smoke for all these years? 作为一个做了近20年研究的人,我忍不住怀疑过往研究的课题是否有确凿的依据立论。这些年来我致力探求的是否只是海市蜃楼? I have spent nearly a decade working on the concept of ego depletion, including work that is critical of the model used to explain the phenomenon. I have been rewarded for this work, and I am convinced that the main reason I get any invitations to speak at colloquia and brown-bags these days is because of this work. 我曾用将近十年的时间来研究“自我耗尽”的概念,包括对解释该现象的模型至关重要的一些工作。我因此项研究获奖,同时我确信现在我之所以能受邀在众多学术讨论会发言并白吃白喝都是因为此项研究。 The problem is that ego depletion might not even be a thing. By now, many people are aware that a massive replication attempt of the basic ego depletion effect involving over 2,000 participants found nothing, nada, zip. Only three of the 24 participating labs found a significant effect, but even then, one of these found a significant result in the wrong direction! 问题在于,“自我耗尽”这个概念可能根本就不存在。时至今日,许多人都知道一项由两千余人参加的试图重复“自我耗尽”效应的大规模研究最终什么都没发现,一片空白。二十四个参与研究的实验室中只有三个发现显著的效应,但即使这样,其中一个发现的显著效应竟然是反向的! There is a lot more to this registered replication than the main headline, and there is still so much evidence indicating fatigue is a real phenomenon. I promise to get to these thoughts in a later post, once the paper is finally published. But for now, we are left with a sobering question: If a large sample pre-registered study found absolutely nothing, how has the ego depletion effect been replicated and extended hundreds and hundreds of times? More sobering still: What other phenomena, which we now consider obviously real and true, will be revealed to be just as fragile? 此次记录在案的重复性研究留下的不仅仅是一个标题,同时,还有大量的证据表明“疲劳”是真实存在的现象。我承诺一旦我的论文最终发表,我会在之后的博客文章中加以阐述。但现在,令人警醒的问题则是:如果此前大量的研究毫无斩获,那么“自我耗尽”的效应是如何成千上万次地被复制并延伸的呢?更令人警醒的:其它那些我们认为真实无疑的现象,又会不会同样经不起检验呢? As I said, I’m in a dark place. I feel like the ground is moving from underneath me and I no longer know what is real and what is not. 如我所说,我身处黑暗之地。我感觉似乎脚下的土地都在移动,而我已经辨不清真实和虚假了。 I edited an entire book on stereotype threat, I have signed my name to an amicus brief to the Supreme Court of the United States citing stereotype threat, yet now I am not as certain as I once was about the robustness of the effect. I feel like a traitor for having just written that; like, I’ve disrespected my parents, a no no according to Commandment number 5. 之前我编辑了《刻板印象的威胁》一书,我还签署了一份美国最高法院的法庭陈述并引用了《刻板印象的威胁》,但如今我对该效应的确凿程度却不如过去那样坚定。写下这些文字,让我觉得自己像个叛徒。这感觉如同我对父母大不敬,触犯了十戒第五条。 But, a meta-analysis published just last year suggests that stereotype threat, at least for some populations and under some conditions, might not be so robust after all. P-curving some of the original papers is also not comforting. 但是,去年一项“元分析”(对以往的研究结果进行系统的定量分析)的研究表明,”刻板印象威胁”在一些特定条件下对于一些特定人群可能并不适用,此外对一些原始论文作p值统计曲线的结果同样不让人放心。 Now, stereotype threat is a politically charged topic and there is a lot of evidence supporting it. That said, I think a lot more pain-staking work needs to be done on basic replications, and until then, I would be lying if I said that doubts have not crept in. Rumor has it that a RRR of stereotype threat is in the works. 如今,“刻板印象威胁”是一个政治上受攻击的话题,也受很多有力证据的支持。在这样的情况下,我认为在基础的重复性研究上还有更多艰苦的工作需要做,在这之前,我若说对该效应没有疑问那肯定是在撒谎。有传言称,在之前的很多关于“刻板印象的威胁”的工作中存在着危险信号。 To be fair, this is not social psychology’s problem alone. Many other allied areas in psychology might be similarly fraught and I look forward to these other areas scrutinizing their own work—areas like developmental, clinical, industrial/organizational, consumer behavior, organizational behavior, and so on, need an RPP project or Many Labs of their own. Other areas of science face similar problems too. 公正地说,不止是社会心理学领域存在此问题。心理学中的许多其它类似领域可能同样受影响,我希望这些领域中的研究工作被仔细检验,如进化的、临床的、产业的/组织的、消费行为的、组织行为的心理学等等,都需要一个研究参与池项目【译注:RPP,Research Participation Pool,是一个协调管理研究参与对象的项目】或者“多重实验室”项目【译注:多重实验室项目,Many Labs Project是一个旨在对心理科学多种效应进行可重复性验证的项目】。其他领域的科学研究同样面临类似问题。 During my dark moments, I feel like social psychology needs a redo, a fresh start. Where to begin, though? What am I mostly certain about and where can my skepticism end? I feel like there are legitimate things we have learned, but how do we separate wheat from chaff? Do we need to go back and meticulously replicate everything in the past? Or do we use those bias tests Joe Hilgard is so sick and tired of to point us in the right direction? What should I stop teaching to my undergraduates? I don’t have answers to any of these questions. 在我消沉的这段时间,我觉着社会心理学需要推倒重建,从头来过。那么,从哪儿开始?对于哪些事我能确信不疑?在哪里我能平息我的疑惑?我认为我们学到了一些合理的东西,但如何区分成果和糟粕呢?我们是否需要回去并且一丝不苟地重复过去所有的事情呢?或者我们是否该使用Joe Hilgard厌恶至极的偏见测试来指明方向?哪些东西是我不该教授给本科生的?对所有这些问题我都没有答案。 This blogpost is not going to end on a sunny note. Our problems are real and they run deep. Okay, I do have some hope: I legitimately think our problems are solvable. I think the calls for more statistical power, greater transparency surrounding null results, and more confirmatory studies can save us. What is not helping is the lack of acknowledgement about the severity of our problems. What is not helping is a reluctance to dig into our past and ask what needs revisiting. 本篇博文注定不会有个阳光的结局。我们的问题是真切的,而且深入。好吧,我确实有几点期望:我有理由相信我们的问题是有解的。我认为更多数据支撑,对零结果研究更透明的运作,更多证实性的研究,这些可以解救我们于目前的困境。而帮倒忙的则是:缺乏对问题严重性的认知,不愿意挖掘探究我们的过去并且不愿拷问哪里出了问题。 Time is nigh to reckon with our past. Our future just might depend on it. 时候不早了,是该和我们的过去做个了结了。或许,我们的未来还指望着它呢。

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*In case you haven’t heard, Alison started a wonderful Facebook discussion group that I have the privilege of co-moderating. If you’re tired of bickering and incivility, but still want a place to discuss ideas, PsychMAP just might be for for you. 再次安利一下,Alison开了一个非常不错的脸书讨论组,我也有幸在其中参与共同主持。如果你厌倦了互撕,但仍想找个地方抒发讨论,PsychMAP可能恰好就适合你。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]总统外貌学初级教程

When Democracy Meets the Ghost of Evolution: Why Short Presidents Have Vanished
当民主遭遇进化的幽灵:矮个总统为何不再有

作者:Lixing Sun @ 2016-03-02
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚)
来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/when-democracy-meets-the-ghost-of-evolution-why-short-presidents-have-vanished/

Size matters in politics: America hasn’t seen a president shorter than 5’7” since William McKinley. A main culprit, unbeknownst to many, comes from voters’ cognitive biases—the work of evolution. And the conundrum took a theatrical turn early this year when Marco Rubio, a Republican presidential hopeful, was spotted wearing a pair of new boots.

