[译文]伊斯兰改革是否可能?

Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes.
伊斯兰教能够被改革吗?历史和人的本性告诉我们:能。

作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08
译者:Tankman
校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny)
来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed

Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here.
《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上:伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。

Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate?

伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退,激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗?或是能被改革,变得更加温和,现代且与邻为善呢?伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利,并给穆斯林信仰自由,接受现代金融和司法的基本原则,而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗?

A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that “radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution,” the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, “He’s wrong. Sorry about that.” She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point.

越来越多的分析家认为不会,穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情,这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中,成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注:一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物,以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题,温和伊斯兰是解药”时,她说:“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕,追求同一目标,和相同的敌人战斗,但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。

My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge.

我的论述有两部分。第一,很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的;第二,革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。

Arguing Against Essentialism
对本质主义的驳斥

To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion’s core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past.

声称伊斯兰不可被改变,则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解,而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误,因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切,包括对圣典的解读,随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。

Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran’s interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of “no compulsion in religion,” and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi’i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam.

只有不考虑人类本性,无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁,一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变,像圣战,奴隶,高利贷,“宗教的非强制原则以及妇女的角色。而且,我们容易想到过去的1400年,很多重要的伊斯兰诠释者—— ash-Shafi’i,al-Ghazali,Ibn Taymiya,Rumi,Shah Waliullah和Ruhollah Khomeini彼此对伊斯兰教导的内容有很大分歧。

However central the Koran and Hadith may be, they are not the totality of the Muslim experience; the accumulated experience of Muslim peoples from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond matters no less. To dwell on Islam’s scriptures is akin to interpreting the United States solely through the lens of the Constitution; ignoring the country’s history would lead to a distorted understanding.

可兰经和圣训也许是中心,而不是穆斯林经验的全部;从摩洛哥到印尼以及其他地方的穆斯林社群积累的经验也很重要。只专注于伊斯兰的文本就像是只从宪法角度解释美国;忽略了这个国家的历史,会导致认知的扭曲。

Put differently, medieval Muslim civilization excelled and today’s Muslims lag behind in nearly every index of achievement. But if things can get worse, they can also get better. Likewise, in my own career, I witnessed Islamism rise from minimal beginnings when I entered the field in 1969 to the great powers it enjoys today; if Islamism can thus grow, it can also decline.

换一种说法就是,中世纪穆斯林文明是杰出的,今天的穆斯林在衡量成就的每个指标上几乎都是落后的。但是如果事情能变得更糟,它们也能变得更好。就像我自己的事业,1969年我进入该领域时,我见证了伊斯兰主义从很小的规模兴起,到今天享有着巨大能量;如果伊斯兰主义可以壮大,那么它也可能衰落。

How might that happen?

这种变化可能会如何发生呢?

The Medieval Synthesis
中世纪整合

Key to Islam’s role in public life is Sharia and the many untenable demands it makes on Muslims. Running a government with the minimal taxes permitted by Sharia has proved to be unsustainable; and how can one run a financial system without charging interest? A penal system that requires four men to view an adulterous act in flagrante delicto is impractical. Sharia’s prohibition on warfare against fellow Muslims is impossible for all to live up to; indeed, roughly three-quarters of all warfare waged by Muslims has been directed against other Muslims. Likewise, the insistence on perpetual jihad against non-Muslims demands too much.

伊斯兰作用于公共生活的关键是伊斯兰教法及其加诸于穆斯林身上的不合理要求。用伊斯兰教法允许的最小税负来运作政府被证明是不可持续的;而且怎么能运作一个不要求利息的金融系统呢?一个刑罚体系,要求四个男人在作案现场目睹一起通奸事件是不现实的。沙利亚禁止穆斯林对穆斯林同胞发动战争,遵循这禁令是不可能的;实际上,穆斯林发起的战争中,约四分之三是针对其他穆斯林。类似地,坚持对非穆斯林的永久性圣战也实在要求过分了。

To get around these and other unrealistic demands, premodern Muslims developed certain legal fig leaves that allowed for the relaxation of Islamic provisions without directly violating them. Jurists came up with hiyal (tricks) and other means by which the letter of the law could be fulfilled while negating its spirit. For example, various mechanisms were developed to live in harmony with non-Muslim states. There is also the double sale (bai al-inah) of an item, which permits the purchaser to pay a disguised form of interest. Wars against fellow Muslims were renamed jihad.

为了回避这些或者其他一些不现实的要求,前现代的穆斯林发展了一些合理化的做法,允许放松一些伊斯兰法条,而不直接违背它们。法务人员使用hiyal(花招)和其他方式,遵循法律的形式,同时否定其实质。比如,为了和谐的生活在非穆斯林国家,很多技巧被发展出来。还有重复售卖(bai al-inah)意味着允许购买者支付隐性利息。对穆斯林同胞的战争则被重新命名为吉哈德。

This compromise between Sharia and reality amounted to what I dubbed Islam’s “medieval synthesis” in my book In the Path of God (1983). This synthesis translated Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands. Kecia Ali, of Boston University, notes the dramatic contrast between formal and applied law in Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, quoting other specialists:

沙利亚和现实之间的妥协契合了我的著作《在神的道路上》(1983)中的伊斯兰“中世纪整合”的概念。这一整合把伊斯兰从一套抽象,不切实际的要求,翻译成可以被实行的体系。在实际中,它减低了沙利亚的力度,使得法条可以操作。沙利亚现在能够充分被实行,同时穆斯林不会被其更加严苛的要求束缚。波士顿大学的Kecia Ali,在《Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam》一书中指出了正式和实用法律之间鲜明的对照。他引用了其他专家的话:

One major way in which studies of law have proceeded has been to “compare doctrine with the actual practice of the court.” As one scholar discussing scriptural and legal texts notes, “Social patterns were in great contrast to the ‘official’ picture presented by these ‘formal’ sources.” Studies often juxtapose flexible and relatively fair court outcomes with an undifferentiated and sometimes harshly patriarchal textual tradition of jurisprudence. We are shown proof of “the flexibility within Islamic law that is often portrayed as stagnant and draconian.”

律法研究的一个主要方式是“比较教条和法庭实践”。当学者讨论经文和法律书注记时,“社会上的模式和这些‘正式’来源所呈现的‘官方’图景反差很大。”研究经常把灵活和相对公平的法庭判决和没有变通、有时非常宗法制的传统法律文本并列。这就是“常被描述为顽固专横的伊斯兰法的内在灵活性。”

While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists. Indeed, premodern Muslim history featured many such challenges, including the Almohad movement in 12th-century North Africa and the Wahhabi movement in 18th-century Arabia. In each case, purist efforts eventually subsided and the medieval synthesis reasserted itself, only to be challenged anew by purists. This alternation between pragmatism and purism characterizes Muslim history, contributing to its instability.