身高在政治中很重要。自威廉·麦金利以后,美国已经没有出现过身高低于5英尺7英寸的总统了。一个不为许多人所知的主要原因是选民的认知偏差——这是进化的产物。本年初,这个谜案出现了一个戏剧性转变:来自共和党的总统强力候选人马克·卢比奥穿出了一双新靴子。

“Marco Rubio’s Republican rivals literally are hot on his heels,” opened a New York Post news article on January 6. Speculatio(more...)

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When Democracy Meets the Ghost of Evolution: Why Short Presidents Have Vanished 当民主遭遇进化的幽灵:矮个总统为何不再有 作者:Lixing Sun @ 2016-03-02 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚) 来源:The Evolution Institute,https://evolution-institute.org/article/when-democracy-meets-the-ghost-of-evolution-why-short-presidents-have-vanished/ Size matters in politics: America hasn’t seen a president shorter than 5’7” since William McKinley. A main culprit, unbeknownst to many, comes from voters’ cognitive biases—the work of evolution. And the conundrum took a theatrical turn early this year when Marco Rubio, a Republican presidential hopeful, was spotted wearing a pair of new boots. 身高在政治中很重要。自威廉·麦金利以后,美国已经没有出现过身高低于5英尺7英寸的总统了。一个不为许多人所知的主要原因是选民的认知偏差——这是进化的产物。本年初,这个谜案出现了一个戏剧性转变:来自共和党的总统强力候选人马克·卢比奥穿出了一双新靴子。 “Marco Rubio’s Republican rivals literally are hot on his heels,” opened a New York Post news article on January 6. Speculations followed as to how expensive the boots were. The Rubio camp wasted no time to clarify that they were nothing more than Men’s Florsheim, costing about $100. “卢比奥的党内对手的热情名副其实地只落后他一个脚跟”,1月6日的《纽约邮报》新闻报道如此开头。随后就有人开始猜测这双靴子有多贵。卢比奥的竞选团队即刻澄清说那只是一双富乐绅男款鞋,价格约100美元。 But the core of Rubio’s “bootgate” brouhaha wasn’t about luxury; it was about the heels—a whole two inches high. “A vote for Marco Rubio” tweeted Rick Tyler, Ted Cruz’s commuatsnications director, “is a vote for Men’s High-Heeled Booties.” 但卢比奥“靴子门”事件喧闹的核心不在于它是不是奢侈品,而在于它的鞋跟——厚达2英寸。“投票支持卢比奥”,泰德·克鲁兹的公关联络主管Rick Tyler在Twitter上说,“就是投票支持男式高跟靴子。” Why would Rubio sport a pair of, as Rand Paul teased, “cute new boots”? As far as we know, tall men have scores of advantages in life, work, and romance. Among CEOs, for example, 90% are taller than the average man, and only 3% are below 5’7”. In fact, for every inch added to their height, men can get an extra 1.8% (about $800) in wages, an amount duly dubbed by economists as a“height premium.” 为什么卢比奥会穿着一双如兰德·保罗所戏称的“可爱小靴靴”出来卖弄呢?据我们所知,高个子男人在生活、工作和爱情方面都有优势。比如,CEO中90%身高高于男性平均水平,只有3%身高不到5英尺7英寸。事实上,身高每增加1英寸,男性可以多拿1.8%的工资(约800美元),经济学家恰如其分地把这个增加额称为“身高溢价”。 Rubio may be aware that since the beginning of the last century, nearly 70% of the presidential campaigns between the two major parties have been won by the taller candidate. This wasn’t always the case, though. In fact, of the presidents elected before 1900, eleven were shorter than 5’9”, and only nine were taller (see the chart). 卢比奥可能意识到,自上个世纪初以来,两大党之间70%的总统竞选最终是身材更高的候选人获胜。但是,情况并非从来如此。实际上,在1900年以前获选的总统中,11人身高低于5英尺9英寸,只有9人身材比这高(见下图)。 screen-shot-2016-03-02-at-12-35-20-pm   After that, however, all short candidates have lost to their tall rivals—James M. Cox (5’6”) to Warren G. Harding (6’0”) in 1920, Thomas Dewey (5’8”) to FDR (6’2”) in 1944, then to Harry S. Truman (5’9”) in 1948, and Michael Dukakis (5’8”) to George H. W. Bush (6’2”) in 1988. 但是,自那以后,所有矮个候选人都输给了他们的高个子对手:1920年,詹姆斯·M·考克斯(5英尺6英寸)输给了沃伦·G·哈丁(6英尺);1944年,托马斯·杜威(5英尺8英寸)输给了F·D·罗斯福(6英尺2英寸),1948年他又输给了哈里·S·杜鲁门(5英尺9英寸);1988年,迈克尔·杜卡基斯(5英尺8英寸)输给了老布什(6英尺2英寸)。 At 5’10”, Rubio is taller than the average American man. Still, he is 5” shorter than the front-runner Donald Trump, a difference you can easily see on the screen during Republican primary debates. By adding two inches to his stature, he hoped to up his chance—if only his rivals weren’t paying attention. 卢比奥身高5英尺10英寸,高于美国男性平均水平。但是,他还是比领跑者唐纳德·特朗普矮5英寸。这一差别在共和党初选辩论的屏幕上看得很清楚。他想通过给自己身高增加2英寸来提高机会——只盼对手不要注意。 Do tall men make good leaders—presidents in particular? I pulled out data from Wikipedia.com and did some statistics (such as the Mann-Whitney U test and Spearman’s rank correlation analysis). And I found no relationship whatsoever between height and performance ranking for all elected presidents before 1900. (Obviously, I can’t do so for the period after 1900 because no short presidents have been elected.) 高个子就能当好领袖吗?特别是,高个子就能当好总统吗?我从维基百科上找数据做了一些统计工作 (比如曼—惠特尼U检验、斯皮尔曼等级相关分析)。我发现,1900年前获选上任的所有总统的身高和他们的任职表现排名之间找不出任何关系。(1900年以后显然无法做这种分析,因为这段时间没有矮个总统获选。) Why have short American presidents suddenly vanished since 1900? 为什么美国在1900年后突然就没有矮个总统了呢? The answer, apparently, lies in the use of images in the media. In fact, the advent of the televised debate in 1960 has ushered in even more public scrutiny on candidates’ looks. As a result, no short or bald candidates have made it into the White House since Dwight Eisenhower. (Perhaps, that’s why Trump is careful about his hair—in case people think he is bald.) 答案显然在于媒体对照片的大量使用。实际上,1960年出现的电视辩论使公众对候选人的外貌审查进一步增加。