虽然中世纪整合持续了几个世纪,它并未克服一个基本的弱点:它并没有全面的植根于伊斯兰的有宪法意味的基础文本,或者从其中独立出来。基于妥协和折衷,面对原教旨主义者的挑战,它仍然是脆弱的。实际上,前现代穆斯林历史总是凸显这样的挑战,包括十二世纪北非的穆瓦希德运动和十八世纪阿拉伯的瓦哈比运动。每个例子中,原教旨主义的努力最终被软化,中世纪整合重新回到轨道,而后被新的原教旨主义挑战。实用主义和原教旨主义的更替是穆斯林历史的特色,助长了其不稳定性。

The Challenge of Modernity
现代性的挑战

The de facto solution offered by the medieval synthesis broke down with the arrival of modernity imposed by the Europeans, conventionally dated to Napoleon’s attack on Egypt in 1798. This challenge pulled most Muslims in opposite directions over the next two centuries, to Westernization or to Islamization.

中世纪整合所提供的实用主义的解决方案被欧洲强加的现代化因素打断,传统观点来看,这可以追溯到拿破仑在1798年对埃及的入侵。这一挑战在接下来的两个世纪中,把大多数穆斯林拉向了两个相反的方向:西方化或是伊斯兰化。

Muslims impressed with Western achievements sought to minimize Sharia and replace it with Western ways in such areas as the nonestablishment of religion and equality of rights for women and non-Muslims. The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), symbolizes this effort. Until about 1970, it appeared to be the inevitable Muslim destiny, with resistance to Westernization looking rearguard and futile.

西方的成就给一些穆斯林留下了深刻印象,他们试图削弱伊斯兰教法,代之以同类领域的西方做法,比如不利用法律确立宗教,妇女和非穆斯林拥有平等权利。现代土耳其的缔造者——凯末尔·阿塔图尔克 (1881-1938)代表了这种努力。在1970年前,这似乎是穆斯林不可避免的命运,对抗西方化的努力看起来被动无力。

But that resistance proved deep and ultimately triumphant. Atatürk had few successors and his Republic of Turkey is moving back toward Sharia. Westernization, it turned out, looked stronger than it really was because it tended to attract visible and vocal elites while the masses generally held back.

但是这种抵抗被证明根基深厚并最终取得了胜利。阿塔图尔克的后继者不多,而他的土耳其共和国现在正退回伊斯兰教法。说到底,西方化表面上看起来强大,实则不然,因为它倾向于吸引曝光度高,有话语权的精英,而广大民众则被压制。

Starting around 1930, the reluctant elements began organizing themselves and developing their own positive program, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and India. Rejecting Westernization and all its works, they argued for the full and robust application of Sharia such as they imagined had been the case in the earliest days of Islam.

从1930年代起,抗拒因素开始组织起来,发展他们自己的力量,尤其是在阿尔及利亚,埃及,伊朗,和印度。他们拒绝西方化及其所有的成果,呼吁要按照他们想象中的早期伊斯兰历史那般,坚决完全的实施伊斯兰教法。

Though rejecting the West, these movements—which are called Islamist—modeled themselves on the surging totalitarian ideologies of their time, Fascism and Communism. Islamists borrowed many assumptions from these ideologies, such as the superiority of the state over the individual, the acceptability of brute force, and the need for a cosmic confrontation with Western civilization. They also quietly borrowed technology, especially military and medical, from the West.

虽然排斥西方,这些被称为伊斯兰主义的运动,依靠同一时期涌现的极权主义意识形态塑造了自身,比如法西斯主义和共产主义。伊斯兰主义者借用很多这些意识形态的假设,比如国家优先于个人,可以接受暴力斗争,和在全世界和西方文明进行斗争的必要性。他们也静静地从西方借用技术,尤其是军事和医疗方面。

Through creative, hard work, Islamist forces quietly gained strength over the next half century, finally bursting into power and prominence with the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 led by the anti-Atatürk, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89). This dramatic event, and its achieved goal of creating an Islamic order, widely inspired Islamists, who in the subsequent 35 years have made great progress, transforming societies and applying Sharia in novel and extreme ways.

通过创造性的努力,伊斯兰主义者的力量在接下来的半个世纪静静增长,最终在1978-79年由阿塔图尔克的反对者,霍梅尼 (1902-89) 领导的伊朗革命中,显出了爆发性的能力和优势。这个戏剧性的事件,和其达到的目标——创造一种伊斯兰的秩序,在伊斯兰主义者中影响广泛。他们在接下来35年中有了巨大进步,用各种创新且极端的方式,变革社会,实行伊斯兰教法。

For example, in Iran, the Shiite regime has hanged homosexuals from cranes and forced Iranians in Western dress to drink from latrine cans, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has torched girls’ schools and music stores. The Islamists’ influence has reached the West itself, where one finds an increasing number of women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas.

比如,在伊朗,什叶派统治者用起重机吊死同性恋者,并强迫穿西方服饰的伊朗人喝茅厕里的液体。在阿富汗,塔利班统治者烧毁女生学校和音乐店。伊斯兰主义者的影响波及到了西方自身,你在西方可以发现越来越多的妇女穿戴面纱,头巾和罩袍。

Although spawned as a totalitarian model, Islamism has shown much greater tactical adaptability than either Fascism or Communism. The latter two ideologies rarely managed to go beyond violence and coercion. But Islamism, led by figures such as Turkey’s Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954-) and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explored nonrevolutionary forms of Islamism. Since it was legitimately voted into office in 2002, the AKP gradually has undermined Turkish secularism with remarkable deftness by working within the country’s established democratic structures, practicing good government, and not provoking the wrath of the military, long the guardian of Turkish secularism.

虽然脱胎于一个极权主义模型,相比法西斯和共产主义,伊斯兰主义表现出远为优越的战术灵活性。前两者很少试图超越暴力和强制手段。而伊斯兰运动,被诸如土耳其总理埃尔多安 (1954-) 之类的人物和他的正义发展党(AKP)领导着,已经探索出了伊斯兰主义的非革命形式。自从它在2002年合法地通过选举上台,AKP就用十分纯熟的手腕,借助该国已经建立的民主制度,和良好的施政表现,逐渐削弱土耳其的世俗化力量,而且没有激起土耳其世俗主义的长期守护者——军队的强力反弹。

The Islamists are on the march today, but their ascendance is recent and offers no guarantees of longevity. Indeed, like other radical utopian ideologies, Islamism will lose its appeal and decline in power. Certainly the 2009 and 2013 revolts against Islamist regimes in Iran and Egypt, respectively, point in that direction.

伊斯兰主义者如今风头正健,但是它们的势头并不是由来已久,也并不保证能持续下去。实际上,像其他激进乌托邦意识形态一样,伊斯兰主义将会失去它的吸引力,其力量也会衰减。伊朗和埃及分别在2009年和2013年对伊斯兰主义统治的反抗,明确体现了这点。

Toward a Modern Synthesis
通向一个现代的整合

If Islamism is to be defeated, anti-Islamist Muslims must develop an alternative vision of Islam and explanation for what it means to be a Muslim. In doing so, they can draw on the past, especially the reform efforts from the span of 1850 to 1950, to develop a “modern synthesis” comparable to the medieval model. This synthesis would choose among Shari precepts and render Islam compatible with modern values. It would accept gender equality, coexist peacefully with unbelievers, and reject the aspiration of a universal caliphate, among other steps.

若要打败伊斯兰主义,反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林必须发展出一套替代性的伊斯兰图景,来解释成为一个穆斯林意味着什么。要做到这点,他们可以回溯历史,尤其是在1850年到1950年间的改革努力,对照“中世纪整合”,来发展出一套“现代整合”。这种整合将会在伊斯兰教法戒律中做出选择并使伊斯兰与现代观念兼容。它将可能接受性别平等,和不信伊斯兰者和平共存,并在各步骤中排斥建立普世哈里发国的冲动。

Here, Islam can profitably be compared with the two other major monotheistic religions. A half millennium ago, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all broadly agreed that enforced labor was acceptable and that paying interest on borrowed money was not. Eventually, after bitter and protracted debates, Jews and Christians changed their minds on these two issues; today, no Jewish or Christian voices endorse slavery or condemn the payment of reasonable interest on loans.

在此,把伊斯兰教和其他两大一神教相比较,不无益处。五个世纪前,犹太教徒,基督教徒和穆斯林全部大致同意奴隶是可以被接受的,借贷收利息则不被允许。最终,经过了苦涩和反复的辩论,犹太教徒和基督徒改变了他们在这两件事情上的观点;今天,没有犹太教或是基督教人士会支持蓄奴或是谴责给贷款支付利息。

Among Muslims, however, these debates have only begun. Even if formally banned in Qatar in 1952, Saudi Arabia in 1962, and Mauritania in 1980, slavery still exists in these and other majority-Muslim countries (especially Sudan and Pakistan). Some Islamic authorities even claim that a pious Muslim must endorse slavery. Vast financial institutions worth possibly as much as $1 trillion have developed over the past 40 years to enable observant Muslims to pretend to avoid either paying or receiving interest on money, (“pretend” because the Islamic banks merely disguise interest with subterfuges such as service fees.)

然而在穆斯林当中,这些辩论才刚刚开始。即使卡塔尔在1952年,沙特阿拉伯在1962年,毛里塔尼亚在1980年,官方禁止了蓄奴,奴隶制仍然在这些地方和其他以穆斯林为多数人口的国家存在(尤其是苏丹和巴基斯坦)。一些伊斯兰权威甚至声称一个敬虔的穆斯林必须支持奴隶制。很多金融机构可能市值达一万亿美元,并已经发展了四十年来让穆斯林可以假装避免支付或接受货币利息,(“假装”因为穆斯林银行们仅仅用服务费等术语来遮掩利息这一名目。)

Reformist Muslims must do better than their medieval predecessors and ground their interpretation in both scripture and the sensibilities of the age. For Muslims to modernize their religion they must emulate their fellow monotheists and adapt their religion with regard to slavery and interest, the treatment of women, the right to leave Islam, legal procedure, and much else.

穆斯林改革主义者必须比他们中世纪的前辈做得更好,并把他们的表述植根在文本和时代潮流当中。当穆斯林试图现代化他们的宗教,他们必须模仿其他一神教,改变自己宗教在蓄奴,利息,妇女权益,背教自由,司法程序和很多其他方面的立场。

When a reformed, modern Islam emerges it will no longer endorse unequal female rights, the dhimmi status, jihad, or suicide terrorism, nor will it require the death penalty for adultery, breaches of family honor, blasphemy, and apostasy.

当一个改革的,现代的伊斯兰涌现,它将不会再支持不平等的妇女权益,统治异教徒的观念,圣战,或者自杀性恐怖主义,它也不会要求对通奸,危害家族荣誉,渎神和背教者处以死刑。

Already in this young century, a few positive signs in this direction can be discerned. Note some developments concerning women:

在这一新的世纪,一些积极的苗头已初露端倪。有关妇女的一些进步如下:

  • Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council has responded to rising public outrage over child marriagesby setting the age of majority at 18. Though this doesn’t end child marriages, it moves toward abolishing the practice.
  • 沙特阿拉伯的协商会议回应了公众对童婚的愤怒,把成年的年龄定为18岁。虽然这没有终结童婚,但向着禁止这一行为迈进了一步。
  • Turkish clerics have agreed to let menstruating women attend mosque and pray next to men.
  • 土耳其神职人员已经同意,让经期的妇女参加清真寺礼拜,并且和男人一起祷告。
  • The Iranian government has nearly banned the stoning of convicted adulterers.
  • 伊朗政府已接近于禁止对通奸罪施以石刑。
  • Women in Iran have won broader rights to sue their husbands for divorce.
  • 伊朗妇女在诉讼离婚方面赢得了更广泛的权利。
  • A conference of Muslim scholars in Egypt deemed clitoridectomies contrary to Islam and, in fact, punishable.
  • 穆斯林学者在埃及召开了一个会议,认为阴蒂割除违背伊斯兰,事实上应该被惩罚。
  • A key Indian Muslim institution, Darul Uloom Deoband, issued a fatwa against polygamy.
  • 一个著名的印度穆斯林机构 Darul Uloom Deoband发表了一项伊斯兰释法,反对多妻制。

Other notable developments, not specifically about women, include:

其他显著进步,不一定局限于妇女权益方面,包括:

  • The Saudi government abolished jizya (the practice of enforcing a poll tax on non-Muslims).
  • 沙特政府终止了Jizya(向非穆斯林征收人头税)。
  • An Iranian court ordered the family of a murdered Christian to receive the same compensation as that of a Muslim victim.
  • 一个伊朗法庭,判决被谋杀的基督徒的亲属得到和穆斯林受害者一样多的赔偿。
  • Scholars meeting at the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Sharjah have started to debate and challenge the call for apostates to be executed.
  • 学者们在位于沙迦的国际伊斯兰教律学院开会,开始就处决背教者展开辩论。

All the while, individual reformers churn out ideas, if not yet for adoption then to stimulate thought. For example, Nadin al-Badir, a Saudi female journalist, provocatively suggested that Muslim women have the same right as men to marry up to four spouses. She prompted a thunderstorm, including threats of lawsuits and angry denunciations, but she spurred a needed debate, one unimaginable in prior times.

同时,倾向于改革的人士不断推出新的想法,如果不是着眼于改进,那就是从模仿着手。比如Nadine al-Badir,一个沙特女记者,大胆建议穆斯林妇女和男人拥有相同的权利,和四个配偶结婚。她引发了一场风暴,包括诉讼威胁和愤怒谴责,但她的确引发了一场亟需的辩论,在以前时代这是无法想象的。

Like its medieval precursor, the modern synthesis will remain vulnerable to attack by purists, who can point to Muhammad’s example and insist on no deviation from it. But, having witnessed what Islamism, whether violent or not, has wrought, there is reason to hope that Muslims will reject the dream of reestablishing a medieval order and be open to compromise with modern ways. Islam need not be a fossilized medieval mentality; it is what today’s Muslims make of it.