于是,自艾森豪威尔以来,再没有任何矮个或秃顶候选人入主白宫了。(这也许就是特朗普特别在意发型的缘故,他担心人们以为他秃顶。) How can a candidate’s physical appearance hold such a strong sway on voters’ choices? Psychologists and behavioral economists will point to the halo effect, where a perceived strength—here, the height of a candidate—eclipses all weaknesses. Why, then, are our cognitive systems so naïve as to swoon for something utterly irrelevant (namely, the body size) of a potential leader? 为什么候选人的身体外形如此强烈地左右选民的选择呢?心理学家和行为经济学家可能会说这是因为存在光环效应:人们感知到的某一力量(此处就是候选人的身高)会遮蔽所有弱点。那么,我们的认知系统为什么如此幼稚,竟会被准领导人完全无关的某些特征(即体型大小)迷住心神呢? The answer lies in our evolutionary past. Research shows that in a vast number of animals, from insects to mammals, body size can robustly predict winners when resources and mates are at stake. In primates, alpha males are usually large and assuming. (That’s why, even for a novice, it often takes just a glance to spot them in a bunch.) Not only do they win more fights, but females also fall for them. 答案就是我们的进化史。研究表明,对于从昆虫到哺乳类的大量动物而言,在资源和配偶成问题的情况下,体型大小能牢靠的预测谁会胜出。灵长类的雄性领袖通常都高大专横。(因此即便是新手也能从一群动物中一眼认出它们。)它们不但能赢取更多战斗,而且能收获雌性的喜爱。 This process favoring large body size is known as sexual selection, and apparently, it also worked for our Stone-Age ancestors. Even in modern tribal societies, from the Amazons to Papua New Guinea, tall, husky men are still widely preferred as chiefs—or “Big Men,” in Polynesia and other Pacific islands. No wonder our cognitive systems are tuned to looking for tall guys as leaders or mates—the hunks, in our colloquial lingo. 这一偏爱大块头体格的进程叫作性选择,我们石器时代的祖先们显然也受到了影响。即便在现存的部落社会中,从亚马逊丛林到巴布亚新几内亚,人们依然普遍更喜欢接受高大魁梧的男性当首领——或者“大人”,波利尼西亚和其他太平洋岛屿上就用这种称呼。因此,我们的认知系统会调整到找高个男人(——就是俗话说的hunk)做领袖或配偶,这毫不奇怪。 Since 1900, apparently, our liking for hunks hadn’t hit a major hitch until Harding was elected. In appearance, Harding was tall, virile, and gracious with thick eyebrows, wide shoulders, and a deep voice—features that can provoke a feeling of being macho, resolute, and competent. 显然自1900年以来,我们对大个头肌肉男的喜爱直到哈丁当选都没有遭遇什么大挫败。哈丁眉毛浓密、肩膀宽阔、声音低沉,身材高大雄壮且和蔼可亲。这些特征让人觉得他富于男性气概、做事果断干练。 Indeed, he rose from being a small town newspaper editor to an Ohio state senator, a US senator, and finally the president. But just after two years in the Oval Office, Harding’s impressive suite of manly features turned out to be all fake. They did nothing but make him a womanizer. 实际上,他最早只是一个小镇的报纸编辑,后来当上俄亥俄州参议员,然后是国会参议员,最后成为总统。但入主白宫椭圆办公室才2年,哈丁那些令人印象深刻的全套男性气质完全变成了假相。它们没有什么用处,只是让他风流成性而已。 He is called, according to the U.S. News, “an ineffectual leader who played poker while his friends plundered the U.S. treasury.” Even Harding himself confessed, “I am not fit for this office and should never have been here.” When he died, rumors had it that his wife had poisoned him, not out of jealousy but to salvage his reputation from the charges of corruption in his administration. 据《美国新闻杂志》,他被称为“当同伙们洗劫美国国库时还在玩扑克牌的无能领袖。”连哈丁本人都承认,“我不适合这个职位,一开始就不应该到这来。”他死后,有传言说他是被妻子毒害的,原因不是嫉妒,而是为了补救他被控任内腐败的名声。 As the ghost of our evolutionary past lingers on, there is no reason why hunks with Harding’s physique won’t be elected again. If you have any doubt, think about Arnold Schwarzenegger. How much of a halo did he draw from his muscles as a body builder and his fame as an action movie star to win the Californian gubernatorial race in 2002? 进化史的幽灵一直在徘徊,因此没有理由认为拥有哈丁那种体格的大个头肌肉男不会再次被选上。如果你有任何疑虑,想想阿诺德·施瓦辛格。他那身健身运动员的肌肉和作为动作电影巨星的名气到底为他赢得2002年加州州长竞选贡献了多少光环? It’s disconcerting for all concerned citizens to realize that in our age of television and the Internet, presidential elections share much with pageants for Mr. America. If our guts are all we rely on in the process, even the 5’7” John Adams or the 5’4” James Madison may not stand a chance to be elected today. 在电视和互联网时代,总统选举和美国先生选美有很多共同点。所有关心公共事务的公民因意识到这一点而心神不安。如果我们只依赖本能的话,那么5英尺7英寸的约翰·亚当斯或者5英尺4英寸的詹姆斯·麦迪逊今天若参选可能就没有机会胜出。 By forgoing a vast pool of talents from women, short men, and minority citizens (except Obama), how can we find the most capable person to lead our nation? In this sense, putting a woman in the White House will mark a new milestone in American democracy: it can break the entrenched spell—our cognitive biases for hunks—imposed by the ghost of evolution. 把妇女、矮个子、少数族裔(奥巴马除外)中的大量天才排除在考虑之外,我们怎么找出最有能力领导我们国家的人呢?从这个角度来说,选出一位女性入主白宫将成为美国民主新的里程碑:它将破除进化幽灵加在我们身上根深蒂固的魔咒,即我们钟情大个头肌肉男的认知偏差。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]那些体贴备至的警示标签

Warning: Labels
警示:此处有警示标签!

作者:John Stossel @ 2016-06-22
译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
校对:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚)
来源:Reason,http://reason.com/archives/2016/06/22/warning-labels

Warning labels are a product of a litigious society that drive prices up.

警示标签是全社会热衷诉讼的产物,它们抬高了商品价格。

When you use a coffeepot, do you need a warning label to tell you: “Do not hold over people”?