和其中世纪的先行者一样,面对原教旨人士的攻击,现代整合将仍然是脆弱的。原教旨人士可以拿默罕默德做例子,然后坚持不能偏离他的做法。但是,已经见证了暴力或是非暴力的伊斯兰主义所产生的恶果,有理由相信穆斯林会拒绝重建一种中世纪秩序的梦想,并对向现代化妥协持开放态度。伊斯兰不一定是一成不变的中世纪观念;它也取决于当下穆斯林的实践。

Policy Implications
政策含义

What can those, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who oppose Sharia, the caliphate, and the horrors of jihad, do to advance their aims?

反对伊斯兰教法,哈里发国,和可怕的圣战的穆斯林和非穆斯林该做什么来推进他们的目标呢?

For anti-Islamist Muslims, the great burden is to develop not just an alternative vision to the Islamist one but an alternative movement to Islamism. The Islamists reached their position of power and influence through dedication and hard work, through generosity and selflessness. Anti-Islamists must also labor, probably for decades, to develop an ideology as coherent and compelling as that of the Islamists, and then spread it. Scholars interpreting sacred scriptures and leaders mobilizing followers have central roles in this process.

对反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林,最大的责任是不光要发展出一套图景来代替伊斯兰主义,而且要发展出一个运动来取代它。伊斯兰主义者通过献身和努力,通过慷慨和无私,达到了目前的能量和影响力。反伊斯兰主义者,必须也经过可能是数十年的努力,发展出一套和伊斯兰主义一样自洽并有吸引力的意识形态,然后推广它。在这个过程中,解释经文的学者和鼓动群众的领袖有着中心的位置。

Non-Muslims can help a modern Islam move forward in two ways: first, by resisting all forms of Islamism—not just the brutal extremism of an Osama bin Laden, but also the stealthy, lawful, political movements such as Turkey’s AKP. Erdoğan is less ferocious than Bin Laden, but he is more effective and no less dangerous. Whoever values free speech, equality before the law, and other human rights denied or diminished by Sharia must consistently oppose any hint of Islamism.

非穆斯林可以通过两种方式帮助现代化的伊斯兰:第一,坚持反对所有形式的伊斯兰主义——不仅仅是残暴的极端主义者奥萨马·本·拉登,也可以是隐秘鬼祟,表面合法的政治性运动,如土耳其的AKP。埃尔多安也许不如本·拉登残忍,但他却更有效,危险性也就一点不比后者小。伊斯兰教法否认或削弱了言论自由,法律面前人人平等和其他人权,珍视它们的人必须不懈地反抗伊斯兰主义的各种苗头。

Second, non-Muslims should support moderate and Westernizing anti-Islamists. Such figures are weak and fractured today and face a daunting task, but they do exist, and they represent the only hope for defeating the menace of global jihad and Islamic supremacism, then replacing it with an Islam that does not threaten civilization.

第二,非穆斯林应该支持温和和西方化的反伊斯兰主义穆斯林。今天,这些人物弱小零散,且面对着艰巨的任务,但是他们确实存在,他们代表了击败全球性圣战和伊斯兰霸权,代之以一种不威胁文明的伊斯兰的唯一希望。

Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum.
Daniel Pipes是中东论坛的总裁。

July 7, 2013 update: Jeff Jacoby does an excellent job of summarizing this article in his Boston Globe column today under the title “What Is Islam?
2013年7月7日更新: Jeff Jacoby在他的《波士顿环球》专栏上很好的总结了这篇文章,标题为“什么是伊斯兰”。

Oct. 1, 2013 update: Six Commentary readers reply to this article and I then respond to them at “Islam’s Future.”
2013年10月1日更新:六位《评论》杂志读者回复了这篇文章,我回应以“伊斯兰的未来”。

Apr. 10, 2014 update: Despite her 2007 statement quoted in the 2nd paragraph above, about the impossibility of a moderate Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali today wrote that “Both Christianity and Judaism have had their eras of reform. I would argue that the time has come for a Muslim Reformation.” So, perhaps she is coming around to agree with me after all.
2014年4月10日更新:虽然她在2007年的评论中引用了上述文章的第二段,并说温和伊斯兰是不可能的。但是Ayaan Hirsi Ali 今天写道,“基督教和犹太教也有它们的改革时代。我能够说伊斯兰教宗教改革的年代已经到来。”所以,她也许开始接受我的观点了。

Feb, 4, 2016 update: I tweeted today that “When it comes to #Islam, amateurs talk texts, pros talk history.”
2016年2月4日更新:我发了推文“当谈到伊斯兰,门外汉讨论文本,内行讨论历史。”

Feb. 24, 2016 update: Perhaps symbolic of Islamic banking’s illusory promise, here is the reality of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank’s headquarters (as photographed by me). It’s a pale and desultory version of the plans shown above.
2016年2月24日更新:这是我拍摄的阿布扎比伊斯兰银行的现实中的照片,也许这象征了伊斯兰银行业的宏伟计划的不切实际。相对于文章中的计划,这版本似乎并不让人激动。

(编辑:辉格@whigzhou)

*注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——

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Can Islam Be Reformed? History and human nature say yes. 伊斯兰教能够被改革吗?历史和人的本性告诉我们:能。 作者:Daniel Pipes @ 2013-07-08 译者:Tankman 校对:Drunkplane(@Drunkplane-zny) 来源:http://www.danielpipes.org/13033/can-islam-be-reformed Commentary requested an internet supplement for this article and I chose the key passage on the Medieval Synthesis from my 1983 book, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power. To read it, click here. 《评论》杂志要求我为这篇文章补充些互联网材料。我选择了我1983年出版的关于中世纪整合的书中关键的一段。该书名为《在神的道路上:伊斯兰和政治权力》。阅读点这里。 Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become moderate, modern, and good-neighborly? Can Islamic authorities formulate an understanding of their religion that grants full rights to women and non-Muslims as well as freedom of conscience to Muslims, that accepts the basic principles of modern finance and jurisprudence, and that does not seek to impose Sharia law or establish a caliphate? 伊斯兰目前代表了一种倒退,激进和暴力的力量。它只能保持这种状态吗?或是能被改革,变得更加温和,现代且与邻为善呢?伊斯兰权威们能让他们的宗教给予妇女和非穆斯林完全的权利,并给穆斯林信仰自由,接受现代金融和司法的基本原则,而且不寻求强制实施伊斯兰教法或者建立哈里发国吗? A growing body of analysts believe that no, the Muslim faith cannot do these things, that these features are inherent to Islam and immutably part of its makeup. Asked if she agrees with my formulation that "radical Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution," the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali replied, "He's wrong. Sorry about that." She and I stand in the same trench, fighting for the same goals and against the same opponents, but we disagree on this vital point. 越来越多的分析家认为不会,穆斯林信仰不能够做这些事情,这些特征内化在伊斯兰当中,成为其不可变结构的一部分。作家Ayaan Hirsi Ali【译注:一位索马里裔荷兰籍女权分子、无神论者、作家及政治人物,以批评伊斯兰教、反对割礼及女性生殖器切割而知名】一书的作者被问到是否同意我的说法“激进伊斯兰是问题,温和伊斯兰是解药”时,她说:“他是错的。对这点我感到遗憾。”她和我站在同一战壕,追求同一目标,和相同的敌人战斗,但是我们在这一要点上存在分歧。 My argument has two parts. First, the essentialist position of many analysts is wrong; and second, a reformed Islam can emerge. 我的论述有两部分。第一,很多分析家的本质主义立场是错误的;第二,革新的伊斯兰可以涌现 。 Arguing Against Essentialism 对本质主义的驳斥 To state that Islam can never change is to assert that the Koran and Hadith, which constitute the religion's core, must always be understood in the same way. But to articulate this position is to reveal its error, for nothing human abides forever. Everything, including the reading of sacred texts, changes over time. Everything has a history. And everything has a future that will be unlike its past. 声称伊斯兰不可被改变,则意味着可兰经和圣训只能以同一种方式被理解,而这两者构成了该宗教的内核。但是这个论断显示了自身的谬误,因为人类不可能永远不变的遵循某个事情。一切,包括对圣典的解读,随着时间改变。一切事物都有自身的历史。一切事物都有一个与过去不同的未来。 Only by failing to account for human nature and by ignoring more than a millennium of actual changes in the Koran's interpretation can one claim that the Koran has been understood identically over time. Changes have applied in such matters as jihad, slavery, usury, the principle of "no compulsion in religion," and the role of women. Moreover, the many important interpreters of Islam over the past 1,400 years—ash-Shafi'i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, Rumi, Shah Waliullah, and Ruhollah Khomeini come to mind—disagreed deeply among themselves about the content of the message of Islam. 只有不考虑人类本性,无视长达千年对可兰经阐释的变迁,一个人才能够宣称对可兰经的理解始终一成不变。 很多事都曾改变,像圣战,奴隶,高利贷,“宗教的非强制原则以及妇女的角色。而且,我们容易想到过去的1400年,很多重要的伊斯兰诠释者—— ash-Shafi'i,al-Ghazali,Ibn Taymiya,Rumi,Shah Waliullah和Ruhollah Khomeini彼此对伊斯兰教导的内容有很大分歧。 However central the Koran and Hadith may be, they are not the totality of the Muslim experience; the accumulated experience of Muslim peoples from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond matters no less. To dwell on Islam's scriptures is akin to interpreting the United States solely through the lens of the Constitution; ignoring the country's history would lead to a distorted understanding. 可兰经和圣训也许是中心,而不是穆斯林经验的全部;从摩洛哥到印尼以及其他地方的穆斯林社群积累的经验也很重要。只专注于伊斯兰的文本就像是只从宪法角度解释美国;忽略了这个国家的历史,会导致认知的扭曲。 Put differently, medieval Muslim civilization excelled and today's Muslims lag behind in nearly every index of achievement. But if things can get worse, they can also get better. Likewise, in my own career, I witnessed Islamism rise from minimal beginnings when I entered the field in 1969 to the great powers it enjoys today; if Islamism can thus grow, it can also decline. 换一种说法就是,中世纪穆斯林文明是杰出的,今天的穆斯林在衡量成就的每个指标上几乎都是落后的。但是如果事情能变得更糟,它们也能变得更好。就像我自己的事业,1969年我进入该领域时,我见证了伊斯兰主义从很小的规模兴起,到今天享有着巨大能量;如果伊斯兰主义可以壮大,那么它也可能衰落。 How might that happen? 这种变化可能会如何发生呢? The Medieval Synthesis 中世纪整合 Key to Islam's role in public life is Sharia and the many untenable demands it makes on Muslims. Running a government with the minimal taxes permitted by Sharia has proved to be unsustainable; and how can one run a financial system without charging interest? A penal system that requires four men to view an adulterous act in flagrante delicto is impractical. Sharia's prohibition on warfare against fellow Muslims is impossible for all to live up to; indeed, roughly three-quarters of all warfare waged by Muslims has been directed against other Muslims. Likewise, the insistence on perpetual jihad against non-Muslims demands too much. 伊斯兰作用于公共生活的关键是伊斯兰教法及其加诸于穆斯林身上的不合理要求。用伊斯兰教法允许的最小税负来运作政府被证明是不可持续的;而且怎么能运作一个不要求利息的金融系统呢?一个刑罚体系,要求四个男人在作案现场目睹一起通奸事件是不现实的。沙利亚禁止穆斯林对穆斯林同胞发动战争,遵循这禁令是不可能的;实际上,穆斯林发起的战争中,约四分之三是针对其他穆斯林。类似地,坚持对非穆斯林的永久性圣战也实在要求过分了。 To get around these and other unrealistic demands, premodern Muslims developed certain legal fig leaves that allowed for the relaxation of Islamic provisions without directly violating them. Jurists came up with hiyal (tricks) and other means by which the letter of the law could be fulfilled while negating its spirit. For example, various mechanisms were developed to live in harmony with non-Muslim states. There is also the double sale (bai al-inah) of an item, which permits the purchaser to pay a disguised form of interest. Wars against fellow Muslims were renamed jihad. 