使用一只咖啡壶时,你是否觉得它有必要附上一个警示标签,告诉你“不要端到别人头上去”?

Must a bicycle bell be sold with the warning: “Should be installed and serviced by a professional mechanic”? Of course not. Yet that bell also carries the warning: “Failure to heed any of these warni(more...)

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Warning: Labels 警示:此处有警示标签! 作者:John Stossel @ 2016-06-22 译者:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 校对:明珠(@老茄爱天一爱亨亨更爱楚楚) 来源:Reason,http://reason.com/archives/2016/06/22/warning-labels Warning labels are a product of a litigious society that drive prices up. 警示标签是全社会热衷诉讼的产物,它们抬高了商品价格。 When you use a coffeepot, do you need a warning label to tell you: "Do not hold over people"? 使用一只咖啡壶时,你是否觉得它有必要附上一个警示标签,告诉你“不要端到别人头上去”? Must a bicycle bell be sold with the warning: "Should be installed and serviced by a professional mechanic"? Of course not. Yet that bell also carries the warning: "Failure to heed any of these warnings may result in serious injury or death." 出售单车铃铛时,是否必须附带一个警示:“须由专业技工安装维修”?当然不会。可实际上,这只铃铛上不光有这条警示,还附带这样一条:“不听从上述警示可能会导致严重受伤或死亡。” This is nuts. It's a bell. 神经病。那不过是只铃铛! The blizzard of warning labels means we often won't read ones we should, like the Clorox label that warns, do not use bleach "with other product... hazardous gasses may result." No kidding. Mixing bleach and ammonia creates gasses that can kill people. 警示标签狂轰滥炸的后果是,那些真正需要我们阅读的内容,我们倒经常不去读了。比如“高乐氏”的标签上说,不要将漂白剂“和其他产品”混用,“以免产生危险气体”。这不是开玩笑。漂白剂和氨混合会产生能够致命的气体。 But I rarely bother to read warning labels anymore, because manufacturers put them on everything. 但我现在很少阅读任何警示标签了,因为制造商已经在任何东西上面贴满了标签。 A utility knife bears the warning: "Blades are sharp." 比如,工具刀被贴的标签是,“刀刃锋利”。 I know about such dumb labels because Bob Dorigo Jones, author of Remove Child Before Folding, asks his readers and radio listeners to send in ridiculous labels for his "Wacky Warning Label" contest. 我之所以知道这些愚蠢标签的故事,是因为《折叠童车前请抱出孩子》一书作者Bob Dorigo Jones向读者和广播听众征集荒唐标签,参加他搞的“最雷人警示标签”竞赛。 "We do this to point out how the rules that legislatures and Congress make favor litigation," says Dorigo Jones. "We are the most litigious society on Earth. If the level of litigation in the United States was simply at the level of countries that we compete with for jobs in Asia and in Europe, we could save $589 billion a year." “我们这样做是想指出,立法机关和国会制定的法规会如何刺激诉讼,”Dorigo Jones说,“我们是全球最爱打官司的国家。只要美国的年诉讼量跟那些和我们争夺工作岗位的亚欧国家持平,我们每年就能节省5890亿美元。” America has more silly warnings mainly because, unlike the rest of the world, we don't have the "loser pays" rule in courts. That rule means that whoever wins a court battle is compensated by the loser. It creates an incentive not to bring frivolous cases. 美国的傻帽警示尤其多,主要是因为,与世界其他国家不同,我们的法院不实行“败诉者付费”这一规则,也就是说,不管谁赢了官司,都能得到败诉一方的补偿。它会鼓励人们不要为鸡毛蒜皮的事打官司。 In the U.S., the incentive is to try even dubious legal arguments and hope you'll hit the jackpot. Or maybe your enemy will pay you to avoid the bigger cost of hiring lawyers to continue the fight. 而在美国鼓励的则是,就算法律论证把握不大也要尝试一下,并指望中个头奖。要不然就是,你的对手也许因为不想花更多钱雇律师跟你长期纠缠而给你一笔钱了事。 More lawsuits mean more frightened corporate lawyers smearing labels on everything, just in case "lack of warning" is an issue in a lawsuit. 官司越多,意味着公司的律师们愈发胆战心惊,给万事万物都贴上标签,以免“没有警示”成为诉讼的一个争论点。 That's probably why a toy Star Wars lightsaber comes with the label, "Not to Be Used as a Battle Device." Why would they bother to say that? Did someone sue, claiming they thought a lightsaber would do what it does in Star Wars movies? I don't know. The company never responded to our questions. 这大概就是为何星战玩具光剑被贴上“不能用作战斗工具”标签的原因了。他们为什么自找麻烦说这些?是不是有人以为光剑玩具应该有电影《星球大战》里的效果,并(在期望落空后)起诉过他们呢?我不知道。我们问过他们,但该公司没有回应。 Some dumb labels are brought to us by dumb politicians. California requires warnings that something may be "toxic" or cause cancer on everything from foods to theme parks: "Disneyland Resort contains chemicals known to the state of California to cause cancer and birth defects or other reproductive harm." Gee thanks, California, but it would probably be better to warn kids about alligators over in Florida. 某些愚蠢标签是愚蠢政客导致的。加州要求从食品到主题乐园的所有东西都贴上标签,明确其是否“有毒”或是否致癌。比如,“加州政府了解,迪士尼乐园有导致癌症、出生缺陷或其他生殖系统损害的化学品,”。谢了,加州,如果佛罗里达能提醒孩子们小心鳄鱼,那也许更好。 Dorigo Jones offers a prize to whomever submits the wackiest label. The lightsaber label won this year, earning Susannah Peat of Carmel, Indiana, a thousand dollars. You can submit your choices to try to win next year's prize. Dorigo Jones设立了一个奖项征集最雷人标签。本年度获奖的就是光剑玩具上的标签,来自印第安纳州卡梅尔市的Susannah Peat获得了1000美元奖金。你可以提交你的选择,去竞争来年的奖励。 Please do. It's important to make fun of lawyer-driven stupidity that distracts us from more important risks. 请务必提交噢。由律师们搞出来的这种蠢事让我们忽视了更为重大的风险,有必要嘲笑一下他们。 I suppose I shouldn't really blame companies. They've been sued successfully so many times for not having labels that they feel they must try to protect themselves. Injuries aren't the real danger here. Lawyers and politicians are. 我觉得我真不应该谴责这类公司。他们因为没贴标签已经被多次起诉成功,以至于认为必须自保。在这类问题上,伤害并非真正的危险,律师和政客才是。 When companies get sued, they end up charging higher prices to cover the cost of the lawyers. So those warning labels not only distract us but also are part of a process that makes us all poorer. 公司一旦被起诉,最终会通过抬高商品价格弥补雇佣律师的成本。所以,这类警示标签不但扰乱了我们的注意力,而且是造成我们变穷的部分原因。 I worry that they also make us stupider. 我担心它们还使我们变蠢。 Economists say that when people assume that government protects us from all possible harm, we acquire a false sense of security. We stop looking out for ourselves. 经济学家说,如果假定政府能保护我们免受任何可能的伤害,那么我们就会获得一种虚假的安全感,便不再自己小心留神。 Those warning labels give us the impression that the law has assessed every possible risk—if something were seriously dangerous, government wouldn't allow it. 这类警示标签给我们一种印象,以为法律评估过所有可能的风险——如果某件事物很危险,政府不会放过它。 Lawyers and legislators' insistence that most every action be bound by written rules makes many of us forget to use own own brains. 律师和立法者坚持要求几乎所有的事都必须受到成文规则的约束,这让许多人忘记了自己还会动脑子。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]聪明人不需要那么多朋友?