为了回避这些或者其他一些不现实的要求,前现代的穆斯林发展了一些合理化的做法,允许放松一些伊斯兰法条,而不直接违背它们。法务人员使用hiyal(花招)和其他方式,遵循法律的形式,同时否定其实质。比如,为了和谐的生活在非穆斯林国家,很多技巧被发展出来。还有重复售卖(bai al-inah)意味着允许购买者支付隐性利息。对穆斯林同胞的战争则被重新命名为吉哈德。 This compromise between Sharia and reality amounted to what I dubbed Islam's "medieval synthesis" in my book In the Path of God (1983). This synthesis translated Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands. Kecia Ali, of Boston University, notes the dramatic contrast between formal and applied law in Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, quoting other specialists: 沙利亚和现实之间的妥协契合了我的著作《在神的道路上》(1983)中的伊斯兰“中世纪整合”的概念。这一整合把伊斯兰从一套抽象,不切实际的要求,翻译成可以被实行的体系。在实际中,它减低了沙利亚的力度,使得法条可以操作。沙利亚现在能够充分被实行,同时穆斯林不会被其更加严苛的要求束缚。波士顿大学的Kecia Ali,在《Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam》一书中指出了正式和实用法律之间鲜明的对照。他引用了其他专家的话: One major way in which studies of law have proceeded has been to "compare doctrine with the actual practice of the court." As one scholar discussing scriptural and legal texts notes, "Social patterns were in great contrast to the 'official' picture presented by these 'formal' sources." Studies often juxtapose flexible and relatively fair court outcomes with an undifferentiated and sometimes harshly patriarchal textual tradition of jurisprudence. We are shown proof of "the flexibility within Islamic law that is often portrayed as stagnant and draconian." 律法研究的一个主要方式是“比较教条和法庭实践”。当学者讨论经文和法律书注记时,“社会上的模式和这些‘正式’来源所呈现的‘官方’图景反差很大。”研究经常把灵活和相对公平的法庭判决和没有变通、有时非常宗法制的传统法律文本并列。这就是“常被描述为顽固专横的伊斯兰法的内在灵活性。” While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists. Indeed, premodern Muslim history featured many such challenges, including the Almohad movement in 12th-century North Africa and the Wahhabi movement in 18th-century Arabia. In each case, purist efforts eventually subsided and the medieval synthesis reasserted itself, only to be challenged anew by purists. This alternation between pragmatism and purism characterizes Muslim history, contributing to its instability. 虽然中世纪整合持续了几个世纪,它并未克服一个基本的弱点:它并没有全面的植根于伊斯兰的有宪法意味的基础文本,或者从其中独立出来。基于妥协和折衷,面对原教旨主义者的挑战,它仍然是脆弱的。实际上,前现代穆斯林历史总是凸显这样的挑战,包括十二世纪北非的穆瓦希德运动和十八世纪阿拉伯的瓦哈比运动。每个例子中,原教旨主义的努力最终被软化,中世纪整合重新回到轨道,而后被新的原教旨主义挑战。实用主义和原教旨主义的更替是穆斯林历史的特色,助长了其不稳定性。 The Challenge of Modernity 现代性的挑战 The de facto solution offered by the medieval synthesis broke down with the arrival of modernity imposed by the Europeans, conventionally dated to Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1798. This challenge pulled most Muslims in opposite directions over the next two centuries, to Westernization or to Islamization. 中世纪整合所提供的实用主义的解决方案被欧洲强加的现代化因素打断,传统观点来看,这可以追溯到拿破仑在1798年对埃及的入侵。这一挑战在接下来的两个世纪中,把大多数穆斯林拉向了两个相反的方向:西方化或是伊斯兰化。 Muslims impressed with Western achievements sought to minimize Sharia and replace it with Western ways in such areas as the nonestablishment of religion and equality of rights for women and non-Muslims. The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), symbolizes this effort. Until about 1970, it appeared to be the inevitable Muslim destiny, with resistance to Westernization looking rearguard and futile. 西方的成就给一些穆斯林留下了深刻印象,他们试图削弱伊斯兰教法,代之以同类领域的西方做法,比如不利用法律确立宗教,妇女和非穆斯林拥有平等权利。现代土耳其的缔造者——凯末尔·阿塔图尔克 (1881-1938)代表了这种努力。在1970年前,这似乎是穆斯林不可避免的命运,对抗西方化的努力看起来被动无力。 But that resistance proved deep and ultimately triumphant. Atatürk had few successors and his Republic of Turkey is moving back toward Sharia. Westernization, it turned out, looked stronger than it really was because it tended to attract visible and vocal elites while the masses generally held back. 但是这种抵抗被证明根基深厚并最终取得了胜利。阿塔图尔克的后继者不多,而他的土耳其共和国现在正退回伊斯兰教法。说到底,西方化表面上看起来强大,实则不然,因为它倾向于吸引曝光度高,有话语权的精英,而广大民众则被压制。 Starting around 1930, the reluctant elements began organizing themselves and developing their own positive program, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and India. Rejecting Westernization and all its works, they argued for the full and robust application of Sharia such as they imagined had been the case in the earliest days of Islam. 从1930年代起,抗拒因素开始组织起来,发展他们自己的力量,尤其是在阿尔及利亚,埃及,伊朗,和印度。他们拒绝西方化及其所有的成果,呼吁要按照他们想象中的早期伊斯兰历史那般,坚决完全的实施伊斯兰教法。 Though rejecting the West, these movements—which are called Islamist—modeled themselves on the surging totalitarian ideologies of their time, Fascism and Communism. Islamists borrowed many assumptions from these ideologies, such as the superiority of the state over the individual, the acceptability of brute force, and the need for a cosmic confrontation with Western civilization. They also quietly borrowed technology, especially military and medical, from the West. 虽然排斥西方,这些被称为伊斯兰主义的运动,依靠同一时期涌现的极权主义意识形态塑造了自身,比如法西斯主义和共产主义。伊斯兰主义者借用很多这些意识形态的假设,比如国家优先于个人,可以接受暴力斗争,和在全世界和西方文明进行斗争的必要性。他们也静静地从西方借用技术,尤其是军事和医疗方面。 Through creative, hard work, Islamist forces quietly gained strength over the next half century, finally bursting into power and prominence with the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 led by the anti-Atatürk, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89). This dramatic event, and its achieved goal of creating an Islamic order, widely inspired Islamists, who in the subsequent 35 years have made great progress, transforming societies and applying Sharia in novel and extreme ways. 通过创造性的努力,伊斯兰主义者的力量在接下来的半个世纪静静增长,最终在1978-79年由阿塔图尔克的反对者,霍梅尼 (1902-89) 领导的伊朗革命中,显出了爆发性的能力和优势。这个戏剧性的事件,和其达到的目标——创造一种伊斯兰的秩序,在伊斯兰主义者中影响广泛。他们在接下来35年中有了巨大进步,用各种创新且极端的方式,变革社会,实行伊斯兰教法。 