Why smart people are better off with fewer friends
为什么聪明人最好少交朋友

作者:Christopher Ingraham @ 2016-03-18
翻译:小聂(@PuppetMaster)
校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子)
来源:The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/18/why-smart-people-are-better-off-with-fewer-friends/

Hell might actually be other people — at least if you’re really smart.

他人没准还真是地狱——至少对一个真正聪明的人来说是这样的。

That’s the implication of fascinating new research published last month in the British Journal of Psychology. Evolutionary psychologists Satoshi Kanazawa of the London School of Economics and Norman Li of Singapore Management University dig in to the question of what makes a life well-lived. While traditionally the domain of priests, philosophers and novelists, in recent years survey researchers, economists, biologists and scientists have been tackling that question.

这是上个月在《英国心理学杂志》发表的一篇有趣的新研究中说的。两位进化心理学家,伦敦政治经济学院的Satoshi Kanazawa和新加坡管理大学的Norman Li,对于如何活出幸福人生进行了深入的研究。这个传统上被神父、哲学家和小说家把控的议题,近年来却被问卷调查者、经济学家、生物学家和科学家所关注。

Kanazawa and Li theorize that the hunter-gatherer lifestyles of our ancient ancestors form the foundation for what make us happy now. “Situations and circumstances that would have increased our ancestors’ life satisfaction in the ancestral environment may still increase our life satisfaction today,” they write.

Kanazawa和Li提出的理论是,我们祖先的狩猎采集生活方式决定了我们感受幸福的底层机制。他们认为,“在原始环境中能够使我们祖先得到满足的情境,或许在今天仍然可以提升我们的满足感。”

They use what they call “the savanna theory of happiness” to explain two main findings from an analysis of a large national survey (15,000 respondents) of adults aged 18 to 28.

他们使用了这个所谓的“关于幸福的热带草原理论”来解释两个主要的研究发现,被研究对象是一项涵盖了15,000个18到28岁成年人的大型全国调查。

First, they find that people who live in more densely populated areas tend to report less satisfaction with their life overall. “The higher the population density of the immediate environment, the less happy” the survey respondents said they were. Second, they find that the more social in(more...)

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Why smart people are better off with fewer friends 为什么聪明人最好少交朋友 作者:Christopher Ingraham @ 2016-03-18 翻译:小聂(@PuppetMaster) 校对:小册子(@昵称被抢的小册子) 来源:The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/18/why-smart-people-are-better-off-with-fewer-friends/ Hell might actually be other people — at least if you're really smart. 他人没准还真是地狱——至少对一个真正聪明的人来说是这样的。 That's the implication of fascinating new research published last month in the British Journal of Psychology. Evolutionary psychologists Satoshi Kanazawa of the London School of Economics and Norman Li of Singapore Management University dig in to the question of what makes a life well-lived. While traditionally the domain of priests, philosophers and novelists, in recent years survey researchers, economists, biologists and scientists have been tackling that question. 这是上个月在《英国心理学杂志》发表的一篇有趣的新研究中说的。两位进化心理学家,伦敦政治经济学院的Satoshi Kanazawa和新加坡管理大学的Norman Li,对于如何活出幸福人生进行了深入的研究。这个传统上被神父、哲学家和小说家把控的议题,近年来却被问卷调查者、经济学家、生物学家和科学家所关注。 Kanazawa and Li theorize that the hunter-gatherer lifestyles of our ancient ancestors form the foundation for what make us happy now. "Situations and circumstances that would have increased our ancestors’ life satisfaction in the ancestral environment may still increase our life satisfaction today," they write. Kanazawa和Li提出的理论是,我们祖先的狩猎采集生活方式决定了我们感受幸福的底层机制。他们认为,“在原始环境中能够使我们祖先得到满足的情境,或许在今天仍然可以提升我们的满足感。” They use what they call "the savanna theory of happiness" to explain two main findings from an analysis of a large national survey (15,000 respondents) of adults aged 18 to 28. 他们使用了这个所谓的“关于幸福的热带草原理论”来解释两个主要的研究发现,被研究对象是一项涵盖了15,000个18到28岁成年人的大型全国调查。 First, they find that people who live in more densely populated areas tend to report less satisfaction with their life overall. "The higher the population density of the immediate environment, the less happy" the survey respondents said they were. Second, they find that the more social interactions with close friends a person has, the greater their self-reported happiness. 第一个发现是,在高人口密度地区生活的人们对他们的生活总体上更缺乏满足感。被调查者回应说“周围人口密度越大,就越感觉不幸福”。第二个发现是,和亲密朋友的更多交往伴随着更多的幸福感。 But there was one big exception. For more intelligent people, these correlations were diminished or even reversed. 但是有一个明显的例外,对于高智商人群,上述相关性会变弱,甚至反转。 "The effect of population density on life satisfaction was therefore more than twice as large for low-IQ individuals than for high-IQ individuals," they found. And "more intelligent individuals were actually less satisfied with life if they socialized with their friends more frequently." “所以,对于低智商人群来说,人口密度对于生活满足度的影响会比对于高智商人群大一倍以上”他们还发现,“高智商人群的生活满意度甚至会因为和朋友交往过多而下降。” Let me repeat that last one: When smart people spend more time with their friends, it makes them less happy. 容我重复一下后一个发现:如果聪明人在与朋友交往上花更多的时间,他们反倒会感觉不开心。 Now, the broad contours of both findings are largely uncontroversial. A large body of previous research, for instance, has outlined what some have called an "urban-rural happiness gradient." Kanazawa and Li explain: "Residents of rural areas and small towns are happier than those in suburbs, who in turn are happier than those in small central cities, who in turn are happier than those in large central cities." 现在,两个研究发现的粗线条概要大体是无争议的。例如,曾有一大批研究项目概括出被有些人称为“市区-郊区幸福梯度”的东西。Kanazawa和Li解释说:“乡村和小镇的居民比近郊居民更幸福,后者又比生活在小型中心城市的居民幸福,而小型中心城市的居民又比生活在大城市的人幸福。” imrs Why would high population density cause a person to be less happy? There's a whole body of sociological research addressing this question. But for the most visceral demonstration of the effect, simply take a 45-minute ride on a crowded rush-hour Red Line train and tell me how you feel afterward. 为什么高人口密度会使一个人不开心呢?现在已有大量的社会学研究瞄准了这个问题。但是如果要最感同身受地体现这种影响,莫过于在高峰期搭乘45分钟的拥挤地铁,然后告诉我你的心情如何。 Kanazawa and Li's second finding is a little more interesting. It's no surprise that friend and family connections are generally seen as a foundational component of happiness and well-being. But why would this relationship get turned on its head for really smart people? Kanazawa和Li的第二个发现则更有意思一些。毫无疑问,亲情和友情往往是构成个人生活幸福快乐的基础之一。但是为什么对于聪明人来说,这种关系会被反过来呢? I posed this question to Carol Graham, a Brookings Institution researcher who studies the economics of happiness. "The findings in here suggest (and it is no surprise) that those with more intelligence and the capacity to use it ... are less likely to spend so much time socializing because they are focused on some other longer term objective," she said. 我就此问题请教了在布鲁金斯学会研究幸福经济学的Carol Graham。“这个发现(毫不奇怪地)表明具有高智商并且能将其驾驭自如的人……较不愿意将大量时间花费在与人交往上面,因为他们专注于其他更长期的目标,”她解释道。 Think of the really smart people you know. They may include a doctor trying to cure cancer or a writer working on the great American novel or a human rights lawyer working to protect the most vulnerable people in society. To the extent that frequent social interaction detracts from the pursuit of these goals, it may negatively affect their overall satisfaction with life. 想想你认识的真正聪明人。他们也许是一个试图治愈癌症的医生,一个想要写出一部杰出的美国小说的作者,或是一个关注保护社会弱势群体的人权律师。如果社交活动过于频繁,以至妨碍他们追求这些远大目标,就会降低他们整体的生活满意度。 But Kanazawa and Li's savanna theory of happiness offers a different explanation. The idea starts with the premise that the human brain evolved to meet the demands of our ancestral environment on the African savanna, where the population density was akin to what you'd find today in, say, rural Alaska (less than one person per square kilometer). Take a brain evolved for that environment, plop it into today's Manhattan (population density: 27,685 people per square kilometer), and you can see how you'd get some evolutionary friction. 