For example, in Iran, the Shiite regime has hanged homosexuals from cranes and forced Iranians in Western dress to drink from latrine cans, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has torched girls' schools and music stores. The Islamists' influence has reached the West itself, where one finds an increasing number of women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas. 比如,在伊朗,什叶派统治者用起重机吊死同性恋者,并强迫穿西方服饰的伊朗人喝茅厕里的液体。在阿富汗,塔利班统治者烧毁女生学校和音乐店。伊斯兰主义者的影响波及到了西方自身,你在西方可以发现越来越多的妇女穿戴面纱,头巾和罩袍。 Although spawned as a totalitarian model, Islamism has shown much greater tactical adaptability than either Fascism or Communism. The latter two ideologies rarely managed to go beyond violence and coercion. But Islamism, led by figures such as Turkey's Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954-) and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explored nonrevolutionary forms of Islamism. Since it was legitimately voted into office in 2002, the AKP gradually has undermined Turkish secularism with remarkable deftness by working within the country's established democratic structures, practicing good government, and not provoking the wrath of the military, long the guardian of Turkish secularism. 虽然脱胎于一个极权主义模型,相比法西斯和共产主义,伊斯兰主义表现出远为优越的战术灵活性。前两者很少试图超越暴力和强制手段。而伊斯兰运动,被诸如土耳其总理埃尔多安 (1954-) 之类的人物和他的正义发展党(AKP)领导着,已经探索出了伊斯兰主义的非革命形式。自从它在2002年合法地通过选举上台,AKP就用十分纯熟的手腕,借助该国已经建立的民主制度,和良好的施政表现,逐渐削弱土耳其的世俗化力量,而且没有激起土耳其世俗主义的长期守护者——军队的强力反弹。 The Islamists are on the march today, but their ascendance is recent and offers no guarantees of longevity. Indeed, like other radical utopian ideologies, Islamism will lose its appeal and decline in power. Certainly the 2009 and 2013 revolts against Islamist regimes in Iran and Egypt, respectively, point in that direction. 伊斯兰主义者如今风头正健,但是它们的势头并不是由来已久,也并不保证能持续下去。实际上,像其他激进乌托邦意识形态一样,伊斯兰主义将会失去它的吸引力,其力量也会衰减。伊朗和埃及分别在2009年和2013年对伊斯兰主义统治的反抗,明确体现了这点。 Toward a Modern Synthesis 通向一个现代的整合 If Islamism is to be defeated, anti-Islamist Muslims must develop an alternative vision of Islam and explanation for what it means to be a Muslim. In doing so, they can draw on the past, especially the reform efforts from the span of 1850 to 1950, to develop a "modern synthesis" comparable to the medieval model. This synthesis would choose among Shari precepts and render Islam compatible with modern values. It would accept gender equality, coexist peacefully with unbelievers, and reject the aspiration of a universal caliphate, among other steps. 若要打败伊斯兰主义,反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林必须发展出一套替代性的伊斯兰图景,来解释成为一个穆斯林意味着什么。要做到这点,他们可以回溯历史,尤其是在1850年到1950年间的改革努力,对照“中世纪整合”,来发展出一套“现代整合”。这种整合将会在伊斯兰教法戒律中做出选择并使伊斯兰与现代观念兼容。它将可能接受性别平等,和不信伊斯兰者和平共存,并在各步骤中排斥建立普世哈里发国的冲动。 Here, Islam can profitably be compared with the two other major monotheistic religions. A half millennium ago, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all broadly agreed that enforced labor was acceptable and that paying interest on borrowed money was not. Eventually, after bitter and protracted debates, Jews and Christians changed their minds on these two issues; today, no Jewish or Christian voices endorse slavery or condemn the payment of reasonable interest on loans. 在此,把伊斯兰教和其他两大一神教相比较,不无益处。五个世纪前,犹太教徒,基督教徒和穆斯林全部大致同意奴隶是可以被接受的,借贷收利息则不被允许。最终,经过了苦涩和反复的辩论,犹太教徒和基督徒改变了他们在这两件事情上的观点;今天,没有犹太教或是基督教人士会支持蓄奴或是谴责给贷款支付利息。 Among Muslims, however, these debates have only begun. Even if formally banned in Qatar in 1952, Saudi Arabia in 1962, and Mauritania in 1980, slavery still exists in these and other majority-Muslim countries (especially Sudan and Pakistan). Some Islamic authorities even claim that a pious Muslim must endorse slavery. Vast financial institutions worth possibly as much as $1 trillion have developed over the past 40 years to enable observant Muslims to pretend to avoid either paying or receiving interest on money, ("pretend" because the Islamic banks merely disguise interest with subterfuges such as service fees.) 然而在穆斯林当中,这些辩论才刚刚开始。即使卡塔尔在1952年,沙特阿拉伯在1962年,毛里塔尼亚在1980年,官方禁止了蓄奴,奴隶制仍然在这些地方和其他以穆斯林为多数人口的国家存在(尤其是苏丹和巴基斯坦)。一些伊斯兰权威甚至声称一个敬虔的穆斯林必须支持奴隶制。很多金融机构可能市值达一万亿美元,并已经发展了四十年来让穆斯林可以假装避免支付或接受货币利息,(“假装”因为穆斯林银行们仅仅用服务费等术语来遮掩利息这一名目。) Reformist Muslims must do better than their medieval predecessors and ground their interpretation in both scripture and the sensibilities of the age. For Muslims to modernize their religion they must emulate their fellow monotheists and adapt their religion with regard to slavery and interest, the treatment of women, the right to leave Islam, legal procedure, and much else. 穆斯林改革主义者必须比他们中世纪的前辈做得更好,并把他们的表述植根在文本和时代潮流当中。当穆斯林试图现代化他们的宗教,他们必须模仿其他一神教,改变自己宗教在蓄奴,利息,妇女权益,背教自由,司法程序和很多其他方面的立场。 When a reformed, modern Islam emerges it will no longer endorse unequal female rights, the dhimmi status, jihad, or suicide terrorism, nor will it require the death penalty for adultery, breaches of family honor, blasphemy, and apostasy. 当一个改革的,现代的伊斯兰涌现,它将不会再支持不平等的妇女权益,统治异教徒的观念,圣战,或者自杀性恐怖主义,它也不会要求对通奸,危害家族荣誉,渎神和背教者处以死刑。 Already in this young century, a few positive signs in this direction can be discerned. Note some developments concerning women: 在这一新的世纪,一些积极的苗头已初露端倪。有关妇女的一些进步如下:
  • Saudi Arabia's Shura Council has responded to rising public outrage over child marriagesby setting the age of majority at 18. Though this doesn't end child marriages, it moves toward abolishing the practice.
  • 沙特阿拉伯的协商会议回应了公众对童婚的愤怒,把成年的年龄定为18岁。虽然这没有终结童婚,但向着禁止这一行为迈进了一步。
  • Turkish clerics have agreed to let menstruating women attend mosque and pray next to men.
  • 土耳其神职人员已经同意,让经期的妇女参加清真寺礼拜,并且和男人一起祷告。
  • The Iranian government has nearly banned the stoning of convicted adulterers.
  • 伊朗政府已接近于禁止对通奸罪施以石刑。
  • Women in Iran have won broader rights to sue their husbands for divorce.
  • 伊朗妇女在诉讼离婚方面赢得了更广泛的权利。