但是Kanazawa和Li的热带草原幸福理论提供了一个不一样的解释。该理论始于一个前提,即人类大脑进化是为了适应我们祖先在非洲大草原上的生存环境。在这种环境下的人口密度近似于如今的阿拉斯加荒野(每平方公里不到一人)。从这种环境下进化出的大脑,被丢进当今的曼哈顿(人口密度每平方公里27,685人),这种进化上的摩擦可想而知。 Similarly with friendship: "Our ancestors lived as hunter–gatherers in small bands of about 150 individuals," Kanazawa and Li explain. "In such settings, having frequent contact with lifelong friends and allies was likely necessary for survival and reproduction for both sexes." We remain social creatures today, a reflection of that early reliance on tight-knit social groups. 对友情来说也近似:“我们祖先作为狩猎采集者,生活在一个个约为150人的小集体里,”Kanazawa和Li解释说。“在这样的环境中,和终生朋友以及盟友的频繁接触对于生存和繁衍 很可能是必要的,无论是男性还是女性。”我们至今仍是社会性的物种,这反映了我们早期对于被社会关系纽带紧密编织起来的小集体的依赖。 The typical human life has changed rapidly since then — back on the savanna we didn't have cars or iPhones or processed food or "Celebrity Apprentice" — and it's quite possible that our biology hasn't been able to evolve fast enough to keep up. As such, there may be a "mismatch" between what our brains and bodies are designed for, and the world most of us live in now. 从那时起,人类生活有了极大改变——在热带草原时期我们可没有汽车、iPhone、加工食品或是“明星学徒”【译注:电视真人秀节目】——而我们生理特性的进化极可能赶不上这些改变。因此,在我们的身心设定与我们生存的世界之间,可能会存在着“错配”。 To sum it all up: You've heard of the paleo-diet. But are you ready for paleo-happiness? 简而言之,你知道有旧石器食谱,但是你想不想试试旧石器幸福感? There's a twist, though, at least as Kanazawa and Li see it. Smarter people may be better equipped to deal with the new (at least from an evolutionary perspective) challenges present-day life throws at us. "More intelligent individuals, who possess higher levels of general intelligence and thus greater ability to solve evolutionarily novel problems, may face less difficulty in comprehending and dealing with evolutionarily novel entities and situations," they write. 但是剧情到这里有个反转,至少Kanazawa和Li这么觉得。聪明人可能更擅长处理现代生活中的新(至少从进化的观点看)挑战。“那些更有智慧,更具有高等的通用智能从而可以更好的解决新进化问题的个体,可能会较易于理解和应对进化上的新实体或是新问题,”他们写道。 If you're smarter and more able to adapt to things, you may have an easier time reconciling your evolutionary predispositions with the modern world. So living in a high-population area may have a smaller effect on your overall well-being — that's what Kanazawa and Li found in their survey analysis. Similarly, smarter people may be better-equipped to jettison that whole hunter-gatherer social network — especially if they're pursuing some loftier ambition. 如果你更聪明,并且更有能力适应环境,你应能更容易处理好先天进化不足和现代社会生活的错配。所以住在高人口密度地区可能对你的总体生活舒适程度影响很小——这就是Kanazawa和Li的调查研究发现。同样的,聪明人更有能力能力人更有可能完全放应对进化上的新实体或是情景说有些人称为“市中舍弃那套狩猎采集式的社交网络——特别是当他们有远大目标的时候。 It's important to remember that this is an argument Kanazawa and Li are proposing and that it's not settled science. "Paleo-" theories — the idea that our bodies are best adapted to the environment of our earliest ancestors — have come under fire in recent years, especially as food companies and some researchers over-hyped the alleged benefits of the paleo-diet fad. 值得注意的是,这只是Kanazawa和Li提出的论点,绝非科学定论。以“旧石器”开头的理论——基于我们的身体仍与我们最早期的祖先所处环境相适应之假设——在近年来饱受争议,特别是由于食品公司和某些学者过于推崇当下流行的旧石器食谱所带来的可能好处。 Kanazawa and Li's main findings about population density, social interaction and happiness are relatively uncontroversial. But Brookings's Carol Graham says one potential flaw in their research is that it defines happiness in terms of self-reported life satisfaction ("How satisfied are you with your life as a whole?"), and doesn't consider experienced well-being ("How many times did you laugh yesterday? How many times were you angry?" etc.). Survey researchers know that these two types of questions can lead to very different assessments of well-being. Kanazawa和Li对于人口密度,社会交往以及幸福感的主要观点相对来说并没有太大的争议。但是布鲁金斯学会的Carol Graham认为他们的研究有个潜在的缺陷,即用受访者自我报告的生活满意程度来定义幸福(“整体上来说,你对自己的生活满意么?”),而不考虑受访者关于舒适生活的实际体验(“你昨天笑了几次?生气了几次?”等等)。问卷调查者都知道这两类问题对于幸福生活的衡量可以得出完全不同的结果。 For their part, Kanazawa and Li maintain that that distinction doesn't matter too much for their savanna theory. "Even though our empirical analyses ... used a measure of global life satisfaction, the savanna theory of happiness is not committed to any particular definition and is compatible with any reasonable conception of happiness, subjective well-being, and life satisfaction," they write. Kanazawa和Li则认为这一区别对他们的热带草原理论影响不大。“虽然我们的实证研究……使用了总体的生活满意度,关于幸福的热带草原理论并不局限于任何一种定义,并且适用于任何对于幸福、主观幸福感和生活满意度的合理的概念化处理,”他们写道。 Kanazawa himself is no stranger to controversy. In 2011 he wrote a blog post for Psychology Today entitled "Why Are Black Women Less Physically Attractive Than Other Women?" The post ignited a firestorm of criticism and was swiftly taken down. Kanazawa本人也经常处于争议之中。2011年他给《今日心理学》写了一篇名为“为什么黑人女性在生理上不如其他女性具有吸引力?”的博客文章。该文引发了猛烈的批评,并且被迅速撤下了。 His current research on well-being is not likely to generate as much criticism as that blog post. But the evolutionary perspective on happiness and intelligence is likely to prompt some heated discussion in the field. 他现在关于幸福的研究不大可能引发类似的抨击。但从进化角度解读幸福和智力很可能会在该领域引发一些热烈的讨论。 In an email, Kanazawa said that his approach to understanding happiness is fundamentally different than the arguments about, say, the benefits of a paleo-diet. "Blindly introducing our ancestors’ diet when we do not have other aspects of the ancestral life seems like a dangerous and nonsensical prescription to me," he said. 在一封电子邮件里, Kanazawa认为他理解幸福的方式和关于比如说旧石器食谱的好处的论证有着本质的区别。“盲目的引入我们祖先的食谱,而不考虑到我们生活的其他方面与祖先有异,在我看来是危险且毫无道理的,”他说。 "I only explain nature; I do not tell people what to do or not to do," he added. “我只是解释自然现象;我并不是告诉人们去做什么或是不做什么,”他补充道。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