  • A conference of Muslim scholars in Egypt deemed clitoridectomies contrary to Islam and, in fact, punishable.
  • 穆斯林学者在埃及召开了一个会议,认为阴蒂割除违背伊斯兰,事实上应该被惩罚。
  • A key Indian Muslim institution, Darul Uloom Deoband, issued a fatwa against polygamy.
  • 一个著名的印度穆斯林机构 Darul Uloom Deoband发表了一项伊斯兰释法,反对多妻制。
Other notable developments, not specifically about women, include: 其他显著进步,不一定局限于妇女权益方面,包括:
  • The Saudi government abolished jizya (the practice of enforcing a poll tax on non-Muslims).
  • 沙特政府终止了Jizya(向非穆斯林征收人头税)。
  • An Iranian court ordered the family of a murdered Christian to receive the same compensation as that of a Muslim victim.
  • 一个伊朗法庭,判决被谋杀的基督徒的亲属得到和穆斯林受害者一样多的赔偿。
  • Scholars meeting at the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Sharjah have started to debate and challenge the call for apostates to be executed.
  • 学者们在位于沙迦的国际伊斯兰教律学院开会,开始就处决背教者展开辩论。
All the while, individual reformers churn out ideas, if not yet for adoption then to stimulate thought. For example, Nadin al-Badir, a Saudi female journalist, provocatively suggested that Muslim women have the same right as men to marry up to four spouses. She prompted a thunderstorm, including threats of lawsuits and angry denunciations, but she spurred a needed debate, one unimaginable in prior times. 同时,倾向于改革的人士不断推出新的想法,如果不是着眼于改进,那就是从模仿着手。比如Nadine al-Badir,一个沙特女记者,大胆建议穆斯林妇女和男人拥有相同的权利,和四个配偶结婚。她引发了一场风暴,包括诉讼威胁和愤怒谴责,但她的确引发了一场亟需的辩论,在以前时代这是无法想象的。 Like its medieval precursor, the modern synthesis will remain vulnerable to attack by purists, who can point to Muhammad's example and insist on no deviation from it. But, having witnessed what Islamism, whether violent or not, has wrought, there is reason to hope that Muslims will reject the dream of reestablishing a medieval order and be open to compromise with modern ways. Islam need not be a fossilized medieval mentality; it is what today's Muslims make of it. 和其中世纪的先行者一样,面对原教旨人士的攻击,现代整合将仍然是脆弱的。原教旨人士可以拿默罕默德做例子,然后坚持不能偏离他的做法。但是,已经见证了暴力或是非暴力的伊斯兰主义所产生的恶果,有理由相信穆斯林会拒绝重建一种中世纪秩序的梦想,并对向现代化妥协持开放态度。伊斯兰不一定是一成不变的中世纪观念;它也取决于当下穆斯林的实践。 Policy Implications 政策含义 What can those, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who oppose Sharia, the caliphate, and the horrors of jihad, do to advance their aims? 反对伊斯兰教法,哈里发国,和可怕的圣战的穆斯林和非穆斯林该做什么来推进他们的目标呢? For anti-Islamist Muslims, the great burden is to develop not just an alternative vision to the Islamist one but an alternative movement to Islamism. The Islamists reached their position of power and influence through dedication and hard work, through generosity and selflessness. Anti-Islamists must also labor, probably for decades, to develop an ideology as coherent and compelling as that of the Islamists, and then spread it. Scholars interpreting sacred scriptures and leaders mobilizing followers have central roles in this process. 对反伊斯兰主义的穆斯林,最大的责任是不光要发展出一套图景来代替伊斯兰主义,而且要发展出一个运动来取代它。伊斯兰主义者通过献身和努力,通过慷慨和无私,达到了目前的能量和影响力。反伊斯兰主义者,必须也经过可能是数十年的努力,发展出一套和伊斯兰主义一样自洽并有吸引力的意识形态,然后推广它。在这个过程中,解释经文的学者和鼓动群众的领袖有着中心的位置。 Non-Muslims can help a modern Islam move forward in two ways: first, by resisting all forms of Islamism—not just the brutal extremism of an Osama bin Laden, but also the stealthy, lawful, political movements such as Turkey's AKP. Erdoğan is less ferocious than Bin Laden, but he is more effective and no less dangerous. Whoever values free speech, equality before the law, and other human rights denied or diminished by Sharia must consistently oppose any hint of Islamism. 非穆斯林可以通过两种方式帮助现代化的伊斯兰:第一,坚持反对所有形式的伊斯兰主义——不仅仅是残暴的极端主义者奥萨马·本·拉登,也可以是隐秘鬼祟,表面合法的政治性运动,如土耳其的AKP。埃尔多安也许不如本·拉登残忍,但他却更有效,危险性也就一点不比后者小。伊斯兰教法否认或削弱了言论自由,法律面前人人平等和其他人权,珍视它们的人必须不懈地反抗伊斯兰主义的各种苗头。 Second, non-Muslims should support moderate and Westernizing anti-Islamists. Such figures are weak and fractured today and face a daunting task, but they do exist, and they represent the only hope for defeating the menace of global jihad and Islamic supremacism, then replacing it with an Islam that does not threaten civilization. 第二,非穆斯林应该支持温和和西方化的反伊斯兰主义穆斯林。今天,这些人物弱小零散,且面对着艰巨的任务,但是他们确实存在,他们代表了击败全球性圣战和伊斯兰霸权,代之以一种不威胁文明的伊斯兰的唯一希望。 Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum. Daniel Pipes是中东论坛的总裁。 July 7, 2013 update: Jeff Jacoby does an excellent job of summarizing this article in his Boston Globe column today under the title "What Is Islam?" 2013年7月7日更新: Jeff Jacoby在他的《波士顿环球》专栏上很好的总结了这篇文章,标题为“什么是伊斯兰”。 Oct. 1, 2013 update: Six Commentary readers reply to this article and I then respond to them at "Islam's Future." 2013年10月1日更新:六位《评论》杂志读者回复了这篇文章,我回应以“伊斯兰的未来”。 Apr. 10, 2014 update: Despite her 2007 statement quoted in the 2nd paragraph above, about the impossibility of a moderate Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali today wrote that "Both Christianity and Judaism have had their eras of reform. I would argue that the time has come for a Muslim Reformation." So, perhaps she is coming around to agree with me after all. 2014年4月10日更新:虽然她在2007年的评论中引用了上述文章的第二段,并说温和伊斯兰是不可能的。但是Ayaan Hirsi Ali 今天写道,“基督教和犹太教也有它们的改革时代。我能够说伊斯兰教宗教改革的年代已经到来。”所以,她也许开始接受我的观点了。 Feb, 4, 2016 update: I tweeted today that "When it comes to #Islam, amateurs talk texts, pros talk history." 2016年2月4日更新:我发了推文“当谈到伊斯兰,门外汉讨论文本,内行讨论历史。” Feb. 24, 2016 update: Perhaps symbolic of Islamic banking's illusory promise, here is the reality of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's headquarters (as photographed by me). It's a pale and desultory version of the plans shown above. 2016年2月24日更新:这是我拍摄的阿布扎比伊斯兰银行的现实中的照片,也许这象征了伊斯兰银行业的宏伟计划的不切实际。相对于文章中的计划,这版本似乎并不让人激动。 (编辑:辉格@whigzhou) *注:本译文未经原作者授权,本站对原文不持有也不主张任何权利,如果你恰好对原文拥有权益并希望我们移除相关内容,请私信联系,我们会立即作出响应。

——海德沙龙·翻译组,致力于将英文世界的好文章搬进中文世界——



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