[译文]为何那么多选民胡乱投票

Political Animals by Rick Shenkman: why we shoot our democracies in the foot
Rick Shenkman新书《政治动物》:为什么我们会搬起石头砸民主的脚

作者:Olivia Archdeacon @ 2016-01-22
译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻)
校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy)
来源:CapX,http://capx.co/political-animals/

Best-selling historian and Emmy award-winning investigative reporter Rick Shenkman is back. He explains in the latest of his seven books, Political Animals – How our Stone-Age Brain Gets in the Way of Smart Politics, that despite our species’ pride of rational thinking, our world is anything but rational.

畅销历史书作家和艾美奖调查记者获得者Rick Shenkman回来了。他在最新的第七本书《政治动物:石器时代的大脑如何妨碍政治精(more...)

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Political Animals by Rick Shenkman: why we shoot our democracies in the foot Rick Shenkman新书《政治动物》:为什么我们会搬起石头砸民主的脚 作者:Olivia Archdeacon @ 2016-01-22 译者:babyface_claire(@许你疯不许你傻) 校对:沈沉(@你在何地-sxy) 来源:CapX,http://capx.co/political-animals/ Best-selling historian and Emmy award-winning investigative reporter Rick Shenkman is back. He explains in the latest of his seven books, Political Animals – How our Stone-Age Brain Gets in the Way of Smart Politics, that despite our species’ pride of rational thinking, our world is anything but rational. 畅销历史书作家和艾美奖调查记者获得者Rick Shenkman回来了。他在最新的第七本书《政治动物:石器时代的大脑如何妨碍政治精明》里解释到,尽管我们人类以理性思考为傲,但是世界却一点也不合理。 Like economists, political scientists base their models on rational choice, and do not want to think that a one off event like a shark attack can have a significant effect on voting. Yet it has been proven time and again that when times are bad, people vote against the incumbents. If a meteor hit Arizona, they’d vote against the incumbents. Extraneous forces have political consequences. Unfortunately for politicians, this is especially the case when the effect is negative. 像经济学者一样,政治学者以理性选择为基础建构其模型,并且不愿意认为一件像鲨鱼攻击这样的一次性事件可以对投票结果产生重大影响。然而事实一次又一次证明,一旦碰上光景不好,人们就会投票反对当权者。如果有陨石击中亚利桑那州,他们会投票反对当权者。外来力量能够造成政治后果。 不幸的是,对政治家而言,如果这种影响是负面的,情况更是如此。 Readers of Shenkman’s previous book, ‘Just How Stupid Are We? Facing the truth about the American voter’ may be reluctant to pick up another anthology of painfully embarrassing truths about the general public of the world’s most powerful economy. But they should be reassured that Political Animals is a forgiving, empathetic and motivational read. 读过Shenkman上本书《我们是多么愚蠢?正视美国选民的真相》的人,可能不愿再读一本关于世界最大经济体的一般公众的痛苦尴尬真相的汇编。但是我可以向他们保证,《政治动物》是一本宽容、体贴且激励人心的读物。 It is tough love, however. Shenkman points out that despite the human brain being packed with eighty-six billion neurons – making human beings smarter than the smartest computer that ever existed (yet) – when it comes to politics, the public is very easily fooled. What is more alarming is that we’re fooling ourselves. We cannot blame the politicians or the Illuminati. 然而,这是严厉的爱。Shenkman指出,尽管人类的大脑挤满了860亿个神经细胞(使人类比迄今为止最聪明的电脑更加聪明),可是一旦涉及政治,公众却非常容易被欺骗。更令人担忧的是,是我们自己在欺骗自己。我们不能把责任推给政治家或“光照派”。 “We often lie about out reasons for doing what we do in politics. We don’t just lie to others, we lie to ourselves. Therefore we can only detect what people are thinking when we study patterns of behaviour in groups.” “我们经常会在我们政治行为的缘由方面撒谎。我们不止对别人撒谎,我们对自己也撒谎。因此,我们只能通过研究群体的行为模式来检测人们在想什么。” Shenkman’s genuine passion for his subject matter shines through. As much as we rationalise our actions in hindsight, we’re not in a position to truly know ourselves seeing as so much of what happens in our brain happens outside of conscious awareness. So attempting to understand why people vote the way they do simply by asking them will get us nowhere. We need science. Shenkman 对他的研究主题闪耀着真正的热情。我们会在事后尽力合理化自己的行为,鉴于大脑中发生的大量事情处于我们的自觉意识之外,我们就处在一个不能真正了解自己的境地。所以,只是追问人们为什么如此这般投票,对我们理解这一问题毫无益处。我们需要科学。 Political Animals does this. It uses breakthroughs in neuroscience, genetics, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, behavioural economics, political science, political psychology and game theory to give new insights into political behaviour. 《政治动物》要做的就是这件事。它利用了神经科学、遗传学、进化心理学、人类学、行为经济学、政治科学、政治心理学和博弈论等学科的新突破,寻求对于政治行为的新见解。 The basic premise of the book is that our brain evolved roughly 1.8 million years ago and so the instincts that were baked into human DNA then are now often not the most appropriate or efficient response to our environment: “In politics, [instincts] often don’t work: they malfunction, misfire and lead us astray.” Shenkman even goes as far as to argue that “when it comes to politics, the times when we can unquestioningly go with our instincts is almost nil.” 这本书的基本前提是:我们的大脑大约在180万年前进化形成,因此那些整合到人类DNA中的本能通常并非我们对环境所能做出的最合适或最有效反应。“在政治中,[直觉]通常不可行,他们会失灵,无法奏效,还会带我们误入歧途。” Shenkman走得很远,他甚至认为,“当谈到政治时,我们可以毫无疑问的跟随直觉走的时候基本为零”。 In essence: we frequently sabotage ourselves, upending democracy in ways none of us intended. 从本质上说,我们经常会在没有人刻意如此的情况下伤害自己、颠覆民主。 Shenkman focuses on four problems that we continually make: political apathy; failure to correctly size up our political leaders; a habit of punishing politicians who tell us the hard truths we don’t want to hear; and our failure to show empathy in situations that clearly demand it. Shenkman关注我们经常犯的四个错误:政治冷漠,不能正确地认识政治领袖,习惯性地惩罚跟我们讲述我们不愿意听的残酷事实的政治家,在明确需要的情况下不能表示同情。 Hearing all of this, it is sorely tempting to conclude that democracy is hopeless. But all is not lost. 听到这一切,让人很容易得出结论,民主是无望的。但这并不意味着一切。 Throughout the book we are reminded that the way our brain is constructed does not mean we are fated to behave as cavemen, even though we might be inclined to think that based on the morning’s headlines. He shows us with numerous thought experiments (that readers can conduct on themselves) that is better to think of our brains as being pre-wired rather than hard-wired. We have certain innate traits but whether they determine how we behave in a particular situation depends on a range of factors. This shouldn’t be so surprising – think how easily and dramatically our energy levels can affect our decision making and self-control. 这本书从头到尾一直在提醒我们,我们的大脑如此构造,并不意味着我们注定要像穴居人那样行动,尽管根据早上的头条新闻我们可能倾向于这样认为。他通过许多思想实验(读者可以自己进行)向我们表明,我们最好将大脑看作是预设的而并非是固设的。我们有某些天生的特质, 但这些特质是否会决定我们在特定情况下的行为则取决于一系列因素。这并不应该让人感到惊讶——想想我们的精力水平能如何容易、如何显著地影响我们的决策和自控能力吧。 What is more controversial is Shenkman’s challenge to the convention that the main political problem society faces is a lack of information: “Modern Platos raise a huge cry over the problem ignorance poses to democracy, turning alarmism about ignorance into a virtual cottage industry” 更有争议的是Shenkman对社会面临的主要政治问题乃是缺乏信息这一传统观念的挑战,“现代柏拉图们大声疾呼,宣称无知威胁民主。他们已经把对无知的担忧警惕几乎变成了一种祖传家酿。” And he’s right – critics have been beating the same horse for generations, crying ‘mass man is ignorant!’ After the Second World War and the rise of Nazism, university professors became consumed with the problem of public ignorance. It is not that simple, unfortunately. Proving that unknowledgeable voters can be turned into knowledgeable ones doesn’t prove much we didn’t already know. We send children to school because we believe they can learn. The truth is more unsettling: it is not an intelligence or information problem. It’s a motivation, environment, social and, above all else, a human being problem. The problem is that voters on their own don’t try to learn. 他是对的——评论家们世世代代都在鞭打同一具尸体,喊叫“大众是无知的!”第二次世界大战和纳粹主义兴起之后,大学教授们开始全心关注公众无知的问题。不幸的是,这不是那么简单。证明了无知的选民可以转变为有知的选民,这并不能证明多少我们事先就不知道的事情。我们送孩子去学校是因为我们相信他们有学习的能力。真相是更让人不安的:这不是一个智力或者信息问题。这是激励、环境、社会的问题,最重要的是,这是人性问题。问题在于选民们自己不尝试去学习。 Perhaps voters need to be motivated, probably financially. But no government has tried this (directly) because voters would find it insulting – anyone who dared suggest that voters need to be paid because they are citizen delinquents would instantly be branded as elitist. 或许选民需要刺激,比如经济刺激。但是没有任何政府(直接地)试图这么做,因为选民们会感到这是侮辱——任何人若胆敢建议给选民支付费用【编注:从上下文看,意思好像是付费让选民接受公民培训,但也可能是指为投票行为付费。】,而且给出的理由是因为他们是公民群氓,那他立马就会被贴上“精英主义”的标签。 Equally, the Scandinavian experience shows culture can be just as effective (75% of Swedes participate in adult civics-study circles at some point in their lives having retained an interest in politics from school-age). But why should it take either money or culture to get people to perform their civic responsibilities? Shouldn’t people want to be involved? 同样的,北欧的经验表明文化同样奏效 (瑞典人中凡是曾在生活中某一时间参与过成人公民学习圈的,有75%都保留了从学生时代起培养出的政治兴趣)。但是为什么需要钱或者文化的驱使才能让人们履行公民责任呢?难道人们不想参与吗? So this is not a guidebook for how to be the perfect citizen. Shenkman is far from being an idealist. Instead, he offers un-patronising, concrete steps to ‘do politics’ better: don’t place a lot of confidence in your natural curiosity; don’t delude yourself into believing you can read politics; whenever possible, try to put yourself in a position where you can experience politics directly. 所以这不是一本怎样成为完美公民的指南。Shenkman远非一个理想主义者。相反,他提出的是并不高高在上的、具体的步骤,来更好地“做政治”:不要过分信赖你天生的好奇心上;不要欺骗自己说你可以读懂政治;有可能的话,尝试坐到某个位置上,直接体验政治。 In this engaging, illuminating and often humourous portrait of our political culture, Shenkman probes the depths of the human mind to reveal what we must do to fix our floundering democracy, and to become more political, less animal. 在这幅引人入胜、发人深省且常常带些幽默的政治文化肖像中, Shenkman窥探到人类心灵的深处,告诉我们必须做什么来修复我们挣扎的民主,多一些政治性, 少一些动物性。 Political Animals was first published on the 21st January 2016 by Basic Books, £17.99 RRP, hardback. 《政治动物》由基本图书公司在2016年1月21日首次出版,精装版标价£17.99 。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——